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Abstract 
Background. Most countries that have based their healthcare systems on primary care 
enjoy better population health, lower health disparities, more equitable access to care, and 
lower costs. Iranian primary health care (PHC) has achieved population health indices 
similar to that of the best in the region during the past two decades. Despite this, the 
system showed itself to be both inadequate in meeting the evolving health needs of the 
population and unaffordable by many. To address these shortages, in 2005 it was decided 
to implement a new system, called family medicine (FM), together with Behbar (rural 
insurance for all) in rural areas and in urban areas of less than 20,000 population. The aim 
of this thesis was to identify facilitators of and barriers to the implementation of FM in Iran. 
Methods. Qualitative methods were used, particularly individual semi-structured interviews 
with stakeholders at three levels: national (19 interviews), provincial (9), and local (43). In 
addition, three focus groups, document analysis, and observations in health centres were 
used. The framework approach was employed as the main method for analysis, while 
remaining open to accommodate emerging themes. The analysis was based on a modified 
fourfold framework consist of administration, bargaining, interpretation and institutional 
structuring components, originally introduced by Harrison (2004). 
Results. The study revealed four interdependent factors that influenced implementation: 
aspects of the policy; the existing environment; the experience of implementation; and 
attitudes and perceptions of local practitioners and the public. Making the policy in the 
'organized anarchies' of the health system, where ambiguity is prevalent, few people 
involved and imposing it on others was at the heart of problems with implementation. The 
policy that was conceptually welcomed because of its innovation and incentive for 
cooperation, was badly put into practice. The core barrier was the merger of two diverse 
policies, implemented concurrently by two hostile organizations (MOH & MIO). 
Conclusions. The thesis revealed the dynamic model of health policy analysis. The policy 
was essentially adopted on the basis of idealistic views rather than a real solution to 
existing problems. Implementation was an attempt by two organizations with different 
aims. Despite some efforts to reduce practical difficulties, the underlying divergence 
between Behbar and FM was too fundamental to be overcome. Parliament's attempt to 
separate the purchaser from the provider resulted in great mistrust between the two and to 
some extent undermined the essence of FM. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Why conduct this study? 
The need to enhance primary care is clear because of the important part it plays within 
health care systems (Starfield, 1998). Countries whose healthcare delivery focuses on the 
role of specialists tend to fare less well (Davis et al, 2006) in surveys that take account of 
the three WHO (the World Health Organization) defined aims of healthcare systems: the 
improvement of health, fair financing, and responding people's expectations (WHO, 2000). 
Primary care potentially offers crucial advantages within health systems in terms of health 
status of the public, costs, and improving health related outcomes (Campbell, 2007). This is 
why, the WHO highly recognizes the value of a strong primary care base within national 
health systems (WHO, 2004). 
The Iranian pattern of PHC (Primary Health Care) has achieved population health indices 
similar to that of the best in the region during the past years (UNDP, 2003; WHO, 2008), but 
there is still need to do more. A foreign observer describes the health system in Iran: 
`Iran is a large country with a well developed health care system, both public and 
private. It has sufficient doctors to meet its needs. It has a well developed primary 
health care network which offers care right down to the village level for all people in 
the country, and a well-functioning referral system' (Couper, 2004). 
Despite the extensive network in rural areas, the main features of the Iranian health care 
system were an emphasis on private inpatient care and hospital based services rather 
than primary care or preventative medicine, input based planning, rather than needs or 
cost effectiveness based planning, and a reliance on funding from the state budget or out 
of pocket rather than through social insurance or taxation. In the last decade, this model 
had shown itself to be inadequate to meet the evolving health needs of the population, as 
well as unaffordable. The main criticism in Couper's report is training in family medicine, 
presumably lack of family medicine as a result: 
,... one notable lack is that there is no general practice or family medicine within 
universities in Iran' (obid). 
To combat this, implementing family medicine (an adopted model of primary care with GPs 
as gate-keepers), was at the heart of recent health sector reforms (NUHSR, 2005). The 
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implementation officially started in August 2005 concurrently with another reform called 
Behbar (rural insurance for all), in villages and cities of less than 20,000 population, hosted 
by rural health centres alongside health houses (Figure 1.2). 
Developing policies and plans is a lot easier than implementing change. As Walt and 
Gilson (1994) emphasize: 
'Recent health reforms are likely to fail because it is expected that policies will be 
implemented as planned without taking into consideration factors that affect 
implementation'. 
Buse et al (2005) argue that implementation is the most important phase of policy. 
However, implementation is often the most neglected phase of policy making and is 
sometimes seen as divorced from agenda setting and policy formulation (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). It is useful therefore both retrospectively and prospectively, to 
understand past policy failures and successes and to plan for future policy implementation, 
as well as investigating the ongoing implementation to improve its process and outcomes 
(Walt et al, 2008). However, a long span of study of the policy process may well be needed 
to identify unintended and unexpected consequences of policy, 'a decade or more' 
sometimes (Sabatier, 2007). There is no simple way of knowing when the best time to 
initiate such work is. 
In this chapter, the Iranian health system is briefly introduced in order to understand the 
current hierarchical structure in which decisions are made and health services are 
delivered. The importance of primary care as well as the position of FM is then considered. 
Finally, the aim and objectives of the thesis together with its structure are outlined. 
2 Health system in Iran 
The Islamic Republic of Iran (I. R. 1) is the third biggest country in the Middle East (Figure 
1.1) with almost 72 million inhabitants, 23 million of these live in rural areas. The country is 
divided into 30 provinces with 338 districts which consist of 69,000 villages and 887 urban 
points or cities (SCI, 2007). It has seven cities of more than 1 million inhabitants, with 
Tehran being the capital and the largest (about 12 million population). The country has a 
GNP per capita (PPP in international $ in 2006) of USD 9800 (WHO, 2008). 
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Iran has a dual public and private health system. There are approximately 104,000 
hospital beds and about 650 hospitals throughout the country, both public and private. The 
country has 102,000 physicians (mainly general practitioners) with about 42,000 
specialists. There are 1.1 physicians and 2.6 nurses per 1000 population (Cheraghali et 
al, 2008). 
According to the Iranian constitution (Article 29) and the Islamic principles, all Iranian 
citizens are entitled to receive free health care at the point of use. About 85% of health 
care is provided by the government and 15% is private. In cities about 95% of people have 
social or private health insurance. Usually they pay approximately 10% of the cost of 
admission themselves and about 20% for outpatient services. Private hospitals, which are 
active in major cities, also get paid by different insurance schemes under government 
authority. These schemes run their own hospitals as well (Couper, 2004). 
The entire health system is managed by a combined Ministry of Health and Medical 
Education (MOHME)- to keep the abbreviation shorter and more convenient to follow, I 
use MOH instead of MOHME in the entire thesis, unless otherwise specified- which is 
structured around a number of deputy ministers responsible for particular areas such as 
human resources, legal affairs, education and research. It also regulates the provision of 
private health services as well as NGOs (the World Bank, 1999). The nature of the 
structure means that these officials are often senior academics with a lot of practical 
experience and a high level of education. The medical university in each province is 
responsible for looking after public sector health care in the province, both in terms of 
providing human resource training and managing the public sector health system. 
Chancellors of medical universities who simultaneously hold the position of 
Undersecretary for Health in the province, are appointed by the Minister of Health and 
enjoy a reasonable power of attorney to make decisions in their province/city. 
Fundamental steps to improve the health system were taken almost 40 years ago as a 
part of a healthcare development programme in the Western Azerbaijan province, prior to 
the Alma-Ata declaration in 1978. Being described as an "incredible masterpiece" 
(Tavassoli, 2008), the Iranian primary health care (PHC) networks devised in 1981 by 
creating health houses in rural areas, which emphasized community participation and 
intersectoral cooperation, and focused on basic health care financed by governmental 
budget. Before the recent introduction of family medicine, the PHC provided services 
including: immunization, prevention and control of communicable diseases, prevention of 
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Figure 1.1 The map of Iran, its neighbours and internal divisions. The Golestan 
province, where the local study was conducted is highlighted in green. 
unexpected pregnancies, oral health, mothers and children health, family planning, 
community nutrition improvement, environmental health, occupational health, and schools 
and youth health. Each health house serves 1500 people in its village and surrounding 
settlements. There are about 17,000 health houses around the country. As the first points 
of seeking services, health houses have a fundamental role in providing basic care in rural 
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areas, where 35% of the population live (HERIMP, 2004). The health house is staffed by 
locally sourced health workers called behvarz from the Farsi words beh (good) and varz 
(skill), a multipurpose community health worker trained for two years at a district level. 
There are at least one female and/or one male behvarz in every health house. The male 
behvarz is responsible for environmental sanitation activities and services in satellite 
villages (Chapter 4), while mother and child services and family planning are mainly 
provided by female behvarz. The health houses refer patients to rural health centres. The 
PHC reaches almost 90% of the population and is particularly extensive and integrated in 
rural areas (World Bank, 1999; WHO, 2008). 
Health houses are supervised and supported by rural health centres, which cover about 
6000 to 10,000 people. Each of the 2274 rural health centres has one or more general 
practitioners, several health technicians (mid level workers responsible for a range of 
different activities including occupational health and environmental health, communicable 
diseases, etc), midwives, and administrative personnel. The general practitioners in the 
health centres are also responsible for visiting the referring health houses, to supervise the 
behvarz working in these, and to see any patients that they are having difficulty with. Many 
rural health centres also have delivery facilities attached to them. 
The corresponding structures in urban areas are health posts which are similar to health 
houses but cater for much larger numbers i. e. about 12,000 people per health post. The 
health posts are also staffed by health technicians (usually three: family health technicians, 
one environmental health technician and one midwife) who are trained at university level. 
The health post refers patients to an urban health centre which covers a population of 40- 
60 000 people. Again there are health technicians in these health centres, but more 
general practitioners per capita. There are also 2182 urban health centres in cities, 
responsible for residents and villagers from close rural areas. However, the PHC in cities 
is fragile and loose compared to the comprehensive networks in rural areas. Usually, there 
are a number of volunteers in health centres who facilitate communication with the 
population, provide training for the public, and follow up cases with special needs. 
The role of both the urban and rural health centres is management of elective and 
emergency patients referred to them, supporting and supervising the health houses or 
health posts, and issues related to the public health service. The health centres in turn are 
under the management of a district health centre. The district health centre, an 
administrative structure responsible for the management of the districts, is also linked in to 
18 
Figure 1.2 Organizational structure of local health system in Iran 
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Chancellor of University of 
Medical Sciences and Health Services 
I 
Directorate of Distnct 
Health Network 
BTC - 
District Health District 
center Hosoita 
BTC: Behvarz Training Center 
HP: Health Post 
HH: Health Houses 
SP: Specialized Polyclinic 
WHV: Woman Health Vdunteers 
Rural Health Center 
SP 
Urban 
Health 
Center 
HP HP 
-- ------ --- ------ 
HH HH HH H! i 
Source: Malekafzali, 2002 
HP 
WHV 
the academic system so is able to respond to educational and training issues as well as 
getting assistance and support from the university schools of public health. Figure 1.2 
illustrates the hierarchy of the PHC network in Iran. Understanding this structure is 
essential for appreciating health services delivery within the FM framework. 
The health centres refer patients to district hospitals. District general hospitals are staffed 
by at least 5 specialists in internal medicine, paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology, 
surgery and anaesthetics. General practitioners are mainly used in the emergency section 
and in the out-patients department. Each district has between one and five hospitals 
depending on its size. District hospitals in turn refer to the provincial university teaching 
hospitals, which can refer to the major urban hospitals for super-specialised services. 
There is no consensus regarding the proportion of GDP for health in Iran. Some report 6.5 
% (PRB, 2004), others estimate 7.5% (Cheraghali et al, 2008), while the WHO recent report 
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(2008) indicates that 6.9% of GDP is spent on health care. Out of this, expenditure on 
outpatients, drugs, and inpatient care is 15%, 15%, and 23.8% respectively, while only 7% 
of the budget is spent in primary care. Ignoring the share of foreign donations and private 
insurance bodies, neither of which are significant, finance is provided from the public 
budget and direct public contributions, whereas secondary and tertiary care are financed 
(and sometimes directly provided) through compulsory schemes of the Social Security 
Organization (SSO) for private sector employees, labours and their dependents; the 
Medical Insurance Organization (MIO) for civil servants, rural households, the self- 
employed, and others (e. g. students); and the Army Medical Service Organization (AMSO) 
for members of the military and their dependents. In addition, the Imam Khomeini Relief 
Foundation (IMRF), funded by the government as well as public donations, is used to 
insure the poor and low-income rural residents for inpatient services; this scheme was 
handed over to the MIO after introducing Behbar (rural insurance for all). Private insurance 
generally is supplementary. 
3 Primary care in other contexts 
Most countries that have based their healthcare systems on primary care enjoy better 
population health outcomes, lower health disparities, more equitable access to care, and 
lower costs (Starfield et al, 2005; Ferrer et al, 2005). Primary care or general practice has 
specific features in organization, patient pattern, client-doctor relationship, health team 
composition, and focus, which are different from other settings of health services. The 
function of general practitioners (referred to as family doctors in this thesis) and their way 
of managing different cases is also distinguishable from their specialist counterparts. 
Although, primary care has a common meaning, it varies by the range of services provided 
or qualifications of practitioners, doctors in particular. For instance, General Practitioners 
(GPs) in the UK are trained in primary care prior to being qualified to work as a GP. Some 
GPs in the UK have special interests in particular fields like dermatology or diabetes, who 
spend their time partly seeing patients referred from other GPs. In the USA, doctors who 
practice in primary care might be internists, paediatricians, or even gynaecologists. 
However, family doctors in Iran have no specific training in primary care. Chapter 4, 
section 4.1.2 explains the definition of GPs in Iran and its variation with other settings such 
as UK. Apart from their qualifications, primary care doctors generally provide health 
services with the assistance of other professionals, called health teams in Iran (Chapter 4). 
Approaching primary care on the basis of family medicine and prioritizing primary services 
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over specialized care via gate-keeping to enhance quality and efficacy of services, 
reducing costs, and prioritizing prevention over treatment have been points of attention in 
different settings of primary care over past decades. There is some evidence that health 
spending in countries with such a system was less than settings with no primary care and 
gate- keeping in place (7.8% vs 8.6% of GNP) (Anderson et al, 2000). It is expected that 
such programmes provide more equitable access to care, particularly for specialised and 
inpatient services, as well as reduce patients' unnecessary visits to specialists. 
Given the different periods in various countries where family medicine is in practice as well 
as various patterns of programmes, there is no evidence on the effectiveness of such 
programmes in many contexts. Nonetheless, many countries have implemented a primary 
care system based on the British model of general practice, where patients enter the 
health system and are referred to specialised level only by a GP (general practitioner). For 
instance, the USA during 1990s adopted a model where the general practitioner was the 
first point for patients to engage with the health system and be referred to the specialist 
level if needed hoping to reduce costs and improve quality. However, the programme did 
not succeed as expected due to either lack of patients' compliance, who saw GPs as 
barriers to specialists or opposition from specialist doctors whose patient numbers fell 
(Phillips, 2005). The reform went gradually back to its original format, particularly because 
of lack of evidence on quality improvement as well as increased expenses (Forrest, 2003). 
The programme was revised later on to consider various capacities for GPs, like recruiting 
almost 5000 GPs in 2002 as hospitalists, who were responsible for patients' treatment and 
follow up after their referral to hospitals. The programme considerably reduced costs and 
improved quality of services for patients (Bodenheimer, 2003). Furthermore, a group of 
GPs in the USA joined the managed care programmes which provide different health 
services packages to chronic patients like asthma and diabetes, to improve treatment and 
follow up of such patients as well as reducing their stay in hospital. Although, many studies 
to evaluate impacts of managed care have been conducted by executing organizations, 
there are ample evidence to show efficacy of such programmes in improving quality of 
services and patients' satisfaction (Bindman & Majeed, 2003). 
Another example of implementing FM, after years of practice on the basis of Soviet-style 
polyclinics (Rese et al, 2005), is Lithuania, where a new system on the basis of primary 
health care and highlighting the GPs' role was gradually introduced in the 1990s. The main 
aim of the programme was to shift as many health services to the primary and outpatient 
levels (Lovkyte & Padaiga, 2001). In contrast to the US setting, a fundamental problem was 
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a lack of GPs who consisted of only 10% of doctors, increased to 12% in 1998. 
Lithuanians started a specialist training programme on FM which educated 1900 family 
doctors by 2005 (Starkiene, 2005), who had training on management of particular cases 
like mother and child, elderly, chronic conditions, etc. They could relatively succeed to 
improve health quality and manage costs (Lovkyte & Padaiga, 2001). 
After three decades of successful implementation of primary health care (PHC) in Iran, the 
health system started to implement a referral-based primary care system concurrently with 
Behbar (rural insurance for all) in rural areas and cities of less than 20,000 population to 
enhance accessibility of services. Family medicine was identified as the most appropriate 
strategy to fulfil the programme aims. Therefore, parliament, along with the Management & 
Planning Organization (MPO), passed a bill in March 2005 which obliged the Medical 
Insurance Organization (MIO) to issue insurance log-books for all residents in the above- 
mentioned places, in order to provide FM (NUHSR, 2007b). Prior to FM and during almost 
three decades of PHC network in Iran, behvarz was a focal point for services as well as 
gate-keeper. Doctors' presence in health centres was not universal and no defined 
pathway for referral to secondary care was in place. FM introduced doctors as gate- 
keepers and enhanced their accessibility for villagers. Besides, in cities, particularly big 
ones, there was no distinct role for GPs as gate-keepers. GPs were undermined and 
overlooked by both the public and policy makers. Besides, PHC provided only basic care 
(more details in Chapter 4). Such services used to be appropriate, but were no longer 
adequate. Health indices showed little progress or remained constant in recent years 
(NUHSR, 2007a). In particular, management of long-term conditions and public well-being 
were not appropriately addressed in PHC. FM aimed to promote the notion of primary 
care, in which GPs perform as family doctors. S/he is a focal point and a gate-keeper who 
looks after his/her assigned community, not only to cure patients but also to promote 
health and take the overall responsibility for public wellbeing (More details in Chapter 4). 
The family doctor (FD) and his team of other practitioners are fully responsible for the 
health of their assigned population. They provide care defined in a health services 
package (Chapter 4) to the public, and are responsible for referring cases to specialists 
and follow them up. Registered people are entitled to be referred only by a FD, otherwise, 
they must pay all expenses (10 times more). 
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4 Purpose of the thesis 
Aim: 
To identify facilitators of and obstacles to the implementation of family medicine (GP- 
based referral system which is being implemented concurrently with rural insurance 
programme for all: Behbar) in Iran. 
Objectives: 
1) To explore and select theories and approaches to implementation of change that might 
be appropriate for understanding implementation of FM in Iran. 
2) To identify and categorize facilitators of and barriers to the implementation of change 
that have been identified in the literature. 
3) To study facilitators of and obstacles to the implementation of FM in Iran. 
4) To consider the applicability of selected theories in the context of Iran as a middle 
income country. 
5) To identify ways in which the experience of implementation of FM in Iran might 
contribute to theories of policy implementation. 
6) To identify policy implications to improve the implementation of FM in Iran. 
5 Outline of the thesis 
Implementation of FM in the Iranian health system, which is called the second biggest 
revolution in the health system after PHC in the 1980s by some stakeholders, has faced 
many ups and downs on its way. Appreciating Lindblom (1959) simulation who describes 
the policy process as what policy makers 'muddle through', this thesis draws on four 
overlapped disciplines: health policy, health services research, public policy and social 
science. It consists of 10 Chapters, dedicated to the subjects below: 
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Chapter 2 reports the results of the literature review of theories of implementation in public 
policy and varieties of approaches to implementation, from the traditional era of dichotomy 
of top-down and bottom-up, to the modern synthesising approaches. The chapter ends by 
summarizing varieties of theories in the field and selects those which contributed to the 
conceptual framework adopted. 
Chapter 3 presents the process as well as findings of a synthesis of qualitative studies on 
facilitators of or barriers to implementation of change. The review created an evidence- 
based and comprehensive list of such factors which significantly contributed to the 
conceptual framework. It was also helpful in the study design based on semi-structured 
interviews as the main source of data collection, alongside other methods. 
Chapter 4 provides a narrative explaining the development of FM from a need to design 
the policy and its implementation. It draws on several resources to provide an account of 
FM as the policy for reforming the Iranian health system as well as its implementation. The 
chapter investigates the history of primary care in Iran and its increasing trend of 
shortages which resulted in the reform. It describes preparatory measures to implement 
FM, development of the policy, and the principles of its implementation. It ends by 
presenting a few preliminary changes in health indices following implementation, though 
hesitating to link those changes to policy implementation. 
Chapter 5 explains the methodological aspects of the thesis. A qualitative approach is 
justified and using purposive sampling both for individuals and health centres is described. 
The analytical approach is explained then, using mixed deductive and inductive analysis. 
The chapter ends by addressing the ethical considerations for the thesis and the rationale 
behind the organization of the result chapters. 
Chapters 6,7,8, &9 present findings under four interrelated categories which affected 
implementation: aspects of the policy; the existing environment; experience of 
implementation; and impacts of the policy on the public and local practitioners. 
Chapter 6 reports findings of the analysis on aspects of the policy (content) which 
facilitated or hampered its implementation, considering both positive and negative aspects. 
Chapter 7 investigates the effects of the existing environment and features of the Iranian 
society (context), both the health system and the general situation, on the implementation 
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of FM. The existing PHC network prior to implementation is addressed in more detail. 
General specifications of the insurance system in Iran, organizational capacity of the 
Iranian health system, and individuals' knowledge and insight to the policy are also 
explored. The chapter continues by addressing the legal and political environment of the 
implementation and ends with an investigation of the preparation for the reform. 
Chapter 8 explains how implementation was undertaken (process), focusing on certain 
impacts of experiencing the implementation on blunting or facilitating it. The chapter 
reports the administration of implementation and investigates the cooperation between 
individuals as well as organizations. It investigates political management and explores the 
effects of communication between individuals and organizations. The chapter continues 
with an investigation of the appropriateness of training for stakeholders and explaining the 
reform to the public and ends by studying the impact of auditing practitioners' performance 
on implementation. 
Chapter 9 reports on factors engaging individuals locally, either practitioners or the public 
and their representatives. It describes how their relationship with the policy and their 
interaction with the environment shaped their attitude towards implementation. 
Chapter 10 is the final chapter of the thesis that summarizes the findings before explaining 
them based on selected theories of policy implementation discussed in chapter 2. It then 
considers the applicability of these Western theories in the context of Iran as a middle 
income country. The next section explains the ways that the thesis has contributed to the 
literature. Then, the methodological strengths and limitations of the study are addressed. It 
concludes the thesis and ends with the policy implications, embedded with addressing the 
areas in need of further research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review: theories of policy implementation 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of a literature review of theories of implementation of 
public policy and varieties of approaches to implementation, from the traditional dichotomy 
of top-down and bottom-up and their challenges, to modern synthesising approaches. It 
aims to identify relevant theories and use them in a structured manner to establish an 
appropriate theoretical framework for analysing the findings of the thesis. The chapter 
begins with a brief history of implementation studies and its position in public policy 
research. Then the methodology of this review is justified. It continues with defining 
implementation. Theories and the main approaches to implementation are then introduced 
in three groups. The chapter ends by summarizing and reflecting on selected theories and 
incorporating them in a framework for analysis and discussion in Chapter 10. 
1 Historical background and review strategy 
Although a large number of reviews on policy implementation have been published, 
surprisingly little is known about the subject (Saetren, 2005). One reason perhaps is that 
accommodating implementation in a sensible place is difficult: 
'There is (or must be) a large literature about implementation in the social 
sciences- or so we have been told by numerous people. None of them can come 
up with specific citation to this literature but they are certain it must exist'... 'lt must 
be there, it should be there, but in fact it is not'.... 'How shall we persuade others 
that it is fruitless to look for a literature that does not exist? ' (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984, p. 1 66). 
Saetren (2005) concluded that most studies have focused on health and education, 
predominantly in high income, Western countries. There are a few notable exceptions 
including Kaler & Watkins, 2001; Kamuzora & Gilson, 2007. This review aims to identify, 
analyse, and synthesize the main stream contributions to implementation literature. Such a 
review is crucial for reflecting on the Iranian health sector reform and expanding theoretical 
understanding in a new background. Saetren (2005) highlights one particular problem in 
implementation literature as failing to explain how most reviewers arrive at their many 
interpretations. Jackson (1980) describes this as common among reviews in the discipline 
of social science and points out that it precludes judgements regarding validity of their 
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assertions and conclusions, although Saetren identifies a few exceptions: (O'Toole, 1986; 
Hill & Hupe, 2002; and Sinclair, 2001). 
As a result, a comprehensive account of implementation research, its origin, disciplinary 
foundation, and development patterns has not been narrated. Harrison (2004) takes the 
date back to the late 1960s and 1970s. It took almost two decades from about the time of 
the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky's book "Implementation" in 1973, until the end 
of thel 980s when an intensive academic debate was running about understanding of the 
phenomenon of implementation (Hill & Hupe, 2002). They recommended considering three 
aspects in any review of implementation. First, they advise looking for studies before the 
word was used because it has been a matter of attention for many scholars for long. 
Second, many writers and researchers have been concerned about the phenomenon of 
implementation although not using the word per se. They might have approached it from 
different background than public policy. Third, different cultures and backgrounds might 
perceive implementation differently and in different shapes. (Hill & Hupe, 2002). This 
indicates that implementation literature could be anywhere: 
If implementation is everywhere, is it ipso facto nowhere? ... No doubt this 
is why 
students of implementation complain that the subject is so slippery; it does depend 
on what one is trying to explain, from what point of view, at what point in its history' 
(1984: 164). 
It seems difficult and somehow unrealistic to define a structured manner for reviewing 
literature on the subject of implementation. In line with the purpose of the thesis, a 
theoretically based analysis of implementation of FM in Iran, I followed a heuristic 
approach in this review, aiming to include the main stream theories. I asked three experts 
in the field of health policy and/or public policy for a list of the main theories in the field of 
implementation, plus the names of those who contributed to those theories. This approach 
was chosen for two reasons: the realm of implementation theories is very broad to be 
covered in a structured way per se; and the thesis aims to use theories to analyse the 
process of implementation of FM in Iran. Its scope does not allow it to fill the longstanding 
gap of a comprehensive review of implementation theories. 
2 Methodology of the review 
The three experts each suggested books and journal articles from 1975 to 2005. One of 
them labelled articles as essential (fundamental contributions to streams) or 
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supplementary (ones which expanded aspects of the streams). I created an Excel 
database and cross checked for duplicates. My premise was books, particularly recent 
ones, are more comprehensive to open a window to common categories of theories and 
give me a general understanding of the main contributions. Therefore, I started with Hill 
and Hupe (2002), John (2002), Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), and Sabatier (1999). 
Then I updated the database by a bibliographic search of materials covered in those 
books. 
I used the categorization of Hill & Hupe (2002): top-down, bottom-up, and synthesizing 
approaches. Then, I advanced the Excel database by mapping identified theories into the 
three categories. The list had a separate subgroup of essential and supplementary 
sources, in which I filled the cells based on opinion of the expert who made this distinction. 
Appendix V gives the final list of included literature. 
To conduct the review, first I went through the database, read all essential articles and 
summarized them. Second, I read summaries of other articles, reading the entire articles in 
which the main theories were mentioned in the summary. Theoretical framework of the 
thesis was built mainly upon theories/approaches introduced in this review. This review is 
a small-scale attempt to present the major contributions in the field of policy 
implementation to draw on for the theoretical framework of analysis of my empirical 
research. 
3 Implementation 
Implementation has a subject which is often a policy. Policies may be made at many 
levels: central or local government; a multinational company; a local business, a school or 
a hospital (Buse et al, 2005). There are varieties of interpretations of implementation of 
policy. Some refer to it as the stage after a policy is formulated, encompassing the 
development of operational plans by hierarchical levels of government and other 
organizations to put the policy into practice (Hill & Hupe, 2002). They argue that separating 
implementation from formulation facilitates appreciation of the ways that interaction among 
diverse policy actors shape policy outcomes, particularly for analytical purposes. 
Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) also define stages from making a policy, followed by 
policy outputs (decisions), and impacts due to which the policy could or could not be 
revised. This is somehow echoed by O'Toole (1995) who highlights that policy 
implementation bridges the governmental intention and actual outcomes. These 
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approaches separate policy formulation from implementation and consider a linear 
sequence in the process of public policy, reflecting mechanical and hierarchical views 
towards implementation. 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) emphasize that a policy must exist to be implemented 
prior to implementation. Contradictory to their initial top-down view of implementation, they 
find it difficult to distinguish between a policy and its implementation. They describe 
implementation as embedded in the policy. 
Others have expressed a more dynamic view of implementation. For instance, Barrett and 
Fudge (1981) were more concerned about policy-action relationship, rather than 
transmitting policy into a series of consequential actions in mechanical order. They 
consider implementation as a process of negotiation and interaction over time between 
policy makers and those who put it into practice. This is a less mechanical view and leaves 
more room for actors' say in the process. 
Various definitions of implementation show the complexity of the subject. How 
implementation gets defined becomes the foundation of the three categories of theories of 
implementation: top-down, bottom-up and synthesizing theories. 
4 Theories of policy implementation 
Policy implementation has traditionally taken two approaches: top-down and bottom-up 
(Ham & Hill, 1993). Top-down models consider consequential stages to the process of 
policy comprising problem definition, policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. 
From this perspective, policy formulation must be conducted prior to implementation, 
which is basically practicing that policy (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979). In contrast, bottom- 
up approaches tend to be more pragmatic by approaching policy change as a dynamic 
and interactive process. This perspective emphasises the need to understand 
implementation systems and the actors responsible for implementation, in order to 
understand why policies do or do not achieve expected outcomes. The gap between 
anticipated goals and actual outcomes of implementation is a demonstration for some 
scholars in bottom-up approach of how policy is recreated through the process of 
implementation, rather than an implementation failure (Hill, 1997). 
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One of main differences between perspectives lies in their approach to actors' 
engagement in the policy cycle and the extent to which they are able to affect the policy 
implementation through their actions and judgement. The bottom-up perspective is 
focused around lower level actors and gives centrality to them. It leaves plenty of space for 
discretion of this group of actors that might affect the implementation through negotiation, 
interaction, and bargaining. Whereas, top-down approaches consider no or little room for 
interaction and negotiation between hierarchy of levels in the policy cycle. They are biased 
around small group of top policy makers. Policies are commands from top people which 
must be put into practice by subordinates. Therefore, only little chance remains for 
discretion, revision and bilateral communication to affect the policy based on this 
approach. 
Other approaches, called synthesizing theories, are attempts to combine the advantages 
of the two traditional approaches. Their focus is reconciliation between aspects of top- 
down and bottom-up to reach a more realistic manner of implementation analysis. Also 
called bargaining or evolutionary frameworks (Grindle & Tnomas, 1991), bargaining 
between different stakeholders is the basis of analyzing the outcomes of implementation in 
these approaches. The following sections introduce the three approaches and major 
examples. 
4.1 Top-down approaches (implementation as separate from policy) 
The principle of top-down theories is making a clear distinction between policy formulation 
and execution. The approach to the policy process is a linear sequence of activities. 
Observing a gap between the intended plan and what occurs as a result of policy is 
common and is based on the concept of perfect implementation. Premier scholars 
including Hood (1976) saw desirable implementation as a product of good harmony 
between external factors like availability of resources and supportive political environment, 
and administration of policy implementation. They reasoned that many government 
reforms are concentrated on efforts that devise systems in which the possibility of 
implementation according to intended policies increases. Such an approach has roots in 
early studies of implementation gap, in which policy makers were interested to know why 
such gaps existed and how they can manage to bridge the gap. 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) hypothesized that implementation would be most 
successful in places where only marginal change is required and there is a high 
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consensus on goal. They put six variables into the model, which are dynamically linked to 
the outcome performance, including: policy standards, resources and incentives, the 
quality of inter-organizational relationship, the macro environment, and the disposition or 
response of implementers. They talked about multi-dimensional characteristics of policy, 
organizations, actors and environment into consideration. They considered a linear 
relationship between variables that was innovative. However, they defined an environment 
for interaction which was too realistic. Nonetheless, they were not many scholars at that 
time to take inter-related categories of variables into account. 
Bardach (1977) described the perception of implementation as involving games' in which 
a variety of games might be played. His approach is considered top-down because he 
advises policymakers as the top players of the game that in order to achieve the desired 
outcomes, they must greatly care about the scenario writing process and structure the 
game in the right way. This approach fails to acknowledge the importance of ownership of 
a policy among medium and lower level actors. It does not consider the importance of 
interactions among the hierarchy of actors as well as their authority for discretion, which 
can alter the entire policy intention. Also, there is no room for feedback and revising the 
policy within the implementation process in this approach. 
Pressman & Wildavsky (1984) separated policy formation from implementation. They 
studied the federal mandated programme of economic development in California, USA in 
the 1970s and explained the extent that successful implementation depends upon linkage 
between different institutions and departments at the local level. They assume actions as 
dependent variables which depend on the number of links in an implementation chain. 
Inevitably the degree of cooperation between agencies required making those links very 
close to 100%, if a situation is not to occur in which a number of small gaps cumulatively 
end up with a large gap. The idea of implementation deficit was born at this point in their 
theory which makes implementation mathematically analysable. The key factor for 
effective implementation for them is a system which clearly shows the causal link between 
goals and actions in achieving them. They highlight the importance of clear goal setting, 
prepared administration, and good command transfer from centre to periphery, as 
essential prerequisites for successful implementation. Their view towards implementation 
was mechanical, trying to rationalize that the linear consequence of factors results in 
intended implementation. 
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Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) expanded the approach by suggesting the role of 
feedback as well as consistency in the policy itself. In their view, analysing the 
implementation of a top-level policy decision is begun by clarification of four issues: 
I- The extent to which the actions of implementers are in line with policy 
decisions; 
2- The extent to which the policy impacts are consistent with its objectives over 
time; 
3- Principal factors affecting the policy implementation, both political and relevant 
to the policy itself; 
4- The extent to which experience affected formulation of the policy over time. 
They brought new notions to the top-down approach by taking into consideration the 
importance of consistency between the policy and implementers' discretion. Implicitly, they 
emphasized policy impacts as important in feeding into implementation and decision 
making. This opens doors for feedback which in turn might fertilize the soil for learning 
over time and taking influential ongoing factors into consideration. One might categorize 
this approach as bargaining and therefore closer to a bottom-up perception of 
implementation. In fact, Sabatier followed up this route and became a pioneer of such an 
approach later on in the 1990s (later in this Chapter). Nonetheless, a clear division 
between policy formation and implementation is noticed in their account and a linear 
consequence of the process is observed in the approach. 
Hogwood and Gunn (1984) defend their top-down view on the ground that those who 
make policy are democratically elected and therefore eligible to dictate. They legitimized 
such an approach by looking at democracy as a ground for ruling with absolute power. 
Elected policy makers are eligible therefore to do whatever they decide and reach goals 
through whatever trajectory they choose. This approach overlooks complexities of human 
beings, organizations and interactions between them. It also ignores other mechanisms in 
democratic governments such as parliament, which monitor quality and appropriateness of 
elected leaders' decisions. 
4.1.1 Summary and discussion 
The top-down perspective has contributed to the history of implementation theory. 
Chronologically, modern categorization of implementation theories started from early 
developments of top-down. Different scholars expanded the field from diverse points of 
views, some of which, including Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), also contributed to the 
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next generation of approaches: bottom-up. However, it failed to recognize a few crucial 
factors, as a result of which the bottom-up was born. Some of the most cited flaws are: 
1- Over-emphasizing central policy makers, while neglecting other levels of actors in 
implementation process. 
2- Over-estimation of government action versus other factors in analysing 
implementation. 
3- Overlooking complexities of reality in implementation, where many actors including 
individuals and organizations are involved, rather than a single government as 
commander and all others as followers. 
4- Very little chance of having all preconditions prepared prior to implementation. 
5- Lack of dynamic approach to implementation process, in which policy is subject to 
change and revision because of interactions, negotiations and feedbacks. 
The main criticism is that the reality of implementation is messier and more sophisticated 
than even the most complete top-down approaches can cope with. It is 'neither a good 
description of what happened in practice nor a helpful guide to improving implementation' 
(Buse et al., 2005: 124). Even early contributors, including Pressman and Wildavsly (1984), 
emphasized interaction and a cooperative environment between actors and highlighted the 
need for bargaining relationship to move implementation forward. This was to reflect the 
importance of players other than top policy makers to narrow the implementation gap, 
which is main subject of the bottom-up approach. Such failures moved scholars to 
approach the subject from another end of spectrum and led to the birth of the bottom-up 
approach. 
4.2 Bottom-up approaches (implementation as a part of policy) 
Limitations of the top-down approaches, particularly lack of accounts for actors other than 
top policy makers resulted in more focus on front line staff opinion and rejected a linear 
configuration of implementation. Bottom-up considers implementation as consisting of 
intertwined phases in a policy cycle. The focus is on actors at lower levels. Bottom-up 
views developed during the 1980s to compensate for the lack of attention to frontline staff 
in traditional top-down views. Below are main contributions to the bottom-up approach. 
Lipsky (1980) presented the idea of street-level bureaucrats and emphasized the role of 
frontline staff in the policy cycle in 1971, even before Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) 
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published their book on top-down approaches. He analysed the behaviour of front-line staff 
in policy delivery, whom he called 'street level bureaucrats', including those administering 
social welfare benefits, social workers, teachers, local government officials, doctors and 
nurses. He re-conceptualized the implementation process, especially in services which 
were highly dependent on the actions of significant numbers of professional staff, such as 
in health and social services. Those people generally work in conditions that are not 
conducive to the adequate performance of their jobs, facing high demand for their services 
but lacking the organizational and personal resources necessary to do the job well. They 
have to routinely make difficult resource allocation decisions about who gets services or 
not (Elmore, 1978; Hudson, 1989). Lipsky mentions that implementation depends highly on 
bottom level actors' understanding of policy, their sense of ownership, and degree of 
innovation to face challenges. 
Observing a number of discretionary decisions by front-line staff, he argues that public 
policies are essentially the routines that staff establish and the mechanisms they apply to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressure. He attempted to shift the focus of 
implementation failure from bottom level staff to top policy makers. He implicitly links 
implementation failure to the lack of commitment of senior actors to provide adequate 
resources as well as making the work environment appropriate. He highlights that people 
join services generally to do good and to be committed. Huge workload and uncertainties 
coming from top-level actors make them reluctant, so they lose faith in the policy, which 
leads to implementation failure. His focus is to shift attention to actors at the lowest level of 
implementation. However, such efforts overlook the important role of higher level actors in 
the process. Thus, his strategy to remedy the deficits of top-down perspectives ends in 
over crediting lower level players. The approach acknowledges frontline staffs discretions 
to cope with the dynamics of implementation, which is a main shortage in top-down. 
However, it overemphasizes street-level players' role in policy cycle and is significantly 
biased in their favour. Lack of balance between top and bottom level players in his 
approach makes it difficult for applying in real implementation which is messy, multi- 
dimensional and stretched among all levels and groups of stakeholders. 
The neglected position of front-line personnel in implementation was also emphasized by 
other scholars, who contributed to the perspective. Walker and Gilson (2004) studied the 
implementation of fee removal policy in South Africa. They realized that nurses approved 
the principles of the policy. However, they were negative towards it in practice because of 
practical difficulties. For instance, introduction of fee removal increased their workload. 
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Whereas, the policy considered no incentive for staff as well as the drugs supply being 
insufficient. Staff lost their faith in the implementation therefore and started to invent new 
routines based on their discretions. Nevertheless, motivated staff compensated the 
shortages by their courage and commitment. The authors concluded that developing inter- 
personal competence and trust within organizations is necessary to strengthen 
implementation (also Elmore, 1978). This is one of main missing points in top-down 
approaches, considering which bring greater sense of ownership and interaction to 
implementing a new policy. 
Rothstein (1998) contributed to the perspective by applying it in a specific setting. He 
emphasizes the special application of bottom-up perspectives to the delivery of services 
such as health care. Because of the dynamic environment of such services, staff discretion 
is essential to respond effectively to customers' needs. This approach highlights the 
relationships between central, regional, and local agencies in influencing policy. One of 
outcomes of this view is dividing labour between hierarchies of actors, rather than 
privileging central policy makers over local staff, which reduces their motivation in 
implementation. He moves forward to a new generation of approaches in which actors 
engage in implementation in a mutual and cooperative way. 
4.2.1 Summary and discussion 
The common concept in bottom-up approaches lies around the indication that policy is a 
problematic concept and implementation is a complex task. It suggests looking at 
implementation as a 'property' in which different actors may make different claims as to its 
true features. It emphasizes that despite a top-down approach that looks at the 
implementation process as a depoliticized step, political processes occur throughout 
implementation. Therefore, it assumes bottom level actors are the most crucial ones 
during the implementation. 
There is no doubt about the importance of frontline staff for putting policy into practice. 
However, the common deficiency of the perspective is an exaggerated emphasis on 
bottom-level staff and fading top level engagement, by which multi-lateral negotiation and 
communication among all levels are overlooked to move implementation forward. Theories 
have to balance the role of structure (institutions), agency (participants/interests), ideas 
(how policies should work), and socio-economic circumstances. Although a bottom-up 
approach rightly recognizes the crucial role of front-line staff, it cannot keep balance 
35 
between them and other actors. It also risks becoming prescriptive. Some of its most-cited 
flaws are: 
1- Lack of analytic distinction between policy formulation and its implementation, 
which makes it difficult to distinguish the influence of different actors in 
implementation. 
2- Undermining direct and/or indirect central influences in shaping the organizations in 
which bottom-level staff operate, react and make discretions. 
3- Difficulties in monitoring performance and evaluating implementation or specific 
policy impacts, due to lack of distinction in decision points. 
4.3 Towards a pragmatic understanding of implementation: Synthesizing theories 
Table 2.1 summarizes the main aspects of the two traditional approaches. Highlighting 
pitfalls of such approaches to portrait complexities of implementation, synthesizing 
theories are built on the theories of top-down and bottom-up to advance the approaches 
for a more realistically addressing implementation. Because of the pitfalls in both, 
researchers have called for a synthesis of the two (Sabatier, 1991; 0'Toole, 1986). 
Table 2.1 Main aspects of top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation 
Top-down Bottom-up 
Initial focus Central government decision Local implementation actors 
and networks 
Identification of major From top-down and starting From bottom-up, including 
actors with government both government and non- 
government 
View of the policy Largely national process, Interactive process 
process proceeding from problem involving policy makers and 
identification to policy implementers from various 
formulation at higher levels to parts and levels of 
implementation at lower government and outside in 
levels which policy may change 
during implementation 
Evaluative criteria Extent of attainment of formal Much less clear- possibly 
objectives rather than that policy process takes 
recognition of unintended into account of local 
consequences influences 
Overall focus Designing the system to Recognition of strategic 
achieve what central/top interaction among multiple 
policy makers intend- focus actors in a policy network- 
on 'structure' focus on 'agency' 
urces: 5abatier (1956); Buse et a 
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Synthesis depends on recognizing the legitimacy of the complex formulation of the topic. 
Goggin et al (1990) call attempts to resolve the dispute as 'synthesizing' or'third- 
generation' with the proposition that choice of methodology may depend upon the subject 
and circumstances of the policy being implemented. Such challenges led to the efforts 
which pick out key ideas from each traditional approach, generally called 'synthesizing 
approaches'. Some of the most cited synthesizing theories are introduced in this section. 
4.3.1 Multi-actor collaboration 
Barrett and Fudge's (1981) interpretation of implementation was innovative in their era, 
when top-down was leading the course. They emphasized a dynamic pattern of policy 
implementation which undergoes interpretation, revision and modification. They consider 
special room for discretion among actors because of their different assumptions. Similarly, 
Hjern and Hull (1982) emphasize 'organization-theory' in implementation studies in which 
none of actors has privilege over other actors. Such approaches echo the dynamic link 
between diverse group of actors and accommodating them in an organizational setting for 
implementation. Their approach makes distance from bottom-up by considering equal 
roles for actors in the frame of organization, which is not biased around frontline staff. It 
bridges traditional approaches with bargaining views and third generations of theories of 
implementation. 
O'Toole in much of his work tries to connect the concerns in the implementation literature 
and the contributions of organizational sociologists (1986). Numerous disciplines 
contribute to the implementation literature and he calls for cross-disciplinary comparison 
across them to develop an appropriate approach. He argued that it is not always easy to 
match policy objectives with inter-organizational arrangements (O'Toole, 1993), so this is 
not necessarily a way to successful implementation (O'Toole, 1994; 1997). He 
reemphasized the role of context, particularly 'constitutional choice'. 
Linder and Peter (1989) also promoted the idea of multi-actor collaboration by taking multi- 
layer players into consideration. They mention two general sets of variables which affect 
policy implementation: capacity of the government and complexity of the policy. The 
interaction between these two has been at the core of attempts to reconcile the top-down 
and bottom-up approaches, which reemphasizes interaction and context. 
37 
Rothstein (1998) developed the idea of multi-actor collaboration by emphasizing the role of 
state and institution in implementation, particularly in relation to social welfare. The main 
question for him was the manner in which public services must be organized when the 
nature of the activity - the advantage or service to be provided or the behaviour to be 
regulated - makes it difficult to realize this model of state action. He attempted to answer 
that question by fusion of empirical state theory with normative state theory. He studied the 
influence of various public administrations on implementation. He emphasizes that even 
with uncertainty and lack of knowledge, the state must do something in some 
circumstances. For him, the best ways to organize policy implementation depend on the 
kind of the activities that the organization must do, which is substantially based on 
organizational theory. Based on this perspective, the study of implementation is a form of 
studying organizational behaviour which aims at understanding individuals' and groups' 
behaviour and performance within institutional patterns of structure (Mullins, 2002). 
Rothstein's contribution to implementation theory has two main directions. First, it resolved 
the traditional argument concerning accountability by recognizing the multiplicity of ways 
policies may be legitimated. Second, it helped structure the relationship between policy 
makers, who are somehow autonomous, and the public. He advanced the approach by 
incorporating the role of institutions and a macro vision of organizations. He separates 
policy formation from execution issues (top-down) to identify conditions under which 
policies may be designed to minimize implementation problems. However, his main 
contribution is to emphasize the role of organizations, which legitimizes bargaining in 
implementation. 
There is a strong link between policy analysis and organizational studies, although the 
former applies to macro-levels of state or government, whereas the latter tends to focus on 
the level of firms, located at the meso level. Organizational studies are based on the 
premise that organizational behaviour can only be understood in context. They examine 
behaviour within organizational settings, maintaining that change in individuals usually 
follows change in organization (Curry, 2000). Soft and divergent characteristics of 
organizational studies suggest that it is unlikely to produce universally agreed findings 
within a quick timescale (Tranfield & Starkey, 1998), due to which the approach seems 
inappropriate for studying implementation process. In addition, Weible (2005) argues that 
organizations are unable-on their own to produce the necessary resources to achieve their 
goals, so they must acquire additional resources from others. Nonetheless, the approach 
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seems helpful in monitoring and analysing outputs of implementation within a realistic 
timeframe. 
4.3.2 Rational Choice Theory 
Rational choice theory assumes that individuals have the capacity to act as rational agents 
(Ward, 1995). It links organizational theory with individuals' roles and capacities inside an 
organization. It recognizes individual choice as the foundation of political action and 
inaction and explores individuals' reaction to constrains, instructions and patterns of group 
interaction (John, 2002). The theory aims to understand individuals' reaction to choices 
made by other actors. It investigates the reasons actors decide to cooperate in 
implementation or not, particularly on many occasions that they are not part of making the 
policy. The theory builds on principles about what individuals are likely to do in complex 
settings of implementing change and adapting to institutional rules. 
Modern Rational Choice theory is sensitive to the importance of cultural and historical 
contexts as well as the interplay between changing institutions and the choices of actors, 
which provides rational choice with its realism and analytical power. March and Olsen 
(1989) argue that institutions are the main independent variables in structuring political 
decisions and policy outcomes. Institutions simplify decision-making by providing options 
that are more or less readily available and plausible. They provide familiarity, reduce 
psychological uncertainty and eventually lead to beliefs, which routinize of meaning as well 
as the establishment of coalitions. Moreover, institutions rationalize idiosyncrasy, 
heterogeneity and diversity by shaping decision makers' preferences, thereby introducing 
a measure of uniformity. Altering incentives or disincentives, changing the balance of 
power among policy makers, introducing new technology, or shifts in organizational 
secondary beliefs open windows for non-incremental policy change. 
Rational choice theory provides room for ideas, beliefs, and interests to play roles in 
actors' interaction with the policy and implementation constraints. However, it fails to 
recognize many occasions in which agents do not or cannot act rationally for several 
reasons. Individuals are sophisticated agents that might act irrationally and opposite to 
predictions even if conditions are on their side. There are many other factors than 
rationality that affect their behaviour, undermining the applicability of the theory in some 
settings. Nevertheless, the theory is a useful tool to explain actors' behaviour in 
organizations, particularly in conjunction with other complementary frameworks. 
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4.3.3 Communication perspectives 
Expanding the emphasis on collaboration between actors in policy implementation, Lane 
(1987) saw the problem of implementation studies embodied in the meaning of the word 
and suggested that implementation is seen as involving both notions of an 'end state or 
policy achievement' and 'a process or policy execution'. His emphasis was on two 
alternative concepts: responsibility and trust. While responsibility concerns the 'relationship 
between objectives and outcomes', trust concerns 'the process of putting policies into 
effect' (p. 542). He argues that top-down approaches emphasize responsibility, while 
bottom-up underlines trust. The main issue in this approach is how the centre can trust the 
periphery and how the periphery can be accountable to the centre. His approach 
addresses the communication gap and the degree of engagement by actors in the field. It 
is a reasonable reconciliation between ignoring frontline staff in top-down approaches and 
underestimation of high level actors in bottom-up approaches. However, it fails to explain 
how such interaction could actually be established in complex situations of implementing 
controversial policies. 
Goggin et al (1990) developed these ideas and presented a "communication model" of 
implementation in which the main emphasis is upon factors that affect the acceptance or 
rejection of messages between layers of government. Their model escapes from the 
rigidity of top-down approaches and difficulties in handling feedback between 
implementation and policy formation. It concentrates on communication between different 
levels of government that are responsible in policy execution. The model goes beyond the 
simplicity of the responsibility and trust dichotomy. It creates an environment for actors' 
collaboration and idea exchange and engages with features of implementation in a more 
realistic fashion. However, it is rooted in federalism case studies in the USA and its degree 
of universal application is contested. 
One of well-recognized models of putting policy into practice, mapped into communication 
models and interactions between different layers of actors is 'principal-agent' perspective. 
It derives from a conjunction of organizational theory and institutionalism, communication 
models, and acknowledging actors' discretion in executing policies. The perspective is not 
a theory of implementation per se, but it applies the achievements of management theory 
for better practice and more efficient performance in implementing change. It states that 
sub-optimal policy implementation is an inevitable result of the structure of institutions of 
modern government, in which decision makers (principals) have to delegate responsibility 
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for the implementation of their policies to their officials (e. g. civil servants in the Ministry of 
Health) and other agents (e. g. managers, doctors, or private contractors) who they only 
indirectly and incompletely control and who are difficult to monitor (Buse et al, 2005). It has 
been well received as a pragmatic platform in policy execution by different organizations. 
The perspective considers that agents have discretion in how they act on behalf of political 
principals and may not even see themselves as primarily engaged in making a reality of 
the wishes of the principals. Principals can only indirectly and incompletely control agents 
who are difficult to monitor (Pollitt, 1993). Tuohy (2003) points out how vital the trust-based 
principal-agent relationship, as well as the contractual relationship in which actors are 
relatively well-informed, are to overcome implementation gaps. Since agents have their 
own views, values, ambitions, loyalties, and resources, discretion opens up the potential 
for ineffective or inefficient translation of principal's intention into reality by which policy 
implementation can be hindered. The catch phrase of the reformers is that the government 
should be 'steering not rowing'the ship of state (Osborne &Gaebler, 1992), confining itself 
to what only it could do best. In order to increase the quality of services, the principal- 
agent perspective considers performance indicators to ensure the delivery of services is 
satisfactory, and to assess whether agents' performance meets principal's objectives and 
improves services or not. Nonetheless, the perspective does not explain the institutional 
interests and values of principal, nor the impact of principals' approaches to the policy as 
well as the way that the policy is introduced. 
4.3.4 Advocacy coalition framework 
Paul Sabatier developed a perspective called the 'advocacy coalition approach' with 
Jenkins-Smith (1993), which approaches the policy process from a more holistic view and 
with more emphasis on actors (bottom-up). Sabatier's (1999) concept of advocacy 
coalition has the virtue of highlighting the possibility of conflicts in policy because of the 
simple divide between policy makers and those who put the policy into practice. Interaction 
between actors who generate, disseminate, and evaluate policies in subsystems runs the 
policy forward. Because of lack of time and inclination, the public are not members of a 
sub-system in the advocacy coalition approach. 
Sabatier defines advocacy coalitions as a small number of organized actors and networks 
within a large number of participants in each sub-system, who are in conflict with one 
another, because of competition for influence over government institutions (2007). A 
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distinct set of norms, beliefs, and resources distinguishes one coalition from another. By 
definition, many professional groups such as researchers, civil servants, members of civil 
society organizations, politicians, and journalists are considered as members of advocacy 
coalitions. He highlights that the core norms and beliefs of an advocacy coalition do not 
change, unless a major change occurs in the external environment (such as political 
regime change, economic recession, etc). The perspective provides a rather self-evident 
claim that major policy change in the wake of external shocks is more likely if an 
incumbent coalition member revises core aspects of its belief system (Nohrstedt, 2005). 
Otherwise, policy changes as a result of policy-oriented learning in the interaction between 
advocacy coalitions, which might take as long as decades. 
Sabatier also highlights the role of policy brokers as important players in his model 
(1999,2007). Coming from a variety of sources, from civil servants experienced in a 
particular sub-system to committees of inquiry who are in charge of agreement production, 
these mediators make effort to find feasible compromises between the positions 
advocated by the multiplicity of coalitions. They are an influential and motivated group of 
actors who bridge the communication gap and facilitate putting policy into practice by 
advocating stakeholders. 
Over the last decade, advocacy coalition framework has been widely used in analysing 
public policy implementation particularly in environment and education sectors. The 
approach has not been frequently applied in health sector. It advances the initial approach 
of Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980) by accommodating a more dynamic view of 
implementation and recognizing all actors' beliefs and values in the policy cycle. It opens 
windows for revising the policy and fitting it to the context by learning and feeding back into 
the cycle. Its origin is in federal political regimes like the USA. However, it has the 
capability to be fitted into settings with few features of democracy. 
4.3.5 Summary 
Synthesizing approaches are worthy efforts to reduce the limitations of traditional theories 
of policy implementation. They attempt to reconcile the biased direction of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches towards the two ends of actors, by emphasizing interaction among 
actors at different levels of the policy cycle. Somehow complementary, they cover different 
aspects of the complex and multi-dimensional aspects of implementation. They bring 
context and macro politics to considering implementation and highlight organizations and 
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actors' inter-relationship. Effective communication and feedback are aspects that are 
highlighted in synthesized approaches, as crucial dimensions that were overlooked by 
traditional approaches. Emphasizing the beliefs and values of all actors was a 
revolutionary aspect that resulted in acknowledgement of discretion, particularly for 
frontline personnel. The broad umbrella of this third generation of implementation 
approaches also led to innovative practical models of policy execution, which are 
supposed to contribute to better implementation. The principal-agent perspective is among 
well-received methods based on many experiences of implementation. It aims to create a 
more efficient platform for implementation and to narrow assimilation gaps that hinder the 
process. 
Even though synthesizing perspectives are more pragmatic to explain implementation, 
none of them are comprehensive enough to portray all aspects of reality. Studying 
implementation is investigating human behaviour, action, and interaction in a complex 
setting. To draw a picture of implementation that accommodates as many aspects of 
reality as possible, including a tailored conjunction of theories in the analytical framework 
seems to be inevitable. 
5 Discussion 
Studying implementation of a policy requires a multi-disciplinary approach that must 
explain the interaction between institutions, interests, and ideas (Buse, 2008). There is no 
single comprehensive theory to explain all aspects. It is a symphony rather than a solo 
performance that is characterized as: 
'mountain islands of theoretical structure, intermingled with and occasionally 
attached together by foothills of shared methods and concepts, and empirical work, 
all of which is surrounded by oceans of descriptive work not attached to any 
mountain of theory' (Schlager, 1997, p. 14). 
Implementation is a complex notion, studying which needs complementary approaches. 
Such a collective approach is crucial to cover different aspects and provide an 
understanding of the phenomenon. This thesis aims to create a comprehensive portrait of 
implementation of a policy based on robust theoretical analysis. A theoretical structure is 
essential to explain diverse components of implementation. Such employment of 
theoretical frameworks is a heuristic measure to accommodate as many aspects of 
implementation as possible and to see the implementation through variety of lenses. It 
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aims to provide a clearer and more advance understanding of implementation. The focus 
here is to reflect on theory and map finding of study into principles of existing literature. 
Such an approach might or might not result in advancing the theoretical literature. 
Health policy, like other branches of public policy, consists to a large extent of patching 
and repairing, building on and learning from experience (Heclo, 1974). It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to compare various theories to address their strengths and weakness. 
The thesis rather seeks to analyse the implementation of a policy (family medicine) in a 
particular setting (Iran) in order to identify facilitators of and barriers to the implementation, 
aiming to improve the process. 
As John (2002) points out, approaches and theories are not rivals. Rather they can be 
used as complementing each other and portray a clearer picture of implementation. Also, 
Antonsen et al (2000) recommend using a strategy of 'filling out' when analysing complex 
empirical problems, while at the same time keeping the theoretical framework relatively 
simple. Several scholars have effectively combined divergent theoretical perspectives in 
their empirical studies including Spillane, 1998; Cauthen & Amenta, 1996. Given that every 
approach had its own pitfalls, systemization and generalization is almost impossible. To 
overcome the complexity, I took Elmore's (1981) advice on 'backward mapping'. He 
suggests that in the study of complex policies, it would be valuable to triangulate accounts 
by using different theoretical models to obtain a satisfactory demonstration of what 
happened. Reviewing the theoretical literature on implementation granted me a better 
understanding of strengths and weaknesses of various approaches and provided me the 
opportunity to fill out the theoretical framework. 
Some argue that picking a particular theory could enhance the degree of generalizability of 
findings by creating a more testable environment of the participants' behaviour 
(John, 2002). However, because my main purpose was to shed light on the implementation 
of FM, only 'multiple lenses' or a 'multiple framing' approach could portray the reality and 
give an explanation of the process (Cairney, 2007). With that in mind, I followed John's 
(2002) suggestion of using different theories in the theoretical framework as a part of an 
overall explanation. 
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6 Conclusion: Selection of a theoretical model for studying implementation 
There has been much less attention paid to how to do the analysis, and what research 
designs, theories or methods best inform policy analysis (Walt et al, 2008). No policy 
analyst can use all the tools of the trade all the time. Rather, the contention throughout is 
the attempt to draw on different theoretical aspects which are essential. Like rational 
decision making, an infinite wealth of potentially relevant information to choose from but 
finite resources with which to choose, is the main problem in most health policy analysis 
(Cairney, 2007). As a result, focusing attention on one or a few particular aspects of 
explanation is inevitable. Although employing more than one theory/framework does not 
solve this problem, it highlights a series of perspectives through which to view the same 
phenomena. 
One of well-known public policy frameworks is the stages heuristic (Brewer & DeLeon 
1983). It divides the public policy process into four stages: agenda setting, formulation, 
implementation, and evaluation. Analysts have criticized the stages heuristic for presuming 
linearity to the public policy process that does not exist in reality, for postulating neat 
demarcations between stages that are blurred in practice, and for offering no propositions 
on causality (Sabatier, 2007). Having this in mind, to understand and explain the 
implementation process as a whole and to make sense of what actors actually did as well 
as their reasons for that, I incorporated my selected theories in a four-fold framework of 
viewing implementation developed by Harrison (2004), with some modifications. Since the 
model is largely heuristic, it can be retained, modified, or abandoned in keeping with its 
usefulness, rather than being subject to direct tests of validity. 
I was not neutral towards contradictory approaches when adopting the framework. 
Harrison states that the four-fold framework captures much of the variation within past 
research and theorizing on implementation. The first frame views implementation as 
administration. Although I was aware of failures of mechanical views in top-down 
approaches, such as the failure to recognize interest groups and the lack of ownership it 
leaves behind in lower level staff, I incorporated the concept to reflect the popular 
assumption that governmental bureaucracies are instruments for policy implementation. 
Crudely, it provides a focus on the government capacity by emphasizing how institutional 
design and socio-economic conditions (context) constrain and shape the process of 
implementation. 
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The second frame was a bargaining view, albeit I knew the difficulties of studying 
implementation by taking a bottom-up approach which makes no distinction between 
different phases of the policy cycle, and fails to acknowledge that policy agendas and 
actors' interests are themselves products of negotiation and interpretation. The approach 
focuses on sub-system complexity by emphasizing how the beliefs of participants, their 
relationship and networks, and inter-organizational dynamics shape and constrain the 
implementation. As particular approaches to study bargaining among actors at different 
levels, I incorporated the notion of a policy network to investigate the interconnections of 
actors with each other (Rhodes, 1988) and understand their common values and interests 
(if there were any) to mobilise and integrate them (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003) to form and 
implement the policy (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). As a well-known attempt, few aspects of the 
advocacy coalition framework are used to interpret the crucial role of policy brokers in 
compromising the policy components as well as the position of different advocacy 
coalitions in affecting the policy agenda and the process of implementation. Adopting this, I 
was aware of Buse et al's claim that the model works fairly well in explaining policy 
reforms over a decade in relatively decentralized, open, federal, and pluralistic political 
systems such as the USA (Buse et al, 2005, p. 133), a very different context from Iran. 
The third frame treats implementation as a process of interpretation by identifying 
important forces that were overlooked by the more instrumentally-oriented administrative 
and bargaining frames. It emphasizes actors' understanding, priorities, and discourse, 
pointing to the possibility of delayed consequences of implementation such as changing 
actors' beliefs, norms, and values. Although the 'Multiple Streams' framework by Kingdon 
(2003) is not categorized as an approach to implementation, I incorporated that into the 
framework. The approach is an explicit attempt at applying the insights of the 
organizational 'Garbage Can' logic of temporality, timing and chance to the national 
political system, albeit it is more specifically directed at understanding the policy process. 
The core of the framework for Kingdon is that the policy process can be conceptualized as 
distinct streams of problems, policy and politics, and the coupling of these streams that 
enables the setting of the agenda for new political initiatives and their respective 
development. The perspective has also been used to analyse the entire process of 
interests while making a decision (Zahariadis, 1995). A further contribution of the 
interpretive frame is its focus on diversity among actors. However, Harrison (2004) claims 
that there are few clear guidelines for applying the frame in research and most of these 
studies concentrate on policy formulation more than on implementation (see more in 
Chapter 10). 
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The fourth frame looks at implementation in terms of the institutional structuring of political 
processes and organizational practices. It emphasizes the ways that social and political 
institutions structure interactions among stakeholders. Institutional arrangements shape 
both the substance and the process of policy making (Epsing-Anderson, 1994). The frame 
provides a valuable supplement to the distinctive concerns of the other analytical frames 
and draws attention to ways that policy making is embedded in social structures and 
norms that extend beyond the formal political system. As particular contributions to the 
framework, I used the advantages of the Institutional Rational Choice perspective 
developed by Scharpf (1997) and Ostrom (1999), to explain action and motivation of 
central policy makers as well as staff within a structural context of health system in rural 
areas. This encompasses an interest for rational agents pursuing their self interests as 
well as interest for how institutions affect this behaviour. Actors can be a group, functioning 
as a 'composite actor', which can include as many of the actors involved in the policy 
process such as: interest organizations, influential policy makers, purchaser/provider, etc. 
Rather than analysing the internal actions of one organization, it can often treat the 
organization as a single actor. On this basis, the framework perceives the policy process 
as a strategic interaction between actors, like a 'game'. The theory is also good in 
providing a dynamic link between the micro and the macro levels which is often missing in 
other approaches. I used this frame to understand composite actors, either individuals or 
organizations, their preferences and mutual interaction, and the role of ideas and 
ideologies to shape, perceive and implement family medicine and rural insurance. 
To make the fourth frame more comprehensive, I incorporated some aspects of 
communication models into it. I used the principal-agent perspective to illustrate how 
particular individuals acted as governmental delegates, as well as how their own norms 
and values affected the policy implementation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003). In particular, the 
perspective was useful to explain the purchaser-provider split, as well as lack of 
decentralization in Iran, which is important to increase quality of services and practitioners' 
satisfaction (Bossert et al, 2003). 
Figure 2.1 illustrates how four components of the framework are used to explain various 
dimensions of implementation of FM in Chapter 10. In summary, each framework focuses 
attention on different aspects of implementation and emphasizes different outcomes. The 
multiple frames illuminate possible consequences of policy implementation that might be 
overlooked if only one is used. In addition, the framework fairly accommodates five political 
science approaches/theories that can explain formation and implementation of a policy: 
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Figure 2.1 The four-fold framework and the link of each frame to explain findings. 
institutional, group and network, socio-economic, ideas-based approaches, plus rational 
choice theory (John, 2002). Though the approaches usually co-exist in political science at 
the same time, they have also emerged in reaction to each other, and as response to the 
failures of earlier accounts of policy change and variation. A further advantage is that apart 
from some particular theories and approaches that are incorporated into this thesis, its 
general concept has been successfully used to analyse health system reforms in the 
United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Sweden (Harrison, 2004). 
Nonetheless, it is important to contextualize the health policy environment in order to 
understand the challenges to methodology and theory. Furthermore, no prescription or 
advice to policy makers is worth much if it is not based on an understanding of the world of 
policy making (Klein & Marmor, 2005). Having in mind that most ideas and concepts in 
policy analysis are derived from studies in high income countries, transferring such 
concepts into the middle income setting like Iran needs to be undertaken with caution 
(Walt et al, 2008). The thesis investigate the applicability of theories in the context of health 
system reform in Iran. 
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Chapter 3 Literature review: A synthesis of empirical studies to 
identify facilitators of and barriers to implementation 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a synthesis of studies of implementation of health sector reform, 
focusing on identifying facilitators and barriers. Despite many studies having been 
conducted, there is little in the literature to categorize such factors and explain their role in 
the policy process: 
`Similar reform programmes may have very different expression in different country 
contexts and there is a need for detailed studies of implementation processes. At 
the same time, common analytical categories need to be found to facilitate some 
comparison across such individual case studies' (Atkinson, 1999). 
To bridge this gap, the aim was to identify factors that affect the implementation process. It 
not only analyses and purposefully categorizes facilitators and obstacles, but it also 
creates a practical framework for the empirical research in the thesis. In addition, methods 
for studying implementation are identified to be feed into the design of the thesis, and a 
dynamic model of implementation to underpin the research is proposed. 
1 Developing a three stage model for structured review 
Studies were included if they evaluated and investigated implementation in the health 
sector and identified facilitators of and/or obstacles to the implementation in any country of 
world. Studies were excluded if they: 
" were not original research, 
" could not pass quality check on the basis of Blaxter's criteria (2000) for qualitative 
research (Appendix VII), and 
" were in languages other than English. 
A three-stage model was developed to guide the review. First, Medline and Embase were 
searched (1999-2006) using keywords: implementation, implementing, facilitators, 
obstacles, barriers, obscuring, hampering, policy, health, reform, and public policy in a 
variety of combinations. 188 articles were found, 17 of which were excluded because of 
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language. 95 articles did not meet the relevance criteria after reading their abstracts. 64 
papers were excluded, either because of their relevance or quality. The remaining 12 
articles were included. The result of searching the Cochrane database (Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons) to find any systematic review was negative. 
Second, material was gathered through a manual search of key journals known to me and 
my advisors (Ferlie, 1997). Ten key journals (Health Policy and Planning; British Medical 
Journal; Health and Social Care in the Community; Social Science and Medicine; Journal 
of Public Health Policy; Journal of Health and Social Policy; Health care Policy; Health 
Services Management Research; Health Policy; and Journal of Health Services Research 
and Policy) were hand searched from May 1999 to May 2006. Out of thel 03 studies found, 
21 were identified irrelevant after reading their abstracts. 15 articles were excluded on the 
ground of poor quality. 64 articles overlapped with the first stage findings, out of which 8 
were commonly included. The remaining 3 articles were also added to the included list. 
In the third stage, papers cited in the included studies were searched. By evaluating 
against inclusion and quality criteria, three more studies were added. After the first round 
of data extraction, the list of excluded and included papers was checked again, and 
extracted data were re-examined. Any doubt or discrepancy was solved by reference to 
the original papers. 18 papers were included in the main study (see Appendix VI for the 
specification of studies). 
The assessment of quality was based on Blaxter's criteria (2000). They included: checking 
questions; testing general aspects; methods; analysis techniques; presentation; and 
ethical considerations. Altogether there were 20 questions in the criteria, some of which 
were divided into 1-3 sub-questions. All papers were assessed by me and by another 
researcher. The final evaluation of the quality of each paper was considered as the mean 
of the two assessments. Papers were included in the review if the overall opinion of 
evaluators showed that 15 or more questions were met. Details of this assessment 
process can be found in Appendix VII. Critics may argue that the approach is too 
subjective. However, the selected studies used different theoretical and methodological 
approaches and presented findings which contradicted as well as supported each other. 
Studies were synthesized using narrative synthesis. The effectiveness of single strategies 
and different combinations of strategies were realized in the analysis. 
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2 Design and methods of studies 
Qualitative methods were used in the majority of papers; mostly individual interviews and 
some group interviews (focus groups) for data collection. Quantitative methods such as 
surveys and secondary data analysis were used in six and seven studies respectively. 
One study was a randomised controlled trial (Kinsman et al; 1999). Another used small 
scale ethnography to understand some cultural issues. 
Samples in many studies were not intended to be representative, but attempted to 
maximize the variation of participants and give a balance of views by sampling participants 
from an interested group and from a non-interested one. Plaza et al (2001) was one of the 
few studies which used both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Studies were based in many countries including South Africa, New Zealand, Colombia, 
Bangladesh, Canada, Russia, Zambia, India, Uganda, and UK. Most studies investigated 
both facilitators and obstacles, with a greater emphasis on obstacles. The review had no 
geographical inclusion criteria, but included articles covered a diverse socioeconomic and 
cultural group of countries that were different form Iran. Therefore, applicability of findings 
here must be tested in the Iranian context. Given the general lack of such literature in Iran 
and the purpose of this Chapter, such diversity can be considered as a benefit. Moreover, 
identified categories of facilitators and obstacles were tailored in the data collection based 
on the Iranian background. The feasibility study (Chapter 5) and reflexive data collection 
were main techniques to do so. 
In general, three interrelated factors influenced implementation of change in the health 
sector: the means by which the policy was introduced to the workforce; the use of the 
policy model by service providers; and the broader service context. Facilitators of and 
obstacles to implementation varied in accordance with many factors including: nature of 
implementation; cultural, educational, and socio- economic situation; level of 
implementers' involvement; financial concerns; effects on interests of involved groups; 
degree of required changes; governmental structure; and degree of decentralization. 
Facilitators and obstacles are categorized in the following sections. Some of the 
subgroups overlap and could be accommodated under a different heading. 
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3 Facilitators 
Facilitators of implementation are categorized into four main groups: good communication; 
universal agreement; proper logistics; and supportive political context. 
3.1 Good communication 
3.1.1 Mass Media 
In attempts to implement the AIDS policy in South Africa (Schneider & Stein, 2001), a 
number of NGOs also offered models of prevention programmes that set a standard for 
the government. One example was Soul City, a multimedia "edutainment" strategy which 
penetrated the most rural parts of South Africa, and it consistently outstripped other soap 
operas in viewership and listenership, and won numerous awards. 
3.1.2 Auditing performance 
Gill & Ahmed (2004) and Danishevski et al (2006) highlight how effective monitoring the 
performance of implementers was to ensure right implementation of policies. 
3.1.3 Feedback exchange 
Atkinson (1999) explains using suggestion boxes as a channel for the expression of a 
population's viewpoint; however its impact is limited as a result of illiteracy. There are also 
channels such as health committees for passing information from the health centre to the 
community with potential for two- way dialogue. 
3.2 Universal agreement 
The majority of actors' agreement on overall nature of the reform and consensus on the 
policy is one of the most influential factors to facilitate implementation. Such an ideal 
situation like in Lusaka, Zambia (Atkinson, 1999), where the rationale for and experiences 
of decentralized management are shared by all, rarely happens in implementation. In 
another study in New Zealand (Deviln et al, 2001), strategies attracted little controversy 
mainly because they were developed and largely built on existing policies. Such a 
consensus was also observed by Mosquera et al (2001). Kinsman et al (1999) mention 
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how agreement on policy between key players such as users and providers creates trust, 
which in turn enhances the universal agreement itself. 
3.2.1 Strong partnership between key stakeholders 
Gill & Ahmed (2004) nominate the key success of implementing their subject policy in 
Bangladesh as sustained partnerships between the key players. Family planning in 
Indonesia is another example of how strong partnerships moved the implementation 
forward into the agenda (Shiffman, 2004). In a study of health sector reform in New 
Zealand (Deviln et al, 2001), the importance of partnership was also mentioned with much 
emphasis on providing an opportunity for different ethnic groups to have their share in the 
process of policy making and implementation. 
Schneider & Stein (2001) highlight the key role of individuals and groups, both inside and 
outside the government to challenge and provide a critical mirror for both the government 
and the society in the long-term success of the AIDS policy implementation in South 
Africa. Successes in the Indonesian experience of implementing a controversial policy like 
family planning in the context of the Islamic beliefs (Shiffman, 2004), was because policy 
makers did not circumvent religious opposition and did not push forward in spite of it from 
the very beginning, but rather engaged religious leaders and modified the policy in 
response to their concerns. 
3.2.2 Dedicated individuals 
Walker and Gilson (2004) mainly demonstrated barrier to the Implementation of a new 
policy (fee removal) in their article. One of a few exemptions of facilitators was the higher 
level of cooperation, efficiency and commitment among staff in the smallest, least 
resourced and the most over-crowded clinic in their study. The facility co-ordinator in this 
clinic was highly motivated, very organized, dedicated and positive in spite of extremely 
difficult working conditions. Gill & Ahmed (2004) and Kinsman et at (1999) also address a 
similar situation in different settings. 
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3.2.3 Implementers' sense of ownership 
Shiffman (2004) quotes from an Indonesian official to indicate the necessity of portraying 
the role of all allies in implementation and making their position secure within the 
programme: 
'How do we manage the orchestra? By creating a sense of ownership so they do 
not feel they have been directed by the conductor, but rather have played 
voluntarily, joined in as participants'. 
Customizing the reform in an understandable manner through the providers' contribution 
enhances their sense of ownership. Kaner et al (2003) mention that service providers 
preferred to customize the current model rather than rejecting it, by multidisciplinary input 
to the process of reconfiguring services, particularly from those working `at the local face': 
'We've got it, why keep reinventing it, and why keep getting other models from 
goodness knows where? ' 
Moreover, Walker & Gilson (2004) report the positive effects of user fee's removal on 
practitioners' feeling about the reform. They highlight that 44% of the survey respondents 
(nurses) strongly agreed with the statement that 'implementing free care has been 
rewarding' for them personally and 59% indicated (as either very important or important) 
that they felt more 'professionally fulfilled as a result of the free care policy'. 
3.2.4 Public support 
Plaza et al (2001) claim that their studied reform radically transformed the Colombian 
health care system within a short period of time. Such a rapid big bang of a radical new 
reform was unique in the recent health sector reforms in the Latin America and in the 
history of political reforms in Colombia (Bertranou, 1999). During the first five years of 
implementation, it survived three governments and five ministers of health with different 
opinions and views, therefore attracted the public support. My interpretation is that the 
public supports whatever benefit is given to them to enjoy benefits of such a policy, 
however, the problem occurs when policy tends to change something or take it away, 
which brings the public opposition and makes that extremely difficult for implementation. 
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Strong public support also facilitated implementing general practice in Russia (Rese et 
al, 2005), and evaluating and explaining the new policy of emergency obstetric care in 
Bangladesh (Gill & Ahmed, 2004). 
Walker & Gilson (2004) indicate positive effects of fee removal on public support and 
community health, particularly on widening access to health services as the most 
successful aspects of free primary care. 
3.3 Proper logistics 
Preparing adequate resources and conducting a pilot study prior to the universal 
expansion of implementation was addressed as a facilitator of implementing change in 
health systems. 
3.3.1 Adequate resources 
Particular attention to appropriate resource allocation including human resources, 
equipment and finance is crucial for successful implementation. Gill & Ahmed (2004) 
report over-utilization of services because of either improved performance or better 
equipment in local communities. 
3.3.2 Pilot study prior to universal expansion of the policy 
Rese et al (2005), Gill & Ahmed (2004), Plaza et al (2001), and Shiffman (2004) all portray 
the extent to which the pilot implementation of policies before its universal expansion 
facilitate the main implementation by identifying influential barriers in advance. 
3.4 The political background 
Decentralization and good political leadership are discussed in this section. 
3.4.1 Decentralization 
Kaner et al (2003) mention that the majority of their respondents branded decentralization 
as the most important reform achievement to date. They addressed improvement in the 
relationship between the centre and periphery as well as the growing credibility of the 
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reform following decentralization, as a facilitator of implementation. Lavis et al (2001) also 
address the same finding in Canada, however, they caution the need to balance the desire 
for local autonomy in decision making against national consistency in provision, like 
Schneider & Stein's (2001) study on the implementation of the AIDS policy in South Africa. 
3.4.2 Political management and leadership 
Shiffman (2004) points out impacts of political management on efficient implementation of 
a policy. The BKKBN (National Family Planning Coordination Board), as the public 
organization in Indonesia responsible for resource provision and generating 
implementation support, was legitimized through integration of its activities into the 
government structure. Even though the process was against decentralization, it was 
successful in that particular context. This shows the importance of contextual background 
as well as socio-cultural considerations in implementation. The authoritarian 
characteristics afforded Indonesian bureaucrats unusual power. 
Adversely, some degree of centralization facilitated the implementation of a complex task 
like AIDS in the decentralized background of South Africa (Schneider & Stein , 
2001), 
where the government had a central role to lead, fund, and implement a comprehensive 
response to AIDS. The final authority rested with a coordinating structure in the president's 
office at national and the Prime Ministers' offices at provincial level (NACOSA, 1994). In 
1994, AIDS was declared a 'Presidential Lead Project', which highlighted the special 
status of the AIDS programme and early access to resources set aside for reconstruction 
and development. Good leadership mobilized and coordinated a range of actors across a 
multitude of social and sectoral divides around a common vision in that programme, the 
type of leadership called 'management of meaning' (Smircich & Morgan, 1982). Walker and 
Gilson (2004) also address the positive impacts of high political support on 
implementation. Facilitators of implementation are summarized in Table 3.1. 
4 Obstacles 
Interestingly, the same factors which facilitate implementing a change could hamper that in 
another way, depending on many contextual factors. Identified obstacles to 
implementation are categorized into four groups: approach to make the policy, 
inappropriate communication, improper logistics, and unsupportive political context. 
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Table 3.1 Facilitators of implementation 
I 1- Good Communication " 
Mass Media 
" Auditing performance 
" Feedback exchange 
" Common Language 
0 
ii 
2- Universal Agreement 
\ý 
" Clarity of Policy Guidance 
" Strong Partnership 
" Trust 
" Enthusiasm 
" Dedicated Individuals 
" Sense of Ownership 
" Public Support 
Human 
" Adequate Resources " Financial 3- Proper Logistics " Pilot Study L" Equipment 
" Financial incentives 
" Short Distance 
4- Political Context 
" Decentralized system/Local power 
" Political Management 
" Leadership 
" Bureaucratic Culture 
" Content and Clarity of the Policy 
4.1 Inappropriate policy making 
Top-down approaches to define the policy, conflict of interest, making vague policies, and 
lack of evidence-based policy making are described in this section. 
4.1.1 A top-down approach to the policy 
Many studies address barriers to implementation in relation to imposition of policies, 
calling for consultation with stakeholders including service providers, the public, and local 
policy makers to make a policy. Kaner et al (2003) report that most respondents in their 
study had no introduction and no opportunity to express an opinion about the reform. The 
flow of information was perceived to be one-way from management to service providers 
with minimal interaction, which ended in their anger and feeling undervalued. Developing 
policies outside the local area appears to generate suspicion amongst the respondents. 
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Whereas, customizing the policy with service providers' engagement unites them in the 
view that there should be multidisciplinary input into the process of reconfiguring services, 
particularly from those working at the coal face (obid). 
Even in a decentralized context such as Canada, it was crucial to understand who makes 
the policy (Watt et al, 2005). The question is who should make the decision and on what 
basis (Harrison et al, 2000). Walker and Gilson (2004) explain how broadly isolated the 
overwhelming majority of participants felt by imposing a policy on them with no priori 
advocacy. They considered themselves excluded from the policy process, feeling their 
experience and expertise were overlooked. Mosquera et al (2001) explain that it ended up 
with lack of trust and participation, which in general led to a sense of disregard for the 
policy. 
4.1.2 Conflict of interests 
Many policies create conflict in the interests of stakeholders, bureaucrats, the public and 
media; lack of advocacy and imposing policies could flare the conflict up. Lavis et al (2001) 
report severe reactions to the information which was against the interest of stakeholders 
that supported the status quo. Gill & Ahmed (2004) address being unwelcome to the 
parallel health systems of the Directorate of Health Services and the Directorate of Family 
Planning in Bangladesh, which posed particular challenges in building up a viable referral 
system. 
Schneider & Stein (2001) point out the conflict of views between the minister of health in 
South Africa, who created controversy by unexpectedly announcing at a large conference 
that AIDS was to be made notifiable, and the medical research council along with other 
institutions which were strongly opposed to notification. Bergen & While (2005) also 
introduced conflicts with professional values. 
4.1.3 Vague policies 
Some studied policies are vulnerable to individuals' interpretation because of the lack of 
clarification which leads to rigidity in practice and quality of services. Kaner at al (2003) 
argue that ambiguity in tier definitions of implementing mental health policy in the UK 
ended in that practitioners interpret cases in ways which are beneficial to themselves or 
their agency, rather than in the best interests of users. Danishevski et al (2006) also report 
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that service providers felt they were already working at full capacity, therefore unable to 
accept further additions to their case loads. Harrison et al (2000) demonstrate their 
respondents' own interpretation about crowded hospitals and overworked nurses, which 
made them decide they could not afford proper implementation. In addition, a controversial 
study subject such as abortion made implementation more vulnerable to individuals' 
interpretation. Abortion in the case of rape or incest and saving women's lives received 
significantly more support than abortion on request or abortion for women in poor social or 
economic circumstances. 
4.1.4 Lack of evidence-based policy 
Watt et al (2005) explain how implementing a change in the length of stay at hospitals in 
the Ontario province of Canada was about to fail because of no evidence suggesting a 
longer length of stay is universally beneficial. Practitioners deliberately did not even tell 
women about the policy and actively discouraged extended stays based on accepted 
standards of their practice. Walker & Gilson (2004) mention how a valid theory of cause 
and effect underlay the policy, and the removal of fees anticipatory promoted increased 
utilization. 
4.2 Poor communication 
Improper communication and lack of trust among stakeholders are mentioned here. 
4.2.1 Improper communication 
Indirect communication between involved agencies creates a serious barrier to 
implementation. Kaner et al (2003) highlight widening distance between service providers 
due to the habitual use of paper communication. Furthermore, some respondents reported 
that information was not shared equally across different professional groups or that it was 
sometimes actively withheld, which lowered their lack of ownership. 
Plaza et al (2001) identify lack of communication and training in their study on expansion 
of insurance in Colombia; this resulted in many of the poor, who were to benefit from the 
expansion, not knowing how the system is supposed to work nor their own rights. Some 
people even applied for multiple insurance cards, assuming that if one is good, two must 
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be better. Atkinson (1999) also branded poor communication within the clinics and 
between professionals and health authorities as the key barrier. 
4.2.2 Lack of trust 
In hope to improve efficiency in the New Zealand health sector, a policy was defined, but 
was never implemented (Delvin et al, 2001). Disappointing outcomes of that policy 
provided a sharp contrast with the overoptimistic expectations of its proponents. 
4.3 Inadequate preparation 
Lack of proper logistics, inappropriate financial incentives, and insufficient training are the 
three categories of barriers in this section. 
4.3.1 Improper logistics 
There are many reasons for lack of appropriate logistics in implementation. Kaner et al 
(2003) address an ambiguous policy which does not verify needed materials as well as 
practitioners' feeling of being over- stretched, that ends in excessive referral of users while 
resources are insufficient. Rese et al (2005) report that directors of GP training centres 
identified the need to improve the vague federal regulatory framework. Plaza et al (2001) 
explain how considerable logistics shortages at the beginning of the implementation 
resulted in frequent abuse by the insurance companies which enrolled people without 
issuing insurance cards, thereby receiving premiums without providing services. Kinsman 
et al (1999) also mention time constraint as a common barrier. 
Many studies reported numerous human resource, financial, and logistic barriers to 
implementation. Harrison et al (2000) argue that although reproductive health services 
were being overall reformed in KwaZulu/Natal province in South Africa, but women were 
still perceiving a need for more extensive services and better quality of care (Fonn et 
al, 1998). Despite the policy emphasis on abortion, health care providers at most hospitals 
and clinics refused to provide abortion, or to be trained to do so, hindering implementation 
of the Act (ICSP, 1998), which left a population of over two million women of reproductive 
age without adequate access to abortion services. Gill & Ahmed (2004) also identify 
logistics insufficiency as the major constraints to implementation of obstetric emergency 
care in rural Bangladesh, where trained health personnel are concentrated in urban areas 
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for financial, security and family concerns. Mosquera et al (2001) and Sinha et al (2006) 
also portray impacts of lack of basic equipment (office equipment, supplies, telephones, 
and transport) on implementation in other settings. 
4.3.2 Lack of financial incentives 
Rese et al (2005) report that many respondents in their study on implementing GP practice 
in Russia commented about the large discrepancy between the GPs' average monthly 
income in state and private primary care facilities (2091 roubles v 13820 roubles), which 
ended in a very tough monetary condition for newly trained GPs. Insufficient funds was 
also the reason for improper logistics. 
Introducing free care or fee removal is another incentive which causes over-utilization of 
services from one side, and probable public satisfaction from another. Walker & Gilson 
(2004) state that 85% of their respondents (nurses) complained about their substantial 
workload rise because of the new policy (free care), which caused serious compromise in 
key elements of their professional practice. Over-utilization of services which inevitably 
reduced drug supply, deteriorated nurses' relationship with their patients as well as having 
a direct negative effects on personality and behaviour of the majority of nurses. Many 
nurses resigned from the clinics and moved into the private sector or abroad, perceiving 
that while patients benefited from new policies, their status deteriorated at the same time. 
4.3.3 Training insufficiency 
Schneider & Stein (2001) describe recruitment of new personnel with little knowledge of 
large bureaucracies, while they were left abandoned to make innovation in the policy. In a 
period where AIDS was a rapidly expanding but still a largely invisible problem, national 
and provincial governments naturally focused on other immediate priorities because of 
lack of knowledge and training to identify and tackle challenges, similar to Danishevski et 
al (2006) in the Russian context. 
4.4 Lack of political support 
Cultural and traditional values, information, institution, and inadequate political will are four 
groups of obstacles to be discussed in this section. 
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4.4.1 Cultural, traditional, and religious concerns 
Harrison et al (2000) point out a few religious and cultural concerns which influence the 
implementation of a new policy (termination of pregnancy) in South Africa. Many nurses in 
their study felt they would be killing another human being if they participated in providing 
abortions, arguing that the hospital was established to save people's lives not to remove 
them. Beyond opposition to abortion itself, in South Africa as in other settings, legalization 
alone cannot halt unsafe abortion, as access often remains a problem due to ignorance to 
the law among women and medical staff, judgmental attitudes toward women seeking 
abortion, and complicated procedures to obtain an abortion (Bennett, 1999). In addition to 
practitioners' concerns, the study also reported users' conflicts over the new policy at 
many levels, arguing that the new law would encourage young women to be irresponsible 
for their sexual behaviour. Nevertheless, in certain specific circumstances, particularly 
rape and incest, both nurses and users agreed. This distinction says much about the 
community norms. 
Gill & Ahmed (2004) identify socio- cultural barriers to implementation including women's 
lack of decision making power within their households as well as poverty. 
Shiffman (2004) discusses a very typical example of religious conflict before implementing 
family planning in Indonesia. Most family planning programmes in countries with 
predominantly Islamic population have faced difficulties in promoting the use of 
contraceptives. One reason is the clerics' orientation, many of whom view family planning 
as the replacement of the will of God with that of individuals in regard to reproduction. 
Kumar & Gantley (1999) highlight some ethical considerations and traditional barriers. 
4.4.2 Informational barriers 
Lavis et al (2001) convey some of their respondents' feelings concerning the availability of 
the wrong type of data for them. A few people were concerned that the information was not 
getting to the right people in the right way. One participant highlighted the importance of 
approaching this information differently. Idea- related barriers were cited more than twice 
as often in this study, probably because of conflicts between the policy implications of 
information and current organization philosophies, priorities, or strategies (value- related 
barriers). 
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Plaza et al (2001) address the non coordinated flow of information, meaning that on one 
hand, there was a proliferation of unneeded and duplicated information, and on the other 
hand, those who needed information to make decisions often did not have access to it, 
particularly at the central level. Mosquera et al (2001) also highlight information imbalance, 
while Sinha et al (2006) mention lack of information as a barrier. Watt et al (2005) notice 
the same group of problems in the context of a high income country: Canada. 
4.4.3 Institutional and organizational barriers 
Rese et al (2005) argue that despite a major investment in training GPs in Russia to 
become family doctors, trainees faced major barriers in applying what they had learned 
because of opposition from senior doctors, unreformed financing structures, and scarcity 
of equipment. Administrative staff, specialists in polyclinics and hospital physicians who 
saw their professional dominance being undermined, also opposed the policy. 
Lavis et al (2001) list a group of barriers related to who would win and who would lose 
(interest-related barriers) while the policy is implemented as well as those related to how 
decisions are made (institution-related barriers). In addition, they criticized the existing 
government partnerships for lack of accountability to address issues which cross a 
departmental or governmental boundary. Providing yet another perspective, a federal 
health policy maker branded the trade agreements between Canada and other countries 
as a barrier to interventions related to the policy. 
Schneider & Stein (2001) explain how difficult defining responsibilities and coordinating 
actions were between spheres of government in the context of quasi-federalism and 
evolving decentralization to implement the AIDS policy in South Africa. Roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships might be clear on paper, but they are complex in 
practice. Despite the achievements of that presidential led project, some evidence suggest 
that initiatives at the presidential level have not necessarily been successful, which could 
indicate the lack of an overarching social development framework within the government 
(Marais, 1997). 
Plaza et al (2001) point out difficulties in coordinating and organizing health sector reform 
at the national level in Colombia, while institutions at the local level had limited 
understanding of the overall scope of the reform and how crucial their role was in the 
process. Conflicting messages were also common in that reform. Additionally, Mosquera 
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et al (2001) identify the lack of integration within the system and deficiency of knowledge 
concerning the responsibilities and roles of each institution which confronted both flow of 
resources and information channels. 
Watt et at (2005) brand organizational context as the major barrier to extension of hospital 
stay in Canada. Ironically, the length of stay at hospitals was being extended 
simultaneously with downsizing of hospitals. They had anticipated a high rate of 
acceptance of the offer and were convinced that resources were not available to 
implement the policy. 
4.4.4 Inadequate political will 
Schneider & Stein (2001) mention inadequate political willingness as the reason for lack of 
progress in implementing the AIDS policy in post-apartheid South Africa. The study 
exemplifies the difficulties of implementing an ambitious programme through a weak and 
inherited administration undergoing restructuring at every level. It also categorizes the 
inadequacy of political commitment as an explanatory variable, highlighting the role of 
leadership to mobilize and coordinate a broad and multi-sectional response to a complex 
policy such as AIDS. 
Atkinson (1999) argues that sitting at a critical veto point position highlights how policy 
implementation may be blocked or transformed during implementation. She mentions 
three groups of veto points. First, the Minister of Health who retains an immense amount 
of power in the health system and his reformulation of health bill has radically altered its 
nature. This happened in spite of opposition from the powerful donor community which 
significantly drove and funded the reform process. Second, decentralization itself may 
have created a new or stronger veto point by giving more power to the district managers 
over their own financial resources. Finally, the concept of citizen participation, which is 
very strong in the policy document, is weakened at each level in the system. Health 
workers' refusal to provide abortion services in Harrison et al (2000) confers power as veto 
points on them, in the sense that they can deny services to women seeking care. This 
refusal also has seized the moral high ground in a dialogue where the voices of women 
seeking access to care have not always been heard. 
Identified obstacles to implementation are summarized in Table 3.2. 
64 
Table 3.2 Obstacles to implementation 
" Top-down Approach to the Policy, no Advocacy 
" Conflict of Interests 
Different Interpretations of Policies 
" Who Makes the Policy 
5 Discussion 
I- inappropnate Policy Context 
Policy Making " Unclear Definitions 
No Monitoring System 
" No Evidence-Base 
" Different Interpretations 
" Language Difficulties I 
2-Poor " Communicating Problems Between User & Provider 
Communication " Lack of Trust 
" Lack of Participation 
" Lack of Literacy 
r Improper Logistics 
3- Inappropriate 
Preparation 
4- Unsupportive 
Political Context 
Conflict with Current Responsibilities J 
t-. -1 
" Time Constraints 
" Financial Shortcomings: Lack of Funds 
" Veto Points 
" No Monitoring System 
" Training Insufficiencies 
" Level ot Decentralisation 
" Severe Central Control 
" Traditional, Cultural & Religious Concerns 
" Barriers Informational 
" Unsuccessful Precedents . Institutional Inadequate Political Will 
" Organisational 
"Ethical Considerations 
mbiguity in Responsibilities 
Implementation has a dynamic nature. The same factors can either facilitate or obstruct 
the implementation depending on the context. When more facilitators exist, the predicted 
gap between the policy and the outcome is narrower, and vice versa when obstacles are 
dominant. The facilitators and barriers in this model are based on the findings of this 
synthesis, and therefore are conditional on further studies. The model and the concept 
behind it seem to work in any implementation experience. 
This review provided evidence that studying implementation is a two-way process, where 
all components of the implementation cycle affect its process. The synthesis also clarified 
that intended policies are subject to change, modification, reshaping, and even withdrawal 
during the implementation process. Factors which act as facilitators of and obstacles to 
implementation function as a double-edged sword. The factor which facilitates the 
implementation of policy X, can hamper implementing of policy Y, and vice versa. Context 
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determines whether a factor is a facilitator or obstacle. For instance, even though 
decentralization facilitated the implementation of policies in some settings (Harrison et 
al, 2000; Lavis et al, 2001; Gill & Ahmed, 2004; Watt et al, 2005), a strong centralized system 
pushed a controversial policy like family planning to the top of the agenda and significantly 
contributed to its successful implementation in another political environment 
(Shiffman, 2004). 
Conflict of interests of different stakeholders could blunt the implementations process, but 
could be tackled through greater cooperation (Lavis et al, 2001). However, such an 
approach might accentuate the gap between those who readily change and those who are 
more resistant to change, ending in an increased variation in care for service users (Firth- 
Cozen, 1997). Involving individuals and organizations ensures that they are not lost in the 
process and improves their cooperation (Nutbeam, 1997). Potential winners and losers with 
political influence must never be absent during policy development (O'Neil & Pederson, 
1992). It is necessary to understand the perspectives of all stakeholders in the system 
before attempting to implement changes in practice (Grol, 1997). Particularly, public 
support is key to the success in any implementation (Plaza et al, 2001) and relies on proper 
communication. Developing policies outside the local area appears to generate suspicion 
amongst the respondents: 
'Successful implementation of new models for service delivery and organization is 
unlikely if those responsible for delivering care are not part of the process of 
change' (Fitzgerald et al, 2003). 
Local and national stakeholders' support and their universal agreement on reform 
significantly facilitates the implementation. This approach is congruent with the tenets of 
complexity theory, which encourages a shift in thinking about health care organizations 
from mechanistic black boxes, in which rational technical fixes produce predictable 
outcomes, to complex adaptive systems with dynamic and unpredictable properties 
founded on relationships between different stakeholder groups (Sweeney & 
Mannion, 2002). 
Different interpretations by providers must also be taken into account. They interpret and 
adapt policy changes initiated at higher levels in ways that not only shape the policy, but 
may also lead to unexpected outcomes. Policy success may, in effect, have been limited 
by the manner in which providers exercise their discretion in implementation. 
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Mass media is one of the most influential tools (Schneider & Stein, 2001), overlooking its 
role hampers implementation. 
Employing managerial tools like check lists to audit implementation on the basis of 
specified criteria linked to the policy goals, and auditing practitioners' performance as well 
as relating their earning partly to their performance, by conducting independent and 
unbiased audits could provide effective feedbacks to put evidence-based inputs into the 
implementation cycle (Gill & Ahmed, 2004; Danishevski et al, 2006). 
Communication between different stakeholders has undeniable impact on implementation. 
Atkinson (1999) reports how effective communication with patients opened channels for 
population viewpoints to reshape the policy. In addition, it enhances partnership between 
different stakeholders (Gill & Ahmed, 2004) and worsens providers' cooperation 
(Atkinson, 1999; Shiffman, 2004). On the other hand, poor communication, such as 
excluding stakeholders from the process of policy making (Harrison et al, 2000; Walker & 
Gilson, 2004), ends in contradictory interpretations of policy which blunts implementation. 
Logistics has a vital role in any implementation. Even though dedicated individuals and 
ambitious service providers can compensate many shortages (Gill & Ahmed, 2004; 
Kinsman et al, 1999), most studies suggested that proper logistics( including human, 
financial, and equipment) facilitates implementation and vice versa (Gill & Ahmed, 2004; 
Rese et al, 2005; Walker & Gilson, 2004). Inappropriate logistics widens the gap between 
the intended policy and the actual outcome. However, proper preparation before 
implementation does not guarantee its success, because of the dynamic nature of 
implementation. 
Even though reducing user fees enhanced utilization of services in some studies (Gill & 
Ahmed, 2004; Walker & Gilson, 2004), it may also cause a moral hazard that results in 
over-utilisation if not carefully introduced (Takian & Kabir, 2007). 
The political environment is a fundamental factor in facilitating or obstructing the 
implementation. Political leadership has a major impact. Supportive leadership is a key to 
success (Schneider & Stein, 2001; Shiffman, 2004), whereas inadequate political will 
endangers the process (Schneider & Stein, 2001). Determined political support is strong 
enough to facilitate or hamper implementation even when others are pushing it adversely 
(Shiffman, 2004). 
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Traditional, cultural, and religious values are important variables and must be respected 
even in secular societies, otherwise implementation may fail (Harrison et al, 2000; Gill & 
Ahmed, 2004; Shiffman, 2004; Kumar & Gantley, 1999). 
6 Conclusions 
This review has revealed a dynamic model of implementation which connects different 
factors that influence the implementation of a public policy. It has contributed to my 
understanding of implementation and the impact of various factors. It also clarifies the 
double function of same factors and the variety of variables which convert such factors to 
either a facilitator or an obstacle. Moreover, it reveales the mechanisms by which different 
factors take various roles to perform as facilitators or obstacles, as well as factors which 
determine such a process. Exceptions may apply to a few factors which specifically affect 
the implementation of some policies in particular settings, which are important to consider 
during the data collection phase of the thesis. Given the lack of qualitative research in the 
health system on Iran, this synthesis provides evidence of the applicability of qualitative 
methods to address the objectives of this thesis. 
The findings contributed to the methodology for the empirical research that follows. The 
value of qualitative methods to investigate facilitators and obstacles became apparent. I 
also saw practical examples on sampling methods, which assisted the sampling process of 
the thesis. Furthermore, It provided eight practical lessons, which are presented below. 
First, the health policy makers' position is very important in implementation. They act as 
the intellectual leaders within government, and sometimes outside of it, to help frame the 
policy in the language of other stakeholders' values. Programmes for clarifying policies 
and gaining an understanding of health workers' concerns regarding the intended policy 
are also very important. Such programmes could be workshops designed to develop a 
framework for assisting health workers to relate their values and beliefs to the needs of 
their clients. Health workers' resistance is a powerful impediment to access to care. In the 
balance between people who need services and health care workers who provide those, 
users will continue to lose until this debate is resolved. The above mentioned programmes 
might facilitate removing this challenge. 
Second, political issues, particularly in decentralized systems, have an effect at several 
levels. There is a need for supportive legal and regulatory frameworks at the central level 
68 
to allow regional authorities to develop locally applicable policies. An explicit human 
resources strategy should tackle staff motivation and retention. Incentives must be aligned 
with the goals of the reform and be system-wide, taking account of those working in 
different hierarchies such as primary and secondary care. Also, resources are needed to 
support change. For models that are moving from a system based on cheap, poor quality 
labour to one with fewer skilled people supported by modern technology, it is bound to be 
painful, eliciting opposition from those with most to lose. The process of change will 
inevitably require targeted investment and technical support. 
Third, policy makers should argue for institutional innovations within governments which 
will ensure that intended policies are not left out of decision-making processes. The 
success of efforts to build a policy also appears to depend on how decisions are made. In 
particular, success depends on institutional features like the extent of fragmentation of 
jurisdictional authority between departments and levels of government, the pattern of 
existing government partnerships, and the extent of accountability for addressing cross- 
departmental and cross-governmental issues. To overcome this barrier, steps need to be 
taken to establish cross-departmental or cross-governmental accountability for health. 
Again, action here depends in part on overcoming idea-related barriers. Consistency in 
this relationship is also important. If the government bureaucracy is a weak player, it 
should also be feasible for credible political leaders to harness the considerable energies 
available outside of the formal government. 
Fourth, policy implementation in any health care system also relies upon providers' 
commitment. Therefore, those responsible for delivering care need to be part of the 
process of change. Commitment to routine measurements and publication of key 
indicators of performance in implementation greatly improve the ability of politicians to 
justify and be held accountable for structural change and help the public to engage in 
informed debate. A template for such assessments could include indicators of the 
technical efficiency of providers, transaction costs as a proportion of total spending, 
horizontal equity (the extent to which those with similar needs receive similar services), 
reduction in the level of ill health and of health inequality attributable to health services, 
and users' experience of services (Devlin et al, 2001), or whatever criteria are endorsed as 
objectives of the implementation. Monitoring and evaluation sometimes identify a much 
more conflicting type of process. Conflict, however, does not need to be unproductive and 
delivers the possibility for progress by highlighting the gap between what is and what 
should be. 
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Fifth, particular attention must be paid to help actors at all levels who develop the 
institutional capacity to successfully carry out their intended functions. Clearly articulated 
ground rules at all institutional levels must also be readily available to convert theory into 
practice. Information about how the system functions and particularly the users' rights 
must be widely disseminated. The manner in which information is conveyed must be 
accessible for the users of the system to improve their demand capacity, which in turn will 
allow competitive forces to work. 
Sixth, establishing a solid institutional capacity is vital to effectively implement reform. 
Proper managerial instruments to function within a competitive market are also essential. 
Reform proposals should be accompanied by clearly stated and measurable objectives 
against which the new system's performance is monitored and scrutinised. Proposals for 
change should be accompanied by estimates of the transitional and ongoing costs. Policy 
analysis plays a role in this process by helping the various actors to understand their 
environments, and to recognize themselves to be better strategic or political actors (Walt & 
Gilson, 1994). 
Seventh, policy statements, no matter how convincing, cannot change health care practice 
on their own. Inhibiting factors must be addressed if policy is to be used as a tool to 
change practice. Policy makers need to carefully consider not only the intent and 
objectives of a policy and the evidence for and against alternative approaches, but also the 
contextual barriers faced by implementers. Importance of tailoring policy for local 
circumstances is clearly emphasized in the literature on modern implementation. 
And finally, it is also important to know that some radical reforms are at a certain brief 
political moment in time. Delaying implementation until all the necessary tools are ready 
would probably destroy the whole project. The choice sometimes is not between doing it 
correctly or doing it wrongly, it is between doing it hastily or not doing it at all 
(Takian, 2008). 
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Chapter 4: A description of family medicine in Iran 
Introduction 
In order to appreciate family medicine (FM) and the facilitators of and obstacles to its 
implementation, it is necessary to be familiar with the development of the policy. This 
chapter describes the history of primary care in Iran and the need for its reform; 
development of FM policy; preparatory measures to implement it; principles of 
implementing FM; reasons for its concurrent implementation with Behbar; and preliminary 
outcomes of implementation. The content of this chapter is based on a number of 
documents, including the policy, the operational instructions for implementation (several 
versions), reports by the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Welfare and other organizations, 
parliamentary bills and negotiation minutes, along with my observations and field notes. 
1 History of primary health care (PHC) in Iran 
Nationwide implementation of PHC networks started in 1981 in Iran with parliamentary 
approval (see Chapter 1 for more details). It was designed for both rural and urban areas, 
but in practice remained comprehensive in villages and loose in cities. As a result, 
dramatic improvements were obtained in health indices over the following 25 years. Some 
of the most important ones are presented below: 
1. General life expectancy rose from 46.7 to 71 (WHO, 2006); 
2. Reduction in maternal mortality rate from 140 to 27 in 100,000 life birth ; 
3. Decreased population growth from 3.9% to 1.2%; 
4. Decreased under-five deaths caused by diarrhoea and respiratory infection from 5 
& 7.8 in 1000 rural children in 1993, to 0.8 & 2.9 respectively in 2002; 
5. Increased vaccination coverage for all recommended vaccines from 40% to 95%; 
6. Measles eradication in children between 6 months and 5 years in 1994, its 
incidence was 34 in 100,000 in 1977; 
7. Increase in doctors per capita from 4.7 per 10,000 population in 1981 to 11.1 in 
2001; 
8. Increases in hospital beds, medical imaging equipment, and laboratory services 
from 153,175, and 3.3 per 10,000 population in 1981, to 169,278, & 5.7 
respectively in 2003 (CFD, 2004). 
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The PHC network in Iran had a significant role in achieving better health over the last three 
decades, particularly in villages. This thesis revealed a number of such features which also 
facilitated the implementation of FM in rural areas (see Chapter 7 for further details). 
Despite all these improvements, the increased life span of the population; changes in 
disease pattern towards long-term conditions and non communicable diseases; mass 
migration to cities; natural disasters; introduction of a market prominent economy; 
privatization and innovations in medical technology have created new challenges for the 
health system. The way that services were delivered did not address the changing needs 
(HERIMP, 2004). In order to respond to these conditions, a series of reforms was planned 
in the health system. 
The 4`h plan for development of Iran disclosed explicit emphasis on social support. For 
instance, health dominant insurance, reducing out of pocket expenditure, and equitable 
distribution of user fees were clearly endorsed in the plan. The plan, which was designed 
for five years by The Expediency Council (Majmaee Tashkhise Maslehate Nezam in 
Farsi), and was affirmed by the leader, is constitutionally the most important source of 
policy making in the country; none of bills and plans must contradict it. In summary, the 4`h 
plan emphasized the role of the government to (DOC, 2005): 
1. Expand health to the entire population; 
2. Promote public health and reduce risk of diseases and other public challenges; 
3. Create logical and equitable public accessibility to health services by rationing; 
4. Reduce out of pocket expenditure from 55% (even though many stakeholders 
believed it is currently at 70%) to 30% at most, along with reduction of 
catastrophic expenditure from 3% to 1 %. 
5. Implement health insurance on the basis of family medicine and referral; 
6. Provide basic insurance for treatment for the entire population by 2009 
(Vaezmahdavi & Rafiefar, 2005). 
In addition, parliament, particularly its commission on health (COH), in cooperation with 
the Management and Planning Organization (MPO) revised the annual budget bill for 
2005, instructing the Medical Insurance Organization (MIO) to issue insurance log-books 
to all residents in rural areas and cities of less than 20,000 population, which entitled them 
to family medicine (FM) services and a referral system (NUHSR, 2005 b). 
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2 Preparation for the reform 
In 2002, a small team of stakeholders in the health sector including the MOH, the social 
security organization (SSO), the MPO and the COH, was formed to undertake a 
comprehensive study of primary care systems, particularly in Canada and the UK 
(NUHSR, 2005a). An executive team was also established for health sector reform, aiming 
at training staff and policy makers. Together with insurance organizations, four provinces 
were identified to pilot implementation of FM. Even though the MOH, insurance 
organizations, and the MPO had consistently agreed to undertake the task, pilot studies 
were abandoned for many reasons, mainly the separation of insurance organizations from 
the MOH in early 2004. 
Nevertheless, two things changed the reform pathway: the government's decision to 
reconstruct the health system in Bam (the southern city which was almost completely 
destroyed by an earthquake in late 2003 with 45,000 casualties) on the basis of referral, 
and parliamentary legislation to fund rural insurance for all (Behbar) by issuing insurance 
log-books to all residents in rural places. In the former, the FM pilot focused on rationing 
and GP gate-keeping. Soon after, in March 2005, parliament shifted the entire funds for 
villagers' treatment to the MIO, which was one step forward in integrating the pooling 
system. 
Although the MOH had initially planned to start the implementation from urban areas in the 
four selected provinces, parliamentary budget approval was the MOH's opportunity to 
cooperate with the MIO (under supervision of the recent established Ministry of Welfare 
and Social Security: MWSS) to implement FM in rural places. Instead of pilot in cities, they 
agreed to implement FM universally on the basis of referral, alongside Behbar, in rural 
areas and small cities. The aims of the reform were reengineering the funding 
mechanisms and payment methods, reducing unnecessary costs, providing basic services 
to all, making out of pocket equitable, raising responsibility, establishing a proper system 
for auditing performance, and improving public satisfaction. Implementation of FM started 
nationwide in August 2005, concurrently with Behbar in rural areas and cities of less than 
20,000 in population. 
2.1 Principles of Implementing FM 
Three scenarios were short listed for implementation (PEHP, 2007): 
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" Making contracts with private doctors to work alongside PHC doctors. 
" Making separate contracts with existing public doctors to deliver services on the basis 
of MIO needs. 
" Integrating the current resources to create a virtual pool for common use in the 
implementation. 
Six pillars were considered as the main principles for implementing FM along with 
insurance coverage for rural areas, the tribal population (almost 3 million in country), and 
residents in cities with less than 20,000 inhabitants: 
1. The PHC network was identified as the only appropriate and available medium to 
deliver health services. Rural health centres were defined as the base for doctors, 
midwives, nurse, lab staff, etc. 
2. A health services package was defined to enable managers to assess quality, 
quantity, and efficiency of services. 
3. It was decided to assign one health team for every 2000-4000 population. 
Therefore, rural residents needed no change in their registered health houses. 
4. To fulfil patients' expectations, the referral pathway in rural places varied on the 
basis of regional specifications, accessibility to specialist services, possibility for 
information management and transport facilities. 
5. The most essential factor to audit FM was defined as users' satisfaction. 
6. Payment mechanisms and audits were branded the two most important 
cornerstones for success of the implementation. 
The family doctor (FD) is responsible for coordinating and managing health team activities 
(both preventive and curative) in his/her served area. S/he is in charge of recording 
patients' medical data within the health folders, which were uniformly distributed across the 
health centres. 
2.2 Aims of FM 
Aims of FM were as follows (NUHSR, 2005a): 
1. Establishment of a referral system; 
2. Increasing health system responsibilities; 
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3. Raising public access to health services; 
4. Reducing non-essential expenditure; 
5. Enhancing coverage; 
6. Health promotion; 
7. Equalizing health status in the society; 
8. Rationing services; 
9. Employment of relevant graduates, particularly GPs and midwives. 
3 Development of FM 
To implement FM, seven steps were undertaken by the MOH. This section (3) has been 
extracted mostly from NUHSR2005a &b; and NPEHP, 2007): 
3.1 Studying phase (2002-2005) 
1. Studying similar experiences in other countries. 
2. Undertaking feasibility studies in the four selected provinces: Eastern Azerbijan 
(northwest), Khorasan-e-Razavi (northeast), Chaharmahal-va- Bakhtiari (west), 
and Bushehr (south), as well as the city of Barn (south). 
3. Capacity building for personnel through national and international training 
courses. 
4. Producing scientific documents and operational instructions including: `the Book 
for Health Sector Reform' (green books) in five volumes, instruction for referral 
system and FM, etc. 
5. Preparation and publishing health services package and clinical guidelines for 10 
most frequent diseases in primary care. 
6. Incomplete pilot of FM and referral system in Barn. 
3.2 Preparation phase (2005-2006) 
1. Establishment and equipment of a national administration for Behbar across 
medical universities and health districts. 
2. Establishment of committees in technical, educational and public relations in the 
national administration for Behbar, as well as universities and health districts. 
3. Collection and finalization of executive instruction for implementation. 
4. Advocating chancellors of medical universities and provincial MIO. 
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5. Running a website for Behbar: www. behbar. takfab. ir, in order to facilitate multi- 
lateral communication between involved individuals and organizations (the website 
has not been updated since six month after the start of implementation). 
6. Determination of a provincial and district deprivation index. 
7. Renovation and reconstruction in almost 1000 rural health centres, and purchasing 
1080 vehicles for most health centres with the World Bank loan (PIU). 
3.3 Contract phase (2005-present) 
1. District health centres made contracts with provincial MIOs. 
2. Determination of methods for delivering pharmacy, laboratory, and radiology 
services in rural health centres. 
3. Making contracts with doctors and midwives. 
3.4 Settlement phase (2005-present) 
Doctors and midwives, who joined health teams, settled in almost 2300 rural health 
centres nationwide. The recruitment was still continuing in 2008, until all positions are 
filled. People were encouraged to register for Behbar insurance log-books. All people who 
resided in the geographic area were entitled to register, even those with other insurance 
schemes. They had neither a choice of doctor or health centre; both were allocated 
according to where they lived. Village councils, Behvarzes, and other volunteers facilitated 
administrative activities. There was a premium fee of 2800TM (£1.50) per log-book. In the 
beginning of this phase, in order to encourage people to register for Behbar, the premium 
fee was set at 1000 and 700TM, and was even free for a while. It was claimed that 8-15% 
of the public who registered for Behbar, were already covered by another insurance 
scheme. There were also a significant number of people who lived in cities most of the 
year but had record homes in villages and who registered for Behbar. By the end of 2007, 
just over 25million people were registered with Behbar, though10% had not yet been 
issued with their log-book and thus were not entitled to utilize services at the Behbar tariff. 
3.5 Training phase 
Family doctors were GPs with no specific training in FM. A few courses (induction 
workshops for newcomer GPs, distance learning courses, and courses to become a 
specialist in FM) were planned for them, but none were held. 
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3.6 Auditing phase 
Volume three of the green books was about auditing practitioners' performance, according 
to which, family doctors, midwives and other members of the health team had to be 
audited at least every three months. 30% of practitioners' income was linked to their 
performance results. There were some checklists in the book as guidelines for auditing. 
The book said nothing about the qualification of auditors. The Golestan University (the 
province which I studied) adopted a checklist, so-called 'The Pyramid of Auditing' to also 
audit the administrative staff, either in the DOH or in local authorities and health centres. 
3.7 Revision phase 
The policy and operational instructions have been continuously revised to respond to 
peripheral needs and improve implementation. By 2008, instruction had undergone five 
major revisions, so-called versions. At the beginning of every Persian new year (201h 
March), a common annual agreement was expected to be signed by the two ministers 
(MOH & MWSS) to address principles of cooperation and to clarify probable challenges. 
4 Principles of concurrent implementation 
it is necessary to clarify the specifications of FM and Behbar and define features of the 
referral system as regards definitions, cooperation, style of implementation, and payment. 
4.1 Definitions 
4.1.1 Family medicine (FM) 
Family medicine is a model of primary care, in which a family doctor (FD) or a behvarz are 
the first level of public contact. Behvarzes are local practitioners with two years training to 
deliver basic services, who are based in health houses in rural areas (see Chapter 1 for 
more detailed explanation). Gate-keeping, which rations referral to specialist care, is at the 
core of FM (PEHP, 2007). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, behvarzes are based in health houses, whereas, family 
doctors are based in rural health centres. However, the latter visits health houses to 
supervise their work. Patients have freedom to choose their first point of contact, either 
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behvarz at health house or doctor at rural health centre. Patients who go to a health house 
first and who the behvarz recognizes their need to be seen by a doctor, follow one of three 
journeys. If behvarz can manage their problem which is the case for simple complaints like 
cold, s/he does so. In an emergency they are urgently referred and sometimes 
accompanied by the behvarz to be seen by a doctor in health centre. There are some 
patients that behvarz recognizes are in need of doctor's visit, either because of following 
up their chronic condition or more serious but non urgent complaints. They are given 
appointment by behvarz to be visited by doctor in the next village rota which is not more 
than few days. Nonetheless, patients have the right to visit doctors at any point of these 
journeys based on their own will (NUHSR, 2005b). What registration statistics show and as 
I observed in all villages, most people often visit doctors even for commonplace 
complaints. There is no particular change in behvarz's duties after FM. In fact they were 
referring patients to rural health centres prior to FM. Introduction of FM enhanced chance 
to see doctors alongside other changes caused this. 
4.1.2 Family doctor (FD) 
Family doctor is a general physician who has a medical degree (MD) and is officially 
entitled to practice. Obtaining an MD in Iran takes at least 7 years, including 1.5 years 
internship. There are 39 public and almost 80 non-governmental medical universities in 
Iran, their graduates' ratio is four to one. Medical education is free in the public 
universities. There is at least one public university in each province which is responsible 
both for medical education and for health care in that province. Each year the medical 
schools together produce 4600 graduates of which about 85% are doctors, 10% are 
dentists and 5% are pharmacists. 
Although medical students have to do one month of social medicine in their undergraduate 
years and one month during their internship, MDs have little training in primary care and 
management of inpatient cases. It is the social medicine training which is intended to equip 
them for working in health centres. The MOH is trying to revise the curriculum to 
strengthen primary care in medical training, but the subject is not taken seriously by the 
majority of medical students (Couper, 2004). 
All GPs (general physician- there is a distinction between GP in Iran as general physician, 
and the UK as general practitioner, but GP in this thesis means the former, unless 
otherwise stated) must register with the Iranian Medical Association (IMA) to be entitled to 
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practice. There is a distinction between the IMA and the BMA (British Medical 
Association). There is no independent organization such as the General Medical Council 
(GMC) in the UK to register doctors and regulate practice. Rather, the IMA, as one of the 
oldest non government organisations in the country is in charge of both responsibilities. At 
present there are approximately 130 000 professionals registered by the IMA, of which 85 
000 are physicians, 15000 dentists and 10 000 pharmacists. It issues temporary and 
permanent registrations for doctors. The registration can be upgraded to permanent upon 
completing a two-year mandatory scheme (male doctors could attend compulsory army 
services instead), which has been used for the past 20 years to settle doctors in deprived 
areas. To be entitled to practice in affluent areas, such as capitals of provinces and big 
cities, doctors (either generalists or specialists) need to obtain particular scores, which 
requires several years of practice in deprived areas. 
The health care system is based around specialists, especially in private and hospital 
settings. The earnings and status of specialists are far higher than GPs so there is a lot of 
competition for specialist training (PEHP, 2007). Every year, 1100 doctors are accepted for 
specialist training or residency (equal to the specialist registrar level in the UK) out of 
about 12000 applicants. In order to get accepted for specialisation doctors have to develop 
credit points. This can be done through succeeding in academic entrance exams, but that 
alone is insufficient. Points are acquired through working in health centres, particularly in 
rural areas or alternatively two years army services for male doctors (Cheraghali, et 
al, 2008). Age is also an important factor and doctors are not accepted for specialisation 
after the age of 40. Those wanting to specialise must have done at least two years 
compulsory rural service, except outstanding students and married female doctors. To 
date, there is no specialist training in FM in Iran. 
The FD is supposed to deliver services to his/her assigned population with no 
discrimination in sex, age, socioeconomic status, and risk of disease. If necessary, and in 
order to keep and promote individuals' health, s/he must refer them to specialist care, 
while remaining responsible for following the case and continuing to provide services. The 
FD is also the manager of the health team. To enjoy the financial benefits (subsidy) of 
Behbar, patients must visit the FD first, otherwise, expenses incurred must be paid in full. 
The FD refers patients and monitors their journey within the health care system 
(NUHSR, 2005b). 
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4.1.3 Health services package 
The package is made up of preventive and curative services, provided by FDs or other 
members of health teams. It includes (NUHSR, 2005a): 
. Prevention 
Immunization, prevention and control of communicable diseases, family planning, oral 
health, mental health, etc 
. Training and health promotion 
Education and health promotion, teaching healthy life styles, teaching life skills, etc. 
. Acute care 
Services such as visits at the clinic; diagnosis and treatment of diseases; minor and simple 
surgeries like vasectomy and circumcision, injection, home visits, telephone-counselling, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), etc. 
" Referral 
Referring patients with special needs to secondary and tertiary care. 
" Health services management 
Medical record keeping for the registered population; inter-sectoral collaborations; and 
monitoring health team activities. 
4.1.4 Health team 
Apart from the FD, members of a health team for a population of 2500-4000 are at least 
two others: a family health assistant or a midwife, and a nurse or a health visitor. By 
definition, behvarz, and experts in occupational health, disease prevention, mental health, 
and family health are also members of the team (NUHSR, 2005b). 
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4.1.5 Referral system 
Referral is a strategy in which patients visit a behvarz in a health house or family doctor in 
health centre to seek health care that is included in the health services package (see 4.1.3 
above). In cases where the FD cannot manage the problem, s/he fills out a form in the 
patients' Behbar log-book and refers them to a specialist (secondary care). Behvarz is not 
entitled to directly refer patients to hospital or any other kind of secondary care. Specialists 
undertake necessary actions for the patient, record their actions and any needed follow up 
procedures on the specific feedback forms, and refer the patient back to the FD for long- 
term follow up. In cases that the behvarz has not been instructed to manage, the patient is 
permitted to directly visit the FD at first (PEHP, 2007; NUHSR, 2005a). 
4.2 Cooperation between medical universities and provincial MIOs 
Prior to the parliamentary approval for Behbar in 2005, the MIO received 90billionTM 
(£1.00=1800TM in that time) annual budget for the treatment of rural people (MPO, 2004). 
In March 2005, parliament topped up another 325billionTM, crediting the MIO the total 
amount of 415billionTM to purchase all needed health services at all levels for rural 
inhabitants. The budget was approved for 500,485, and 51 ObillionTM in 2006,2007, and 
2008 respectively. Parliament assigned the MOH as the policy maker and service provider, 
while the MIO was defined as the purchaser and auditor. The provincial branches of the 
MIO signed cooperation agreements with the DOH (Deputy of Health in the province) while 
the district health authorities in charge of supervising PHC at local levels, signed 
agreements with the district MIOs, highlighting items such as (NUHSR, 2005, a&b): 
1. The average annual budget per capita for primary care for rural and tribal people 
was 10,000TM. 
2. Behbar insurance log-books must be presented to access FM services. 
3. Residents without Behbar log-books, or whose log-books were expired, or were 
not covered by any other insurance schemes, should have to pay full tariff. 
4. Behbar insured patients must pay 10% of the visit fee, 30% of pharmacy, lab, and 
radiology costs, and 10% of inpatient expenditure. The visit fee for holders of 
insurances other than Behbar was 30%. However, Behbar-insured people in 
cities with less than 20,000 inhabitants, had to pay 30% of visit fee. 
5. Practitioners' payment is calculated on the basis of all served rural and tribal 
residents, whether their insurance was Behbar or not. 
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6. Up to 4000 served population per doctor were paid 100% of capita. Health 
authorities were instructed to avoid assigning more than 4000 people to one 
doctor. In case it was inevitable, for 4001 to 6000 population and 6001 to 8000 
population, they were entitled to 60% and 25% of the capita respectively. 
7. Patients who ask for services beyond the content of the agreement, should pay 
the full tariff, with no respect to their insurance scheme. 
8. A village health council must be established in villages with a rural health centre, 
taking its members from village councillor, 1-2 members of the village Islamic 
council, the headmaster of the village school, two trustee villagers, one behvarz, 
and the FD as the head of the council. Health councils were expected to enhance 
public awareness through advocacy; facilitate the doctor's stay in the village, etc. 
At the national level, a supreme heath council was established. Headed by the 
president, and the minister of health as the first secretary, the council consisted 
of many other national stakeholders. The supreme council holds only two 
meetings and was dissolved soon after the start of implementation. 
In Golestan, the doctor's degree of success to establish, run and activate village 
health councils was scored in performance audits (PEHP, 2007). I witnessed a few 
meetings of village health councils, within which they decided to build sanitary 
toilets, collect and correct burial of waste, etc. In one village, people contributed 
up to 70% toward costs to build a new health centre. 
4.3 Working arrangements for FM 
Villages under health district authorities (11 authorities in Golestan province), are one of 
the following (Shad poor, 2000; PEHP, 2007): 
1. Villages with rural health centres (19% of villages nationwide), where health 
houses also exist. 
2. Villages without rural health centre, but with the health house, so-called 
principal villages. Usually, one or more health houses are supervised by a 
rural health centre. Health houses which are close to cities might be under 
urban health centres, called rural-urban health centres. 
3. Villages with neither a health centre nor a health house, but under a health 
house's supervision, so-called satellite villages. 
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4. Villages with too little populations, where residents are served by moving 
teams. 81% of villages are either with or without a health house, or moving 
villages. 
5. Suburb villages which are too close to cities and are directly under rural- 
urban health centres. 
On the basis of the recent national census (INS, 2007), there are 681 urban points, 66,075 
rural points, 2274 rural health centres, 16341 health houses, and 2182 urban health 
centres in Iran. 
For a maximum of 4000 people, one doctor was assigned to a health centre. Every extra 
4000 population was subject to be assigned another doctor. For every two doctors, one 
midwife must have been assigned. In centres with three or more doctors, instead of the 
second midwife, a nurse must have been recruited. In centres with less than 4000 
population, at least one doctor and one midwife must have been employed. 
Practitioners, who were already working in health centres, were recruited first. Then, 
private doctors or midwives who had been working in the area were selected, subject to 
them closing their own clinics. If there were still centres without personnel, or hard-access 
centres with less attraction to work in, practitioners in the mandatory scheme could be 
recruited. In case of childbirth facilities and the presence of a midwife, a nurse could be 
recruited instead of a second midwife. 
Even though it was attempted to assign doctors to a particular population, in practice all 
doctors were in charge of the entire population served by the centre. Particularly during 
visits in village rotas, or on occasions where doctors were in rota, patients were visited by 
any present doctor in the centres. One of the doctors -preferably an official staff of the 
DOH, was appointed as the manager of the health centre. There was no distinguished 
incentive for managers, however, the instruction was recently revised to allocate 4-7% of 
the whole amount of monthly payments for managerial duties. Doctors and members of 
health teams must have worked 8 hours a day, while time tables varied in different 
centres. Doctors that were given night shifts must have been available all hours between 4 
pm and 8 am next day. FDs were instructed to undertake village rotas for their served 
population in villages every other day, or at least twice a week. Village rota was mandatory 
once a week in single-doctor centres. Villager rota for moving villages was at least once 
every quarter. 
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The policy emphasized medical record keeping and free first visit to every single villager. 
FDs were instructed to complete health folders (a form of 4 pages of A4 size to store 
population health data and results of examination and follow ups) for up to 80% of their 
population by the end of the first year (for up to 4000 population under cover). Midwives, 
nurses, and behvarzes were also instructed to attend the first visit. The instruction clearly 
indicated that health folders must be kept in rural health centres. However, all the six 
visited health centres accused that because of lack of space they did not keep folders. 
Folders were stored in health houses which doctors visited once or twice a week. 
Moreover, most folders were blank or just signed and stamped by doctors. Folders were 
not being asked for or referred to by doctors upon visiting patients. In one health centre, 
doctors had been pushed to fill folders for all population within two months. Most folders 
were filled by behvarzes as a result, however, signed and stamped by doctors! 
Doctors were also instructed to not prescribe more than 2.5 drug items per visit; 
otherwise, costs would be deducted from their earnings. The only exemption was in 
villages with more than 25% over 50 year olds, where three items per prescription was 
acceptable. To avoid income deduction, doctors were allowed to order lab test and refer 
patients to specialist care for up to 10% of their visited patients. The figure was 4% for 
radiology services, except ultrasound for pregnant women which was not restricted. 
4.4 Payment to practitioners 
To encourage practitioners to promote health and make them more responsible, a mixed 
payment method affected by six factors was used: 
1. Deprivation index: The average of provincial, district, and rural area, which 
was a number between 1 and 1.9 (the higher the index, the more deprived 
the area). Payment to doctors on the basis of only deprivation index was from 
110,000TM for index 1, to 695,000TM for index 1.9. The deprivation index for 
11 health districts in Golestan was between 1.00 for the capital and 1.9, while 
the provincial index was 1.18 (NUHSR, 2007). 
2. Past history: For every year's work as a member of a health team, 20,000TM 
was added (0 for the first year). 
3. Night shifts: For every night stand in the health centre, 10,000TM for single- 
doctor, 11,000TM for double-doctors, 12,000TM for triple or more doctors and 
18,000TM for 24 hours centres was added. 
4. Per capita: 130TM per person under a FD was paid. 
84 
5. Scattering index: Including the factors such as the number of served health 
houses by a FD and the distances between the health centre, health houses 
and district health authority in Km. 
6. Performance index: Performance of all practitioners must have been 
monitored every three months on the basis of check lists containing technical, 
structural, managerial, satisfaction, inter-organizational cooperation, and 
following the instruction aspects. If the monitored person achieved 90% of the 
total score, his performance index was 1.0. Scores between 90-95%, and more 
than 95% were given performance index of 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. In other 
word, if practitioners scored 90% in monitoring, their salary was paid in full. For 
every 1% rise in the index, 2% of their whole salary was added. For scores less 
that 90%, practitioners' payment was accordingly deducted or their contract 
became suspended. 
The minimum monthly income of a FD, who served 4000 population, with least deprivation 
and scattering index, whose performance index was 1.0, with no absence and complete 
night shifts, would be 930,000TM. If the deprivation index was 1.9, there were 5 health 
houses under his cover, and summation of distances was 160 Km, while other factors 
were constant, the amount would be 1,600,000TM. Midwife and the nurse followed the 
same rules and calculations for their income, however different units of payment for 
indices were used for them. Their salary was in range of 145,000 to 390,000TM. 
5 Preliminary outcomes of implementation 
It is too early to assess the impact of FM on the health of the population given its recent 
implementation. No formal evaluation has taken place yet to assess such impact. 
However, there are a number of improvements, which might be linked to the 
implementation of FM & Behbar. 
5.1 Rise in inputs to the health system 
The number of doctors in rural areas which was 2534 in spring 2005 (three months before 
implementation), jumped to 5808 by November 2007,3095 of whom were from the private 
sector, (53.9% from private sector versus 46.1 % from public sector). By mid 2007,73% of 
rural health centres had one doctor for every 4000 population, while 95% of health centres 
had one doctor for every 6000 population nationwide; whereas, there was one doctor for 
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Table 4.1 Changes in practitioners' number before and 18 month after 
implementation in selected provinces in Iran (NUHSR, 2007b) 
No of midwives in health 
centres in the year of 
No of doctors in health 
centres in the year of Province 
Early 2006 Late 2004 Early 2006 Late 2004 
266 0 420 84 East Azerbijan 
90 13 121 79 Ardebil 
163 99 224 194 Isfahan 
309 125 385 150 Khozestan 
1 11 97 232 123 Golestan 
every 9000 villagers before FM (Report to the minister of health, 2008). The proportion 
improved to one FD for every 4250 villagers after implementation. In addition, midwives' 
numbers dramatically increased from 860 in 2004, to 4100 in late 2007.86% of midwives 
were also recruited from the private sector. Table 4.1 shows the figure for some provinces 
including Golestan. 
5.2 Enhanced population coverage 
Until June 2007,24.7 million people in rural areas and cities of less than 20,000 population 
were covered by Behbar insurance, among them 21.9m (89%) village residents and 2.8m 
city inhabitants (NUHSR, 2007c). This represents 76% of the entitled population. By the 
end of 2007,72% of the covered population had been issued Behbar log-books, 4% more 
than the previous year. 
5.3 Increased utilization 
The rise in practitioners' number, as well as enhancing access to FD, increased public 
utilization of services dramatically. Out of the 24million registered population in 2005, 
almost 6m visited FDs. The number rose to 14m in early 2007. Moreover, by conducting 
village rota visits, twice a week in health houses, once a month in satellite villages, and 
once a season in moving villages, the number of visits to FD in those villagers rose from 
172,688 in 2005, to 450,098 in early 2007 (NPEHP, 2007a). 
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Predictably, the number of visits to pharmacies also increased, but not in line with the 
increase in visits to FDs (from 2.8m in 2005 to 8.3m in early 2007), which might indicate 
improvements in prescription behaviour. In 2005 and prior to FM, only 72 private 
pharmacies had contracts with the PHC nationwide. The figure rose to 747 in early 2007. 
There was also a decrease in referral rate for laboratory and radiology services by FDs, 
which could be linked to gradual establishment of referral standards and doctors' gate- 
keeping role. In early 2005 and prior to implementation, 14.03% of cases were referred for 
laboratory tests. The figure was 10.13% and 8.55% for early 2006, and early 2007 
respectively. The figure for radiology services for same time periods were 1%, 1.42%, and 
1.39% respectively, which shows a considerable jump at the beginning, probably because 
of public pressure, which slowed down gradually as expected. 
Furthermore, because of doctors' night shifts in health centres in order to provide 
emergency services 24 hours a day 7 days a week, health authorities attempted to 
prepare proper living-in facilities for personnel. Number of physical facilities attached to 
health centres for staffs accommodation jumped from 1445 in 2005 to 2292 in 2006. 
5.4 Changes in health indices 
Although this thesis is cautious about linking changes in some health indices to FM either 
because of time span or lack of formal evaluation, a few positive changes appear to have 
resulted from FM. FM's emphasis on screening four target diseases: diabetes mellitus 
(DM), high blood pressure (HBP), tuberculosis (TB), and new-born hypothyroidism 
(NBHT), was associated with a significant rise in diagnosis of new cases of HBP and DM 
at the starting period of implementation, which shows practitioners' willingness to screen 
and report new cases, either to get incentives or promote health. 
The deduction in these two figures one year after implementation was predictable, 
because the majority of cases were diagnosed at early stages, after many years of 
ineffective screening. Furthermore, the number of cases under control for DM and HBP 
increased within one year of implementation, which indicates more effective methods to 
manage and control those patients in FM. However, fewer TB cases were diagnosed while 
FM was implemented, either because of a general reduction in TB incidence (unlikely, as 
there is no reason for that), or an ineffective method to approach TB in FM. As for NBHT, 
the number of patients under management considerably rose after implementation. These 
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data are incomplete for some years before the implementation, when rates were rising so 
these observed changes may not be due to implementation of FM (Table 4.2). 
Comparing results of "vital horoscope"- a circular chart resembling a horoscope and 
displaying extensive details of births, deaths and family-planning activities, kept in the 
health houses- years before and after the implementation also suggested some 
improvements (Table 4.3). Some changes could be easily interpreted as the impact of FM. 
For instance, frequency of attendance at birth by untrained practitioners, usually lay 
experienced women, halved from 2002 to 2006. The five fold rise in midwives and 
attendance of midwives in almost all remote areas of the country might be linked to this 
improvement. 
Although, maternal mortality rate (MMR), infant mortality rate (IMR), and under-5 mortality 
rate also showed improvements, trend did not reveal any meaningful difference from its 
pattern during the preceding decade. Therefore, the thesis cannot judge impacts of FM 
regarding such indices. 
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Table 4.2 Diagnosis and maintenance of four target diseases before and after 
implementation of FM (Report to the minister of health, 2008). 
2005 (early stages 2006 (One year 
Subject 2004 (before FM) of FM) after 
implementation) 
No of diagnosed DM 85,556 94,897 76,542 
No of under care DM 102,124 168,009 170,506 
No of diagnosed 182,568 204,713 163,597 
HBP 
No of under care 330,158 516,576 505,457 
HBP 
No of diagnosed TB 7977 7693 3951 
No of under care TB 9329 9043 4708 
No of diagnosed N/A 1114 1024 
NBHT 
No of under care N/A 19,443 26,422 
NBHT 
Table 4.3 Comparison of some health indices before and after implementation of FM 
(NUHSR, 2007b) 
Index 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Untrained 
attendance in 21.3 17.6 14.2 10.7 8.8 5.79 
birth (%) 
Crude death 
4.3 4.2 4.2 4.4 4 8 4 92 4 68 (%) . . . 
Infant m mortality ctal 
rate 
31.7 29.5 26.8 26.3 24.5 22.34 19.01 
Under-5 
40.2 37.8 33.2 31.6 29 1 26 66 81 22 mortality rate . . . 
Maternal 
mortality rate 37.6 32.81 26.65 
(MMR) 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
Introduction 
Evaluating complex reforms such as implementation of family medicine (FM) while they 
are being implemented is difficult for several reasons: the lack of opportunity to use 
experimental or quasi-experimental methods (Rossi et al, 1999); the difficulty to define the 
objectives of the reform (Le Grand et al, 1998; OECD, 1994; Orsman, 1999; Robinson & Le 
Grand, 1994); the difficulty of determining the impacts of the implementation on the 
achievement of goals; using performance data, particularly when the data is poor in 
quality, incomplete, or not available (Drummond, 1995); lack of a governmental system of 
monitoring and evaluation set up alongside health reforms (Robinson and Le Grand, 1994); 
and other changes in the health system occurring during the period of evaluation 
(Drummond, 1995). In addition, the ways in which decision 'emerge' rather than take place 
at a single point in time, which are often unobservable to the researcher, can be 
particularly difficult to explain (Exworthy, 2007). 
This chapter explains the methodological aspects of the thesis. First, a qualitative 
approach is justified. Second, any assumption about the design and the way the study is 
conducted is explained. Third, the qualitative methods to gather data, including semi- 
structured interviews (the main method), focus groups, observation, and documentary 
analysis are explained, and their use is justified. Fourth, use of purposive sampling, either 
for individuals or health centres is explained. Fifth, the analytical approach to data and use 
of mixed methods of deductive and inductive analysis, as well as the steps taken to 
conduct and finalize the analysis are described. Sixth, ethical considerations are 
addressed. The final section of this chapter explains the rationale behind organizing the 
forthcoming result chapters (6-9). 
1 Justification of a qualitative approach 
Underlying beliefs are better captured through qualitative studies (Comaroff, 1976). They 
also play important roles in the assessment of health technologies (Black, 1994; 
Leys, 2003; Murphy and Mattson, 1992; Jaye, 2002). They seek to answer the questions on 
how social experience is created and given meaning to (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). 
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Today, beyond past debates to prove whether quantitative or qualitative research were 
more rigorous and reliable, there is widespread acceptance of the qualitative approach in 
health services research and health policy (Dingwall et al, 1998; Giacomini and Cook, 2000; 
and Mays & Pope, 1995,1997,2000). Attention is on to how to ensure studies are robust 
and how to judge the quality of qualitative research (Giacomini and Cook, 2000). It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in epistemological debates about the philosophy 
and validity of qualitative methods, but rather it provides information to justify the research 
design, data collection, and process of analysis and data interpretation. 
A qualitative approach was an appropriate method to identify facilitators of and obstacles 
to implementation of FM in Iran, as well as to understand the impacts of implementation on 
individuals' behaviours and attitudes (either policy makers and practitioners or the public). 
Such qualitative stakeholder analysis has been widely employed in the past (Le Grand et 
al, 1998; Robinson & Le Grand, 1994; Mays et al, 2001). Qualitative approach was 
described as 'an essential component in health and health services research' (Pope & 
Mays, 1995). They assert the value of qualitative methods, in a climate where 'qualitative 
and quantitative approaches to research tend to be portrayed as antithetical' (obid, p. 43). 
They explained the role of qualitative research as development of concepts to assist 
understanding social phenomena in a natural (rather than experimental) setting, giving the 
emphasis to the meanings, experiences, and views of all the participants. Qualitative 
research facilitates insight into experimental phenomena, to help answer such questions 
as what, how, and why. The objectives are to explain behaviours, social relationships, 
processes and situations, and meanings people give to their activities and the activities of 
others (Blaikie, 2000). Because of the latter specification, the qualitative approach is 
referred to as 'social constructive or interpretative' research (Patton, 2002). That is, studies 
attempt to construct reality on the basis of data provided by the subjects. Vickers defines 
constructed reality in the analysis of decision-making as an appreciative system: 
,... appreciative judgements reflect the view currently held by those who make them 
of their interests and responsibilities, views largely implicit and unconscious which 
none the less condition what events and relations they will regard as relevant or 
possibly relevant to them, and whether they will regard these as welcome or 
unwelcome, important or unimportant, demanding or not demanding action or 
concern by them' (Vickers, 1965, p. 67). 
There are a number of methodological aspects to consider when conducting qualitative 
research: well-reasoned sample selection; appropriate data collection for the setting and 
the research objectives, and comprehensive enough to support rich and robust 
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descriptions of observed events; and proper and relevant data analysis, with corroboration 
of findings by employing multiple sources, so-called triangulation. Depending on the 
objectives of the study, qualitative methods can be used in their own right, or to 
supplement quantitative data using triangulation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 1999; 
Stake, 1995; Bowling, 1997), or to complement quantitative work by investigating aspects of 
quantitative work in need of more clarification. 
This thesis is a qualitative study which attempts to provide an explanation of different 
stakeholders' (policy makers, managers, practitioners, and the public at three levels: 
national, provincial, and local) attitudes towards FM in Iran, and to analyze implementation 
by investigating facilitators of and obstacles to it. The study is a concurrent or prospective 
analysis of a policy process in order to support improvement of the implementation. 
Stakeholder analyses that focus on positions, power, and perceptions, and behaviour are 
therefore key to this type of work (Roberts et al, 2004). 
Despite traditional attention to the content of the reform rather than the process, even in 
investigating the primary health care approach, this study took Walt and Gilson's (1994) 
advice to concentrate much on the processes contingent on developing and implementing 
change and the context within which the policy was developed. This was necessary to 
avoid diverting the attention from understanding why desired policy outcomes failed to 
emerge. The thesis focuses therefore on process rather than on the outcomes or impact of 
FM, acknowledging Reich's (1994) argument that policy reform is a profoundly political 
process, affecting the origins, formulation and implementation of policy. In addition to 
difficulties in assessing outcomes only months after start of implementation, the evaluating 
process has advantages over outcomes. First, comparisons are not essential in the study 
process. Second, direct study of processes can identify the obstacles and deficiencies of 
implementation which need to be remedied (Crombie & Davies, 1998). Thus, it provides 
indicators for action to improve implementation. There are many examples of failure in the 
process which are likely to lead to poor outcomes. 
The study aims to identify factors which facilitated or hampered the implementation of 
family medicine in Iran as the core of health sector reform. It seeks to explain why policy 
on paper was widely different from what was executed. It tends to explore roots of 
practitioners' perception of the policy, as well as the public (clients'), in order to provide a 
reliable account to improve the implementation. Therefore, it was essential to get at the 
narrative behind the policy process, to explore the phenomenon from the perspective of 
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those involved, and to analyse their views, opinions, and actions. It needed immersion in 
the policy debates that took place to identify ideas that were held, and influences that held 
sway. The qualitative approach was especially well suited to the research questions 
addressed in this research because: 
1. To depict the process of implementation of FM, it was essential to understand 
how people engaged with each other; 
2. Usually, different people have different experience from one phenomenon, so 
their experiences needed to be captured in their own words; 
3. The process was fluid and dynamic; 
4. Participants' perceptions were a key consideration for process. 
Like other qualitative studies, it was assumed in this thesis that there is no single absolute 
reality, but there are multiple realities (ontological relativity). 
2 Researcher's assumptions and position 
One of the issues facing health policy analysts is how they are viewed or situated as 
researcher, their institutional base, perceived legitimacy, and prior involvement in policy 
communities (Walt et al, 2008). Such an issue is critical to their ability to access the policy 
setting and conduct a meaningful analysis. The case is more serious if the analysis 
requires engaging with policy elites (Shiffman, 2007), and when investigating sensitive 
issues of 'high politics' (Walt et al, 2008), very much the case in this thesis. The possibility 
that a researcher's constructed realities are framed by his/her dominant views is also high. 
Strong preconceived ideas affect scientists' work (Kuhn, 1970). Epistemological subjectivity 
is therefore inevitable in a study as this. The traditional distinction of a researcher's 
positionality often is made between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. The former may be both 
participants and researcher, or alternatively, country-based rather than foreigner, which 
has certain implications for the data collected and the interpretation of research findings, 
as Merriam et al (2001) explain: 
'... being an insider means easy access, the ability to ask more meaningful 
questions and read non-verbal cues, and most importantly, to be able to project a 
more truthful, authentic understanding of the culture under study. On the other 
hand, insiders have been accused of being inherently biased.. . the outsider's advantage lies in curiosity with the unfamiliar, the ability to ask taboo questions, 
and being seen as non-aligned with sub-groups' (p. 411). 
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Being an outside investigator is particularly useful for persuading the interviewees to give 
fuller explanations than they might otherwise have felt necessary. It is said that combining 
both outsider and insider researchers to gather and analyse the data may yield the richest 
and most comprehensive understanding of the policy process (Walt et al, 2008). 
Researcher's position has influences on not only access to data but also for knowledge 
construction (Parkhurst, 2002). My position in this research was actually both insider and 
outsider. As an Iranian general practitioner who had connections to the field, policy 
makers, and the data, with a reasonable knowledge of the policy and the environment of 
implementation, I was an insider by definition. I was also an outsider because I was based 
in London, conducting my study to obtain the degree of PhD at the LSHTM. This dual 
character widened avenues for cooperation at various levels for understanding the reality. 
On one hand, I could facilitate organizing the research and appreciate practicalities. On 
the other hand, I was an outsider for the majority of participants who treated me as 
someone from London, even though I am Iranian. This helped me a lot in asking taboo 
questions and attracted interviewees' trust to open accounts which was otherwise not 
likely. For the general public, it took longer to accept me as an outsider (not someone from 
the ministry of health or the government), than for practitioners and other interviewees. 
However, because I stayed in villages long enough and lived with them for a while, they 
gradually appreciated my position, trusted me a lot more and cooperated well. In addition, 
although I was passionate about FM and its benefits for the Iranian public, I was neutral to 
the implementation and was not committed to the government, which made me 
substantially reflexive to gather and interpret the data. Collectively, I could enjoy or actually 
combine the benefits of being an insider and an outsider at the same time in this research, 
the difficult situation which rarely happens in health policy analysis (Walt et al, 2008). 
As the sole researcher, I devised and conducted the interviews (individual or group), 
selected the documents for analysis, and carried out the data analysis. Therefore, my 
personal values, beliefs and perceptions have influenced the study. Despite this, I have 
attempted to remain open and sensitive during the design, data collection, and analysis 
and to link the meanings and subjects' perspectives. My supervisors' perspective as well 
as other advisors' enabled me to approach the study design and data analysis critically, 
corroborate relevant themes to pursue, read and re-read the data to identify 
supplementary themes worthy of exploration. I also tried to remain reflexive during the 
entire process of the research, and explicit within the analysis. 
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Being a medical doctor with only a few years of clinical experience in Iran, most of my 
professional career has been in management and administration. Armed with managerial 
knowledge and experience, I have been looking critically at the Iranian health system 
through the lens of improving efficiency. Moving to the UK in 2004 enriched my personal 
experience as a user of GP services, and opened my eyes more widely to the reality of 
rationing health services and gate-keeping in one of the most comprehensive primary care 
systems in the world. Even though my UK experience was hard for my habit of using all 
care services at a very cheap price, I realized how effective rationing services could be in 
reengineering the health system. Therefore, I developed a particular interest in the policy 
of FM in Iran. However, as the main topic in this research is not an epistemological debate 
on whether FM is the right policy or not, my views should not have overly influenced my 
approach to exploring what factors have been facilitating or hampering its implementation. 
Rather my own views on the policy have been further influenced by this research. 
3 Study design 
In accordance with the aim and main objectives of the study, multiple methods of data 
collection were used including: literature review, semi-structured interviews with 
individuals, focus groups, documentary analysis, and field observation. In order to make 
sense of the policy and the environment of implementation, a feasibility study was also 
conducted in December 2005- January 2006. 
3.1 Literature review of theories of policy implementation 
A literature review was conducted between November 2005 and February 2006 to identify 
theories of implementation in public policy (Chapter 2). The review covered the different 
approaches to implementation of a policy, from the traditional dichotomy of top-down and 
bottom-up, to modern synthesising approaches. The review contributed to the conceptual 
framework of the study as well as the interview guide. 
3.2 Structured review of facilitators and obstacles 
A structured synthesis of empirical studies on implementing reforms was conducted 
between February 2006 and May 2006, which identified facilitators of or barriers to 
implementation (Chapter 3). This systematically categorized factors and resulted in the 
design of the dynamic model of implementation, which contributed to the conceptual 
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framework of the research and the design of the data collection. Emphasis on semi- 
structured interviews as the main source of data collection, alongside other methods, was 
in part the result of the review. 
3.3 Feasibility study 
Prior to designing the main study, I paid a visit to Iran in December 2005, during which I 
interviewed five national policy makers and four managers, civil servants, and practitioners 
in three provinces where FM was being implemented, using a preliminary interview 
schedule, and gathered some documents. The purpose was mainly situation analysis to 
get familiar with the macro picture of implementation of FM as well as arrangement of 
practicalities. Interviews were only part of the feasibility study to cover broad aspects of the 
implementation. I did not pre-test the interview guide by situation analysis. The time of the 
visit which was only five months after starting implementation, was appropriate to 
understand what was going on in the early stages. This clarified the reality of 
implementation, reasons for concurrence with Behbar, the measures that had been taken, 
and future plans. Local visits helped appreciate the distance between the centre and the 
periphery, and to make me aware of day to day practical challenges. 
The visit was also helpful in understanding the context and intentions behind the policy. It 
helped identify suitable questions for the semi-structured interviews and clarified the areas 
in need of more focus within the field work. I also established a relationship with the 
different stakeholders, whose agreement was vital to conducting the field study, many of 
whom were potentially national level interviewees for the main study. Forming such a 
network of stakeholders facilitated access to key informants and influential policy makers 
during the data collection. In addition, I obtained the Golestan province health officials' 
agreement to conduct the fieldwork there and given the long process of ethical approval in 
Iran, I submitted an official request for ethical approval to both the MOH and the Golestan 
University of Medical Science & Health Services (GMU). 
3.4 Methods of data collection 
3.4.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Interviews were the main method of data collection in this study. Interviews were to 
explore perceptions, meanings, attitudes, past experiences, definition of situations, and 
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constructions of a reality which was development of the policy (Patton, 2002). Jones also 
writes: 
"In order to understand persons' construction of reality, we would do well to ask 
them. . . and to ask 
them in such a way that they can tell us in their terms (rather 
than those imposed rigidly and a priori by ourselves) and in a depth which 
addresses the rich context that is the substance of their meanings" (Jones, 1985, 
p. 46). 
Semi-structured interviews employing a set of open-ended, core questions as an interview 
template, is a useful technique in seeking explanations to specific issues (Mays, 1997). 
Interviewers must be open-minded, introduce divergent questions at the times, and also 
take into account any new concepts and frameworks proposed by the interviewees 
(Britten, 1999). Interviews allowed interviewees to offer their views on political and 
challenging aspects of implementation, freely and in their own meaning. I used open- 
ended questions to get the interviews going and keep it moving. Specific questions 
emerged as the interviews unfolded, and the wording of those questions depended very 
much on the directions the interviews took (Punch, 1998). I guided the direction of the 
interviews but without being too intrusive. The semi-structured nature of the interviews 
allowed me to pursue a flexible line of questions, in case issues came up in a different 
order, before returning to other scheduled questions. 
I conducted face to face semi-structured interviews using a generic interview guide, 
incorporating the objectives. The interviews were undertaken from November 2006 to May 
2007 in two planned phases. There was no hierarchical order in interviewing. Although I 
started with national stakeholders, on many occasions I went to Golestan and interviewed 
provincial managers. However, no interviews at the local level were conducted until six 
health centres had been selected. During the first phase (up to February 2007), I 
interviewed three health centres, all provincial managers and 11 national policy makers. 
The second phase was from March 2007 and completed data collection to May 2007. 
The generic interview guides were adapted for particular groups of interviewees at the 
three different levels: national, regional, and local (Appendix II). The guide was used to 
ensure that all questions were covered uniformly for all participants. In addition, multiple 
probe questions were developed for each question. The interview began with a general 
question about the policy and the specific involvement of the interviewee. This led to 
particular issues like their experience of implementation, finance, logistics, political 
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capacity of the reform, coordination and cooperation in implementation, and finally around 
other issues that interviewee was willing to talk about. Depending on the position and 
capacity of interviewee, every interviewee had a tailored interview guide to reflect his 
individual position. 17 interviews were conducted at national level, 2 at international level 
(with the country representatives of the WHO and his senior health policy advisor), 9 
interviews with provincial officials, 11 interviews with district health authorities, and 39 
interviews at local level with family doctors; nurses; midwives; auxiliary health technicians 
including mother and child health, environmental and occupational health, and tackling 
communicable diseases staff; managers and administrative staff, as well as 
representatives of the public at six selected health centres across 11 health districts in 
Golestan province. Four private doctors were also interviewed. Typology, capacity and 
position of interviewees at each level are described in Appendix I. 
Interviews lasted from 30 to 110 minutes with an average of 70 minutes. Two interviews, 
one at national and another at provincial level, took 2.5 and 3 hours because of the 
interviewees' desire to discuss historical background of the reform in detail. Interviewees 
were asked to express their own personal views, rather than speaking on behalf of the 
institutions that employed them at the time the policy was designed or currently. 
Except for two interviews with international stakeholders which were in English, all 
interviews were conducted in Persian (Farsi). Only the quotes used in this thesis were 
translated into English. I was reflexive (taking context and culture into account rather than 
word by word translation) in translating quotes to English. Except on a few occasions, the 
translation was straightforward and I did not detect any major difficulty. In addition to an 
explanation of the study and interviewees' rights, all interviewees were provided with an 
information sheet beforehand containing an abstract of the study, perspective of results, 
expectations of the interviews, their rights, their potential contribution to the study, ethical 
considerations like data confidentiality, my profile and contact information (Appendix IV). 
The place of interviews depended on the interviewees' choice and convenience. At 
national levels, most interviews were conducted at interviewees' offices. Except for three 
national policy-makers, who were interviewed two and three times, as well as two 
provincial managers who were interviewed twice, all participants were interviewed once. 
Splitting interviews did not happen except for one key national informant, who was 
interviewed in three stages: while he was driving to attend a meeting, in the recovery room 
in a hospital when he had completed an operation (as a surgeon) and the last part at his 
home. This interviewee was a key informant who contributed a lot to establishing FM as a 
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policy in the former government. He was no longer in that position and was reluctant to be 
interviewed. I made myself flexible to his preference in order to not lose his accounts. 
Despite practical difficulties in arrangements, I did not face any problem in splitting his 
interview in three phases and I could reflexively cover the tailored interview guide with him. 
Such interviewing conditions did not affect the quality of interviews. Interviews with 
provincial officials were also mostly conducted in their offices, except one in a classroom 
at a teaching hospital. I interviewed local staff either in clinics or offices (managers) or at 
their place of residence attached to health centres. I interviewed public representatives in 
health centres, health houses, homes or their place of work. A few interviews were 
interrupted because of many factors like calling the interviewee to visit a patient, 
emergency meetings, etc. Nonetheless, none of interviews were left uncompleted because 
of interruptions (Britten, 1995). 
Interviews were digitally audio recorded (with the interviewees verbal consent), except one 
at provincial level when the interviewee refused the request for recording. In addition, I 
made notes during interviews to capture the timing of particularly important points and key 
phrases. When possible, I reflected and made notes on key points soon after interviews. 
This was quite useful, particularly as a back-up mechanism in case files were lost, which is 
what happened after interviewing a district health manager, with no possibility for a second 
interview. The recording was checked after each interview, the interview process critically 
reviewed, and the interview schedule amended. During interviews, I attempted to clarify 
my understanding of some specific sensitive issues by complimentary questions, to ensure 
full reposes to the question. 
Recordings were transcribed by two professional transcribers, typed in a specific format 
and checked by me against the recordings (at least twice) to ensure accuracy. Some direct 
attributable quotes were also checked with interviewees. 
3.4.2 Focus groups 
I conducted three focus groups with representatives of the public in three villages to 
explore service-users' views (Coreil, 1995). The main advantage of focus groups over one 
to one interviews is creating an environment to encourage people to interact with each 
other in a natural setting, so the interaction is analyzed rather than isolated views. It 
encourages a wide variety of participants to communicate, which can reveal additional 
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realities (Kitzinger, 1994). It also encourages debate which brings all views that not 
otherwise have surfaced. 
To enjoy such cited benefits and in order to create a dynamic environment for public 
representatives to express their experience, I planned to conduct six focus groups; one in 
every single village. However, in practice I could only arrange three for several practical 
reasons. In two villages, because of the campaign to run for the local council elections, the 
majority of potential participants rejected to sit together accusing others of exploiting the 
outputs on their behalf. In one village, my plans to hold focus groups failed twice for 
unexplained reasons. I was later informed it was due to the imam's unwillingness. 
Nonetheless, I interviewed six individuals as public representatives in villages that focus 
groups failed to be held (Appendix I). Participants in focus groups included 8-11 public 
representatives: village councillors, Imams, mayors, teachers, elderly trustees and, in two 
villages where behvarz was also a council member, behvarzes were included. The sample 
might not have statistically represented the larger village population, but it covered a range 
of accessible, informed, and trusted people who knew each other and had something in 
common (Green & Browne, 2005, p. 65). I identified these elites through local organograms 
either in the capital of the province or in district health authorities, and/or snowball 
techniques to identify key people at each village. Then I asked behvarzes' assistance in 
each health centre to organize and invite the identified participants. One focus group was 
held in the behvarz's house, another in the village council building, and the third in the 
Imam's home. I obtained participants' verbal consent to audio record the whole session, 
unless they asked me to mute. I also took some pictures with participants and added 
photos to sessions' documents. Although I did not have any specific guide as in the 
interviews, I had a list of broad areas that I wanted to be covered in focus groups. That 
simple guide was a summarized and simplified version of the interview guide at the local 
level. I intentionally avoided such a detailed guide to give greater fluidity to the sessions 
and leave participants with their own account of priorities in a main agreed discipline. In 
the beginning of each session, I explained the study to participants, the reason for inviting 
them and asked them to talk about FM and Behbar, their personal experience, their 
preference to seek care, the possible changes after implementation, the challenges, their 
expectation, their understanding from the policy, and their assessment of implementation. 
I tried to achieve a reasonable understanding of local social, cultural, and political context 
prior to running the focus groups (Vissandjee, Abdool & Dupe're', 2002). I did so either by 
asking local experts in the district to explain the characteristics of the village and 
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relationship hierarchies, and/or by reading the documents regarding the characteristics 
and demography of area. I obtained this information either from the centre/district or the 
village authorities including health centre. I also tried not to interfere in their discussion, not 
interrupt their talk, and act only as a facilitator. I was aware of the power imbalance among 
the selected participants, however, such a limitation was inevitable, particularly in two 
groups in which Imams attended. 
Each focus group lasted from 1.5 hours to 2.5 hours. They provided the view of public 
representatives as well as their perceptions and expectations of the reform. It was also 
helpful to identify five public representatives with greater potential for individual interview. I 
was cautious in not interpreting focus group data (public representatives) as the public's 
view, because of asymmetric information between them and the public. In addition, most 
elites (except council members) were not elected, so by default were government 
employees. Some representatives were even insured by other insurance schemes than 
Behbar. Therefore, I avoided interpreting their perceptions as that of the public. As a result 
the thesis will not have captured an accurate account of the public's experience. In 
addition, the fact that I could not run focus groups in three of the villages might have 
restricted the extent to which the views of public representatives at all six centres were 
addressed. However, I conducted individual interviews with some public representatives in 
villages in which focus groups did not take place. Thus the limitation of this thesis to 
address the public's view also applies to those health centres. 
Throughout Chapters 6-9, quotes from the public representatives including imams, 
teachers, councillors, mayors, etc, derive mostly from focus groups. As clarified above, 
some quotes were extracted from individual interviews. I have not separated these two 
sources of data within the text to make the text smoother to follow. 
3.4.3 Observation 
To compliment the interviews and focus groups at the local level, I observed the actual 
practice in all six health centres and took notes. I had a simple checklist for observing 
facilities, practices, and equipment in health centres. I wrote down the list of existing 
equipment and described its structure in my notebook. I also visited different sections of 
health centres and took notes about them. Depending on health centres (they varied in 
terms of services they covered and amenities they had), I made notes about the quality 
and size of the building, how physical spaces were allocated and used, staff behaviour 
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with the public, administrative procedures from the time of admission, doctors' and other 
practitioners' consultation with patients, drug warehouses (if there were any), and how 
drugs were kept and prescriptions were dealt with. I wrote down what I observed from 
laboratory and radiology facilities in centres with such sections. Observations were with 
patients' permission. I also sat with doctors and observed their interaction with patients. I 
was curious to understand how and under what conditions doctors refer patients to other 
levels of care. Besides, I visited practitioners' accommodation which in most cases was 
adjacent to the health centre and learnt about their facilities. 
I paid a tour visit to every village and wrote my observations about the general 
specifications of the village. I randomly accompanied doctors and midwives in some village 
rotas, during which I recorded the same subjects as above with regard to health houses, 
the way that practices were conducted, facilities and general conditions. Such process of 
observation was followed in all six health centres and their supervised health houses and 
villages. In addition to notes on observation, I recorded my initial impressions, analytical 
thoughts, and possible interpretations, openly in the note book during the observational 
periods. I did not separate these at the time, to ensure it was a written record. I followed 
the general recommendation to review field notes soon after the period of observation, 
which facilitated both further recall of the events observed, as well as the possible 
disaggregating of the data into descriptive and analytical components. When possible, I 
also took pictures and videos of health centres, mainly to record the environment, 
equipments, and facilities. I employed observation as my tool for understanding what is 
practiced in family medicine and the condition of health centres that are implementing the 
reform, only as a supplement to the main sources of data, individual interviews and focus 
groups. Observation was an appropriate tool to verify talks and contextualize findings 
which was beneficial for increasing credibility of findings (Silverman, 2000). 
3.4.4 Documentary data 
Documents are products of structured and informed social practices derived from the 
decisions which people make as individuals and members of groups and organizations 
(May, 1997). Documents, such as public papers, agenda papers, internal documents, 
minutes, correspondence, national bills and legislations, annual reports (official and 
nonofficial), reports on evaluation of practitioners' performance, magazines, newspapers, 
emails, etc, are a rich source of data in this research. Given the nature of this study in 
analyzing the implementation of a health policy, analyzing documentary data was 
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informative. Information derived from documents can be utilized either straightforwardly or 
interpretively, to produce primary research findings or for verification purposes 
(Mason, 1996; Patton, 2002). I used documents as supplementary sources of data to 
validate other data: 
"In conjunction with other data, documents can be important in triangulation, where 
an intersecting set of different methods and data types is used in a single project" 
(Punch, 1998, p. 190). 
Moreover, I used documents to enhance my understanding of the policy, as well as to 
provide some quantitative data. Documentary data in this research allowed access to data 
that was otherwise unavailable. As documents are social products, they must be selected 
and analyzed cautiously, taking into account not only their content, but features such as 
their production and functions (Prior, 2003). Given that, I tried to take Jupp's four key 
considerations (Jupp, 1996, p. 303) to evaluate documents: authenticity (being original and 
genuine), credibility (accuracy), representativeness (being representative of the totality of 
the documents of its class), and meaning (what to say). Based on this, I used many policy 
and evaluation documents published by government bodies, particularly the MOH, the 
MWSS, and the MPO and their subordinate institutions. I also treated contents of some 
specific website such as TAKFAB (the official website of the MOH for FM), and some 
press websites as documents to keep up to date with the progress of implementation. 
Because the policy was not appropriately documented, and its components and relevant 
reports were scattered across different organizations, I sought document from a variety of 
sources. I was also updated on documents so as to achieve as a comprehensive intake. I 
selected documents that: 
r explained the history of development of the policy; 
i- described policy (FM) revolution and revisions, its content, political and social 
debates on that and reasons that resulted in its merger with Behbar; 
reported the progress of implementation of FM and Behbar and challenges ahead, 
annually, quarterly or on irregular basis; 
¢ reported the results of auditing performance of practitioners and managers with 
regards to implementation of FM; 
¢ described the policy, its benefits, prospective outcomes, etc, for various groups of 
stakeholders, either presentations or correspondences; 
¢ explained progress of implementation, stakeholders' attitude and expectations, and 
decisions made to address such concerns, mainly newspapers and magazines, as 
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well as surveys and intra/inter-organizational correspondences, confidential or non 
confidential; 
prepared to educate various groups of practitioners and public regarding the policy 
and its revisions. 
I used both published and unpublished documents. I read all documents that I gathered 
and categorized them using the above classification. In cases that content of the 
documents were contradictory, I asked relevant organization for clarification. In some 
occasions, I compared documents with other sources of data, particularly interviews, to 
add to my understanding or resolve confusion. I categorized findings of documents in 
above mentioned categories and fed them into the thesis to paint a picture of the policy 
and its components, as well as keeping updated with the pace of implementation. Chapter 
4 is mainly based on the results of document analysis. Nonetheless, I used documents 
only as complementary source of data in this thesis. 
4 Sampling 
I took my general rationale for sampling individuals and health centres from Patton: 
"Qualitative sampling designs specify minimum samples based on expected 
reasonable coverage of the phenomenon given the purpose of the study and 
stakeholder interests" (Patton, 1990, p. 186). 
This section explains sampling individuals and local health centres, where data was 
collected from local people, either practitioners or the general public. 
4.1 Selecting individuals 
Following the feasibility study, I concluded that worthwhile data could be collected for at 
least one province (Golestan province in north-east), which was diverse enough to meet 
most aspects of theoretical generalization and would provide a large enough sample to 
meet the purpose of the study. Having studied sampling, I also realized how important it is 
to broadly consider Patton's phrase "stakeholder interests" to select participants. Given the 
political nature of the topic, such a sample would be sufficient to convince stakeholders 
that the analysis and results could apply to them. To achieve that, rural health centres had 
to be purposively sampled to ensure the variation between them was represented. 
Interviewees at any level would need to be purposefully selected in a way that represents 
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influential stakeholders in making, implementing, and evaluating the policy 
(Silverman, 2000). 
I used a purposive sampling strategy to identify relevant individuals at the national and the 
provincial levels. I began by identifying three key informants in the MOH. During interviews 
with them, ten other national policy makers were identified using snowball or chain 
sampling (Peters & Waterman, 1982). Four other national officials were also identified from 
documents. I also used documentary data and conversation with others in the policy 
network to gain a view of their ideas, role and position within the policy cycle. 
4.2 Selecting health centres and local participants 
To understand the reality of the implementation of FM in the periphery, it was necessary to 
investigate the local level. The Golestan province was chosen for the following three 
reasons: 
1- Great diversity with respect to ethnicities, religion, language, and socio-economic 
status. The province is small in size, but includes five major ethnicity groups as it is 
a favourite destination for various groups of immigrants. It is among few provinces 
that the Sunni religious minority have lived for long (almost 35% of population). 
Two languages and five dialects of Farsi are spoken in Golestan. The province also 
shows a significant socioeconomic disparity, with west as affluent and east as very 
deprived area, only within 160 KM diameter (MPO, 2004). 
2- High proportion of rural population (55% vs 45%). The national proportion of rural 
population is 35%, versus 65% who live in urban areas (INS, 2007). Golestan is 
among few provinces in which bigger proportion of people reside in rural areas. 
Because FM and Behbar are implemented in villages and small cities at the first 
phase, this could be a benefit in selection as it is mainly a rural province 
(M P O, 2004; INS, 2007 ). 
3- Size and location of the province. The province is small in size, but has been 
recently separated as a new province. This is why authorities have greater desire 
to cooperate in different projects and prove their capabilities. This provided me with 
good cooperation and willingness to conduct the study, which was crucial to 
manage data collection. 
Six rural health centres in Golestan were identified for local studies. To select three health 
centres with good and three centres with poor implementation, out of the 134 rural health 
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centres in Golestan, I consulted provincial managers in the DOH (deputy for health in the 
medical university of Golestan) and the GMIO (provincial office of the medical insurance 
organization). They formed a committee of experts that met for a day workshop at which I 
explained the research, its aims and methodology. I asked the committee to rank the top 
ten and bottom ten health centres in the province, regarding progress with implementing 
FM from their point of view. I explicitly asked the committee not to count on health indices 
or outcome to rank health centres. Rather, because they were all involved in auditing the 
centres, I asked them to use their perception of progress in FM with regard to managing 
practicalities, allocating logistics, service delivery, personnel turnover and perceived 
public's satisfaction of services. Such a heuristic approach was inevitable given the 
implementation of FM at early stages because of which no formal quantitative evaluation 
existed. In addition, such good and bad categorization of health centres was only an 
auxiliary measure to maximise the diversity of included health centres, along with other 
considerations discussed below. It took two days (not continuously though) to identify the 
top and the bottom ten health centres. I then asked the committee to rank three of each 
list, taking into account the local population in terms of ethnicities, socio-economic status, 
religion, climate and geographical status, TB and HIV/AIDS status and distance from 
capital of the province. After three days discussion, six health centres across 11 health 
district authorities of Golestan were ranked as three good and three bad centres. Again, I 
need to reemphasize that this method for selecting health centres was an attempt to 
achieve as much diversity as possible so as to represent the entire province. 
I divided studies of the health centres into two phases, using observation in the first phase 
to inform the second phase. Collecting data at provincial and local levels followed the 
same flexibility as between national and local levels, easily moving along one level to 
another. 
Prior to local data collection, I met officials at the district health authorities including the 
head of the authority, who was usually an experienced GP, the head of district PEHP, 
administrative, IT and financial staff. This was to become familiar with the area, and to 
seek experience of implementation, as well as to gather documents about the 
implementation. I also invited the health district managers to accompany me in the first 
visit to each health centre. We usually had a formal initial meeting attended by all staff in 
the health centre, where I explained my research, their role, their rights and 
responsibilities, and expectations, and enabled everyone to introduce themselves. Such 
sessions were useful to break the ice and to create a better environment for cooperation. I 
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then recruited staff for interviews. The strategy was to interview all the doctors in single 
and two doctor handed centres, and two or three doctors in centres with more than two 
doctors, one of whom was the head of the health centre. None of centres had more than 
one nurse and one midwife in charge of FM, so all were interviewed. There were midwives 
in some health centres who had no relation to FM, some of whom were also interviewed. 
Occupational health experts, disease control experts, dentists and administrative staff 
were also invited for interview. 
5 Data analysis 
In most qualitative research the analysis begins during data collection, as the data already 
gathered are analyzed and shape the ongoing data collection (Patton, 2002). Most 
research is an interactive process of deduction and induction; a `search for regularities and 
cumulation' (Dingwall et al, 1998). In this study, where I have been the only person 
undertaking both the data collection and the analysis, it was not feasible to maintain 
complete distance from the data before the commencement of the analysis. Data analysis 
in this study therefore began alongside data collection. This sequential analysis 
(Becker, 1971) or interim analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1984) had the advantage of allowing 
me to go back and refine questions, develop hypotheses, and pursue emerging avenues 
of inquiry in further depth in later interviews. Crucially, it also enabled me to look for 
deviant or negative cases. Theory has both informed and been informed by data analysis 
in this research. The review of the theoretical literature helped me establish a set of 
explanatory theories to be tested, as well as providing themes around which the data 
analysis was organized. 
5.1 Documentary analysis 
I started to analyse documentary data prior to the interviews in order to assist identification 
of key themes on which to base the interview topic guide. I also used the content analysis 
approach illustrated by May (1997) and Ericson (1991) to read, conceptualize, and 
interpret the text according to specific themes, and picked out pieces of information 
relevant to the process of implementation of FM in different stages. I categorized 
documents and their themes under the same categories as for selecting documents. I 
created an Excel sheet (Microsoft, 2003), in which columns were the category of 
documents and rows were filled with name and code of document. I carefully read all 
documents first and highlighted sections which were relevant to selected categories, or 
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might be used for updating the implementation status. This shortened the next journey for 
synthesis. For documents which I had a Word version, I copied the relevant part and 
pasted in related cell against its appropriate category. However, because most of 
documents were hardcopies, instead of texts I wrote down page number and paragraph 
number for future use. I then checked all cells in each category together and identified 
discrepancies for further investigation. I updated categories and relevant texts based on 
ongoing document collection which enabled me to enrich my understanding about the 
policy. I then put different cells in each column together and revised it to paint whole the 
picture around categories. Such information was assembled and shaped afterwards, to 
narrate the policy development and implementation, in relation to the conceptual 
framework of the thesis. I examined the documents not only for their content, but also for 
the context in which they were produced and functioned, as explained in selecting process 
for documents. 
5.2 Deductive approach in analysing interviews 
For interview data analysis, I mainly followed the deductive method of the 'framework 
approach' (Pope et al, 1999; Ritchie et al, 2003; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994), not overlooking 
the emerging themes which were revealed whilst reading and rereading data, particularly 
for the analysis of key informant interviews at the national level (Patton, 1990; 
Green, 1998). In addition, wherever theoretical reasoning and the conceptual framework 
were not supported by the data, superiority was given to the data, following an inductive 
approach (Pope et al, 2000). 
The approach was suitable for this study because objectives were set in advance, and the 
research was guided by a conceptual framework. It had two main advantages. First, no 
specialised electronic data management package was used; instead I adapted tables 
produced in Microsoft Word software (the 2003 version). However, the process could also 
be undertaken using manual spreadsheets. Second, the framework approach has been 
mainly developed to analyse qualitative data in policy-oriented research (e. g. Griffiths et 
al, 2001; Rashidian & Russell, 2003; Rashidian et al, 2008). This thesis aimed to detect 
factors which influenced implementation, the method was useful therefore to fulfil this task: 
"... qualitative data analysis is essentially about detection, and the tasks of defining, 
categorising, theorising, explaining, exploring, and mapping are fundamental to the 
analyst's role"(Ritchie & Spencer, 1 994, p. 176). 
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5.2.1 Framework approach 
The framework approach has five main steps: 
1. familiarization 
2. identifying a thematic framework 
3. indexing 
4. charting 
5. mapping and interpretation 
Having conducted all interviews, I was already familiar with the data. Despite this, I took 
Ritchie and Spencer's (1994) comment and started analysis of interview data by listening 
to recordings and matching transcriptions with audio files, particularly because transcribing 
had been carried out by others. I listened to all interviews at least twice, during which I 
developed a summary content form for each interview (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Then I 
stated to identify key themes by reading transcriptions. I developed the preliminary 
thematic framework based on interviews, the earlier feasibility study, documentary data, 
and findings from the literature review (Chapter 3). As mentioned earlier, I divided data 
collection into two phases, to provide the opportunity for comparison and improvement. 
Therefore, the preliminary thematic framework was based on interviews with two 
international managers, 11 national policy makers, 6 provincial managers, and staff and 
the public representatives in three health centres, as well as contributions from documents 
and the literature. Dividing the analysis into two phases was useful for looking for more 
challenging issues in the second phase of interviews, as well as for identifying themes. 
After improving the initial thematic framework, I rechecked the themes against transcripts 
and updated them. The initial framework contained 18 themes, which reduced 
successively to 12,8,5, and finally 4 themes, employing a non-strict adoption of grounded 
theory (Barbour, 2001). 
In the third phase, the transcribed text was 'indexed' using the codes relating to the 
themes and sub-themes of the thematic framework. Some sections of data were indexed 
with one or more codes (cross indexing). I produced one table for each theme in Word 
format, assigning each table row to one interviewee identified with the appropriate code, 
while table columns were assigned to sub-themes. To conduct the charting phase, I added 
the tables together, which created a large table of many cells within which each cell 
corresponded to the views expressed by one interview coded for one sub-theme. I reread 
the data and re-coded some parts then, and checked the internal consistency of the codes 
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by reading the content of the codes and checking that they matched the definitions, which 
resulted in recoding some texts at this stage. The data extracts were then cut and pasted 
from the indexed texts to allocated cells on the chart. The method enabled me to compare 
single interviewees' views on different themes and sub-themes (looking across the rows), 
as well as to compare different interviewees' views on each theme (looking across 
columns). I read the main transcriptions several times after writing the first draft of the 
results, revised the codes where necessary, added new themes or sub-themes, and 
updated the chart. I also investigated the relationship between themes and the sub-themes 
to enhance the consistency of coding. 
Undoubtedly, throughout the analysis my own `hunches' and insights led me to focus on 
certain themes in greater detail. Advanced preparation of preliminary themes on the basis 
of the feasibility study and literature provided a clear structure to guide the analytical 
process. 
Brackets at the end of italic statements refer to the interviewee codes. To quote from the 
interviews, each interviewee was represented with a code which started with the letter'N' 
for national level, 'P' for provincial level, and 'L' for the local level. To meet anonymity and 
confidentiality, I categorized national interviewees to three categories of purchaser (PU), 
provider (PR), and others (0) including other insurance companies than the MIO, MPs, 
people from the management and planning organization (MPO), former ministers, etc. At 
the provincial level, the same rule as national categorization applies. At the local level, the 
digit next to the letter'L' indicates the health centre (1 to 6), and the other number (1 to 9) 
shows the particular interviewee. Letters FD, M, N, and E next to the local numbers, 
respectively represent family doctor, midwife, nurse, and other staff in the health centres 
including infectious disease, environmental, occupational, and family planning experts as 
well as administrative personnel. District officials at local level are mentioned as DA in the 
brackets. I admit that such a categorization might prevent the reader to justify opinions by 
realizing the precise position of interviewees. However, this is at most which could be 
declared to adhere to anonymity, considering ethical commitments. 
I followed the same rule in transcribing and analysing focus groups. Due to the interrelated 
nature of the analysis, I did not separate focus group data from individual interviews, but 
incorporated them within the analysis. 
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6 Ethical considerations 
I carefully considered the ethical issues. The participants were given an oral and/or written 
explanation about the purpose and method of the study, as well as their responsibilities 
and rights. The time, venue, and method of interviews were mutually agreed upon. I 
reiterated the purpose of interviews and the study objectives at the beginning of each 
interview, when I asked participants for permission to audio-record the interview. I coded 
all audio files and kept them secure and confidential. I provided two backups of recordings 
and transcriptions. I assured participants that the thesis or any other output produced from 
this research would not identify any specific individual, village or health centre. The study 
was approved by the ethics committee of the LSHTM and the GMU in Iran. No honorarium 
was offered to the participants. Some participants' request for in advance access to the 
results of the study prior to publicizing was turned down. 
7 Organization of the results 
The results are presented in Chapters 6 to 9. As explained, the thesis adopted four main 
themes to categorize the findings, within four interrelated and dynamic groups. The thesis 
develops a framework which highlights the importance of the dynamic inter-relationship 
between the four main components of health policy. (Figure 5.1). The framework is 
employed here as a roadmap of the results. 
Appreciating Manor's (1991) argument of the need for 'thick description' rather than a 
'parsimonious model', the framework acknowledges the importance of looking at the 
content of the policy, the processes of policy making and how power is used in health 
policy, as well as how interactions between actors as well as actors and the environment 
influence the policy. Such a categorization also means understanding the process through 
which such influence is played out and the context in which different actors and processes 
interact. This dynamic framework reveals a clear distinction between central and 
peripheral stakeholders, which reflects the consequences of imposing policies and the top- 
down approach to policy. 
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Figure 5.1 Dynamic framework for health policy analysis: a roadmap of the results 
chapters 
The existing environment (Context) 
Chapter 7 
spects of the policy (Content & 
Input by central policy makers) 
Chapter 6 
of implementation (Process) 
Impacts on individuals (Local actors) 
Chapter 9 
Based on the framework, the results chapters cover: 
" aspects of the policy (content and intentions of central actors); 
" the existing environment (context); 
" the experience of implementation (process); and 
" impact of the policy on local staff and public representatives (local actors). 
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The framework is a simplified approach to a complex set of inter-relationships. It seeks to 
understand the reality of implementation by appreciating how actors influence the context 
within which they live and work. Therefore, while it helps to systematically investigate 
factors which influence the policy, it acts as a map that shows the main roads. Buse et al's 
(2005) description applies here that has yet to have contours, rivers, forests, paths and 
dwellings added to it. 
In addition, the organization of the results chapters helps analysis and understanding the 
policy itself (analysis of policy) or it can be applied to plan for improving FM (analysis for 
policy). This thesis seeks to do both: a retrospective exploration of the determination of FM 
and what it consists of, and suggestions for the future of the policy to improve its 
implementation, by reflecting on practical implications. 
Before reading the results, I would like to reemphasize that findings in this thesis are 
accounts of the participants. The data presented here are the way that people presented 
themselves and expressed their views, attitudes and accounts about the implementation of 
FM, which was then analysed and thematically categorized using robust methods. Such a 
process was inevitable in this study as it takes into account the complexities of evaluating 
the implementation of a policy once the perspectives of policy makers and other 
stakeholders are taken as central to understanding their options and choices. Much of 
health policy analysis involves giving meaning to what actors behave. And finally, the 
definitions and the way in which they were translated into practice might vary and evolve 
over time as the intellectual, social, and economic environment changes. 
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Chapter 6: Aspects of the policy 
Introduction 
Perceptions of interviewees about aspects of the policy are investigated in this chapter, 
considering both positive and negative aspects. These accounts have been interpreted 
based on analysis and I did not ask respondents directly to express pros/cons. Rather I 
interpreted them in analysis. It is likely that many interviewees often do not cover both 
aspects. Therefore, I need to make it clear that pros and cons views here might have been 
expressed by different and/or sometimes same persons. Aspects of the policy that 
respondents felt promoted its acceptance were: 
" Focus on health; 
" Improved efficiency; 
" Improved quality of care; 
Increased confidence in doctors; 
Purchaser-provider split; 
" Expanded provision of services; 
" Expanded entitlement; 
" Better employment opportunities; 
" Increased pay for practitioners; 
" New payment framework; 
" International basis of the policy. 
In contrast, the policy was criticized because of the following: 
" Top-down approach; 
" Lack of sustainability in funds; 
" Ambiguity; 
" Too much flexibility; 
" Lack of local customization; 
Impracticalities; 
" Unreliable expectation. 
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I Aspects that promoted acceptance of the policy 
FM was widely believed to be the only option to reengineer the health system. Apart 
from 
their interpretation of FM, the majority of interviewees branded FM the right policy for 
reform: 
"Rationally, you have got no choice but FM because demands are high, resources 
are scarce, and you have to endorse grading... " [N10, PR, national policy maker]. 
Regional stakeholders echoed national policy makers: 
"... the policy itself is a right one. We had to start from somewhere. We could not 
just watch continuity of this messy system, and wasting of our resources ... 
" 
[P3, GMU, provincial manager]. 
Even in remote parts of the country, practitioners supported the policy: 
"... FM brings more standard services. There is no choice left other than FM to 
answer the public's current needs... "[Li. 7, behvarz]. 
1.1 Focus on health rather than just disease 
A few interviewees described the policy as 'health dominant', an approach which used to 
be less apparent: 
"... the family doctor is not in charge of his patients' diseases, s/he is responsible 
for keeping the population healthy. As head of a health team, s/he must keep and 
promote his/her assigned population's health... " [NI2, PR, national policy maker]. 
This was why the family doctor was in charge of promoting health, rather than just 
treatment: 
"... by law, insurance must be health dominant in this reform. Family doctors should 
provide health services, not curative ones!... " [N13, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Most doctors were fairly aware of this approach, at least in theory: 
"Family doctors must manage their population's both physical and emotional health 
by getting to know them over a long term, either by face or name. To be more 
successful, they must train people, not just treat them. For example I teach those of 
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my patients who have high blood pressure to exercise more, and take less salt in 
their diet, in addition to taking drugs... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Such a situation became likely for family doctors working for long enough with the public to 
promote their health culture: 
"... it is important that the family doctor lives with people (in villages), knows their 
problems, and thinks to solve them... e. g. he could change drug consumption and 
rationalize prescriptions... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
Considering social aspects of health in FM was not only the policy-makers' desire, but the 
public were happy because their social life was being taken care of in FM, as well as their 
medical conditions: 
"... / am looking forward to seeing the FD as my family member who knows me and 
my family, socializes with us, participates in our ceremonies, and keeps us 
informed about our health status, which makes us alert prior to developing a 
serious condition. We want him to live with us, drinking the water that we drink, 
eating the food that we eat,..., understanding us by putting his feet in our shoes... " 
[L5.8, imam]. 
Despite the policy being health dominant on paper, in practice the interviewees felt that 
treatment was given priority because of the way FM was implemented. 
1.2 Improved efficiency 
As the key function of resource management, gate-keeping was understood by 
practitioners. Many described FM as an opportunity for referral systems: 
"... Behbar helps a lot. Many problems could be solved easier by a doctor or a 
midwife. They do not see specialists by their own and for no reason. The situation 
has therefore significantly improved ... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
With lack of distinction between concepts of referral, Behbar, and FM, some interviewees 
highlighted FM as the only medium to promote referral: 
"... FM has not changed anything other than slightly empowering the referral 
system... " [L2.6, midwife]. 
Specialists in policy making roles believed that most situations could be managed by GPs 
and family doctors: 
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"... If FM is rightly established, we do not need the current number of specialists 
and sub- specialists... " [P3, GMU, senior provincial health manager]. 
FM was mentioned as a programme that takes barriers between providers and users away 
and is associated with better coordination: 
.. call 
it FM or whatever. I passionately believe in this phenomenon because of 
one crucial fact: it eliminates the distance between providers and users of 
services... " [N 17, PR, national health expert]. 
Improved coordination resulted from a defined and systematic relationship between 
providers and users in FM: 
"... when the system connects individuals to each other, the user is aware of what 
services s/he is entitled to, and the provider knows the registered person, because 
of which the veil which prohibited them from regular visits is lifted... " [P4, provincial 
health manager]. 
Prospective medical record keeping in FM was seen as another sign of better 
coordination: 
"... medical record keeping links doctors systematically to their patients. Being 
professionally prepared, the records are easily accessible upon visiting another 
doctor... we must change random and non-registered visits between doctor and 
patient to a recorded one... " [N17, PR, senior health expert]. 
The advantage was also acknowledged at local levels: 
"... not only doctors, but also Behvarzes ought to register their patients' medical 
records, particularly for target groups like under-fives or pregnant women. This is 
essential for future work up... " [L2.2, DA, district health expert]. 
1.3 improved quality of care 
Accessibility, coordination, availability, and equity of services as components of quality of 
care were felt to be improved in FM. Some interviewees explained that FM brought clearer 
responsibility within the health system: 
"... we registered people and responded to their needs via raising responsibility of 
the system. Responsibility is not achieved without an assigned population, as well 
as assigned persons in charge of service provision (FM)... no one previously knew 
who was in charge of what... " [N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
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Providers called this as getting back on track by integrating care: 
"... FM is systematizing the provision of health services. In my opinion, it frames the 
system which was very messy beforehand... " [L2.6, midwife]. 
The policy also was seen as creating more coordinated care: 
"The patient is viewed telescopically at the specialist level. For instance, the doctor 
cares only about the patient's diabetes, not his heart problems... only a family 
doctor could coordinates different problems. " [N12, PR, senior health official]. 
The family doctor's role as the dispatcher or the coordinator, particularly for elderly and 
high risk populations, was highlighted by many as the major reason for supporting FM. 
Perhaps this was why the public interpreted the policy as grounds for active care: 
"... once I heard of FM, / imagined how wonderful it would be. / think it would be like 
in movies, where doctors visit patients at their homes ... 
" [Li. 4, midwife]. 
FM was also explained as a programme for all people that reemphasizes equity: 
"... by law, it is the government's responsibility to provide FM packages for the 
entire population. Every Iranian citizen has to have a family doctor... 
[N3, MP, physician & member of parliament]. 
As another emphasis on equity, provision of services for all Iranians via FM, irrespective of 
their socio-economic or monetary status, was the mandatory duty of the government. 
Practitioners also acknowledged their increased accessibility to the public: 
"... we are more in charge of the population's health (via FM), because we know 
them better. We are so close to the public now. "[LI. 4, midwife]. 
The benefit was echoed by a few Behvarzes who had been in charge of serving people for 
more than a decade. As locals who have been living closely with the public, it was 
important that Behvarzes acknowledged FM as an opportunity for a closer relationship. At 
least, it was expected to have this level of relationship between providers and users, in 
addition to the general strong belief among providers as well as the public: 
"... when the doctor comes to the village, households recognize him as their doctor..., they go to see him more easily ... "[LI. 6, behvarz]. 
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Some were so hopeful in FM as to describe it as the most equitable model of primary care: 
"... although the system is not perfect in England, however, because people are not 
rejected due to monetary reasons, access is fairer... despite shortages in the British 
(primary care) system, its medical recording system makes follow ups more likely 
... " [N9, 
PR, O, senior national policy maker]. 
Exemplifying the British primary care model by this high-ranked policy maker who was fully 
aware of both (Iran and UK), highlighted hope in FM to increase equity, particularly in 
deprived areas: 
"Taking into account our provincial demographics, the design (of FM) is absolutely 
in line with the deprivation, despite difficulties in execution... " [P5, E, provincial union 
member and physician]. 
Some interviewees mentioned FM as the only way to expand availability and accessibility 
of services and make them equitable: 
"... FM is the only framework in which doctors become available and accessible. 
There is no other way around... "[N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
This opinion which was mirrored by practitioners other than doctors: 
"Although doctors do not perform well on some occasions, however, the main aim 
of FM which was increasing doctors' accessibility is being fulfilled. Now, the 
majority of people do not give birth at homes anymore. They know there is a FM 
system to support them. They are happier and more at ease... " [Li . 4, midwife]. 
1.4 More confidence in doctors 
Undoubtedly, the implementation of FM had been going forward by creating mutual 
opportunities for practitioners and the public to establish long-term relationship on the 
basis of trust and confidence. More confidence in doctors was identified: 
".. .a 
level of confidence has been created because of which it is unlikely that they 
go to visit another doctor (even at this centre (with three other doctors). They get 
upset if 1 ask them (patients) to see other doctors while I am busy... " 
[L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
The current level of close relationships had been achieved not only because of the long- 
term stay of family doctors, but also the nature of doctors' duties and responsibilities: 
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"... FM is good because the doctor knows his patients well, ..., he does not ignore 
patients and follows them up,.... doctors are more involved now... they enforce 
behvarzes to take care of specific cases... "[L2.6, midwife]. 
Simultaneous prioritization of issues such as maternal mortality in Golestan province was 
interpreted as raising sensitivity towards patients, which enhanced follow ups as well as 
responsibility to the public: 
"... 1 think FM has increased the number of follow ups, because doctors are more 
sensitive now, they discuss high risk cases among themselves... " [L2.7, Iocal 
dentist]. 
That was why people at some places preferred to visit family doctors rather than seeking 
care from private doctors: 
"Since FM started, I prefer to come here (the health centre) just because of follow 
ups (here). They follow up pretty well. They care so much. " [L2.8, Imam]. 
FM created the opportunity for a close and defined relationship between practitioners and 
the public, in order to provide good services and good management of resources: 
"... private doctors do not keep their patients' records to follow them up. They know 
their patients just by name, not their problem. To what extent can one who visits 
thousands of insured people (as just part of his patients), rely on his memory?... " 
[P2, PU, provincial policy maker]. 
1.5 Concurrent implementation of FM and Behbar (rural insurance for all) 
It was difficult to assess mutual interaction of the two policies, however, for two reasons 
the concurrence was interpreted as an opportunity for FM: the concept of the purchaser- 
provider split and expanded service provision. 
The purchaser-provider split was identified as essential for undertaking the 
implementation. Bearing in mind the budget deficit, the MOH was more likely to allocate 
FM resources to remedy these inherited shortages: 
"... given our long-run budget deficit, if money was under our control, we were 
definitely doing something else. We rank hospitals ourselves across the medical 
university. I never rank hospital X (the oldest educational hospital in the capital of Golestan) a third class one, however, it really is. Using whatever technique, I rank it first class, to charge clients in first class rate. If the MIO was in charge of ranking, it 
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certainly was not evaluating us better than 3rd class.. . thus, if I was going 
to monitor 
our performance, I was interpreting results for my own good at many occasions ... " 
[P3, PR, senior provincial health manager]. 
The purchaser also identified the split as necessary: 
"... we could not accept that one organization (MOH) to determine the price, as well 
as sales and also purchases (services) by itself, while enforcing others to purchase 
only its services. Given that, separation was prosperous... " [P2, PU, provincial 
manager]. 
It was believed that the split would enhance efficiency and quality of services: 
"... parliament as the fund approver has instructed the MOH to make policies, which 
must be followed by the MIO... in fact, defining policies, designing health packages, 
and providing checklists are MOH's tasks. The MIO is supposed to monitor the 
performance on the basis of policies and the MOH provides the checklists. These 
two are complimentary, rather than independent and interfering units... " 
[N3, MP, physician, member of parliament]. 
Nevertheless, national stakeholders other than the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security 
were concerned that FM would be ruined by the MIO, because of their lack of a health 
focus: 
"... there is always the danger that one day the MIO will ruin the reform. Having 
monetary control, particularly as long as the organization is chaired by people like 
the current minister (who has said we are not in charge of public health), it is quite 
likely that they do not take responsibility for health, stating they are just the insurer, 
and no more. I fear them saying that whenever insured people get sick, they will be 
responding accordingly. Such a situation would be a hugest disaster for FM... " 
[N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
The extent that concurrence promoted FM was unclear, given the principal disagreement 
of the MIO with FM: 
"... the programme was executed by an insurer (MIO) which was principally against 
FM from the beginning, while principal designers of FM had been put aside ... " [N8, O, senior finance official]. 
One interviewee assessed the concurrence implementation as a potential threat to FM, 
because of shifting emphasis from prevention to treatment: 
"... we enjoyed Behabr as an opportunity to lead our health system towards FM and 
referral. Meanwhile we were concerned about losing our past 27 years of 
achievements in primary health care by privatizing rural insurance, which could 
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potentially shift focus of systems from health to treatment ... " [N12, 
PR, senior 
health official]. 
Suspicious about different aspects of implementation, this case was negative towards 
concurrence: 
"... implementing Behbar destroys the concept of FM, because doctors are 
temporary ones who work in mandatory conditions. Contrary to the principle of FM, 
it is also run publicly... " [N1 3, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
He considered himself as the person who started FM in Iran. He was pessimistic about all 
aspects of the current format of implementation and negative even towards points the 
majority had welcomed. Accusing current managers of incapability, he believed the 
German primary care system as the only suitable option for Iran, insisting every one else 
was wrong. 
Irrespective of a desirable approach to the purchaser-provider split, the study revealed a 
few practical consequences of the split that will be discussed in coming chapters. 
Because of the Behbar and the simultaneous equipping of health centres, provision of 
health services was expanded. This led to a considerable rise in service utilization. Such 
an improvement was highlighted as the main benefit of concurrent implementation: 
"... enjoying Behbar, we settled doctors in 2500 rural health centres, activated 
health centres and enhanced the public's trust. Utilization of services has 
dramatically gone up to 10 times ... 
"[N10, PR, PU, national policy maker]. 
It was not surprising therefore that key central policy-makers branded the implementation 
as only delivering some services to deprived people, hesitating to call it either FM or 
Behbar: 
"... we built up pillars of FM whose base is still underground. 500billionTM was 
spent for people who were deprived from any services. Even if nothing happened, 
accessibility has increased which itself causes less death. Nevertheless, it is 
neither FM nor rural insurance... " [N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Increased service delivery was seen as the main achievement of implementation thus far: 
"... the way of implementation has inevitably increased service provision. We 
introduced 390 (currently 270) drugs, accommodated family doctors in villages, 
established pharmacies, created 24 hours services including radiology units and 
laboratories... "[N4, O, senior policy maker]. 
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Irrespective of the extent to which the current implementation was consistent with the 
policy, some believed it was better than nothing: 
"I would like to reemphasize that Behbar is absolutely rational, even though far 
away from our goal (what is that? ). Taking one step is sometimes better than no 
movement at all" [P3, PR, senior provincial health official]. 
1.6 Expanded entitlement 
At the local level, interviewees acknowledged over-utilization of services because of 
expanded entitlement provided by Behbar: 
"... because of FM, pregnant women do not commute any more. This was not 
possible beforehand, because we only had one doctor. But there are currently 
several doctors in 2-3 health teams to cover such cases, which have improved our 
maternal mortality... "[L1.1, DA, district health manager in Golestan]. 
Behbar removed barriers to utilization of services and made them more accessible, partly 
because of significant reductions in user fees: 
"... people visit doctors with greater ease and less cost these days. Ultrasound 
imaging is almost half price in FM. They can afford to visit specialists much easier 
now. If there was no insurance, they were not going to seek specialist care for 
pregnancy checkups. Behbar is very good in this regard... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
1.7 Better employment opportunities 
Implementation of FM created an opportunity for the MOH to recruit almost 6000 GPs and 
3000 midwives in rural areas nationwide. Such a chance was consistently acknowledged 
as attracting practitioners towards the reform, particularly from the private sector: 
"... a huge number of doctors and midwives got employed in this reform. Job 
creation has been our priority all the time... "[N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
Unemployment had been a serious problem for doctors and midwives in Iran for long. Rise 
in employment was the main reason for many to support the reform: 
"... we had 10,000 unemployed personnel including doctors, nurses, and midwives 
with disproportionate distribution across the nation.. . we created 8000 jobs via this programme for GPs and midwives... providing a platform for doctors to act on was 
one of the philosophies behind FM ... "[N16, PU, former insurance official]. 
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Implementation of FM responded to the problem, particularly by recruiting midwives, who 
used to be almost absent in the PHC: 
"... almost 5000 GPs and 3000 midwives were settled in rural areas, their number 
has not been more than 1800 ever. This means accessibility and availability of 
service providers has raised four times... " [N1, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
Increasing employment was the dominant reason for many practitioners to support FM: 
"... the employment opportunity that FM created was the most important factor 
which facilitated its implementation,... in fact many doctors could not run their own 
clinics... Without FM many doctors would be jobless.. . me too, without FM I must 
had been fired after my mandatory scheme... " [Li. 4, midwife]. 
1.8 Increased pay for practitioners 
A substantial increase in service providers' earnings because of FM, particularly for 
doctors was a great incentive: 
`... Increased payment highly influenced practitioners. Insignificant income 
differences were the main reason that doctors were not pleased to settle in small or 
remote cities. We encouraged them by financial incentives... " 
[N3, physician, MP, member of parliament). 
The majority of policy makers believed that a rise in pay for practitioners, increased their 
reputation in the society and motivated them: 
"... this programme (FM) has raised the doctors' glory. They have 1.5millionTM 
income, whereas it used to be 300,000 TM. It is not high, but it is enough to 
encourage moving to rural parts... " [N4, PR, member of national team for reform]. 
Therefore, FM was introduced to change the doctors' position, whose reputation had been 
damaged by low earnings: 
"... doctors found their lost honour because of this reform. Now, they can at least 
stand on their own to live. It is not like the past, when they needed to take loans to 
work, went to prison if they could not repay their instalments or had to beg for 
money!... " [NI 5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Increased income was almost always highlighted as the greatest incentive to work in 
deprived areas: 
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"... doctors are paid more than 1.5millionTM (monthly), whereas, the average 
payments used to be 200-300 thousandTM. Even though that salary is not that 
much for FDs who have moved to remote villages, it compensated many factors for 
doctors to join the programme... "[N4, PR, senior national policy maker]. 
Senior policy makers claimed that such a rise has also remedied doctors' dignity: 
". doctors in rural areas were paid 200,000 TM prior to FM, whereas, they 
currently earn up to millions ... we realistically modified payment mechanisms. 
They 
used to be jobless or get paid 100,000TM. Now, they have found their dignity... " 
[N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Practitioners' income rise was cited as the most important reason to join the reform, 
particularly at the early stages: 
" ... in 
FM / am not doing anything more than what I was doing before. /just wanted 
to be a FD because of its lmillionTM salary... " [Li. 5, FD, family doctor]. 
Provincial and district managers also saw the rise as contributing to better managerial 
performance: 
"I used to get paid 200,000TM, while now the minimum payment is 900,000TM, ... keep this confidential: many doctors joined us with absolutely no idea about FM. 
Perhaps they found it attractive to make money.... doctors used to cover remote 
areas with too many troubles. Now they work 8.00 am - 4.00 pm, while they visit 
several health houses. They do all of these because we pay them up to 
1,200,000TM... " [L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Nonetheless, increased income was not encouraging enough for some doctors. 
Comparing their income to the past, they were happy in the beginning. However, soon 
after that they realized the workload had increased and there were delays in payments, 
they lost their faith in the reform and became less interested to stay: 
"... for a short period of time I was happy because of this salary, but it does not 
meet my expectations any more, particularly because I can earn much higher with 
less stress elsewhere... " [LI. 2, FD, family doctor]. 
In contrast, one doctor assessed the payment level high for the duties that they were 
carrying out: 
"... this money is too high...! think around 400,000TM is fair... no one hates money, 
though I am concerned that this leads to doctors' diversion from their medical role 
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.... 
If I was a decision maker, I would have decreased the salary and would have 
tried to increase the doctors' dignity and respect... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Although this interviewee was trying to highlight his sadness regarding the relationship 
between practitioners and administrators, he accepted the rise in payment was the 
strongest motivator for doctors. He was from a wealthy family, with no financial problems. 
Trying to show his fury because of the executive challenges, he highlighted that he was 
prepared to get paid less, if moral issues were considered. 
1.9 New forms of payment 
Pay for performance (P4P) and capitation payment were identified as two positive aspects 
of the policy: 
"... we designed a mixed payment mechanism on the basis of practitioners' 
performance and capitation. For instance, if they cure ten patients, they are paid 10 
K, otherwise no money ... "[N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
It was expected that such methods would encourage health promotion rather than 
treatment: 
"... we have been trying to drive towards health in all aspects, including the 
payment system... " [N12, PR, senior health official]. 
Peripheral managers gave a number of examples to illustrate positive impacts of P4P on 
practitioners' behaviour: 
"... we apply the results of checklists' analysis in payment. If not satisfactory, the 
practitioner is granted one more chance for compensation. Otherwise, his contract 
will be suspended. This has really affected the system... managers know that part 
of their earning depends on their scores in the audit pyramid (the format of auditing 
performance in Golestan)... " [P 1, PR, provincial senior health manager]. 
Most practitioners were conceptually happy with such innovations in payment, however, 
Some were concerned about its implementation: 
"... it is good that we get paid according to our performance. It doesn Y scare me 
that a part of my salary is linked to my function. Appropriate monitoring motivates 
me. This has caused me to act better, even mandatory! ... I know that to get my money in full, I have to cover different villages and sign documents... " 
[LI. 4, midwife]. 
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Nonetheless, few practitioners complained that in reality they were paid the amount that 
their boss decided, not based on their performance: 
"... everyone knows that whoever X (head of district PEHP) fancies, get paid better. 
Everything is in his hand ... 
1 never understood why my income in April, was more 
than May, or May was less than June, while just one audit was conducted for all 
three months. There is no rationale for payment... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Capitation payment was also described as a method to make doctors responsible for their 
assigned population: 
"... the biggest disaster would be fixed payment to doctors, not on the basis of 
particular formulation-note that the doctor is paid against the number of registered 
population, not the public's sickness. This means that s/he is responsible for health 
of the public. The formulation itself has considered bonus for managing special 
diseases like diabetes and hypertension, instead of deductions for mismanagement 
of such targets... " [N1, PR, former senior manager]. 
It was claimed that capitation payment might motivate practitioners to enhance the quality 
of their performance by realizing that better work would be paid more: 
"... we had experienced fixed salary payment, within which sweet and bitter was not 
different. Capitation payment teaches doctors that quality of services shows itself in 
payment... " [N 17, PR, senior health expert]. 
1.10 Following experience in other countries 
A number of reasons were identified for the strong belief in the policy. Some called FM the 
international accepted method for reengineering the health system: 
"... 1 conducted a research to find out which way other countries have gone (to 
change their health system). FM is an accepted universal policy! ... " [N15, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Senior policy makers' observation of implementing FM successfully in other countries 
affected their support for the policy: 
"... 1 have studied many health sector reforms in different countries to find out an 
appropriate replacement for our system. 1 learned that FM has been successfully 
employed in all places... " [N11, PR, senior health manager]. 
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However, only two national policy-makers were aware of the origin of the current model of 
FM: 
"... attempting to define FM, we knew that it must be professionally managed, be 
performed on standard (criteria), and be responsible before clients. We therefore 
chose the Dawson model for referral, which is completely regulated on the basis of 
delivering services among an assigned population. According to the model, 
patients' movement in various levels of services is concentrated on primary 
prevention, like England, Canada, etc,... "[N16, PU, former insurance manager]. 
In addition, some interviewees mentioned adopting role models including the British 
primary care to design the policy: 
"... FM in its modern format is matched with experience of many countries, 
particularly England, which we studied rigorously... " [N3, MP, member of 
parliament]. 
Even though efforts to adopt the British primary care system for Iran was commented on, 
few interviewees were keen to acknowledge it, either because of wanting to call FM a 
home product, or other reasons: 
"... 1 do not like the British primary care system. People are not satisfied there! We 
had Nordic countries such as Sweden in mind or Australia ... "[N1, PR, former 
senior health official]. 
"... the Iranian FM system is not a copy from Britain. They have designed that 
system on the basis of households and geography (we have not done so)" 
[N4, PR, senior policy maker]. 
Nevertheless, one interviewee criticized the policy because of its lack of collaboration with 
international experts and organizations: 
"... perhaps, we should have had foreign consultants in this implementation. We 
must have asked some advice on both design and performance phases. When 
implementing a big policy, it's common to also assign a foreign consultant ... " [N16, PU, former senior insurance manager]. 
Employing consultants with no conflict of interest could have also provided a neutral 
evaluation of implementation, currently being undertaken by the implementers (MOH & 
MIO) themselves, which are not even recognized by the other. 
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2 Criticisms of the policy 
2.1 Top-down approach 
There was a consistent belief that the process of policy making was top-down, with low 
participation by key stakeholders: 
"... 1 wonder is a real reform being undertaken in this country? To conduct an 
effective reform, all players must be identified first. Playing the appropriate role 
according to their influence is also essential. Otherwise, restricting the reform to 
few people who just talk to themselves and only write their wish list down, ends up 
with the messy picture you currently see... " [N7, O, senior insurance manager]. 
There were negative effects for such a top-down approach, such as influential 
stakeholders not accepting the policy: 
"First of all, the programme (FM) has been implemented without consultation with 
(professional) medical unions such as the IMA or the GPA, which makes it 
valueless and unreliable... "[N6, O, senior union manager]. 
Similar to any top-down policy, individuals did not consider themselves embedded enough 
into it, which led to loss of motivation, lack of ownership and poor cooperation: 
"... we have influential stakeholders such as the IMA and chancellors of 
universities, whom were not taken into the cycle of policy (for FM). Many opposed 
the reform because of its inherent rationing essence that restricts their earning and 
freedom. Our approach in saving the benefits of the MIO and not providing other 
incentives such as welfare and money for individual was mechanical... " 
[N8, O, policy maker]. 
Stakeholder analysis prior to design FM was overlooked to save money. Not only were the 
key stakeholders ignored, but practitioners who were traditionally considered as obedient, 
were also not consulted: 
"... traditionally, only patients are considered clients in this country. Whereas, 
because practitioners induce behaviour, create cost and define protocols, they 
must be considered as the main clients. You have got to keep them satisfied. 
Stakeholder analysis must have been carried before this... " [N9, O, senior policy 
maker]. 
He predicted that forcing practitioners to carry out some activities would have induced 
demands from patients, which would inevitably escalate costs: 
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"... we have to do what we are instructed to, because we are just performers. If we 
disagree, we will be replaced by someone else. Senior managers had to implement 
FM at whatever price to keep their position. We just pushed subordinates and did 
not give them any chance to have their say... " [N5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
The top-down approach is continuing despite the key policy makers' desire to involve 
stakeholders: 
"... we had decided to ask doctors to meet with trustees like elderly and people who 
are culturally or politically influential... " [N 14, PR, senior former health official]. 
However, practitioners were not consulted by this highly influential policy maker. 
Practitioners felt their dignity under threat and lost their sense of ownership due to the top- 
down approach: 
"The only thing we know from FM is expecting a new version (of policy) ... we 
did 
not know what was going to happen until it started. I am still confused about what is 
going on. We are not counted as human beings ... "[Li . 
3, nurse]. 
On the other hand, being independent from tax payers' money was assessed as positive 
to impose the policy on the public: 
"... our monetary independence (from people) in Behbar was a reason for success. 
By giving something free to people, you could expect recipients to do whatever you 
desire. Otherwise, they want to have their say... " [P2, PU, senior provincial 
manager]. 
This was relevant because as people paid almost nothing to get services, rationing their 
behaviour was easier. 
2.2 Lack of sustainable funds 
Nature of financial resources for implementation that was subsidizing the services, rather 
than insurance, led to general concerns regarding the sustainability of funds for the reform: 
"... we must have designed a real insurance rather than support when we 
formulated this policy (FM)... " [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
The financial basis of the reform was weak, and contrary to the policy: 
130 
"... In fact, subsidizing 70% of health costs while the public takes no risk is support 
not insurance. This is one step closer to health promotion, but is not insurance... 
[N12, PR, senior health official]. 
Stakeholders even from outside the health system were concerned about the fragile nature 
of funding, so-called insurance in Behbar: 
"Do other countries manage insurance as ours? We feel inferior being insured 
here. The approach to insurance in this reform is shameful. They look down on 
people. Unless it improves, no reform succeeds... " [P6, O, senior union manager]. 
The current framework of funding the implementation (supporting by global money rather 
than the insured's contribution), resulted in looking at the reform as just an expansion of 
service provision for villagers not FM: 
"... the insured person pays no premium in Behbar. Everything is free, except the 
insurance log-book issuance. I think they (MOH) just want to provide easier 
curative services (not preventive and promoting health) for villagers... Behabr was 
designed to support the poor against disease ... the principle of FM and referral is being bypassed by Behbar... "[L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Furthermore, many were concerned that lack of rationale and calculation behind the 
budget would endanger its sustainability: 
"... Parliament approved this budget with no idea about the needed amount... there 
was no calculation for that. MPs diverted money from whatever source in the 
annual budget bill, with no logic or reason. What worries me is that big money is 
always badly spent ... "[N8, O, senior national manager and policy maker]. 
No appropriate socio-economic ranking and scientific rationing were undertaken to 
approve the budget. Therefore, the insurance log-books were distributed only on the basis 
of geographic place of residence: 
"... you cannot allocate part of the tax to a certain part of the population, without 
socio-economic ranking... what kind of reform is this? Not even exclude villagers 
who reside in cities (affluent), while they have kept their houses in villages. This is 
just geographic coverage not insurance... "[Pl, provincial health manager], 
Last but not least, interviewees even at local level were concerned that contrary to the 4th 
programme for development, the government was the main financer in FM: 
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"... as far as I have learned, insurance pools must mainly be fed by the insured's 
contribution. Insurers become powerful because of this. Governments occasionally 
contribute to the pools. However, the system is paradoxical and very complicated, 
paying and monitoring by the government (itself)... " [P1, PR provincial health 
manager]. 
2.3 Ambiguity 
Some fell that FM had not been well documented and clearly drafted: 
"I suppose that the policy has not been approved as a clear document. We worked 
hard to define FM, however, we did not produce an understandable and 
transferable draft as the national constitution (for the reform)... "[N4, PR, senior 
policy maker]. 
Even the few existing documents which explained the policy and demonstrated its aims 
and operational steps were branded as vague and misleading: 
"... we were not able to appropriately transfer the policy to practitioners. Because 
they do not know the principles of the policy, they are struggling with many vague 
and obscure problems... "[N10, PR, member of national team for reform]. 
Many practical shortages were linked to the lack of written documents to express aims and 
expectations in FM: 
"... implementation started prior to drafting of the policy. We were not even told 
what we were expected to do. We were never told about FM! Our personal 
interpretation from the 4`h plan (for development of Iran) was implementation on the 
basis of FM. Shortages were therefore inevitable ... " [N15, PU, senior insurance 
manager]. 
In Golestan, the policy draft was not appropriately distributed among practitioners across 
the eleven district health authorities, and those who had access to the draft described it as 
unclear, leading to confusion and misunderstanding: 
"... the policy itself is confusing despite all efforts for its design. Sometimes it is not 
understandable for doctors, because we have not considered that the doctor is a 
doctor. Coming from a different background, he is not necessarily familiar with 
managerial concepts ... "[N 17, PR, national policy maker]. 
People in charge of implementing the policy including regional managers, identified 
particular parts such as financial articles as problematic: 
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"... the policy draft is very long and sophisticated, especially in its monetary 
sections. I have read it four times myself, have highlighted some parts, and am still 
struggling with some parts... sometimes detailed issues are described too much, 
whereas macro parts are left ignorantly behind... " [P1, PR, provincial manager]. 
Some parts of the policy draft led to users' confusion: 
"... 1 wish i had a short, brief and practical pocket manual instead of this (huge) 
misleading draft... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
"(laughing) if you are not among the writers of the draft, it is not clear enough to 
prevent misinterpretations ... 
finding a contradictory section is common in the 
policy... " [L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Some mentioned the lack of flexibility as the reason for the ambiguity: 
"... Although a policy must be comprehensive, it should be flexible enough to 
handle individual circumstances... " [Pl, PR, provincial health manager]. 
The majority of doctors thought the green books were confusing, though the Golestan 
university folder was described as more useful (if they had access to): 
"... the green books were absolutely confusing; the folder (expectations) was not 
too bad... " [L2.3, FD, doctor]. 
The unclear position of the nurse as an important practitioner to fulfil the aims of FM was 
one of the ambiguous aspects of the policy. This was even addressed by representatives 
of other unions: 
"... No nurse or Behyar (lay people who work as nurse assistants) has been 
considered in this reform. Nursing duties have been handed over to midwives, who 
are simultaneously in charge of critical issues such as pregnancy care, mother and 
child health, etc,... " [N6, O, national union manager and policy maker]. 
The policy was confusing in this regard. While nurses were considered necessary, the 
policy was silent in branding nurses as members of the health team. There was no budget 
for recruiting them, except in centres with more than 8000 population. Across the six 
visited health centres, I witnessed patchy recruitment of nurses, apparently being paid not 
directly through the budget of FM, but other sources of DOH so-called Article 88. In some 
centres the midwife was in charge of nursing duties. Presence of nurses in centres was 
mysterious and unsustainable. There was one centre in a very deprived area with a 24- 
hour resident nurse, whose earning was three fold that of other nurses across the 
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province, due to geopolitical specification of that centre bordering a neighbouring country. 
As FM did not pay nurses, they did not consider themselves as part of the health teams. 
The fact that the majority of centres had funded nurses from sources other than FM 
indicated the necessity of nurses as members of health teams, emphasized by managers: 
"... in our centre, the midwife carries out the pharmacy job... A FD needs a nurse 
on his side for sure ... article 88 is for immigrant Afghanis 
in Iran with less benefits, 
not nurses whose role is essential in FM... " [L6.3, FD, doctor). 
2.4 Lack of clarity of responsibilities 
There were several concerns about practitioners' responsibilities, particularly doctors. 
First, shortages in definition of expectations, duties, and responsibilities for family doctors 
were addressed: 
"... to manage health networks, the (family) doctor must know what he, as well as 
specialists and para-medics are expected to do. He must therefore get familiar with 
the PHC structure and referral grading ... 
"[N1, PR, former senior manager]. 
More generally, intra and inter-organizational relationships were not defined. A number of 
day to day matters such as legal aspects were also not drafted: 
"... many things have not been predicted in the policy. Time-off, holiday, pension, 
etc, for instance... " [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Some branded the services flawed because of obscure responsibilities, which might 
endanger patients' lives: 
"... as a district manager, I have seen a few crucial occasions which the policy is 
silent. For example, in health centres with no ambulances, patients are advised to 
go to the hospital on their own (sometimes 40 minutes away). If the patient dies on 
his way to the hospital, as in pregnancy urgent cases, the policy does not explain 
what the doctor is supposed to do" [L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
If a doctor accompanied the patient for humanitarian reasons, while other emergency 
cases attended the centre, s/he would have been penalized. This was particularly likely 
during night shifts in single-handed clinics. 
Lack of clarity of the practitioners' duties and responsibilities were branded a recipe for 
failure. The first concern was that assigned duties for family doctors were inappropriate: 
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"... we have faced family doctors with a number of strange duties. They are 
expected to undertake public health activities, complete health records and refer 
patients to specialists, while they must check bakeries' sanitation... " 
[N5, PU, national insurance policy maker]. 
The high load of responsibilities was because of either managerial or socio-environmental 
assignments for family doctors, both of which had pros and cons. Some believed that 
family doctors were being exploited via duties which were interfering with other managerial 
levels, mainly district health authorities: 
"... there is a mix up between provincial and district health authorities from one side, 
and family doctors from another. / believe this interference is solvable by handling 
all sanitary duties to family doctors and paying them extra for these. The current 
situation in which doctors are paid a certain amount of money to visit patients, 
control wells, as well as bakeries and grocery stores' sanitation with no extra 
incentive is obviously exploitation... " [N5, PU, member of national team for reform]. 
Doctors themselves had a mixed feeling regarding their non-clinical duties. Complaining 
about the high load of such responsibilities, some did not hide the positive impact for the 
public: 
"... (people) look at us like someone beyond just prescription, as experts who care 
for their treatment and other tasks such as school health. They treat us as one of 
them ... " [Li. 
2, FD, family doctor). 
Representatives of the public seemed happier because of the doctors' engagement in 
social duties, whereas some doctors branded it irrelevant, difficult, and not in the public's 
benefit: 
"... If I have to check toilets, what is the environmental health expert's role then? Do 
you think a doctor is capable enough to do all of these (duties)? Currently, people 
listen to doctors less than others. Moreover, we have not been trained to do this. 
this is clearly doctors' exploitation by the MOH which is not in public good... " 
[L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
In addition, midwives were forced to undertake duties such as nursing or pharmacy 
assistance that were irrelevant to their expertise: 
"... midwives are forced to conduct nursing duties such as injections, however they 
do not possess the expertise that of a nurse... "[L1.1, DA, district health manager). 
Nurses obliged to this, accusing midwives' lack of expertise to carry out the job: 
"... a midwife is doing injections and wounds dressing here. Does she have the 
needed expertise... " [L 1.3, Nurse]. 
135 
Managers also faced many objections from midwives regarding this: 
"The policy states that in centres with less than 8000 population, nursing and 
pharmacy services must be provided by midwives. Midwives objected to this 
because of interferes with their main responsibilities such as looking after pregnant 
women ... "[L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
2.5 Policy too flexible 
Interviewees at all levels strongly challenged frequent and quick changes to the policy. 
Although they acknowledged that peripheral feedbacks were the main reason for change, 
given the complex structure of the policy, several revisions led to confusion and 
inconvenience. Indeed, a few interviewees interpreted change as a sign of a wrong policy, 
as well as the implementers' incapability: 
"... 1 think we must avoid endangering this national programme (FM) because of our 
failures. In response to objections, we should accept our mistakes and show our 
willingness for improvement. Having abandoned version 7.1 (versions of the 
policy), version 7.3 is on the way. Our managers are confused because of being 
forced to implement new versions, while the old ones have not yet been circulated 
and implemented... " [N5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Regional managers, who considered revisions as a sign of dynamism to quickly respond to 
the requirements, were also confused and unhappy: 
"... seldom you find a province with no complaint regarding numerous versions 
which are sent through precipitate, when you have no idea in which direction you 
must work in... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
Given the lack of explanation to managers and practitioners about the policy, 
implementation became more difficult because of changes. Policy makers were also 
accused of lack of awareness about the public needs prior to making the policy: 
Versions are my nightmare. While I am still reading the recent one, a new version 
is announced, and probably a newer one is on its way...... [L2.1, DA, district health 
manager]. 
"... in the last 6-7 months, six versions have come through. I guess they will be 
adding an insult to doctors in the new version! " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
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2.6 Lack of local customization 
One key policy maker mentioned some degree of provincial customization: 
"... there were six of us (national policy makers) alongside local managers, each in 
charge of specific regions of the country to revise the policy based on regional 
needs ... 
"[N1, PR, former senior policy maker], 
The need for local tailoring was strongly emphasized, particularly within a diverse province 
of Golestan: 
"... answering needs must be consistent with recipients' level. This is why we must 
categorize villages ... one universal pattern does not work in a diverse area with different regional requirements... "[P9, O, provincial top authority]. 
Because of the lack of customization, some assumed that the policy is a foreign model 
with no adoption: 
"... foreign patterns have no position in this country. Ever thing must be evaluated 
with its background here... " [N7, O, national insurance policy maker]. 
Provincial managers pointed to the lack of customization with more practical examples 
such as drug lists, which showed the operational difficulties more clearly: 
"... they (MOH) must allow us to assess and decide to include or exclude some 
items from drug lists on the basis of our provincial problems... " [P1, PR, provincial 
health manager]. 
Given differences in the prevalence and pattern of diseases across the country, the 
problem was a common complaint by provincial managers: 
"... allocating same drug items for all provinces is absolutely irrational. Each 
province must have a separate list ... e. g. we are the second prevalent TB province in Iran. Why should we have the same item and per capita amount for anti-TB 
drugs as province X, which is almost TB free... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
To sum up, lack of customization was the main reason for the patchy implementation 
across provinces: 
"Ardebil, East Azerb#an, and Gilan have implemented (FM) very well, whereas 
Hormozgan as well as Sistan & Balochestan have implemented very badly... " 
[N11, PR, senior health manager]. 
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The above ranking was partly verified once the MOH and the MIO announced the best (but 
not worst) FM implementer provinces in 2006. 
2.7 Lack of realism 
Policy making in Iran was mentioned as being conducted on the basis of ideal goals, 
rather than on realism: 
"... our rules are actually very good, though problematic once they are executed. 
Rules must not state our ideals, that is the constitution's job. Our operational rules 
are highly idealistic, with the lack of a roadmap to pass the way from A to B... " 
[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Plans either were being abandoned or people were losing their faith in them, due to which 
the public and doctors lost confidence both in the plans and its implementers: 
"... our capitation payment for health is $150, whereas, it is $2000 in Europe. Is not 
it ridiculous that we are expected to provide the European standard services with 
this little money?... Provide people basic needs first, instead of promising unreal 
welfare. Be honest with people, rather than promoting unreal mottos, which people 
soon realize are fake and lose their trust in us ... "[N14, PR, senior policy maker]. 
The problem was echoed by local staff: 
"Our policies, including this (FM) are mainly beautiful talks rather than reality. Some 
people, including many doctors get paid to write down wonderful things, which are 
just rubbish in reality... the minority who are mental retards sit on upper chairs in 
Iran, making decisions for the intelligent majority... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
One recent example of making uncultivable promises was the MIO's decision to pay 
specialists in Golestan 15% extra against providing feedbacks for family doctors. 
Unfulfilling the promise despite ample resources, resulted in a severe lack of trust at the 
time that specialists' support was crucial to promote the reform: 
"... the MIO wrote to us that we get paid 15% on the top up routine, by writing down 
our feedback (for family doctors). They have not even paid one case. We do not 
trust them anymore.... " [P5, O, provincial union and physician]. 
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2.8 Lack of attention to human resources 
Two interviewees pointed to a fundamental character of Iran, which was constitutional 
enough to affect any policy including FM. Human resources have not been considered a 
key element for development in Iran: 
"... in our country humans have not been recognized as pillars for development, 
due to which we have paid much attention to build up of properties, rather than 
mentoring our human resources... " [N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
The problem was described as too much attention to hardware while human resources as 
software of the system were ignored: 
"Our main anti-progressing problem is executing plans prior to crystal clear 
clarification of the goals. Worse still, stakeholders unify around those vague 
goals.... this is why a plan often forms with different aims in the implementers' 
minds. Stakeholders are around just to fulfil their own goals, mostly contradictory to 
others.. . we 
do not have serious hardware problem, however our software 
difficulties are too many. We have got equipment, machineries, etc., with no proper 
software like managerial skills, leadership, efficacy, and appropriate employment of 
the facilities... " [N4, PR, national team for reform]. 
That was the main reason behind the senior managers' call for more investment in 
humans instead of equipment: 
"... undoubtedly it was our legal responsibility and our personal belief to start the 
implementation (of FM). If only we could have started from equipping our human 
resources first, rather than our physical facilities... " [NI2, PR, senior health policy 
maker]. 
2.9 Insufficient remuneration 
Allocated capitation pay for FM was deemed insufficient to cover necessary expenses: 
"... the MIO has credited us 11,000TM (£6) per capita per year. Calculating the 
cost of each visit, the prescription situation in which the public ask for too many 
drugs, administration fees, etc... this does not cover more than three visits a year. 
The MIO thinks wrongly that this is big money... " [P1, PR, provincial health 
manager]. 
139 
Given the low per capita payment for health, there was also discrimination between rural 
and urban areas regarding the budget, allocating only half of the urban budget rate for 
rural inhabitants: 
"... per capita for villagers is half of that of urban counterparts. It was 16,800TM 
which was almost 40% of the urban budget. The amount was raised to 22,000TM 
in 2006,50% of that of urban residents... you know the rate of diseases in villages 
is not less than that of cities, if not more. This is inequity for sure... " [NI 5, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
Taking articles of payment in the policy act into consideration, interviewees were 
concerned about shortages in adjusting practitioners' earnings on the basis of all relevant 
factors. For example, they addressed the gap that FM created in income of administrative 
doctors in the DOH and family doctors in the periphery. The policy was also criticized for 
not providing enough incentives or significant and effective earning differences for doctors 
in deprived and affluent areas. As a result doctors did not want to stay in deprived areas: 
"... some areas are very deprived. The difference of payment between inaccessible 
and affluent areas is not that encouraging. The highest amount we pay is 
1,400,000TM forX (very deprived and hard-accessible area in south of Iran), while 
the salary for Y (not far away from X, but with daily flight to Tehran) is 
1,200,000TM. Doctors have no motivation to stay in X... " [N4, PR, national team for 
reform]. 
Even though the deprivation index was based on socio-economic status and was defined 
in consultation with the locals, the lack of intra and inter adjustment factors was a concern 
of many interviewees: 
"There is no earning justification, taking into account the distance between 
different centres and the capital, climate situation, live in facilities, etc. There is no 
bonus for doctors who act as centre managers as well... " [N6, O, national union 
manager]. 
This was why some experts called for adjustments and revision in payments according to 
variables such as the inflation rate, to keep in line with the purpose of the reform: 
"... Okay, doctors get paid up to 1 or 2millionTM. We must consider for what 
purpose this money is paid. The substitution rate must not be forgotten. He gets 
this money to pay his child's tuition fee for example. If such a fee increases every 
six months, it must be counted. There should be a flexible logic behind it... lf you 
put the doctor under pressure, s/he is clever enough to compensate by doing other 
things through which the public would be the main loser... " [N17, PR, national policy 
maker]. 
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Provincial managers complained a lot about difficulties they had to retain doctors in 
administrative positions within the DOH, because of their significant income gap with 
newcomer FDs: 
"... the current system has created a problematic gap between the office and 
periphery. My administrative personnel prefer to move to the periphery and work as 
FDs. We try our best to convince them to stay and act as administrative doctors, by 
reminding them not to bring their reputation down because of money! However, we 
know they are right. Our administrative doctors who are more experienced, with 
greater work load and stress get paid less than a third of that of FDs... 
[P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
However, with some advantages, provincial managers' main challenge was the significant 
difference in earning for doctors across Golestan health authorities, due to which they 
preferred to work in health centres, instead of keeping their stable chairs in the office: 
"... all doctors prefer to work in health centres... however, work conditions in rural 
areas are much more difficult compared to the office. At the office, warm winter and 
cool summer is guaranteed and reputation is much higher. Nonetheless, the gap 
should not be this wide... " [P3, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Contrary to senior provincial managers' views, administrative doctors preferred to be 
transferred to health centres because of less stress and much better payment: 
"... the bigger issue is increasing the gap between earnings rather than payments. 
Look, a doctor in administrative job is paid 300-40thousandTM, while by working at 
a health centre with less stress and work load, he is paid at least twice as much. 
The irony is that the head of the district health authority, part of whose job is 
supervising FDs, earns half or less than that of an FD in the periphery... " 
[P4, provincial health manager]. 
In contrast to the policy to take doctors' experience into account for payment, only two 
factors were being counted in this regard: the number of the registered population and the 
deprivation index, which upset experienced doctors whose wage was no different from that 
of the doctors in the mandatory scheme: 
"... it is a violation of the purpose to pay official and experienced doctors the same 
as the ones in their mandatory scheme... "[NI7, PR, national manager]. 
Nonetheless, there were some very deprived centres where despite an attractive monetary 
package, no one was prepared to move and practice there. Therefore, recruiting doctors in 
the mandatory scheme seemed inevitable in those centres. 
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2.10 Unrealistic expectations 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, registered people were entitled to utilize services by showing 
their insurance log-books issued by the MIO. As official proof of membership, the log-book 
itself was subject to controversial interpretations because of unrealistic expectations. 
Irrespective of its benefits as a voucher of entitlement, societal perception of Behbar log- 
books was the concern of many, particularly taking into account that the MIO, alongside a 
number of organizations like the SSO, have been issuing similar log-books for several 
decades. These are proof of entitlement as well as a prescription tool to utilize whatever 
services at wherever place, in contrast to FM: based on rationalizing utilization. Issuance 
of log-books in a similar shape and form to other insurance schemes caused many 
challenges. Some people and their representative MPs, accused FM of reducing their 
freedom. People asked for the same freedom to visit any doctor, or to be admitted into 
whatever hospital they prefer, similar to the owners of log-books other than Behbar. It was 
a difficult period when the implementers were arguing with MPs not to suspend the entire 
implementation because of the public's dissatisfaction when comparing log-books like the 
SSO to Behbar, and asking for absolute freedom of utilization, plus free prescription and 
hospital admission: 
"... in areas where people have or have had SSO log-books, villagers asked to visit 
wherever they want with no obligation, objecting to our expectation for rationing, 
while they must pay 10-30% as franchise. (They tell me) your log-book is 
worthless. MPs do not understand that Behbar log-books are worthy, at the service 
of health, and keep arguing that we have restricted the public... " [N2, PR, senior 
policy maker]. 
Nevertheless, the format of Behbar log-books had its supporters. Many MPs supported the 
log-book rather than other formats, addressing the potentials to increase villagers' dignity: 
"... (An insurance) card is a symbol of discrimination. Why had villagers been 
deprived of the respect that urban households have, by having log-books with their 
picture on top. .. "[P9, MP, member of parliament for the province]. 
However, there was a serious concern for overlooking referral because of perceptions of 
the log-book: 
"... these log-books are not compatible with FM, because of cultural mismatches. 
FM log-books should be more valuable than others (like SSO). If I was in charge from the early days, I would have given them a card instead of log-books ... " [N2, PR, senior policy maker]. 
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Many thought that insurance cards might adjust the public's perceptions against referral: 
"... 1 think an insured person must have a card or an insurance number. Because 
these log-books are being abused in many ways, I do not agree with them at all... 
nowhere on the planet do people have log-books!... "[N6, O, national union manager 
and physician]. 
Some claimed that log-books were in contrast to the principal of FM: 
"... even prior to the implementation, my big concern was that linking doctors' 
earning to the number of visits, would endanger health dominant approach of FM. 
Thus, services must be delivered using other ways than log-books ... 1 prefer cards 
as ID of insurance and referral... "[N9, O, senior policy maker]. 
Therefore, branded the log-book issuance a mistake: 
"I would certainly choose a way other than the log-book, which has increased the 
public's expectations that ask for more drugs and bypass the referral... " 
[P4, provincial health manager]. 
Having been tested in other settings, some pointed out the necessity of digitalized 
registration rather than paper IDs like log-books: 
"... log-books are not necessary at all. We could have digitalized and linked our 
system (DOH) to the MIO... "[P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
It was important that the purchaser shared the same feeling: 
" The MIO wants to release people from log-books. We prefer smart cards as an 
alternative, however, the society is not yet prepared... " [P2, PU, provincial manager]. 
Although, this level of coordination between the MIO and the DOH in Golestan did not 
exist at the national level, due to the lack of decentralization and early high pressures on 
the MIO to issue log-books, no digitalization was conducted. Even the GMIO considered 
the public were not prepared to accept smart cards despite, even illiterate people in 
remote parts using smart cards to fill their tanks with petrol. 
3 Summary 
Because of its potentials, most interviewees had a strong positive feeling about the 
concept of FM, albeit for different reasons among different respondents. By emphasizing 
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on the concept of FM, this thesis makes a distinction between what people assumed to be 
implemented, the actual policy and what was executed, indicating inconsistency between 
expectations and implementation on many occasions. 
Villagers welcomed FM because they saw it as a gateway for better quality services. They 
passionately presented their hope in the policy because of its potential to increase their 
entitlement for using healthcare and expanded service provision. Representatives of the 
public and ordinary people submitted themselves to implementation because they 
interpreted the policy as a media that is going to assign a personal doctor to them, who 
has a close relationship with them, take cares of them, attends their homes, listens to 
them, and is trustworthy enough to contribute to their well-being. Such assumptions were 
based on reflections on what they had seen in western movies, in which doctors visited 
patients at home. So they expected FM to bring them a doctor who was embedded with 
them as a member of their family, helped them to tackle their deprivation, narrowed their 
gap with city, and referred them to specialists. They supported the policy hoping to 
experience such a situation therefore. 
Besides, practitioners, particularly doctors and midwives, who were unemployed and low 
paid for a long time, welcomed the policy for different reasons. They shared the public's 
feeling about increasing service provision and improving the quality of care, so they were 
professionally satisfied. Moreover, they appraised the policy because of its direct effects 
on them. For instance, they knew that the new payment formats such as pay for 
performance and capitation payment might potentially improve their earning. They also 
welcomed the policy because of the huge rise it brought to their payment. In addition, FM 
created employment opportunities for more than 5000 GPs and 4000 midwives who were 
unemployed or were doing irrelevant jobs beforehand. They supported the policy because 
it partly tackled the longstanding problem of unemployment among medical professionals. 
Lastly, although some expected different process of implementation, the majority of 
national and provincial policy makers and managers welcomed the potentials of FM. Some 
leading people were aware of the benefits that FM brought to the health sector in other 
countries in terms of equity and cost control. A few policy makers, even those who were 
not engaged in making the policy, branded FM as a health focused policy that might 
reengineer the messy health system in Iran and improve the efficiency of health care, 
which the country had lacked a lot. Thus, there was overwhelming support for FM among 
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participants at different levels, who expected FM to improve the entire health system in 
Iran, either because of expecting their ideal health care or based on their own experience. 
However, despite the widespread support for the concept of FM, four aspects of the policy 
were identified as jeopardizing its successful implementation: 
" Autocratic policy; 
" Unrealistic policy; 
" Ambiguous policy; and 
" Unsustainable policy. 
First, despite its democratic name, the nature of policy making was autocratic. Although 
the political structure was parliamentary republic, in which members of parliament were 
elected by the public so represented them for verifying laws, most policies and bills were 
not collaboratively determined. For instance, FM was made by a few people in the MOH 
and imposed on others. Key stakeholders, including chancellors of universities, 
representatives of practitioners and relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Interior 
and some insurance organizations were not engaged in making and diffusing the policy. 
FM was based on assumptions and wish lists of a small group of people from the MOH 
and a few leading individuals from other organizations, including the MPO and SSO. There 
was not a network of relevant individuals and organizations to gather, accommodate and 
integrate the necessary inputs in formulating the policy. This was why the majority of local 
practitioners, provincial managers and even some national policy makers who participated 
in the policy network, had little sense of ownership. Given the big scope of the policy and 
significant requirement for collaboration and common work for its universal 
implementation, the top-down approach significantly reduced people's engagement and 
cooperation. The policy was not tailored based on local needs. For instance, objections to 
non-customized drug lists or concerns regarding practical difficulties of Behbar log-books 
were consequences of excluding relevant stakeholders from the policy cycle. 
Second, the idealistic approach to making decisions meant policies did not meet societal 
realities. Across all three levels (national, provincial and local), different aspects of the lack 
of realistic views in the policy design were identified. Even leading policy makers who 
participated in the small policy making network criticised FM, branding it too visionary and 
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non-fulfillable. However, they did little to improve this, reason to which is discussed in 
Chapter 10. 
Third, policy makers and regional managers also expressed difficulties in understanding 
and putting the policy into practice. The policy resembled an untailored prescription to 
remedy too many problems. The fundamental societal problem was replacing operational 
laws by wishful thoughts. FM policy looked like an attempt to respond to several 
longstanding shortcomings in the health system. Therefore, the policy was vague so 
vulnerable to different interpretations and individual discretion. Its language was jargon 
and explanations of payment, practitioners' duties and recruitment were confusing. This 
led to frequent revisions and changes, which jeopardized the situation. 
And finally, as much as the potential of FM attracted support, some of its characteristics 
reduced its sustainability. It was not only leading policy makers who were concerned that 
FM would stop shortly due to lack of funding and political support, but also practitioners in 
remote villages were also seriously sceptical about its sustainable future. A core problem 
that contributed to its uncertain status was its funding mechanism. There was no distinct 
financial source for FM. It was funded by a public budget which was linked to nowhere and 
was deducted from constructive projects with no calculation. People paid no premium to 
be insured. Even local staff raised concerns about the future of FM, pointing at that 80% of 
the country's revenue was oil-based and the volatility of the oil market. Implementation 
could stop in a short time period because its costs might not be affordable any more. 
Viewing FM as an unsustainable task had harmful consequences on its implementation. It 
avoided forming firm partnership between providers themselves as well as between public 
and practitioners. This led to fading public trust in implementation, which in turn blunted 
the implementation even further. 
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Chapter 7: The existing environment 
Introduction 
Implementing a new policy will depend on the environment in which it is introduced. 
Interviews revealed eight aspects of the environment that influenced implementation: 
" existing PHC (Primary Health Care) network prior to implementation; 
" general specifications of the insurance system; 
" organizational capacity of the health system; 
" individuals' knowledge and insight toward the policy; 
" legal ground for implementation; 
" political environment; 
" rural setting specifications for hosting the reform; and 
" availability of resources. 
1 The existing PHC network 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the PHC network (Figure 1.2) was selected for delivering FM. 
There was a consensus that the PHC facilitated the implementation. 
1.1 Position of the PHC for the public 
The PHC was the only universal health network in the country that was based on health 
promotion, rather than disease treatment. Its position was unique in rural areas as the only 
facility for delivering health services: 
"... fortunately, rural health centres have been well established across the country, 
in contrast to the loose network in their urban counterparts,... this is one of our 
strong points" [N11, PR, senior health manager]. 
It was also trusted by villagers. Despite other practices, the PHC was still the villagers' first 
point to seek care: 
"... even for my little kid, (rural health) centre is the first place I prefer to go to. If the 
problem was not fixed there, I will go to a specialist.... " [L2.9, Imam]. 
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1.2 Accessibility 
Consistent with the main aim of FM, the PHC organization was easily accessible: 
"... the PHC Was designed to serve every 10,000. Even in less accessible areas 
with small population they easily reach centres ... its accessibility 
has been 
improved within the past two decades ... 
" [N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
It was also population-based that facilitated assigning a doctor to a certain population: 
"The PHC was the best medium to implement FM, not because of its existing 
buildings, rather its population-based structure. In addition to economic 
advantages, the PHC invests in inhabitants rather than in processes... " 
[N8, O, senior finance official]. 
1.3 Efficient hierarchy 
The PHC enjoyed a well-organized hierarchical structure, which facilitated the demands of 
FM: 
"... the PHC was the greatest opportunity, partly because of its high-regulated staff 
with less self-driving power. Whatever is dictated to them must be obeyed, which 
leads to better performance ... 
" [N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
This quotation also reveals to what extent the top-down approach was embedded in the 
central policy makers' mind, pointing out the need for prosperous centralization for proper 
implementation. In addition, such hierarchy increased the flexibility of the PHC, which 
contributed to the progress of implementation: 
"The PHC has shown its efficacy over time. Enjoying a flexible structure, it reacts 
pretty fast that enables it to undertake a lot of tasks in a short time span... " 
[P4, provincial manager]. 
1.4 The only possible host 
The existence of rural networks over the last two decades meant that implementers did not 
have to start from scratch. It helped them save time and expenses by just renovating and 
equipping centres to accommodate FM. Because of the defined population in rural health 
centres, assigning doctors and health teams was also easier: 
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"... the network (PHC) made the implementation much easier. There was a well- 
structured network with accessible services for a defined population. We improved 
this by strengthening the skeleton and some house- cleaning... " [N 14, PR, former 
senior policy maker]. 
The comprehensive PHC infrastructure in rural areas compared to the fragile PHC facilities 
in the cities led to starting implementation in villages: 
"... timing was crucial. We had to do many things in a short time period. This was 
not possible without the infrastructure and amenities that already existed in 
villages. It was the right decision to start there... "[P3, provincial health manager]. 
Other media to accommodate FM in villages seemed impossible therefore: 
"I think the PHC created an appropriate environment for achieving more than 90% 
of the aims of FM in rural areas. Other hosts in villages were just imaginary. Being 
equipped with deep theoretical concepts and lots of experience, the PHC is a huge 
network with a firm and reliable organization... " [N4, PR, senior policy maker]. 
"... structure must follow the strategy. Could you imagine taking a single step if we 
did not have the PHC? Nothing was there but health centres... "[P1, PR, provincial 
health manager]. 
Nevertheless, a purchaser with insurance mentality who preferred to commissioning 
services out to the private sector described the PHC as not capable to host the 
implementation, not because of its organization, but its poor facilities and equipment: 
"... because of its lack of resources, the PHC would not be able to properly host 
FM... " [N5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
The PHC was also accused of not being compatible with gate-keeping as an essential 
requirement of referral: 
"... the PHC principle is an up and down movement across the road. Trying to 
match this model with FM, the first battle is the mismatch between first entrance 
(health houses led by behvarz) and the prototype of FM (with FD as the guide). I 
doubt this could be tackled in the current format... " [N17, PR, health manager]. 
This point, mentioned by one of the main developers of the PHC, emphasizes the 
importance of reengineering FM as much as possible to adopt it with the PHC. Because of 
the strategic mismatches, some mentioned that the PHC might only facilitate prerequisites 
of FM: 
149 
"... the PHC networks in villages is only an introductory tool to FM, it is not FM... 
[N6, O, national union manager and doctor]. 
Some had serious doubt regarding the ability of the PHC to match the strategic aims of 
FM, mainly because it was a governmental organization rather than the private sector: 
"... the PHC is dead at the time being, because it is public. You could not implement 
FM via the public sector... " [N13, PU, national insurance policy maker]. 
The PHC as a medium for FM was also criticized of raising governmental share in service 
provision, against the 4th plan for development of Iran: 
"... the PHC has lost its original specifications... its public management that is 
contrary to the 4th plan has reduced its effectiveness.. We must trust people. We 
must have purchased services from private providers... " [N5, PU, senior insurance 
manager] 
In addition, due to the lukewarm presence of the PHC across cities, the majority ruled it 
out as the host of FM in cities: 
"... the PHC is passive in cities, it would therefore not be able to perform as 
effectively in cities as in villages... " [P2, PU, provincial manager]. 
Predictably, almost all critiques of the PHC for hosting FM was raised by purchasers who 
believed in commissioning and privatization of services, even in rural areas. The MOH was 
not fundamentally against the idea, however, private sector's presence in villages was very 
weak. Given its reluctance to invest in the preventive components of primary care, the 
existing public owned PHC was really the only choice in villages. 
2 The insurance system 
Several concerns were raised about the insurance system, with direct and indirect impact 
on the implementation of FM. 
First, the health insurance system was criticized because of both its premium rate and 
compensation procedure: 
... insurances do nothing. What insurance is this while one must pay 70% of his 
costs? This is not acceptable in any place on the planet! Insurance means the insured should not pay more than 30% of costs... "[N6, O, national union manager]. 
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This interviewee emphasized that unless the insurance system undergoes essential 
changes, other health reforms would be ineffective: 
"You must assess the principal problem which is the insurance system in Iran. It 
might be optimum for insurers, but not for the insured at all... this is the first and 
most fundamental issue. The insurance industry is flawed in our society. The 
insurers' approach should not be compassionate like this. If insurance systems are 
improved, villagers will be automatically benefited, otherwise, I do not know what 
you are studying... " [P6, O, senior cleric in Golestan province]. 
This person mistrusted the insurance system a lot so doubted the efficacy of any health 
system reform that employs the current insurance format. 
Second, because there was no reliable database of insured people, routine functions of 
insurers were considered flawed: 
"... the MWSS was formed mainly to create a database of the insured population, 
but we are still nowhere ... "[N10, PU&PR, national team for reform]. 
Lack of a database led to insurance disintegration and overlap so some rural people were 
also covered by public insurance schemes other than Behbar, such as the SSO: 
"... there is 20% overlap in the MIO pooling system... "[N7, O, senior insurance official]. 
Meanwhile, another national policy maker announced the overlap figure at around 7-8%. 
Significant mismatches in the percentage indicate the necessity of integrating the 
insurance pooling: 
"... a 7-8% overlap exists in Behbar, I think this can be tackled by integrating financial 
pooling ... "[N11, 
PR, senior health manager]. 
In contrast to the principles of Behbar, overlaps ended up in users' confusion and inequity. 
For instance, villagers under insurances other than-Behbar must have paid fees at market 
price (300% of that of FM): 
"... my understanding from the insurers'role in this implementation is that people 
with log-books other than Behbar have to pay more... " [Li. 4, midwife]. 
Worse still, there were a few operational difficulties due to this: 
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"... in industrial villages, where many are SSO's insured, or in poor villages where 
most people have the MIO or IKRO (Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation) insurance, 
we face a big problem to serve them service. This raises concerns about 
inequalities... " [N4, PR, senior member of national team for health reform]. 
To sum up, numerous insurance companies with various policies and tariffs conflicted with 
FM, insurance integration was one f its requirements: 
"... the main rationale to establish the MWSS was to create of a single organization 
with a single Board to integrate policies for the entire population. Some (insurance 
organizations) have financial concerns for integration. There is no need to have a 
real unique fund pool, but a virtual pooling with integrated policy works better... 
expanding the policy to the cities is not possible prior to such an integration... 
[N15, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
3 Organizational capacity of the health system 
The thesis revealed four aspects of the organization of health services affecting 
implementation: the existing capability of custodians; conflict of interest at national level; 
the financial governance of health; and a poor collaborative environment. 
3.1 Capability of the implementers 
Interviewees were concerned about the effectiveness of the organization of the 
responsible department in the MOH to undertake the implementation. The "PHC 
Expansion and Health Promotion" (PEHP) group under the Deputy of Health in the MOH, 
along with DOHS (Department of Health) in provinces were appointed as custodians of 
implementation. However, their capability to perform the reform was doubted, even by 
themselves: 
"... PEHP has put itself far away from technical issues. / believe that the PEHP 
structure must be universally revised, otherwise a massive part of leadership will 
be paralyzed... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
The managerial capacity of the MIO and the MOH was challenged because necessary 
arrangements were not made to accommodate the implementation. For example, the lack 
of full-time personnel, for whom implementing FM was their only task: 
"... we cannot implement Behbar only by the PEHP, which is very busy by 
purchasing vaccines, providing formula and contraceptives and equipping health 
centres. We are putting a big extra burden on its shoulders to manage FM, which is 
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unaffordable ... 
the MIO is even worse, within it there is not a distinct office with 
independent personnel and full engagement in Behbar, ... 
" [N5, PU, senior insurance 
policy maker]. 
Worse still were concerns about the capability of staff within that group: 
"... given the lack of proper infrastructure, implementation has been handed over to 
the PEHP, which has been disabled even in performing its PHC duties. Taking its 
long-run lack of expertise and resources, how would this unit be able to handle 
such a big task (FM)? ... " [N5, PU, senior 
insurance policy maker]. 
3.2 Conflict of interests at national level 
A few interviewees with no conflict of interest identified top policy-makers as the principal 
flaw in the current health system: 
"... our health system is like a messy soup. A few national policy-makers with close 
tie with the private sector, who mostly think of maximizing their profit regardless of 
how and at what cost make main decisions ... I think if our ministers had graduated 
from England, our system would have perhaps been different. In fact, the majority 
of our ministers have graduated from the US, believing in the free market. Quote 
me on this: the principal problem of our health system is that public policies are 
made by people who have simultaneous benefits in the private sector... " 
[N8, O, national policy maker]. 
Conflict of interest interfered with the private sector cooperation with the reform. Specialist 
doctors, particularly ones who were involved in importing high technology medical 
equipment, were against FM, believing it would endanger their profits: 
.. Levels two and three (of referral] are our specialists and higher specialists, who disagree with referral and rationing the services. They assume that their patients 
would be eventually reduced. Moreover, many specialists have invested in 
importing high technology machineries. Medical technology is expensive and 
costly. The referral system discourages using such technologies... " 
[N10, PU, PR, national team for reform]. 
The conflict was threatening the role of unions such as the IMA (Iranian Medical 
Association) to defend doctors' position in the society: 
"... look at the IMA's function which is more or less at the service of some particular 
persons. It is somehow dead. It could revitalize itself by getting involved in FM and 
criticizing the wrong! Implementation... "[N5, O, senior insurance policy amker]. 
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The Government responded to this problem by strengthening the public health services, 
which ended up in a vicious circle of investing money in the public sector that led by 
people whose financial interests were in the private sector, so deteriorated the public 
sector's reputation before the public: 
"... we do not believe in what we have said ourselves. As the government, we 
invest money in public services, while we keep telling people that public services 
are flawed and bad and make contracts with the private sector, sometimes ten 
times more expensive... people do not distinguish between good and bad, rather 
we suggest people to brand public services as bad when we suggest them to go to 
private clinics to get better services... " [N14, PR, senior former health policy maker]. 
Public policy-making was in the hands of people whose benefit was simultaneously in the 
private sector. Fighting to balance the proportion of private and public sectors in service 
provision ended up in excessiveness and dissipation. Furthermore, politicians who were 
supposed to defend the public sector, behaved as though the quality of services was lower 
in the public sector. As a result, public confidence in the quality of services in the public 
sector was damaged. National policy-makers accused specialists and private GPs of 
making the public doubt the quality and efficiency of services in FM: 
`... doctors who freely visited patients in their own clinics, alongside specialists who 
assumed their patients would be reduced are opposing the policy. They keep 
telling the villagers that the services in health centres are unrighteous ... " [NI 1, PR, senior health manager]. 
Some big pharmaceutical dealers, who were branded as the drug mafia, were also 
labelled as powerful opponents: 
"... if you take a right action, some people's profit is endangered so they resist. For 
instance, if the interests of drug mafia are not carefully taken into account, we will 
be defeated by this serious enemy... " [N17, PR, policy maker]. 
That was why opponents from the private sector actively tried to defeat the reform: 
"Specialists' income would drop because of FM. Thus, they began to send letters to 
officials, stating their endangered benefits. They even wrote to the president, the 
governor and MPs. 1 was frustrated once the governor [of Golestan] wrote to me to 
object Behbar...... [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
One MP explained how doctors addressed those objections: 
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"... a group of GPs met with me during the Doctor's Day ceremony, complaining 
about the reduction in their clients and that they could not run their clinic... " 
[P9, O, senior policy maker]. 
Those objections, alongside the lack of support of MPs, ended up in serious objections, 
which damaged implementation in its early stages. 
Even the pre-requisites of the reform, such as creating the national health account to 
finance FM, was in conflict with the interest of some organizations like the SSO. Being 
aware of such conflicts, parliament preferred to inject global funds into Behbar, to bypass 
the practical conflicts in implementation. They hoped such an account would be created in 
future, as the MOH was pursuing: 
"The integration of the pooling system as our ultimate goal has had its strong 
opponents... we would not like to make a crisis. We do not want some 
stakeholders to assume they are losing something, we prefer they think they are 
achieving some benefits... " [N12, PR, senior policy maker]. 
Society was well aware that such objections to FM were because of conflicts of interest: 
`I used to be the head of campaign for a presidential candidate. I advised him to 
insist on FM as the main strategy for health sector reform. He replied: this is 
controversial, are you going to ruin all my chances from the beginning? He 
reasoned that FM has its opponents, many of them senior and influential... it took 
ages to convince him to do so, even reluctantly!... " [NI3, PU, senior insurance 
manager]. 
3.3 Financial governance of health 
Financial system was identified inappropriate because of lack of integration and 
inadequate funding allocation. 
3.3.1 Lack of integration 
For several reasons, the financial system was generally considered inefficient to 
accommodate requirements of the reform: 
"... the health financial system is very complex, bad, inefficient, and expensive in 
Iran... " [N17, PR, national health expert]. 
Lack of a "National Health Account" (NHA) was a reason for unsustainable funding: 
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"The best way to manage this messy insurance market is integration of all 
insurance pools to form a National Health Account. However, this seems unlikely 
because of great resistance. In addition, different organizations charge clients with 
various premiums. There is also leasehold ownership and overlaps between the 
private and public sectors.... you cannot stick to the theory and imagine this is a 
motorway where you can speed up to 180 Km/h all the way through... " 
[N4, PR, senior policy maker]. 
There were tens of insurance schemes across numerous organizations which made 
integration difficult. Lack of a pooling system prevented reformers in designing sustainable 
funds for the reform: 
"... multiple insurance schemes make it difficult to form a pooling system. Since the 
Shah's era [before 1979], international organizations such as the WHO and the 
World Bank have persuaded us to remove this big barrier. To provide a united 
package for the public, pooling (resources) must be quickly undertaken... " 
[N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
Three reasons were mentioned for resistance to pooling integration: complex bureaucratic 
structure; lack of coordination and conflict of interest: 
"... despite adequate resources, the financial cycle is very slow ... our budget system is too bureaucratic. We are always behind budget allocation and 
distribution... " [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
"... there are two things without which every system will collapse: integration and 
coordination. First, we must become integrated, then coordinated, or probably at 
the same time... " [N 10, PU, PR, national team for reform]. 
"... if only we could integrate the pooling, the efficiency would have rapidly gone up. 
However, many social and political factors are against us. The SSO does not allow 
sharing the labourers' money with the united pooling, considering this as injustice. 
Civil servants also object sharing their money with rural people... " [N4, PR, national 
team for reform]. 
This made the system inefficient and wasteful: 
"... even for FM, the MOH pays for prevention, while the MIO pays for the curative 
part. This is simply the system inefficiency... It is impossible to have a cost-effective 
system without unitary funding. Because unity would limit some people's power, 
they resist to it... " [N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
This interviewee's interpretation was that funding is divided between MIO (for curative) and 
MOH (for preventive) services. He labelled the system inefficient which wastes the funds. 
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However, the case was different in reality and all services in FM were paid through a 
global injected fund of Behbar. 
3.3.2 Inadequate funding allocation 
General low per capita funds for health in Iran was mentioned as a main barrier for 
implementing any reform, including FM: 
"Despite a reasonable budget, the overall budget for health as proportion of GDP 
has always been low... "[N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
This was one of the reasons behind dissatisfactory services: 
"... we provide such services with this (little) money... our per capita is less than 
150 USD a year. It was 106 USD last year, not thousands of USD like the 
European countries... " [N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
Even in very remote areas, low per capita funding was identified as a fundamental 
problem, unadjusted to inflation and expectations: 
"... the government's incapability to provide appropriate resources is a long 
repeated story. Everybody knows that the health budget is far behind the 
expectations. In fact, the government must pay the main health expenses... Per 
capita must be adjusted with economic realities like inflation. While expenses get 
tripled, per capita still remains constant... " [L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
3.4 Poor collaboration 
Lack of teamwork in the health system was revealed as a big challenge to implementation. 
The nationwide established culture of individualism seemed to be the main reason for poor 
collaboration. For instance, only a few national policy makers acknowledged other 
stakeholders' role in this reform, whereas the majority attempted to prove their sole role, 
explicitly denying the others' impacts and efforts: 
"... 1 was the only one chasing money for the reform by spending three days a 
week in parliament. The government prevented me to transfer money from other 
plans to Behbar... there was no one other than me... "[N1, PR, former senior 
manager]. 
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Every involved organization tried to take its own benefit singularly rather a united multi- 
organizational implementation: 
"... the policy must be executed; however, the problem is that we have converted 
the reform from its national format to a small partial project. Some people think this 
is the MOH's job. Others say that the MWSS must carry that out. Parliament 
considers itself the inventor of the reform... look at the MOH for instance. 
507billionTM was allocated for FM. When we started to work its only effort was to 
take the whole money. The same applies to other stakeholders... " [N5, PU, senior 
insurance policy maker]. 
Unfortunately, the more senior and influential people were, the greater their extent of 
individualism. Individualism showed itself more practically, as a lack of teamwork in the 
periphery: 
"... look at Tehran as the capital of Iran, which is the most retarded in implementing 
FM. Why? Because there are three universities in charge of implementing FM in 
Tehran, none of which tolerates the other, each of them playing its own 
instrument... " [N5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Some described the rushed implementation as a sign of individualism and show off: 
"The most important factor which forced the MOH to start the implementation in 
their last days in office, was their desire to boast. The minister (of health) liked to 
count it as his personal achievement... "[N6, O, national union manager and 
physician]. 
In addition, individualism led to contradictory interpretations of FM. Worse still, tribal and 
personal benefits were prioritized by the implementers: 
"... in province X, the head of the MIO was a clever and open-minded guy with good 
understanding of the PHC, our difficulties were therefore minimum. In province Y 
(neighbour of X), the head of the MIO was in 24 hour fights with the DOH, due to 
their long-term tribal trouble. This shows that his knowledge and insight was not 
concrete enough to prevent tribal interests, personal interests therefore affected 
social responsibilities ... he asked me to grant him a personal scholarship if I 
expect his cooperation [for FM]... "[N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
4 Individuals' knowledge & insight 
The extent to which stakeholders' insight and knowledge affected the implementation is 
investigated under four headings: policy-makers' attitude towards FM; transferring 
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knowledge to practice; policy makers' knowledge of local conditions; and the importance of 
key individuals. 
First, personal interest in FM either because of knowledge and expertise, or policy-makers' 
personal experience as either user or implementer of FM in different settings, was the key 
factor behind their motivation towards FM: 
"... there were reformists who endorsed the modern notions of health sector reform 
after 1997. They held flagship courses and promoted principles of health 
economics and evidence-based policy making. Their attempts ended in embedding 
such concepts in national plans such as the 4th plan for development of Iran. Those 
things were strange beforehand ... 
"[N8, O, national finance official]. 
Over their period in office as chancellor of provincial universities, the former minister of 
health and his deputy had piloted FM in their sovereign provinces. Even though their 
understanding, model and experience of FM were fundamentally diverse, their endeavours 
to establish a series of reforms with the axis of FM were widely acknowledged: 
"... 1 wrote a book about FM while I was chancellor of the University of X (20 years 
ago). / am not considering it the holy book of FM, rather I want to emphasize how 
FM has been my apprehension all these past years. Dr. X has also been following 
this within the last 15 years ...... [Ni, PR, former senior health official]. 
They were also knowledgeable for essential features to make such a policy: 
"... we always had three pillars of health sector reform in mind: accountability, 
accessibility and availability. We attempted a lot to establish these concepts as 
cornerstones of policy making ... "[N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Second, stakeholders' unenthusiastic understanding of the social determinants of health 
made the implementation of FM difficult: 
"... if only policy-makers would have considered health as the right of the people 
and themselves responsible in fulfilling this right...! wish they had a better 
understanding of health ... " [N9, O, senior policy maker]. 
Because of such a lack, they were not well-prepared to financially invest in health: 
"... policy-makers must understand that investing in health at this stage, even huge 
sums, would be saving our monetary sources in the near future. Investment in 
health needs a vision, which the majority of stakeholders are deprived of... 
[P4, provincial health manager]. 
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Third, policy-makers were accused of flawed policy making, because of the lack of insight 
into local conditions and knowledge of the fieldwork: 
"... l beg your pardon! The one on the top (of MOH) has no idea about the real 
situation in rural areas. Decisions-makers have no field experience... " [L2.8, private 
doctor in village]. 
Key central policy-makers also echoed the claim: 
"... principles of PHC management emphasize that policy makers and managers 
must be continuously present in the field, rather than just relying on reports... 
ironed trouser and polished shoes are not suitable cloths for health... " 
[N4, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
Fourth, insight, dedication and commitment of some key individuals including the former 
minister of health (2001-2005) were an important factor in starting the reform: 
"... if it wasn't for a responsible person as Dr. X, who spent his entire period in office 
to establish the reform, the one that personally attended and firmly defended FM in 
all occasions, the implementation would not have started at all... " [N1 7, PR, national 
health expert]. 
Even at remote areas, his unique efforts to formulate and execute the policy were 
acknowledged. Among many actors, he was the only one who was frequently cited: 
"... particularly, Dr. X's enthusiasm ended up in implementing the policy. We had 
heard that he had undertaken a similar reform in province Z...... [L6.1, DA, district 
health manager]. 
In addition, medical MPs (Member of Parliament) were identified as facilitators of 
implementation, either in budget allocation or supporting its execution: 
"Medical MPs faced a paradox between their belief in the documented international 
experience (of FM) and the public's dissatisfaction of rationing... because of their 
insight in FM, they influenced non-medical MPs to vote for the policy... " 
[N4, PR, national team for reform]. 
5 Legal ground for implementation 
At the macro level, in addition to getting endorsed in the 20 year vision for the 
development of Iran and the "Supreme Council for Health & Food Security" declaration for 
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health sector reform, FM was embedded in the 4`h five year programme for development, 
which secured it to be overlooked by various governments: 
"... parliament endorsed FM in the 4"' five year programme. This forced the 
government to replace the existing treatment dominant insurance scheme by 
health insurance... the 4th plan gave an operational guarantee to FM and 
referral... " [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
Parliament had a power to force governments to implement the policy. It could also 
monitor the implementation and detect deviation: 
"... the 4th plan obliges us to deliver health services towards FM and the referral 
system... parliament monitors our movement in this direction... " [N12, PR, senior 
health official]. 
More deliberately, the necessity of separating the purchaser from provider was endorsed 
in the 4 `h plan: 
"... we endorsed in the (4th) plan that the MOH must make policies, while the MWSS 
was appointed as the purchaser.. . no one could bypass this... " [N 14, PR, former 
senior policy maker]. 
6 Political environment 
6.1 General pattern of health governance 
The political ground of the Islamic Republic of Iran was branded as inconsistent, with 
significant and costly trial and error practice. Because of the unique structure, it was hard 
to adopt suitable policies for the reform: 
"... our (political) structure was not prepared to accommodate capitalist or socialist 
ideas or any model from such regimes (like FM). We are a unique setting, within 
which everything must be experienced... how can I explain our system (laughter 
and pause)? Currently, we are too centralized with the government represent 
almost everything. We do not even have a distinguished identity and definition from 
governance in the Islamic Republic. Sometimes we become extremely socialist, 
whereas, we become more liberal than any existing capitalist system in some 
occasions. Our current pattern is not suitable for adopting FM. We should go ahead 
until it finds its own way!... "[N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
The trial and error practice to prove obvious things has been costly. Defining the macro 
approach to health was requested as a priority therefore: 
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"If I was influential enough, I would have ascertained a pattern (for the health 
system) first. No one tries to re-invent the wheel... " [N10, PU, PR, national team for 
reform]. 
6.2 Ambiguous policy-making process 
Constitutional aspects of governance in Iran were identified as ambiguous, lacking 
transparency and a clear approach. Even key policy makers were unclear about the 
underlying philosophy of health: 
"... we are an Islamic regime without defined governance, moving between 
capitalism and socialism. Our macro direction is ambiguous and our policies are 
vague. For instance, although we brand foreign investment as bad and a sign of 
imperialism, to justify our benefits we call it a great thing sometimes. Our 
constitutional policy is not defined.. . as an expert 
1 do not know our main approach 
to health... "[N5, PU, senior insurance official]. 
Ambiguous macro-philosophy of health led to undefined policy making that exposed the 
policy to misinterpretation: 
.. [Undertaking] reform 
is very hard in this country. We even change our minds 
once executing the policy. Our main quarrel was asking for decision makers' 
faithfulness to their own decisions... "[N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Some mentioned it was because policies were being made in a vague background: 
"Because of undefined policy making, many decisions are made with no theoretic 
background. Many approved FM with no idea about it... "[N4, PR, senior member of 
national team for reform]. 
Some branded the ambiguity intentional to fulfil the policy makers' personal aims: 
"... optimism is achieved upon ambiguity. Authority is in ambiguity. Transparency 
brings responsibility that might be in contrary to the politicians' interests... 
[N7, O, senior insurance official]. 
Among individuals' interests to keep the vague background, religious beliefs were 
mentioned as an example: 
"In principle, I focused more on villages because of their long negligence in the 
development cycle. More importantly, Islam and Imam (founder of the Islamic 
Republic) as manifestations of Islam, were willing to assist poor... " [N9, O, senior 
policy maker]. 
162 
Lack of a defined model to approach the health system exposed FM to personal 
preferences and led to diversion of the policy from its main goals: 
".. . it is very important to 
determine whether we are thinking of prevention or 
treatment. Otherwise, in case of political pressure, diversion from main goals looks 
pretty likely... " [N8, O, national financial official). 
Ambiguous governance of health made undertaking any change difficult: 
"... health patterns are classified as libertarian or egalitarian. We still do not know 
which one we are. Libertarian sometimes, Unitarian occasionally, while making 
rapid u-turns towards egalitarianism sometimes. Indeed, in some messy occasions 
we have no direction at all. Look at our payment system for example. It comprises 
direct and indirect payment, along with reimbursement. Do you know another place 
on the planet like this? ... " [N7, O, senior insurance official]. 
Lack of a clear macro philosophy for the health system blunted big changes, dissatisfied 
individuals and made them reluctant: 
"Practically, there is no theory behind the (health) system in this country. Quote this 
from me! We have handed over this bus to 100 drivers. Once reaching the 
crossing, we ask passengers for their favourable direction: right or left? Some 
passengers say: left. The next traffic light, some passengers shout louder: right. 
We turn right then. At the end of the day, we will fall to the bottom of a valley... the 
Iranian health system is messy. Many prefer this mess (to continue) because of 
their benefits... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
The impacts of a lack of a clear philosophy to run the health system were illustrated in this 
quote. The health system was described as a plane that was being piloted by a number of 
pilots with different destinations. Attempting to change the oligarchy was hard therefore, 
unless the system became transparent: 
"... most efforts to improve FM fail because of the systematic lack of transparency, 
which makes interferences inevitable. If only we had a sustainable and clear 
(health) system... " [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
Thus, selecting a model for macro pattern of health was fundamental for revitalizing the 
reform: 
"I addressed the cabinet that the entire jurisdiction must make the big decision of 
choosing a model for the health system. Unless the pattern is selected from three 
existing models: social insurance like Canada; centralized tax-based like the British 
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NHS; or a free market like the USA, we would not be able to define our strategy. 
We are camel-cow-tiger at this time... " [N10, PU, PR, national team for reform]. 
Nonetheless, some branded the current system potentially brilliant for improving the 
implementation, because of the FM compatibility with the milestones of the Islamic 
Republic and the revolution ideals: 
"... social justice is consistent with the fundamental motto of the Islamic Republic. 
No one is entitled to argue such concepts. Socialization is fulfilled by giving 
facilities to the poor ... 
1 believe this is in line with main aim of FM. We grew up with 
such revolutionary mottos ... surely, such a system would 
be much better than a 
blind socialistic structure. It could get better than capitalist regimes as well. Our 
system is more matched with socialistic ones and might get even better than 
them... "[N1, PR, former senior health policy maker]. 
7 Rural setting specifications 
Starting implementation in rural areas, rather than the original intention of starting in cities, 
turned out to be a benefit. Characteristics of villages and small towns assisted the 
introduction of Behbar for four reasons: 
First, rural areas were less complex than urban areas: 
"... villages are far less complex than cities. There is not a complex stakeholders' 
involvement there. The private sector is also weak in villages. Furthermore, there 
are not powerful political or trade unions there... " [N17, PR, national health expert]. 
Second, compliance was greater because people had traditionally no effective insurance: 
"... 90% of our rural population had no insurance [prior to the implementation]. In 
cities with only 10% uninsured and a complex insured composition of 40% by SSO, 
20% by MIO, 20% by army and 10% by IKRF the implementation was very 
difficult... " [N4, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
Third, there was a strong desire for better services in villages, particularly for a system 
which met their needs and provided them with similar care to their urban counterparts: 
"... people in rural areas [before FM] kept asking for [insurance] log-books which 
covered them like urban inhabitants... " [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
FM was therefore a chance to fulfil their long-term expectations: 
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"... (rural) people were really in need of this programme. it was not their choice, but 
an opportunity to remedy their prolonged deprivation of services... " [N1, PR, former 
senior health official]. 
Local staff recognized the advantage of starting implementation in rural areas: 
"... it is better to resolve some implementation problems here (villages). Managing 
the reform in cities is very difficult, whereas, here you have easily all people under 
one roof. Let's go further in villages first, it could be expanded to cities 
afterwards... " [Li. 4, midwife]. 
The local people supported the implementation by their contribution to the reform: 
"... rural health centre X in province Y was too small to accommodate the health 
team. Villagers allocated a part of their mosque to FM that used to be women's 
worship place. They also prepared two houses in every other village for doctors' 
stay over nights.... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
Their help even extended to donating money and labour to empower logistics: 
"... there is a film showing me ask the villagers to build a residential place for 
doctors,... you will see how they contributed up to 80% of the cost. Willingness of 
the people in need of services motivates them... " [P7, PR, provincial health expert]. 
And finally, the private sector was poorly developed in villages to compete with FM: 
"... people go to health centre easier in villages because of less access to private 
doctors and other practitioners ... " [L3.5, E, Iocal health technician]. 
Lack of private provision arose because: 
"... the private sector is not interested in rural health houses. On the other hand, 
we cannot hand over those because of the local employees who are supposed to 
stay there for their entire life ... " [N12, PR, senior health official]. 
Starting implementation in rural areas did, however, have some difficulties. First, physical 
access was challenging: 
"... planning is difficult because of the geographical problems. We have to plan for 
areas with temperature ranges between -10 to +40 °C at the same time. Reaching 
some areas needs at least three hours driving, whereas some places are close to 
big cities with good roads... "[N1, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
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Practitioners were not keen to work in such difficult conditions: 
"... 23 million people have been insured in an area of 1.7millionSgKm, most of it is 
mountain or desert. In some areas only two people live in every 1OSgKm, whereas 
some places accommodate 200 persons in every Sgkm... "[N15, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
Second, the diversity of ethnicities in rural areas presented difficulties: 
"... we are facing diverse ethnicities even within our centres that make it difficult... " 
[L4.1, DA, district health manager]. 
And third, rural areas in Golestan had an additional problem of providing services for 
Nomadic populations who seasonally move across the borders of neighbouring provinces. 
Registration and allocating a per capita budget were practical challenges for this groups: 
"3 out of 23 million villagers are Nomadic people. Where should they be registered 
when moving? How could we keep their records in such a situation?... 
[P4, provincial health manager]. 
For instance, villages in mostly immigrants' destination faced administrative difficulties: 
"... our rural movements are wave-shaped because of huge immigration towards 
here. One third of the population are Sistani or Balooch (an ethnicity from south- 
east of Iran), with high turnover across the province... " [L2.2, DA, district health 
expert]. 
8 Availability of resources 
The extent to which the logistics were prepared prior to starting implementation affected it. 
The availability of resources including the physical facilities, equipment, funding, staff and 
clinical guidelines is investigated in this section. 
8.1 Physical facilities 
The PHC infrastructure was the only facility to accommodate FM in rural areas. However, 
the existing health centres were not appropriate for practicing in. Residential amenities 
were also not comfortable for doctors to live in: 
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"... Implementation was not supposed to start that early. We started to recruit 
doctors and midwives without allocating the proper physical spaces. Even our 
purpose-built (health) centres were not appropriate for accommodating more than 
one doctor. Other staff were not able to stay there, because of which the 
philosophy of FM was fading... design and appearance of centres were not also 
comfortable. Due to monetary shortages, we could not renovate centres, many of 
which are rented... " [N11, PR, senior health manager]. 
No funds were allocated to make physical facilities suitable for implementation: 
"Our PHC infrastructure is weak. About 55% of rural health centres and health 
houses are rented in Golestan. We must spend at least 20billionTM to improve this 
[almost 2.5 times the provincial budget for FM]... no money has been allocated for 
such renovations. Even if we had money, we did not know what to do to meet the 
standards of FM... " [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
One health centre that served 5000 population, was a shop with three doors (Figure 7.1), 
very cold in the winter and presumably hot in summers. Its small visiting room smelled of 
the oil burning heater. The room was also being used for administering injections (Figure 
7.2). The waiting area was a 4Sqm corridor on the way to the other personnel exit. The 
next door shop was for midwifery with slightly more privacy, while the third shop door was 
for dentistry, which was open only two and half days a week. Visiting with patients was 
likely to be interrupted several times because of giving injections. Enjoying the World Bank 
PIU (Programme Implementation Unit) funds, a new purpose-built centre had been 
constructed, but it was not being used for managerial reasons and tribal challenges among 
the villagers themselves. In addition, there was no place for the doctor to reside in the 
village, so he had to commute almost 120KM every day: 
"... most of centres do not have facilities to live in because of their rental condition. 
Doctors stay there 8 am- 4 pm" [P7, PR, provincial health expert]. 
In contrast to the aim of FM, people were abandoned there during out of hours (4pm-8am): 
"... patients must go to centre X (district) for out of hours services. We have been 
following this problem a lot, trying to push officials to instruct doctors for night 
stays... we are 3 KM from centre X, you can hardly catch a cab... " [L1.1, DA, district 
health manager]. 
Ironically, there were two health houses in that village with better buildings and facilities. 
The lack of physical facilities, both for residence and clinical practice frustrated doctors: 
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Figure 7.1 Health centre in village X (60KM from the capital province of Golestan) 
"... as you can see the facilities here, it is more like a tomb than a clinic. Is this a 
place for practice? This is disgraceful. My wife accompanied me one day, and left 
in absolute anger. We are freezing here. After many followings, a disgusting oil 
heater was installed. I go back home with a headache, my cloths smelling of 
smoke. I was a doctor (before FM) practicing in my own clinic, with no boss... " 
[Li. 2, FD, family doctor]. 
Even in villages where luxury PIU buildings were being utilized, commonplace problems 
such as the lack of heating/cooling systems, no proportionate space allocation, warehouse 
inappropriateness and pharmacy shortages prohibited proper implementation. I stayed in a 
recently built health centre in an area that had been recently granted township. Its location 
was wonderful, however, no heating system was in operation. People were freezing and 
counted seconds to escape the place as quick as possible. Specifications of the building 
were also not in line with the requirements of FM, e. g. with three doctors on duty, there 
was only one consultation room. There was also no designated place for laboratory and 
radiology services. A number of rooms were empty because of unexplained managerial 
decisions, while personnel were forced to share rooms that interfered each other's duties: 
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Figure 7.2 Visit room in health centre X. 
"Despite our heartily desire, we are not able to deliver appropriate services due to 
physical difficulties. In centre X (purpose-built centre) with four doctors on duty, 
only one of them can practice... " [L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Furthermore, in some areas with excessive land and proper funding, the lack of residential 
facilities forced doctors to commute and leave the village at night: 
"... [Improper] logistics is our second main problem. Because of insufficient 
residential places for doctors' night stay, we must compromise many times. As a 
result, FM is not delivered as intended... " [P3, GMU, provincial senior health 
manmager]. 
In some centres with a residential place for doctors, the poor quality of the buildings and its 
facilities discouraged them to stay: 
"... 1 feel imprisoned when I stay for night shifts here. It is residence just by name..., 
what great sin have I committed to have to stay here? Is it a problem that I come 
from a family who care about cleanliness? " [L2.4, FD, family doctor] 
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The situation persisted despite the national managers' awareness of the requirements: 
"If we expect doctors to stay in villages, we must provide them with a comfortable 
environment. Otherwise, they simply escape... " [N9, O, national policy maker]. 
The lack of basic facilities along with live in necessities were serious challenges before 
implementation: 
"... retaining doctors and other practitioners in remote areas and villages has been 
our big challenge. Because of resources scarcity in villages, they do not stay for 
long, particularly once their kids reach school age. The society must invest to 
create welfare facilities in villages... " [N10, PU, PR, national team for reform], 
8.2 Equipping health centres 
Health centres were not appropriately equipped with facilities for practice or transport and 
other necessary materials: 
"If we were serious in improving services, we should have allocated better 
resources. Regretfully, there is little money for this in Behbar. If I could reallocate 
resources, I would spend some to calibrate existing equipments. Many people visit 
us healthy and leave us sick.. . these things have become normal in our system, 
sad to say (interviewee was upset saying this). Having a doctor, nurse or midwife is 
just part of the solution... " [P1 PR, provincial health manager]. 
The system was prepared to pay up to 1 millionTM to doctors every month, but not 
providing them with simple equipments: 
"... we do not have many items in health centres such as DC shock, ECG, etc. Our 
sphynometres are out of order. They (DOH) gave us some brand new otoscopes, 
which were originally impaired. We even run short of wound dressing sets, ... we 
were supposed to buy the needed items using part of the FM budget, but we 
ultimately were not allowed to do so... "[L4.1, DA, district health manager]. 
When finance was available, equipment purchases were restricted to low quality Iranian 
and Chinese products: 
"... when the money was allocated, I was instructed to purchase either domestic or 
Chinese products. However, I did not do so. I am not sure that the Iranian made 
sphyngometre is able to correctly measure blood pressure ... " [P3, GMU, provincial health manager]. 
Existing equipments were also far behind the public expectation: 
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"... providing services is linked to facilities. We must have equipped health centres, 
particularly with ambulances. The disaster here is that we do not have the essential 
tools for emergency cases... " [L3.9, imam]. 
Public compliance and trust are essential to establish and frame a reform. People could 
not trust health centres, where their relatives had died because of facility shortages: 
"If only the government had spent a very small amount of the 1000billionTM 
(budget for FM in 2005 and 2006) for equipping centres.. . they are guilty of the bloody mistake of increasing the public's expectations, with the least investment in 
equipments. They just increased the doctors' number from 1 to 4. How can a 
paralyzed doctor perform?... our doctors are excellent, but with no tools. Moreover, 
there are no laboratory facilities. I'd prefer to go to the city to see a doctor, if I am 
obliged to go there to do my (lab) test. . . there is also no transport facilities for 
patients. Our women might die in emergency situations... " [L2.10, teacher]. 
The reason was partly the lack of knowledge regarding the logistics of health care. People 
in charge of logistics were short of expertise: 
"... the main problem is our approach to health care logistics. We did not recruit 
people with appropriate expertise for the management of logistics, such as the 
ones with a PhD in management of health services. Whereas we appointed a 
dentist as the university deputy of logistics. Worse still is that once he became 
slightly experienced, he was replaced with someone worse . 
[P5,0, provincial 
union manager, physician]. 
I observed that variations between six health centres in terms of equipments were 
significant. 
Practitioners blamed themselves that equipments shortage prevented them from 
appropriate performance: 
"... there is not even a suction machine here. I could not forgive myself when a 21 
year old young man died before my eyes by drowning. Perhaps, he would be alive 
if we had a suction (machine)... " [L1.4, midwife). 
Ironically, central policy-makers believed that equipping health centres improved services 
and revitalized health centres, which were dead beforehand: 
"... facilities are not ideal for sure. To prevent villagers' commute, we must deliver 
as many services as possible. However, the reform has mobilized centres a lot, 
which were previously abandoned or dead" [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
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8.3 Funding 
Interviewees consistently acknowledged the importance of the monetary window that 
parliament opened to implementation: 
"... during the last 5 years, we were looking for a monetary chance to implement 
FM. The government had abandoned the pilot implementation in four provinces, 
due to lack of funding. The MOH was supposed to get 1.5billionTM for each pilot 
province, but received nothing until the time that parliament shifted money to this 
programme to assist villagers. This money which was far greater than our 
expectations helped us so much... " [N 1, PR, former senior health official]. 
Parliamentary funding approval materialized the implementation which had been delayed: 
.. FM must have been implemented in the era of the 3rd plan for development (6 
years ago). They (the MOH) were behind their commitments. Parliament approved 
the budget and forced them to implement... " [N6, O, national union manager]. 
The monetary provision was also addressed by provincial managers who related it to the 
government: 
"... we might experience some difficulties in our financial cycle, but we have been 
fortunate enough to enjoy governmental allocated money for Golestan... " 
[P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
However, stakeholders were concerned whether the fund would be sustainable: 
"... Parliament became a pioneer in 2005 to increase the rural insurance budget 
from 90billion to 377billionTM, which was raised later to 507billionTM in 2006... I 
could even say that parliament was the most effective factor in materializing the 
implementation. If it had not brought this willingness to action, we would still be 
nowhere... " [N3, physician, MP, member of parliament). 
Besides, the MOH enjoyed the World Bank loan to renovate the PHC infrastructure in rural 
areas, purchase new equipment and reconstruct its transport system, which empowered 
the rural health centres in accommodating FM: 
"... in terms of equipment, we had an agreement with the World Bank, which 
incidentally became effective upon the implementation of FM. This helped us to 
purchase most of the needed equipment... " [N8,0, senior finance official]. 
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Both the parliamentary budget and the World Bank loan helped equip health centres prior 
to implementation: 
"We enjoyed the World Bank loan mainly to equip health centres, particularly in 
deprived areas. Most of the money was spent for renovating buildings, purchasing 
equipment and vehicles, or buildings new health centres. 16millionTM was 
considered for each health centre to build or renovate the physical space as well as 
purchase almost 24 devices like ECG... " [N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
However, the peripheral managers and practitioners were unaware of such a loan from the 
World Bank. 
8.5 Personnel 
There was a belief that implementation of FM was facilitated, because of the ample 
availability of practitioners, particularly doctors and midwives: 
"... GPs were mostly unemployed when the implementation started. The midwives' 
situation was worse, so they joined... " [L5.3, FD, family doctor]. 
Two and a half years after implementation, there were still no doctors in some of the most 
deprived health centres, while most of the country had recruited practitioners successfully. 
Moreover, pre-existing personnel in the health system were prepared to move forward 
along with the reform: 
... 
in my opinion, personnel in the health centres are better-organized than their 
counterparts across the MOH. Their cornerstone has been established very well 
from the early stages to move along with regulations. I am certain that the MIO had 
no other choice but to hand over the implementation to the MOH... 
[P2, PU, provincial director]. 
Unlike practitioners, administrative and managerial staff were not appropriately prepared: 
"... inside the MIO and the MOH, there are few experts who can analyze the reform 
... even if they are asked, they do not possess the skills to do so. If you find 
anyone, give him my regards!... " [N5, PU, senior insurance official]. 
This was because of the general lack of expertise, which got worse when the new 
managers came to office. Moreover, a number of administrative personnel in the GDOH 
and the health district authorities did not proportionately increase with the peripheral 
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practitioners, which turned out to increase the workload for the administrative personnel 
with a lack of incentives: 
"I think most of the FM workload is on shoulders of the PEHP. Adding two or three 
experts is not sometimes enough, but the PEHP is even deprived of that... " 
[L2.2, DA, district health expert]. 
The capability of staff was a major concern, particularly because of the shortage in trained 
managers to run the reform: 
"Apart from the structure, the body of our health system is not capable to fulfil the 
requirements of the reform. Decisions which are made at the highest levels with full 
support do not properly flow to the body ... we run short of 
human resources, 
particularly ministers, and health and insurance managers with purposeful training. 
We appoint recently graduated doctors as district health manager, being aware of 
their lack of insight to their job. Once they become a bit familiar, they are 
replaced... "[N3, physician, MP, member of parliament]. 
8.6 Clinical guidelines 
Most interviewees called for clinical guidelines to practice FM. Guidelines were mentioned 
among those aspects which must be prepared prior to starting the implementation and be 
of high quality: 
"... managing the public within the framework of FM must be scientifically defined 
and distinguished. Practitioners should not be left on their own. Step by step 
instructions are an inseparable part of FM, which enables the paramedics to bring 
the medic's order into action... "[N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
However, the only guidelines found in the health centres were for diabetes, high blood 
pressure, pregnancy, and child care, which had been originally prepared for the purpose of 
the PHC. No particular guidelines were prepared for FM: 
"... 1 mark the implementation 12 out of 20, because of its many failures including 
lack of guideline, lack of defining health services, and lack of flexibility... 
[N4, PR, national team for reform]. 
Doctors and other staff complained about the lack of guidelines, despite being aware of 
the restricting impact of guidelines on their practice: 
"We are confused about the extent to which we are allowed to manage patients by 
our own decisions, as well as the appropriate time to refer them to specialists. For 
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example, the midwife keeps asking me the extent she must work up women with 
AUB, and the time for referring her-having a guide package for common problems 
assists us to be relaxed. Sometimes, I wonder to practice based on Harrison or 
Cecil [textbooks of internal medicine], or perform as our system fancies, which are 
sometimes contradictory... I think clinical guidelines are needed if we are serious 
about implementing FM... " [L3.1, DA, district health manager]. 
9 Summary 
This chapter has identified five aspects of the health system environment which affected 
the implementation of FM: 
" The pre-existing PHC; 
" Lack of clear governance of health system; 
" Inadequate knowledge and expertise at national level; 
" Inappropriate health financial system; and 
" Healthcare not a priority at national level. 
First, the pre-existing PHC network in rural areas was identified a great facilitator of 
implementation by the majority of interviewees at all levels. It was the only available 
healthcare structure in many deprived villages that was accessible for many, universal 
implementation of Behbar was deemed to be unlikely without it. In addition, the PHC 
enjoyed a deeply embedded hierarchical structure that might facilitate following guidelines. 
Second, the macro-level political structure was a unique system of governance 
internationally. Notions such as equity and anti-poverty were aspects of the revolutionary 
ideals which promoted FM and Behbar in rural areas. Despite this, the health system 
lacked a defined philosophy of governance, as a result of which there was neither a 
focused direction nor established criteria to assess programmes. This left the health 
system vulnerable to individuals' discretions, who were not afraid to overlook public benefit 
because of their personal or organizational interests. Lack of clear governance led to 
ambiguous policy making and vague operation of policies, which in turn increased 
hostilities between individuals as well as organizations and reduced people's faith in 
teamwork. Opaqueness in governance resulted in a lack of command in the health system, 
which meant the system was run by many drivers in different directions. No policy for 
change including FM could succeed in such an inconsistent environment. 
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However, ambiguous health governance was beneficial on few occasions. It allowed some 
knowledgeable policy makers to direct policy in the right directions and make a difference. 
A good example was the former minister of health (2001-2005) who led a small group of 
advocates to work on FM. His personal impact on the direction of the policy seized upon 
parliamentary approval of Behbar for concurrent implementation of the two policies. In 
addition, some sympathetic MPs facilitated the task inside parliament and opened the 
opportunity for implementation. There were not only national interviewees who identified 
these individuals' key role in implementation. In the severe lack of information and lack of 
explanation of the policy, even some villagers at remote areas of Golestan pointed to 
attempts of the former minister of health as a main facilitator of implementation. More 
importantly, this small group of enthusiastic players inserted FM into the 4`h programme for 
development of Iran, which was a fundamental action to secure the policy throughout 
difficult periods. 
Third, there were serious doubts regarding adequate knowledge and technical expertise in 
the two implementers: MOH & MIO to conduct the task of implementation, particularly at 
the national level. Critics were concerned that FM needed more experience and resources, 
which the two implementers did not possess, given their scarce technical facilities and 
poor leadership. Such concerns became stronger when some knowledgeable informants 
pointed to a fundamental flaw of policy making in the Iranian health sector: public policies 
made by individuals who had significant interests in the private sector. This led to doubts 
about the authenticity of policies and resulted in a loss of trust in policy makers and 
governmental officials, which reduced actors' cooperation dramatically. 
Fourth, the funding system had a series of long-term shortcomings, which impeded any 
kind of reform into the health system. Despite lots of efforts for creating a National Health 
Account and integrating various sources in a single pool, there was no integrated health 
account, whereas several contradictory financial mechanisms were in place 
simultaneously. Apart from wasting resources, this impeded any reform which addressed 
equitable health services such as FM because of lack of population data base and 
inefficient mechanisms for pooling monetary sources. As a result, implementation of FM 
came to rely on the Behbar fund. Given the overwhelming concerns regarding general low 
capitation payment for health as well as severe resistance to integration by different 
beneficiary organizations, financial disintegration and lack of secure funding resulted in 
severe doubts regarding FM sustainability. A good example of financial failure was the 
insurance system, which inherited the lack of an accountable database and disintegration 
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of several insurance schemes. This not only wasted the resources because of the 
insurance overlap and financial insecurity, but also endangered equity, a main objective of 
the reform. Several interviewees were concerned that unless the insurance system 
underwent significant improvement, FM was not implementable. 
And finally, in spite of sporadic support at the highest political levels to prioritize health, 
health was not a national priority and not the main concern of policy makers. Irrespective 
of strong legal grounds, such as the constitutional emphases, healthcare was seen as a 
window shop to obtain a variety of goals, rather than concern for public well-being or 
people's rights. For example, even Behbar gained parliamentary approval to be 
implemented in the format of FM not because of improving health but rather, as a political 
gesture by MPs seeking public votes and wanting to show they cared about the poor. After 
implementation of FM started, some MPs challenged the MOH about referral policies and 
threatened to suspend implementation. At time that implementation needed support, they 
accused FM of reducing the public's freedom of choice. They either had overlooked the 
referral specifications when they had verified the policy, or had not understood the nature 
of the policy, both indicating that health was not their concern. If they had recognized 
health as a public right, as the constitution states, the capitation budget for health would 
not have been as small as it was, a fair indicator of undermining health. Therefore, the 
messy health system was a result of ignorance despite apparent legal supports and key 
individuals' verbal emphasis. The entire political structure suffered lenses towards health 
as a pillar of development and citizen's right. 
177 
Chapter 8: Experience of implementation 
Introduction 
Policies are not necessarily executed as intended. How the policy was implemented was a 
consequence of interaction between the policy and the environment. The management of 
implementation is investigated under six headings: 
" Administration; 
" Cooperation between individuals themselves and organizations; 
" Politics; 
" Communication between individuals and organizations; 
" Explanation of the reform to staff & public; and 
" Auditing performance. 
1 Administrating implementation 
In this section, six administrative aspects of the implementation are investigated: 
" Registration of the public; 
" service provision; 
" bureaucratic payment; 
" high turnover of doctors; 
" medical recording system; and 
" diversion of funds. 
1.1 Public registration 
The public had to register for Behbar log-books with the village health centre on the basis 
of their place of residence, without a choice of doctor. This was criticized for various 
reasons. Some were unhappy that compulsory registration restricted people from choosing 
their doctor: 
"... such registration has taken away the public's undeniable right to choose their 
desired doctor. One might prefer to see his own doctor rather than the assigned 
one. Psychologically speaking, being visited by a preferred doctor counts itself for 
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50-60% of the cure... even for less important daily things such as hair dressing we 
prefer to see someone familiar, let alone medical reasons... " [N6, O, national union 
director]. 
In addition, the process of registration was not carried out equally for the entire population 
in a village. Premiums varied in different periods of implementation (from 2800TM per log- 
book to 1000 & 700TM and free of charge after a while), which left frustrated members of 
village councils and Behvarzes who voluntarily undertook the administrative tasks. Indeed, 
the public accused the volunteers of embezzling the monetary excess (difference of 
2800TM and the lower amounts): 
"... the public lost their trust in us because of the registration process. People keep 
asking us why the premium is not constant for everyone. Our efforts to encourage 
the remaining population to register failed because they expected no premium. 
Some even thought that we put the excess in our pocket... " [L1.7, councillor). 
Because of that, representatives of the public called for more cautious behaviour in making 
decisions, wishing no premium had been taken at all to avoid such inequality: 
"... it was better either not to charge people for log-book issuance or charge them 
equally instead of a gradual reduction... " [L1.8, council member]. 
Unfortunately, the MIO's decision to gradually reduce the premium fee, which was for the 
public's benefit, diminished the reputation of volunteers who had enthusiastically assisted 
the registration. Among them were village councillors who were subsequently defeated in 
new council elections, because people accused them of corruption. Volunteers became 
critical of the reform: 
"... we were the main losers of premium reductions. We are approaching village 
council elections, while our rivals unfairly accuse us of embezzling the difference of 
2800 and 1000TM... people are enjoying the reform, but the government itself is 
losing...! wish it was free for all since it got started... " [L4.9, council member]. 
Worse still was the high number of people registered with each doctor: 
"... Despite the policy emphasis to assign 2500-4000 people to one FD, 
there are places where one doctor is in charge of 5000 or 6000 population. 
To act truly as a FD he would not be able to serve more than 1000 
population... " [N7, O, national insurance officer]. 
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In one village with the 14,500 population, there were four family doctors. Because of the 
routine day to day activities such as village rotas, doctors could not visit their assigned 
population. Along with other reasons for over-utilization of services, the high number of 
registered people led to a high number of visits, due to which doctors were busy by 
delivering only curative features of FM: 
"... unless the (assigned) population gets adjusted, FDs cannot provide proper 
preventive services... they are too busy by visiting patients... " [L2.2, DA, district 
health expert]. 
At the highest level of decision making, there were serious concerns that over-registration 
threatened the health focus of FM: 
"... the number of visits (per doctor per day) has significantly increased from 10 to 
more than 100. On average, the load of visits has increased up to 3.5 to 4 times, 
which worries us in losing the health focus and making our doctor a vector for 
remedy, rather than a promoter of health... " [N12, PR, senior health official]. 
Doctors also complained about huge number of visits that prohibited them from 
undertaking social and preventive responsibilities of a family doctor: 
"... we used to (before FM) replace the daily registration notebook every three 
years. It is being replaced every six months now because the number of patients 
has increased at least four times.. . we can do nothing but visit people and manage 
their diseases... " [L4.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Nonetheless, assigning a high number of patients per doctor was inevitable: 
"... we were obliged to increase the number of the assigned population from 2500 
to 4000, for three reasons. First, despite good payment, no doctor accepted to 
work at some places. Second, and more importantly, doctors' payment which is 
calculated per capita was low there that reduced their motivation. Third, there was 
no facility to accommodate more than one doctor in some areas ... " [NI5, PU, national insurance manager]. 
In addition to patients' requests for referral to specialists, a reduction of almost 90% of 
user fees was frequently mentioned as the main reason for over-utilization: 
"... many people go to our centres with no real complaint. Because it is almost free, health centres get crowded... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
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Ironically, in contrast to the purpose of FM to reduce drug consumption, the increasing 
load of visits ended in an unpredictable rise in drug consumption: 
"... 1 have reliable figures showing that drug consumption has increased two and a 
half times that of the previous year... we emphasize on health by settling FD and 
health teams, meanwhile we fill people's stomachs with poison... " 
[P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
That was why provincial managers wished an appropriate tariff system and called for 
revising fees to prevent such damages: 
"... We should not have reduced fees this much... it was highly destructive because 
the public think that whatever is more expensive, has better quality. One pays 
2000TM to get a cab to reach the health centre, while he cost of all services 
including visit, tests, etc. comes to 700TM.. "[P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
One consequence of a high rate of visits was an increase in waiting time, particularly in 
single-doctor health centres: 
"... the essential problem that discourages us from visiting the health centre is the 
long waiting time. One day, I went there at 10.00 am to collect a letter (the reason 
was getting a referral letter, not visiting the doctor), but the centre was closed until 
11.00 am. After two hours, I was told that doctor will not be coming because of 
personal problems ... 
1 would prefer to directly visit the specialist to not lose my 
whole day ... 
" [L1.8, councillor]. 
Managerial responsibilities, attending training sessions, village rota, or simply getting sick 
and not being able to attend were reasons for doctors' absence, particularly in single-FD 
centres. There were no advance appointments to reduce waiting times and crowdedness 
of health centres. Managers accused the public of a lack of compliance with the 
appointment system. Given that the public have used an appointment system for a long 
time, for example to visit private GPs, such a justification was unlikely. 
The final unanticipated problem that arose with public recognition was that the design, 
format, and shape of the insurance log-book was felt to be inappropriate for its purpose: 
"I do not like the current shape of the log-books at all. They are too small with little 
space on the back to write down feedback... " [P3, GMU, provincial health manager]. 
Practical inappropriateness of use of the log-book for prescriptions was echoed by local 
managers, as well as practitioners. Because of the lack of space and low number of 
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pages, family doctors had been instructed not to write down their prescription and other 
requests on the log-book pages. Family doctors were only stamping and signing log-books 
for referrals rather than for prescriptions so no record was kept in the log-books. 
1.2 Provision of services 
In contrast to the 4`h programme for development in which reducing governmental service 
delivery was emphasized, the private sector was not used much to provide services in FM: 
"... we have expanded the public sector size like an octopus with long tentacles, 
trying to access the entire country from the north to the south. Meanwhile, its 
central core is disabled in handling the task... " [N5, PU, senior insurance director]. 
The private sector itself was not motivated to provide services in villages, because of its 
weak infrastructure: 
"... we did not motivate the private sector to takeover administration and service 
provision in rural areas. To do so, the necessary infrastructure must be built up 
step by step, otherwise, it would not take the responsibility... " [N5, PU, senior 
insurance policy maker]. 
Therefore, the public sector (the MOH) was the only FM service provider in many places. 
A huge expansion of service provision by the public sector was also against the policy, 
which adversely affected the quality of services: 
"... we (MOH) make policy, manage, plan, perform and monitor ourselves, because 
of which the quality drops... we must reduce our size, be more focused on policy 
making and try to handover operational tasks to the private sector... 
[N1 1, PR, senior health official]. 
Involvement of the provincial DOH in service provision frustrated the managers: 
"... we must supervise rather than interfere in every occasion. We must release ourselves 
from service provision and leave this task to municipalities, according to the 4v" programme 
... currently, 
/ am both the performer and the auditor, whereas, I should have 
commissioned this out to enhance the quality of services for the public's good... " 
[Pi, PR, provincial health manager]. 
The expansion of public involvement for service provision was branded against the law: 
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"In contrary to the 4`h programme and the article 44th of the Iranian constitution, the 
current implementation is expanding public stewardship... " [N6, O, national union 
director]. 
One key policy maker estimated the proportion of service provision by the private and 
public sectors: 
". .. a correct analysis 
is never conducted in our country. The majority of central 
policy makers are against privatization so private views do not really exist. 80% of 
our outpatient services are provided by the private sector, versus 10% of inpatient 
services. On the other hand, 90% of inpatient services and 20% of outpatient 
services are provided by the public sector... " [N7, O, senior insurance director]. 
Because the private sector provided a high proportion of outpatient services, they were 
able to manipulate the public, inducing demand: 
".. The private sector is able to force us via the public. I think we have not 
analyzed the most powerful barrier against this implementation who are doctors, 
not the public... " [N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Implementers were trying to reduce public provision by contracting the private sector in 
small cities. The proportion of such private practitioners was low, its effectiveness was not 
clear, and it was flawed with respect to the preventive aspect of services: 
"... follow-ups and keeping medical records are not properly carried out by private 
doctors. Moreover, there is no assigned population to private doctors... 
[L3.1, DA, districy health manager]. 
1.3 Bureaucratic payment system 
Despite welcoming pay for performance and capitation payment, the management of the 
payment was described as too bureaucratic and complicated which ended up in wage 
arrears: 
"... why is the money not directly credited into the district health authority's 
account? If the district makes contracts, why the capitation is not directly paid to 
them, instead of freezing the money by numerous intermediates that considerably 
wastes time and leads to pay with delay ... "[L6.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Because of bureaucracy, some branded the current system unclear and inefficient: 
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"... one of the main challenges is the vague financial process. The biggest doctors' 
disturbance is the payment system, which has caused too much dissatisfaction. 
Unless the inefficient payment is improved, other fundamental problems will be 
inevitably occurring... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
Practitioners were losing their faith in FM, because of the confusing payment system which 
left them unclear to how and on what basis they were being paid: 
"... 1 was told that my earning would be around 250,000TM, but it is not clear how 
much goes into my pocket at the end of the month. We are paid 100,000TM every 
month. We shall wait up to six months, with no idea of how much is deducted, how 
much tax we are going to pay, etc... " [L1.4, midwife]. 
Practitioners, particularly midwives and nurses, as well as administrative personnel in the 
DOH and health centres, who were entitled to bonus payments in FM, implicitly accused 
the senior managers of paying whatever they liked, with no rationale. There was a 
common belief that the vague payment system led to unfair payments. A bonus which was 
meant to raise staff cooperation, ended up in their dissatisfaction, because of its unclear 
method of calculation and high bureaucracy: 
"... they (DOH) just credit our accounts with no explanation. Although we get paid 
more, we are still confused as to how and why... 1 do not know how much / have 
been paid for FM. Managers decide and we can say nothing... I was told 8.5% of 
(the budget of) FM is ours, but we have got nothing so far (15 months)... 
[L2.6, E, Iocal health technician]. 
As a result of the bureaucratic payment system, the GDOH was accused of delayed 
payment; however, senior managers confirmed that was because of delayed payments to 
the DOH by the MIO: 
"... there are many reasons for the delay, for example the MIO has credited the 
university late, because it has got the money with delay itself-" [N15, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
Admitting the existence of arrears, provincial managers linked it to excessive bureaucracy: 
"The serious problem is that the MIO pays us with delay. As a result of the 
bureaucratic payment cycle, we have to pay practitioners with delay which upsets 
them ... FM caused a huge workload in operational activities in the DOH... we 
conduct our audits every three months, but payments are still delayed... " 
[P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
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Complaining from the lack of authority to tackle the problem, district managers were aware 
of the adverse impact of arrears on practitioners: 
"... we are paid with severe delays. For instance, it is almost nine months that we 
have only paid doctors and midwives a partial fixed payment. We finalized 
(payments for) the first three months, yet the remaining six months has not been 
cleared... we are not authorized to tackle this.. . one occasion the president was 
asked (by practitioners) to get involved... " [L3.1, DA, district health manager]. 
1.4 High turnover of doctors 
Given the high work load, wage arrears and other difficulties, a high turnover of 
practitioners, particularly doctors, was inevitable: 
"... we are struggling with the big challenge of a high turnover of our doctors these 
days. 25-30% annual turnover of doctors means that the FD is replaced every 
three months at some places. Immediately after the FD gets familiar with the 
environment, s/he is gone and everything must be repeated again... " 
[N10, PU, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
The problem was also the challenge for district managers: 
"... one of our essential problems in some health centres is the quick replacement 
of doctors. We hold training sessions for FDs, spend time and money for them, 
teach them what to do, but they are not committed to stay. Their contract could be 
terminated with one month notice... "[L6.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Some practitioners branded the problem harmful as it brought down the public's trust, but 
good for doctors themselves: 
"... 1 think lots of changes in doctors have decreased the public trust. Nevertheless, 
moving to another centre is good for the personnel themselves. It is exciting like 
moving to a new house. However, patients lose their trust in us... people get 
curious and keep asking why X left. Some people think the health centre is not a 
good place as it cannot keep its practitioners... " [Li. 3, nurse]. 
Representatives of the public also complained that the high turnover confused villagers: 
"... within the last 16 months, three doctors have been replaced here. Once people 
fall into the habit of a doctor, s/he is gone. If s/he settles in the village, s/he might 
get familiar with the customs and traditions of the public and the public could know him/her as well. Changing doctors confuses and annoys people and reduces their trust in us. They keep telling us the previous doctor was better... " [Li. 6, villager]. 
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1.5 Patient health record 
There was a consensus that the lack of a patient health record put the implementation in 
danger, by leaving practitioners unclear to people's medical history, impairing them from 
properly following up patients: 
"I think we have no vision for this reform. We have just provided log-books to the 
public. No information is taken and kept either about patients' history or their 
physical status. . . If one changes his place of residence, and 
inevitably his doctor, 
everything must be started from scratch... " [N15, PU, senior insurance director]. 
Because of not recording population data, the main targets of FM such as rationing 
services on the basis of needs, creating better chance to follow up in the elderly, and 
preventing repeated interventions to save resources, were threatened. A pity of many 
managers despite clear emphasis in the policy: 
"... 1 regret that a small part of the 1000bilhionTM which was spent on Behbar (within 
the last 2 years), was not allocated to building up a data centre... " 
[P1, PR, provincial health director]. 
After two years of implementation, there was still no system in place to take and store 
population data. Despite senior policy makers' awareness about its necessity, no action 
was taken to tackle the shortage: 
"The referral system, active and ambulatory care could not be established without 
recording and retrieving medical information... so far, 1 have seen no serious action 
to record people's data ... "[N4, PR, senior policy maker]. 
Managerial intentions and the doctors' considerable spare time during the afternoons, 
were two practical incentives to undertake record keeping: 
"... / am warning that if we do not keep records, all efforts will be summarized in 
doctor shopping and treatment... I know it is time consuming, but it is doable to 
even tape recording each insured person's personal information and history, 
transcribing those, and attaching them to the (health) folders. This could be 
gradually completed... " [P3, GMU, senior provincial health manager]. 
Many doctors admitted their reluctance to record data, citing time shortages and long 
waiting times: 
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"... to be frank, health folders are not being used that much... every day I must visit 
70-100 patients, most of them come along while pushing each other to get in 
sooner. Taking medical history and physical examination for each person takes at 
least 20-30 minutes, which leads to objections... "[L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
Lack of time was not an acceptable excuse for many centres. With a few exceptions, the 
doctors, particularly in multi-doctor centres, complained about their wasted time 
between 1 2.00noon and 4.00pm, the period with least likelihood of any visits: 
"... you see there is no patient after 12.30pm. One or two people might come along 
by chance. After 2.00(pm) no bird flies here. We just sit down with nothing to do, 
just to pass working hours... " [L4.4, FD, family doctor]. 
They could therefore divide people accordingly, invite them by appointment, take the 
necessary information, and transfer those to their folders, enjoying relaxed and convenient 
afternoon working hours. Yet, this did not happen, probably because of the lack of belief in 
the necessity of a recording system, or practitioners' lack of awareness regarding the 
importance of data recording: 
"... health folder, well, what do you mean? / have just moved here. Oh, / think you 
mean health indices... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
The lack of space to keep folders was another reason given. I did not witness any doctor 
asking for a folder when visiting patients, even in village rotas. Despite their verbal 
support, national and provincial managers did nothing to improve this. Otherwise, they 
could have managed doctors' afternoon spare time to do so. Furthermore, they could show 
the importance of data recording by imposing disincentives such as financial ones. 
Moreover, the public were not aware of the importance of record keeping for their future 
managed care. Otherwise, they would have pushed doctors to record their information for 
their own good: 
`9 mark the implementation 10 out of 20, mainly because of its defective data 
recording. For example, pregnancy information is not recorded here at a//... 
patients have no idea about such a health folder... " [L6.7, midwife]. 
Even though there was a severe lack of even manual record keeping, a number of 
interviewees called for computerized medical recording, a luxury without which no real FM 
could take place in their opinion: 
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"... yet, the cornerstone of FM which is creating accessible records of people, has 
not been established. Why must a doctor with thousands of healthy and sick 
people not have their information in his computer? A costless process, less than 
500,000TM for each centre... folders are being written using a 50 year old model. It 
was not expensive for the government to equip centres with computers... it was in 
patients' interest by raising the likelihood of a better follow up and managed care in 
the future ... " [P5, 
O, provincial union manager and physician]. 
The idea of digitalized data keeping was supported by interviewees who identified the 
nationwide IT infrastructure capable to accommodate a national integrated database for 
the entire population. Some mentioned that the opportunity for digitalization was missed, 
and money was wasted on publishing paper folders which were never used: 
"... making the right decision needs correct information. If only we had allocated a 
small proportion of Behbar funds to study the feasibility of digitalization (of medical 
records)... the MIO spent a hell of an amount of money to publish millions of health 
folders... If only they had allocated this to computerize the process... " 
[P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Golestan completed a project on its own to create an electronic database for the province. 
However, digitalized data keeping was not nationally spread: 
"... There was not an IT approach to the reform at a national level, otherwise all 
(provinces) would have moved towards it. Some provinces have been developing 
their own software, which are not necessarily compatible. Just imagine integrating 
those. Impossible, hell of an amount of money again... " [P5, O, provincial union 
manager and physician]. 
Lack of record keeping diverted the implementation from one of its crucial aims: active 
follow up. Lack of computerizing the process wasted money, time, and human 
resources. Quality of care came down and the management of chronic patients was 
affected. The administrative costs of issuing insurance log-books (57billionTM so far), 
could also be saved by computerization and giving people their unique insurance number: 
"... if we had looked at FM and referral system through an IT lens and the 
necessity of digital medical record, insurance log-books would not be our initial 
concern... we probably would not need such log-books... "[P3, GMU, senior 
provincial health director]. 
1.6 Diversion of funds 
Interviewees identified a number of occasions on which funds for FM were diverted to 
other purposes. Even senior national managers were concerned about the possibilities 
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that the medical universities might spend the FM budget to resolve their outstanding 
shortages: 
"I am always worried that due to thousands of problems, chancellor of universities 
or local managers spend money for other purposes (than FM)" [N1, PR, senior 
former health official]. 
The existing bureaucracy was seen as a facilitator of potential misallocation: 
"... what worries me are managers who use the (FM) money to solve their current 
problems and do not care what happens next... the universities' accounting system 
is flawed. Money is credited into the university's account, where 10% of it is 
immediately frozen. It is transferred to the account of the deputy of logistics then 
and released whenever they would like to... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
Medical universities were likely to divert funds because they were struggling to pay their 
routine expenses, like the salary of their personnel: 
"... Universities are suffering from a severe budget deficit due to which they cannot 
afford even their routine commitments. This inevitably means that a significant 
portion of FM resources is spent for irrelevant purposes... " [N4, PR, senior member 
of national team for reform]. 
Officials in the Golestan University disclosed their inevitable choice to divert funds: 
"... my current disturbance is my personnel's postponed salary for last month. How 
could I even think about FM? I have no choice sometimes but to shift FM funds to 
somewhere else for relief or tailoring... " [P3, GMU, senior provincial health director). 
The MIO also spent parts of the funds for other purposes. It kept part of the approved 
budget with no declaration. Parts of the budget which were being deducted according to 
the monitoring results were not declared as well: 
"... the budget for this year was increased, despite the fact that nothing has been 
done. The MIO spent part of the money for other purposes (than FM), however, the 
parliament trusted it (approving next year's budget with 10% increase)... " 
[N5, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
2 Cooperation 
Despite a few examples of reasonable cooperation among stakeholders to implement the 
reform, there was a consensus regarding the adverse impact of a lack of cooperation on 
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implementation. Establishment of "The National Office for FM" in the MOH was intended to 
encourage cooperation: 
",.. national office for FM: NOFM is to theoretically feed the implementation, as well 
as to coordinate stakeholders' function by conducting surveys, integrating 
resources, documenting histories and improving macro plans and strategies. The 
aim is to prepare a well-done action plan for executive units... " [N10, PR, national 
team for reform]. 
The office was formed six months after the new government took power. Headed by a 
well-known and reputable policy maker who was passionate about FM as the senior 
advisor to the minister, he tried to revitalize the reform. The office organized several 
specialist committees to work on various issues in a professional manner: 
"... this office is a new experiment within the DOH that enjoys the advice of 
professional committees, working on various issues including drugs, clinical 
guidelines, medical recording, etc... I expect to experience a smoother 
implementation through its outcome... " [N1 1, PR, senior health official]. 
One good impact of its activities was engaging with key stakeholders who had previously 
been neglected despite their desire to cooperate. Organizations such as the GPA (General 
Physicians Association) and the IMA (Iranian Medical Association), which respectively 
represented GPs and all doctors (including GPs), were invited: 
"Following recent interactions between the GPA and the MOH, we organized sub- 
committees within the main committee for FM in the GPA. Headed by one of our 
most experienced managers, its mission is bridging the gap of influential data. That 
guy has gathered 15 authentic managers and researchers with great experience 
from the PHC networks. They attempt to find out better ways for implementation, 
consistent with the MOH goals... their role is advisory, not executive. We also 
convey doctors' opinions to the MOH... everything is done for assisting them to 
perform a better reform. We do this, even if the MOH stops us to do so... 
[N6, O, national union manager). 
Legal improvements in practitioners' contracts were unlikely without close cooperation 
between the MOH and unions like the GPA and the IMA. The cooperation converted the 
anger of opposite key stakeholders to a more productive environment. Moreover, the GPA 
considered itself an advisor to the MOH in implementing the favourite policy of the MOH 
with no executive interference. 
Nonetheless, after a couple of golden months, the head of the NOFM resigned because of 
frustration and lack of ongoing cooperation. The office had not been effective since then. 
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The rest of this section investigates the aspects of the lack of cooperation and its impact 
on the management of implementation under six headings: 
" Degree of common language 
" Their interpretation of goals 
" Coordination 
" Mutual trust between stakeholders 
" Advocates of FM 
" Coalitions and policy brokers. 
2.1 Lack of a common language 
For many reasons including the lack of preparation, a top-down approach to the policy and 
following different goals by stakeholders, there was a lack of a common language between 
the implementers: 
"... common language among various engaged levels is perhaps 30-40%! Because 
they have not been trained, they did not know what to do. Many think that FM is to 
decrease costs... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
Even national senior policy makers had contradictory interpretations regarding the 
fundamental concepts of FM: 
"... a common language has not been effectively in place. The referral is cited more 
than other aspects of the policy. There is not a united and deep understanding of 
FM and its differences with referral... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
Lack of a common language was serious enough to be listed as the main obstacle to 
implementation by many interviewees: 
"Our interpretation from FM is not united at all. Dr. X does not interpret it as I do. 
The public approach is different from Dr. X and me as well. Moreover, Dr. Y and 
Dr. Z's approaches are different from Dr. X and mine. We are not even united in 
our main aims, let alone the strategies... " [N5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
2.2 Inconsistent interpretation of goals 
The goal of the reform was unclear to many key stakeholders, which resulted in 
contradictory interpretations: 
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"The overall opinion is moving ahead with the reform, but we are facing different 
approaches within which everyone is pursuing his own goal, contradictory to others 
sometimes. / think the most vital task is clarification of the main goal... it is very important 
at this stage to write down the main aims and have it signed by all the stakeholders... " 
[N12, PR, senior health official]. 
Lack of transparent goals was identified as the core reason for the diversity of 
interpretations of the policy: 
"You will reach this crucial result that lack of transparency caused all these 
problems. It led to weak political commitment, led to the GPA to stand against 
implementation, despite its benefits, and resulted in lack of a common language. I 
wish you would investigate why goals are not clarified in developing countries like 
ours?... "[N4, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
Several examples were mentioned to show the diversity of goals, which were not 
necessarily contradictory, but were stopping the definition of a suitable strategy to fulfil 
them given the scarcity of resources to simultaneously pursue all the goals. For instance, 
the MOH was accused of looking at the reform as a resuscitator of the rural health 
networks: 
"The MOH's first priority was not implementing FM, it was to revitalize the rural 
health networks... monetary resources of Behbar were used to obtain personnel's 
bread... "[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
The perception that the MOH's priority was not to implement FM in villages was also 
supported by officials inside the health sector: 
"... we formatted many things to convince the MIO to credit us the money. We are 
not doing anything more for patients in FM... " [P3, GMU, senior provincial health 
manager]. 
Because of the diversity of interpretations of the policy, the MIO and the MOH faced many 
challenges in implementing FM: 
"We did not expect this amount of money from the parliament. We were promoting 
rural insurance plans to provide villagers with insurance log-books like that of the 
city residents, to go wherever they prefer. We were not thinking of referral in the 
MIO... "[P2, PU, provincial director]. 
Mandatory concurrence with Behbar shifted the focus to the rural areas, which in turn 
caused diverse approaches towards implementation: 
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"... there is no united interpretation of the policy among stakeholders... for us, FM 
was a health unit, lead by a doctor to deliver a wide range of services including 
social and spiritual, as the WHO defines. Dr. X was looking on referral and FM as a 
GP fund holding like the UK. His approach was not in line with his professional 
experts... the lack of common language within the macro level of decision making 
impaired the lower levels to reach common results. This is why despite decades of 
referral system in this country, we are still nowhere... " [N8, O, senior finance officer]. 
Fundamental variations in interpreting FM also led to selecting unsuitable strategies to fulfil 
the aims of the reform: 
.. after 
lack of a common language, I think the second biggest barrier in front of 
the reform was the wrong strategies for fulfilling our goals... " [N 1 5, PU, senior 
insurance director]. 
Even the two dedicated policy makers, whose efforts were significant in shaping the 
implementation, had contradictory approaches: 
"I criticise Dr. X (the former Minister of Health) because his interpretation from FM 
was in contrary to his closest ties, even his deputies. In particular, Dr. Y (his deputy 
for health) had a different interpretation of the policy... " [N 1 0, PU, PR, national team 
for reform]. 
The core reason behind the implementation failures seemed to be following the diverse 
perceptions of the goals of the policy. The Behbar goal was to narrow the gap between 
villagers and the urban population in terms of equity and entitlement for services, whereas 
the goal of FM was health promotion. Thus, the two policies were being implemented with 
different macro expectations: 
"... the main goal of Behbar was not health, rather it was social insurance for 
villagers as the responsibility of the MWSS. Because people themselves 
distinguish their own needs, health and treatment were considered as a window- 
shop... Parliament changed many things by approving the budget for Behbar over a 
night. The MOH faced that amount of money, which was about to destroy all its 
visions... "[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Parliament approved the budget which surprised the MOH whose attempt was to 
implement FM for urban households. The view of parliament was the opponent of the 
MOH, whose aim was to bridge the gap of primary care in cities and ration services there, 
where the majority were insured. On the other hand, the parliament's aim in Behbar was to 
give the same freedom to villagers as their urban counterparts and bypass rationing. This 
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was why parliament objected to the implementation soon after it started, accusing the 
MOH of taking away the power of selection from villagers: 
"Parliament approved the budget to take away differences between rural and urban 
inhabitants. Look! Parliament was wrongly thinking, looking for a tool to give 
freedom to the villager to do whatever s/he wants.... they bypassed us (with 
emphasis). Parliament allocated money for villagers not because of FM or referral, 
but equalization of rural and urban insurance... this was why the money was 
allocated with no calculation and rationale behind. We always get worried once big 
money comes in, because big money is always spent unrighteous ... " 
[N8, O, national finance officer]. 
Managers in the two organizations explicitly admitted that different goals were followed: 
"The truth is that our desire in the MIO was villagers' social insurance. We started 
to distribute 18 million insurance cards in the Rafsanjani (the Iranian president 
1989-1997) era in 1996 in Kerman province (south of Iran). People's interpretation 
from Behbar there is nothing but replacing Rafsanjani's (the former president 1989- 
1997) cards with Ahmadinejad's (the Iranian president 2005- present) log- 
books.. . our aim was promoting cards 
to log-books!... " [P2, PU, provincial director]. 
The two main implementers approached the reform with opposite goals and different 
agendas. The natural result of such a difference was failure and instability. Worse still, 
they did not even recognize each other to carry out the common task of implementation: 
"When parliament approved our budget (he considered the budget just for the MIO) 
and showed us the green light, we invited the MOH to join. Dr. X (the former 
Minister of Health), and Dr. Y (the former head of the PEHP) had tried their best, 
but they were still nowhere after three years... "[N10, national team for reform]. 
On the other hand, the MOH did not approve such a role for the MIO and denied its 
effective function in the implementation: 
"... it is easy to say, but it was a lot harder in practice to convince parliament to 
allocate money for this purpose. Such concepts are absolutely irrelevant to the 
MIO. Is the MIO stupid to do so? If the MIO says it has done this (Behbar), is has 
done something against the nature of insurance, which is saving resources to 
prohibit more cost... " [N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
The important missing effort by the two implementers was creating a mutual relationship in 
favour of proper implementation. Instead, they denied and accused each other: 
"If I had authority, the first thing I did was to establish an authentic relationship 
between the MWSS and the MOH for execution... " [N11, PR, senior health official]. 
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As a result of following different goals, the implementers' cooperation was lacking. They 
were accused of not spreading FM, even across their entire sovereignty: 
"... you cannot undertake the reform when health is just the issue of four people 
who have sat down in a room with no connection to the outside world, even the 
entire ministry (of health). Until it becomes a national apprehension, FM will not 
succeed... " [N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
2.3 Lack of coordination 
Lack of command harmed the implementation in Golestan, despite cooperation between 
the GDOH and the GMIO who were more coordinated than their national mother 
organizations: 
"We have been in good harmony with the MIO, despite some misunderstandings at 
the start. Now, we have reached a common language...! think our constructive 
interaction facilitated the proper implementation in our province... 
[P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
"... the GMIO and the GDOH were in charge for planning, resource provision and 
performance, although they had multiple command centres inside them. They 
pursued their own plans most of the time ... 
" [P2, PU, provincial director]. 
Almost all interviewees in the two provincial organizations identified the organic and 
prosperous relationship between the two as the main facilitators of what they viewed as 
the relatively successful implementation of FM in Golestan: 
"... the MIO and the DOH are enemies in many provinces. We both liked this task to 
be done and sincerely supported each other for productive interaction... 
[P2, PU, provincial director]. 
Practitioners and the public were aware of the cooperative relationship between them, 
mentioning the smooth process of issuing the log-books as an indicator. 
Lack of cooperation and command caused coordination failures in the management of 
implementation: 
"... this system is dissociated. It is better to say there is no system in place. There is 
no land to be governed and no organization to link the separated islands. Each 
single organization is working for itself... " [N7,0, senior insurance officer]. 
"... the essential command to move the reform forward has not been yet 
established in the system... " [N4, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
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The implementers could not establish a designated unit to coordinate the implementation 
because there was no common language between them: 
"... due to lack of united interpretation, no referral was executed, despite more than 
a decade of legal emphasis on it. There is no specific unit responsible for health.... 
everyone says that referral is good, but its implementation is challenged because 
of restricting freedom of choice... " [N15, PU, senior insurance director]. 
This was why senior officials called for coordination via a single and integrated 
management of the implementation: 
"... I reemphasize that if we are serious in reaching goals, there must be a united 
management to prevent personal interpretations and wrong directions... " 
[N12, PR, senior health official]. 
There were two important aspects of the lack of coordination: the separation of the 
purchaser (MIO) and the provider (MOH), and gate-keeping role of family doctors 
First, despite theoretical support for the separation of purchaser (MIO) and provider 
(MOH), it harmed implementation. In practice, they suffered a lack of coordination because 
of their different goals and diverse interpretations of the policy: 
"One of our big challenges is that I (MOH) have to take responsibility, while money 
is in the hand of the MIO. We disagree even on commonplace issues like the drug 
list. If I am the policy maker, I must decide about the drug items.... It is really a 
problem that the MIO can do everything without our approval. Our objection 
changes nothing, because it possesses the money. We cannot resolve all disputes 
with friendship and ceremonial greetings... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
The fragile teamwork and the two implementers' perception of each other contributed to 
the problem. It was particularly difficult for the provider to accept monitoring by the 
purchaser to get paid. The MIO used to be part of the MOH, prior to moving to the recently 
established MWSS, so the MOH was still looking to the MIO for obedience which it found 
hard to accept. The MOH approach to the reform, which was revitalizing the PHC in rural 
parts, was interpreted as diverting from Behbar by the MIO, resulting therefore in little 
impact despite spending such huge amount of money: 
"550billionTM was a huge amount of money which could explode our system, 
although I do not see signs of such success in our performance... " 
[N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
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Separation was not as beneficial as expected for two reasons. First, the curative focus in 
the MIO: 
"... it was difficult convincing the MIO to pay for primary prevention. It only accepted 
to pay for secondary services ... 
it took ages to gradually adopt itself to not just pay 
for treatment, but for health... "[N1, PR, former senior health official], 
And second, the previous hierarchy of the MOH, in which the MIO was subservient: 
"... conflict between senior managers to materialize their organizational portion (of 
money) was serious... it was hard for the MOH to accept a commander who was 
its ordinary soldier (MIO) beforehand... the MOH lobbied the parliament to dissolve 
the MWSS to take over the MIO as its subordinate again... "[N5, PU, senior 
insurance director]. 
Furthermore, the two organizations undertook parallel activities, which wasted resources 
and lowered efficiency. For example, the MIO did not accept the MOH audit checklists, but 
used its own with different criteria, believing that was increasing the quality of services: 
"... l accept that once upon a time treatment was our focus (MIO), but we have 
changed. We share results of our own audits with colleagues in the DOH. Well, 
who likes to be monitored? One must appreciate the approach that we follow in our 
audits. We monitor to increase the quality of services, and to enhance public's 
satisfaction by improving performance... we just feed the DOH with data to 
encourage them to provide better services... " [P2, PU, provincial director]. 
The MOH had many reasons to be unhappy with the MIO, whose attempts were to prove 
its true independence by influencing the reform. This was why, despite theoretical support, 
separation ended in the implementers' dissatisfaction: 
"... in practice, the MOH does not recognize the MWSS. These two bodies used to 
be one. It was decided to separate the purchaser from the provider to increase 
their mutual interaction, and to enhance the competition for increasing quality of 
services. However, the result was adverse... " [N7, O, insurance policy maker]. 
Addressing the general problem of weak cooperation in Iran, an experienced policy maker 
blamed the split and branded it a barrier to proper implementation: 
"As a minister who has been working with a number of prime ministers and 
presidents, I was always against the efforts to separate welfare and insurance 
affairs from the MOH. The recently established MWSS was proposed several times 
in Mr. X's era (PM 1982-1989). I objected the proposal, not because I was 
centralized or selfish, but I knew the weak inter-organizational cooperation in our 
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country... honestly, if I become president one day, I would reduce the number of 
ministries... the more ministries we have, the worse service we deliver... I have 
seen no positive impact of this (separation). If we had a right system and proper 
administration, different organizations could monitor each other activities... the only 
result [for separation] is stopping or slowing progress... if I was the minister [of 
health], I would merge the MWSS into the MOH ... 
" [N9, O, senior health official]. 
The second aspect of the lack of coordination was the referral and gate-keeping role of 
family doctors. Some mentioned that there was no defined referral cycle in place with 
specialist doctors and hospitals not prepared to accommodate the referred cases: 
"The current big challenge is the lack of coordination with second level (of referral) 
practitioners, most of whom do not provide feedback for FDs. As long as patients 
queue behind specialist clinics, and insurance companies immediately reimburse 
them in cash, why should specialists cooperate... "[N10, PU, PR, national team for 
reform]. 
Although specialists were contracted to accept referrals, their relationship with family 
doctors was not coordinated: 
"... specialist have been identified and contracted, but not in a coordinated manner. 
There is no organic relationship between FDs and specialist to exchange 
feedback... " [N 1 1, PR, senior health manager]. 
Referral to secondary and tertiary care was difficult due to the lack of specialists in many 
towns, transport difficulties and lack of a defined pathway for referral: 
"... there is not a coordinated referral system in many cities for referred villagers... 
many patients are asked in hospitals to pay, or their Behbar log-books are refused 
(despite contract)... many cities have no specialist. People have to commute to 
other cities across the provinces or even to neighbouring provinces to seek their 
needs... " [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
Some patients were confused and dissatisfied, mainly because of the lack of coordination 
with secondary care: 
"... my father needed a prostate surgery. The FD referred him to a SSO hospital. 
They kept him waiting for long and told us there was no more appointment left in 
that hospital, however he might be admitted in a private clinic. They also asked for 
100,000TM extra (normally such operations cost 20,000TM for patients with a 
Behbar log-book), on top of the expenses, as the surgeon fee. They refused to do 
the operation if the money was not paid... " [L 1.8, villager]. 
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Even senior managers in the MOH accused the current referral pathway of promoting 
treatment rather than health: 
"... this referral trajectory mostly promotes treatment not health, by referring patient 
to a doctor who just cures. Apart from a letter of introduction, no relationship is 
established between FDs and specialists. The referral itinerary has not been 
organically designed to employ feedbacks for improving FDs' knowledge about 
necessary future follow ups... " [N12, PR, senior health official]. 
People were also not clear about the requirements of referral, and were either annoying 
doctors with their irrational requests or insulting them: 
"On average, / refer 15-20% of my patients. To be honest, / do not know myself 
why / refer some of them, whom I do not visit and their relatives push me for 
referral. Many times a man comes along with his wife's log-book in hand, asking for 
referral to a gynaecologist. Elderly or kids are other examples... / resisted doing so 
in the beginning, but I was insulted many times. / do not argue with people any 
more... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Lack of public explanation about the necessities of referral had two side effects: a high 
proportion of referrals and retrospective referrals (being visited by a specialist first and 
visiting FD next, just to get the insurance log-book stamped to enjoy the financial benefits 
of Behbar), each of which was endangering gate-keeping: 
11... the high rate of referral to secondary care was a big problem within first months 
until we considered its percentage in evaluating doctors' performance... 
[P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Retrospective referral was accepted in the early stages in order to respond public 
expectations, which turned out in lowering specialists' trust in the referral system: 
"We are not permitted to prescribe for patients who have not been referred (by 
FDs) nor do anything else with the Behbar tariff, however, this system is flexible 
enough to authorize whatever people want (even by breaching principles of gate- 
keeping). They come and see us first. When we tell them that we are not permitted 
to prescribe without being referred by a FD, they go back to their village, get their 
log-books stamped and come back to us again... " [P5, O, provincial union manager]. 
Some patients set up appointments with surgeons before visiting the FDs and then argued 
with the FDs who resisted stamping their log-books. Doctors were angry, seeing their 
dignity and authenticity under threat. Unfortunately, the higher officials did not support FDs 
to perform proper gate-keeping in such occasions: 
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"... the MIO has damaged our reputation before the public by its dual standard. It 
makes contracts with specialists and give log-books to the public on one hand, 
while family doctors are forced not to refer more than 10% of cases ... 
" 
[L4.2, FD, family doctor]. 
Senior officials tried to legitimize their overlooking referral bypass so as to retain MPs' 
political support: 
"By law, we are not allowed to accept retrospective referrals, although we are 
politically obliged to do so to prevent villagers complaining to their MPs that might 
end up in their lack of support and failure of implementation... " [N15, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
Given their preference for specialists, the public interpreted FM as a voucher to visit 
specialists cheaply. They also had other excuses for bypassing referral including lack of 
drugs, long waiting time, etc: 
"... the lack of drug is the reason that forces people to go to cities (visiting 
specialists) first. Sometimes they have to waste half of the day to get their drugs, 
because the village pharmacy does not have many prescribed drugs" [L6.8, imam]. 
In addition, specialists themselves were accused of inducing retrospective referral: 
"... specialists are our big challenge. Not only do they not provide feedback, but 
they also facilitate retrospective referral, which raises patients' expectations and 
challenges the FD's relationship with upper levels. They teach patients to do so, 
assuming our FDs are secretaries... "[L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
2.4 Lack of trust 
It was difficult to identify whether individuals did not trust each other because of the 
system, or lack of cooperation led people to lose their trust in each other. Lack of trust 
harmed cooperation and was apparent even at the highest levels of policy makers: 
"The MOH's proposal to the SSO, the MIO and other insurers for monetary 
integration was refused because of serious doubts about the correct spending ... for 
example, the cabinet decided to implement a referral system in Bam [southern city] 
in 2003, following a very destructive earthquake. The SSO paid 500millionTM in 
response to the government request. Not only the programme was not 
implemented, but also the SSO lost premiums for its own insured clients there. 
How could the SSO trust in the other MOH's plans anymore?... " [N7, O, senior 
insurance policy maker]. 
200 
Furthermore, lack of trust between the two implementers delayed the macro level 
agreements, which ended in wage arrears: 
"... we did not reach an agreement between the two ministries, because of not 
recognizing the other side position. Our different interpretation from the MOH, 
affected the operational phase... " [N15, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
In 2007, the annual cooperation agreement between the two ministers was not signed until 
month seven of the new Persian year. Finally, a vague and confusing agreement was 
signed by their deputies. In 2008, six month into the New Year, the contract had not been 
signed. Reaching agreement has been difficult because of the contradictory goals by the 
two implementers: 
"It was hard to get the signature of both ministers [of health and welfare] for a 
common document. Sometimes we spent a night at a ministers' home arguing the 
quarrel issues. Some agreements were finalized at 4.00am ... 
" [N1, PR, former 
senior health official]. 
Lack of trust was not restricted to governmental bodies. Doctors also did not trust the 
government and its plans. The reason was the ongoing loss of status, despite their 
expectation to revitalize it in FM: 
"... 1 do not trust either the current or the former government. Doctors are 
intellectuals who act as leaders and prophets of health. They deserve more merit. 
Look at football players, many of whom are illiterate, but are significantly more 
respectful... if health is their (the MOH's) desire and they understand doctors' role, 
why don't they allocate a small portion of the budget for promoting sport 
championships to practitioners' well being?... " [L6.9, FD, family doctor]. 
They did not trust the government because of their working conditions: 
"If the government is honest to support FM, why it considers no security and basic 
welfare forme as the service provider? ... I do not expect a big bang. If they leave 
everyone alone, people could manage themselves. I do not want their sympathy 
which puts everyone in trouble... " [LI. 2, FD, family doctor]. 
Some doctors even accused the government of intentionally diminishing their dignity: 
"... 1 think this policy was introduced to diminish doctors' position (with emphasis). 
This is done intentionally. . . the whole society is corrupted, but the embezzlement in health [DOH and MOH] is the worst... "[L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
The MOH officials and the MPs as legislators were accused and hated therefore: 
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"... what the government is doing is just a mistake, tell the minister (of health) on my 
behalf. I do not know why doctor MPs are there? Are they qualified enough?.. . the 
deputy of health is determined to keep doctors' blood into the bottle-these people 
want to make us as bakers... " [L3.3, FD, family doctor]. 
The MIO and the MWSS were not separately addressed here, because they were not in a 
direct relationship with practitioners. It was also not clear for many that they had recently 
been separated. 
2.5 Lack of advocacy 
Lack of cooperation deprived the policy of effective advocacy. Even the national senior 
officials recognized the lack of advocacy by local practitioners: 
"... we presented the policy only to one level of staff in four selected provinces. The 
chancellors of universities, even their deputies other than health in (medical) 
universities were not engaged, let alone the practitioners. That is why; they did not 
consider the programme as their own property... " [N11, PR, senior health manager]. 
The DOH in Golestan tried to involve influential managers: 
"... attempting to sensitize the public, we put FM at the top of the agenda in the 
university (Golestan) Board meeting. We also discussed the issue in the committee 
of health before the provincial governor and senior provincial managers. We used 
all chances to promote the policy for influential people... " [P1, PR, provincial health 
manager]. 
However, the effectiveness of such initiatives was poor with a lack of even a basic 
understanding of the policy and awareness of implementation. The chancellors of medical 
universities, even in the four selected provinces for pilot studies, were not aware of FM 
prior to implementation: 
"I was not aware of FM at all. If they had told me, my advice was to start 
implementation from cities [rather than villages]... " [P3, GMU, senior provincial 
health manager]. 
The university chancellors were reluctant about FM, which irritated the national officials: 
"... yet, universities have not accepted the implementation (of FM) as a task which 
must be undertaken. They do not believe in FM so are reluctant to contribute to this 
revolution. Some look at FM as the money to relief their shortages... " 
[N2, PR, senior health official]. 
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Better advocacy was going on at the local level. Some villages had established a 
committee for FM to encourage the public and their influential delegates: 
"We established a committee by inviting trustees since implementation started... 
the Islamic Council of the Village was very cooperative... we facilitated the 
registration phase by undertaking administrative jobs ourselves... " [L1.6, councillor). 
District managers were positive about the function of such councils: 
"... we have a close relationship with the Islamic council of the villages which links 
us to the public. Their meetings, which are held in mosques, make us accessible to 
the public. "[L6.1, DA, district health manager]. 
The locations of meetings were mosques on many occasions, which was helpful in 
building a close relationship. Given public religious beliefs, gaining the support of people in 
mosques, particularly when Imams who had spiritual influence, encouraged the public. For 
instance, Imams' emphasis motivated many households to register in the scheme: 
"... 1 was asked to encourage people to register with Behbar. / did so on one of the 
Friday prayers, which rushed folks towards the health centre... " [L4.9, imam]. 
2.6 Lack of coalitions 
As a result of the lack of collaboration, advocacy, and the aforementioned individualism 
which lowered cooperation, no real coalition was established to promote implementation. 
Gaining stakeholders support for the policy was not that successful: 
"... it took three years to convince some policy makers and legislators to listen to 
us; it was not promising after all... "[N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Forming coalitions was difficult because of key people's opposition to the policy: 
"... among people whom you [the researcher] might have interviewed, many key 
actors are essentially against FM. I might use the media to challenge them, but we 
have not established a real coalition because of key people fight. We were minority 
In FM, but the majority of powerful stakeholders are against the policy, despite their 
oral agreement. .. "[N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Even though most interviewees approved the FM policy, this person who has been 
working closely with many of the other interviewees for a long time recognised their 
disagreement. It was difficult to consider this as deviant for three reasons. First, position, 
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knowledge and character of the interviewee, who was fully aware of many confidential 
issues. Second, the messy reality of implementation because of mismanagement. And 
third, not only was no real coalition formed, but actually the degree of cooperation, even 
between the main custodians like the Deputy of Health, was too low to allow the formation 
of further coalitions consisting of journalists, social activist, MPs, etc: 
"... if the implementation is serious, the highest manager must replace whoever in 
the MOH, the MWSS, or the MIO that is not in line with the reform with someone 
who agrees with FM and its strategy... " [N10, PU, PR, national team for reform]. 
In such a fragile situation, the opponents' coalition to slow down the implementation was 
easily formed: 
"... some believe that FM is not doable in Iran. In our last meeting, because / knew 
that some people were certain to diminish FM, I even challenged a key member of 
the executive team who believed that FM cannot grow in Iran at all. I warned him 
that it is such hypocritical approaches to FM that has prevented its execution so 
far... " [N 13, PU, senior insurance director]. 
Opponent coalitions tried to discourage MPs about the reform: 
"... we are still worried that parliament stops supporting the reform. Some united 
opponents are lobbying MPs, warning them that by implementing FM their wives 
must visit a GP for gynaecologic complaints, or their kids will be only visited by a 
GP which avoids them from appropriate... " [N15, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Opponents emotionalized MPs by stressing the limits of rationing, particularly for children 
and women. Therefore, the referral strategy with its underlying rationing nature was the 
subject of argument, not the FM policy. 
Nevertheless, implementation benefited from effective policy brokering in parliament 
between the implementers: 
"... within the last two years, a number of meetings were held by parliamentary 
commission of health to mediate arguments between the MOH and the MWSS. 
There have always been misinterpretations about who is responsible for what, etc. 
In addition to being prominent in financing the reform, commission of health has 
interfered many times to bridge the implement ers' gap...... "[N3, MP, member of 
parliament]. 
The majority of interviewees verified the facilitating role of the parliament in policy 
brokering. 
204 
3 Political management of implementation 
Political management of the implementation is considered in this section under four 
headings: politicisation of the reform; governmental support; centralization; and rushed 
implementation. Predictably, political features of the reform were mainly addressed by the 
national interviewees and to a lesser extent by regional managers. Villagers and their 
representatives were almost unaware of the politics behind the health system and this 
particular reform. 
3.1 Politicisation of the reform 
Almost all national interviewees considered the reform highly political. Some felt politics 
was the start and the end of everything in Iran: 
`... this country is the place of political considerations. The only goal of everything is 
political interest. For instance, if labour unions realize they could promote their 
requests by blowing into the referral trumpet, they would so, otherwise, they 
diminish it... "[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Political considerations resulted in the vicious circle of ideological preference and waste of 
resources: 
"... sad to say, because changes are very political in our country, their effects are 
diverse and significant. It resembles a computer that loses its entire memory, all 
data must be re-entered... " [N4, PR, national team for report]. 
Personal political views influenced the appointment of managers, rather than their 
competence: 
"... in our country there is not the structure that determines outcomes, but rather 
individuals' personal benefit is more important. Positions are defined for particular 
persons in Iran, rather than qualifying people to get positions... an organization is 
established to accommodate a person because of political benefits... " 
[N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Side effects of such an approach have been many. The most paralysing one for FM was 
managers with multiple jobs, which ran short of time to lead the task: 
"... the head of the office for reform [in the MOH) is Dr. X. If you could see him 
once, convey my regards to him! The first secretary to the office is Dr. Y who is the 
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manager of... in Z [another country]. How could such (busy) individuals handle the 
reform? ... 
"[N 13, PU, senior insurance official]. 
Political preferences to appoint managers resulted in job insecurity, which turned out as 
the main reason for demanding multiple jobs: 
"... many people have multiple jobs because of insecurity. In case they lose one, 
they might survive with another... " [N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
The inevitable result of multiple positions was depriving others and threatening 
meritocracy: 
"/ believe in FM, but I think it is being improperly implemented, because suitable 
people are not in the right positions to run it... more deserving people do not run 
things, because of political reasons... management is not difficult if the most foolish 
persons are not appointed as mangers... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
FM was branded as a field for political game. The policy was seen as fulfilling the interests 
of politicians, rather than the public benefits: 
"Our politicians ride on the public's vote to abuse power. They set long-term 
benefits of the public aside to fulfil their own short-tem goals... long-run advantages 
of the public are sacrificed to buy their short-term satisfaction... " [N5, PU. senior 
insurance policy maker]. 
3.2 Governmental support 
The concurrent implementation with Behbar was seen as being in line with the strategic 
aim of the Islamic revolution: prioritizing service delivery for rural and deprived areas: 
"... almost 25% of our population live in rural areas, providing services to them is 
more difficult than their urban counterparts. However, serving the poor in whatever 
possible way has been a strategic motto of the Islamic Republic in the last 29 
years. We used this benefit to attract stakeholders support... "[N1, PR, former senior 
health official]. 
Revolutionary beliefs and justice ideals assisted in building the policy and promoted the 
idea of using the PHC as media of services. Such ideological views were so strong, 
opponents were branded neo-liberal or neo-classic, both with negative political overtones: 
"... FM is conforming to the justice ideals of the Islamic Republic. For instance, the PHC success was mainly because of specific features of the revolution. Otherwise, 
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it would be impossible to hold a system, in which a Behvarz was in charge of 70% 
of doctor's job... passionate followers of the revolution would love such a system 
[FMj, because of the possibility of fulfilling one of its main aims: equality... 
otherwise, they did not support policies which are rooted in neo-classic and neo- 
liberal movements... " [N4, PR. senior member of national team for reform]. 
Key policy makers explained how they manipulated justice to promote the policy: 
"In developing countries with lack of defined standards, many things rely on 
individuals. We were riding on the wave of justice and accessibility and availability 
of services, through which we brought stakeholders in line with the plan... social 
justice as the strategic motto of the revolution was matched with FM... " 
[N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
The parliament supported the implementation in different ways, in addition to approving 
the budget for FM. Its support was consistently acknowledged as essential to start and run 
the implementation. The Commission for Health in the 7`h parliament had an extraordinary 
facilitating role: 
"... the political commitment of parliament moved and assisted us a lot.. having a 
bullion, you are able to walk. Otherwise, , power, management, and knowledge are 
useless... " [N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
Implementation started in a transitional period of power hand over from a reformist to a 
ultra-conservative government. The new government was seen as supportive. Social 
equality was mentioned as the main priority by the new president, whose administration 
inherited the implementation: 
"... the president believes in social equality a lot. Even though I did not vote for him, 
I am happy he was elected because of prioritizing justice... all presidents have 
been emphasizing equality, but it is a core for Ahmadinejad" [N9,0, senior policy 
maker]. 
Interestingly, the president himself was cited in most quotations, rather than the relevant 
organizations: 
"... taking into the account the president's concentration on health and treatment 
issues, if we provide a good plan for the reform, we would get his support" 
[N8, O, senior finance official]. 
The new government's focus on health was also addressed by the regional managers: 
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'... improving health facilities was the main focus in the cabinet provincial trips. 
15billionTM was spent for equipping hospitals in our province ..... 
[P8, O. senior 
provincial stakeholder]. 
Nevertheless, although their perception of political support was somewhat inconsistent, the 
interviewees addressed the lack of governmental commitment in critical situations. The 
political system was accused of not properly supporting the policy. Even members of the 
cabinet accused the government of not prioritizing health: 
"... health has never been the government priority. You see nothing about health in 
their reports and proposals... " [N 14, PR, seniorformer health official]. 
Senior officials were accused of not supporting managers to overcome barriers: 
"We suffer from the lack of authority in this implementation. It is very important that 
managers know they are spiritually supported by senior people. In a big 
programme like FM, shifting the scope from organization to the nation would 
restrict the opposition and strengthen the implementation... "[N15, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
Policy makers were accused of not supporting FM as a national priority, due to which the 
essential cooperation at local level was difficult to achieve: 
"Lieutenant- governors or district authorities must officially instruct village 
councillors to undertake their defined responsibilities in FM. Councillors are not 
linked to the health system, which makes us unable to force them to undertake 
their relevant tasks... such agreements must be held in upper levels... " 
[L2.2, DA, district health expert]. 
As a shortcut to prioritizing the reform for the current government, the minister of health 
was seen as so trustworthy and close to the president that his influence could attract the 
presidential support: 
The minister [of health] must promote the intention of the health sector reform from 
a small cycle within the ministry, to a national firm purpose. His close tie to the 
president would be facilitating this ... " [N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
The fact that the new government did not improve the implementation was interpreted as 
its unwillingness, in addition to its lack of expertise and knowledge: 
My experience after 18 months of working in this government is that they are not afraid of making surprises over a night. They are stupidly that obstinate to suddenly 
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make a decision... the problem is that they do not believe in the policy ... " [N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
The new government inherited a policy which was not likely to be its priority. Governmental 
change had two consequences: accusations and change of personnel. 
First, although the newly appointed minister of health confirmed from the very beginning 
that FM would be the priority for the MOH, in practice the MOH did not enact such a 
prioritization: 
"... a president comes to power with new sets of priorities and employees, believing 
the formers have been totally wrong. Immediately after governmental change, they 
started telling people that the formers were bad and corrupted. Again a cycle is 
started from scratch. FM is one of those programmes which will be heading 
towards such a (sad) destination... " [L6.4, FD, family doctor]. 
The governmental change put aside many things from the past for political reasons: 
"... in the very early days of the minister [of health], I asked him not to replace a 
couple of capable experts because of political reasons. I begged him not to exclude 
three out of five people who know FFCI, because of politics... " [N17, PR, national 
health expert]. 
Such illogical replacements were even cited by the current policy makers in office: 
"... we have shamelessly put the 4th plan (for development) aside. It is dead in 
reality. I am sure, if the current government (conservative) is replaced by 
reformists, there would be no change! I think our politicians do not make decisions 
for long-run macro benefits of the country... we spend our resources for accusing 
each other because of political directions and fulfilling personal benefits... " 
[N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Second, changing the majority of managers and policy-makers by the new government 
blunted the recently started implementation: 
"Although current officials were theoretically willing to implement this reform, it 
stopped for a while. Chancellors of universities, managers and policy makers who 
had been trained many years for that were replaced over a night... " 
[N4, PR, national team for reform]. 
Worse still, trained managers were replaced with incapable people, which resulted in 
raising the resistance to change and stopped the implementation on occasion: 
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"... changes which were due to political reasons blunted the implementation. FM 
opponents of FM took the office in some universities, which flared up resistances to 
the reform. It took at least 6-7 months to get back to the starting point. Appointing 
incapable managers imposed serious doubts about the entire reform and 
irreversibly damaged implementation... " [N1 0, PR, national team for report]. 
There were serious concerns about the capability of new personnel: 
"... both Dr. X and Dr. Y [the former and current ministers of health] are passionate 
and committed to the reform, but Dr. X's performance was better. He appointed 
alert managers who were familiar with the country. His deputies, particularly the 
person in charge of the reform was the chancellor of a big university beforehand 
with decades of experience in FM. I pay respect to newcomers, but they severely 
suffer from lack of such knowledge and insight. It will take years for them to 
understand what is going on. I doubt we go significantly further... newcomers 
themselves are not guilty. If they had grown up in the (health) system, they might 
perform better... "[N9, O, senior national policy maker]. 
This quotation illustrates the capability of new managers, judged by a neutral third party. 
As a high level and experienced trustee, he belonged to the party of the new government. 
His insight about the structure of the MOH suggested that his concerns were well- 
informed. 
Worse still, the position of the MWSS, the ministry which was established in 2002 mainly 
to facilitate reforms such as FM was unsustainable. In 2006, in the period that crucial 
decisions were being made, some MPs were debating the dissolution of the new ministry: 
"... the recently established MWSS was subject of continuous changes and threats, 
which prohibited us to reach a concrete policy. It is necessary that the MWSS is 
granted the authority to defend its position against parliament... " [N1 5, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
Unsustainably of the MWSS arose because of the appointment of a minister who was 
biased towards FM. The former MP and the Head of Commission for Social Affairs viewed 
FM as a courtesy of parliament to serve the poor: 
"... in fact, the parliament did a favour for villagers by diverting money to Behbar. 
The MOH is not allowed to tell us how we should spend this money. .. " [Interview with local newspaper, 22.04.2007]. 
The MIO also underwent substantial managerial change with incompetent newcomers, 
even at lower levels: 
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11... political change was an earthquake with massive changes at even subordinate 
levels... The majority of trained managers were substituted by people who were 
blind in many aspects. e. g. Dr. X [former head of national office for health sector 
reform] was replaced by the one you know!. Dr. X has become familiar with A to Z 
of FM within last 5 years... "[N8, O, senior finance official]. 
At the early stages, the former minister was side-lined along with many premiers, whose 
expertise and experience had contributed to the design and development of the reform. 
They were not even invited for part-time consultation. Even experts in the MOH whose 
expertise and knowledge were unique in some respects were not consulted: 
"How many guys like Dr. C [an experienced consultant in the MOH] in this country 
know the PHC and the requirement of FM? Why they were side-lined? " 
[L5.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Appointing personnel who were not fit for their job diverted the implementation from its 
right direction: 
"... the most important facilitator that we lost was our human resources in whom we 
had invested a lot and side-lined them once we started to implement... " 
[N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Such an exemplification by a senior policymaker, who was still in office, explicitly portrayed 
the extent to which the implementation was harmed by the changes in management. The 
newly appointed officers were accused of lack of understanding and vision: 
'I sit on Dr. X's place who was a strong policymaker and strategist. Willing or not, I 
am compelled to repeat his words, even I do not know much... " 
[NIO, PU, PR, national team for report]. 
Some mentioned that the extent to which implementation was adversely affected by 
unsuitable managerial changes was significant enough to endanger the future of the 
concept of FM: 
"Given the situation, such changes [managerial] will have no result but failure. 
Once a policy is defeated in this country, it would be extremely difficult to revitalize 
it... if it gets rejected in parliament, many years must be passed for reconsideration. 
... If FM 
is implemented as weakly as this, its natural essence is gradually faded, 
which leads to its termination. If so, any time you want to raise FM, you are 
accused of moving a corpse.... " [N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
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3.3 Lack of decentralization 
Provincial managers had some freedom to make decisions: 
"... many issues had not been mentioned in the policy, for which we decided 
ourselves... " [P2, PR, provincial manager]. 
The provincial MIOs were also more decentralized than the DOH. They could make many 
decisions without the centre's approval: 
"We just defined some general issues and gave full power of attorney to our 
provincial managers, as the representatives of the minister of welfare in the 
province. We undertook decentralization in performance, due to which the private 
sector was prioritized to deliver services in some provinces... " [N16, PU, former 
senior insurance director]. 
Compared to other provinces, the DOH in Golestan provided more authorization to district 
authorities to decide about operational matters: 
.. Our (health) 
district authorities have full power to purchase their needed drugs. 
Massive drug warehouses in the centre of province have moved to small district 
places... " [P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
However, the lack of decentralization blunted implementation. The diversity of authority 
delegated to district managers was seen as inappropriate: 
"District authorities highly depend on the centre. In fact, we have not managed 
them towards appropriate decentralization and they do not know their authority. 
Therefore, some managers do whatever they want, because of their bravery and 
personal experience, whereas others make no difference because of their low- 
profile personality... " [N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Lack of authority caused regional managers to bypass the centre and make decisions on 
their own to move the implementation forward. Implementation therefore was patchy 
across the country, depending on how far the province was in decentralization: 
"Up to now [month nine of the year], no agreement has been signed at high levels. 
Within the last couple of months, I have visited many other provinces, many of 
whom act provincially and do not wait for the national level [to make decisions]. 
Either in the MIOs or the DOHs across provinces, colleagues are far ahead of the 
centre. This cooperation is correlated to how close the heads of MIO and DOH are 
in the province. Provinces show significant differences in this regard ... 
" 
[P4, provincial health manager]. 
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The MIO had a better performance in decentralization of its local branches. The MOH was 
also moving towards decentralization. However, its success relied highly on individuals, 
either university officials or junior managers in the health districts. In Golestan, 
implementation was patchy across the eleven health districts. 
3.4 Rushed implementation 
Despite plans to pilot the policy in four selected provinces, the rushed universal 
implementation of FM was started in the transitional period during the change of 
governments. The political decisions pushed Behbar to be piloted nationwide, despite the 
lack of preparation: 
"The implementation was done slightly precipitately, although the infrastructure was 
not prepared. We must have piloted it in some provinces beforehand, however, it 
was a good flick overall. Even flawed, it was better that we did it. If we had waited 
to do it perfectly, there was no guarantee to ever start implementation... 
[P3, GMU, senior provincial health manager]. 
The political decision to start the implementation in a rush, due to which the pilot studies 
were aborted, was identified as the main reason for many shortages including lack of 
training and logistics: 
"... we entered a national programme without piloting at the local levels.. . we started a huge and costly programme recklessly... we could use the pilot studies to define 
criteria for audit and to understand the public requests... team members could be 
also trained about fieldwork... " [N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Key managers stated that because of the rush, they were not able to prepare well: 
"... we insisted on implementing this reform. The government was being replaced 
and we knew if we did not fix it, it will not be implemented at all... our emphasis 
was recruitment of personnel as soon as possible... we had no time to work on 
many aspects. .. "[N1, PR, former senior health official]. 
Frequent changes to the policy and the harm it caused (Chapter 6) could have been 
avoided by conducting the pilot implementation: 
"If I was leading the reform, I would have run a pilot before the entire 
implementation to avoid so many versions (of policy act" [L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
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Nevertheless, the rushed implementation was branded as inevitable to ensure FM went 
ahead: 
"... the government was changing. We were worried if we did not begin to 
implement, it was implemented at all... if we had not settled doctors in villages, 
parliament would not have approved the budget for coming years... "[N1, PR, former 
senior health official]. 
Starting implementation in the last days of the former government was strongly defended. 
The rushed implementation was described as necessary to secure the position of the 
entire reform: 
.. 
by law, if a budget is not spent in due time, it is returned to the pooling system, 
which prohibits allocating it for the coming year ... if we had waited more, the 
parliament did not approve the requested money for the next year. Whereas, by 
settling doctors in villages, MPs understood that we are serious in implementing 
the reform... "[N14, PR, former senior health official]. 
4 Communication 
Interviewees raised three aspects of communication which affected implementation: 
feedback and dealing with it; communication among individuals; and the mass media. 
4.1 Lack of feedback from the periphery 
There was no structured mechanism for the centre to receive feedback from the periphery: 
"... we randomly get letters from different practitioners who complain about 
implementation. There is not a system to take feedbacks either from practitioners 
or the public.. . our attempts to establish an office to handle this has not 
succeeded.... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
The MIO and the DOH in Golestan considered some mechanisms in place to keep in 
touch with the periphery: 
"... in the first six months [of implementation] we did not have an effective method to 
take opinions from periphery. We gradually established a committee, attended by 
heads of district health authorities [eleven of those in Golestan], head of the district 
MIO and representative of the head of the provincial MIO. They monitor 
implementation and provide me with direct feedback... " [P2, PU, provincial 
manager]. 
The GDOH had also prepared a problem list on the basis of practitioners' surveys: 
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"... we sent a questionnaire to all peripheral people in sealed envelopes, asking 
about practitioners' difficulties and shortages... despite my expectation to mostly 
receive personal problems, a long problem list of mainly process challenges was 
prepared... " [P1 PR, provincial 
health manager]. 
Results of such surveys and audits were accordingly dealt with to improve implementation, 
either by the MIO and/or the DOH, and passed to higher levels: 
"We categorized the problem lists for different groups of recipients. Some issues 
were in the authority of national managers. A few problems could be sorted out at 
the provincial level and Board of the university... some concerns might be easily 
dealt with through a wider approach to the policy. We authorized district managers 
to be less conservative and go ahead [to solve those]... " [P4, provincial health 
manager]. 
The MIO in Golestan more or less followed the same process to deal with feedback: 
"We have a monitoring office in the MIO which immediately reacts [to feedbacks] 
by commissioning a delegate to the field. Feedback sometimes has resulted in 
changes, but there are some issues which are beyond our authority and we ask for 
information on them.. . our system has got the ISO standards. Our corrective 
actions are both preventive and improving ... 
"[P2, PU, provincial manager]. 
Other stakeholders such as the GPA had prepared problem lists on the basis of doctors' 
letters and correspondence from the entire country: 
"... our colleagues [GPs] have been criticizing the implementation for its structure, 
contracts and content. We have categorized and reflected those to relevant bodies 
for proper action... "[N6, O, national union manager]. 
Public representatives held informal sessions with people to make the public aware of the 
reform. However, they were disappointed because of the lack of response to such 
feedback: 
"... we conveyed the results of our several meetings with public to the officials. They 
were pleased to hear our arguments, however, nothing changed... " [Li. 7, villager]. 
In early 2007, the national PEHP set up a biweekly forum, attended by the representatives 
of selected universities (four or five universities in each session) including the chancellor, 
the deputy for health, the head of PEHP and other managers. Day long meetings were 
held at the office of the DOH in Tehran, by invitation and in the presence of the DOH, as 
well as other national senior managers and experts. I attended one of the meetings in late 
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December 2007, which took nine hours, within which every single university presented its 
performance in implementation, while it was being criticized and ranked by central experts. 
Universities which could not assure the judges of proper performance failed the session. 
They were granted a certain time period to compensate their shortages and address the 
forum about their improvements. The overall feeling was that such forums provided 
constructive feedback, as well as an opportunity to learn from each other. The MIO did not 
attend the forum. I could not detect any study, survey, or forum, even in Golestan, within 
which the public or their delegates kept officials posted about their feedback. 
4.2 Communication among individuals 
The low amount of information was not appropriate for creating suitable ways of 
communication among individuals. Practitioners were not kept informed: 
"... we try our best to keep practitioners in the loop by transferring them (orally) the 
tiny amount of information that we get... " [P4, provincial health manager). 
Ironically, practitioners were reprimanded of not keeping the authorities informed, even on 
the administrative correspondence from the centre: 
"... / did not expect to see my correspondence, in which / had requested 
equipment, in the bin. I was shocked when I saw bunches of letters abandoned in 
the file... sometimes auditors grill us because of unawareness, while the [health 
centre] manager does not keep us informed... " [L4.6, nurse]. 
Flow of information was so slow that even some alert practitioners were unaware of what 
FM was supposed to provide. They mixed up the duties of other protocols [which were 
being piloted in their centres] with FM, simply due to lack of explanation from central and 
regional levels: 
"... FM has not changed our responsibilities, but because of being the pilot [she 
meant other protocols than FM which was accidentally introduced to the system 
with FM], the sensitivity has been increased... " [Li. 4, midwife]. 
There was no defined communication other than unofficial and incidental links between the 
managers and practitioners and among practitioners themselves. Therefore, they could not 
share their experience and systematically assist each other in implementation: 
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"... sometimes we contact our neighbouring provinces. They also occasionally ask 
us about payment mechanisms... there are only five provinces in the national 
committee... " [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
The MIO was more organized in creating the opportunity for communication and 
interaction, at least at the senior level: 
"We have regular seasonal meetings between senior managers from around the 
country, which are rotationally hosted by provinces. Those sessions are a good 
chance to share information and visit health centres in the host province, which has 
been very constructive in making us aware of implementation ..... [P2, PU, provincial 
manager]. 
4.3 The mass media 
There was a consensus that the mass media, particularly the Iranian national TV (IRIB), 
had not been efficiently used to promote the reform. In fact, the main media were never a 
member of the coalition, despite its effective previous roles in promoting health: 
"The media has done little for this reform, despite the IRIB's extraordinary role. Its 
influence was amazing in my era and / am indebted to the media for most of my 
success. The core of any health sector reform is bringing people in line with health, 
without which we reach nowhere. I was successful (in implementing the PHC) 
because it (the IRIB) was my microphone... The system does not vaccinate people; 
rather the public's insight vaccinates them. They actually demand services, rather 
than being forced to accept change... "[N9, O, senior health policy maker]. 
Some described the media as destructive and subject to political exploitation: 
"The mass media has done nothing (in the reform). We do not have good media in 
this country. All media are publicly owned, conservative to criticize wrong issues... 
in fact, the media in Iran is used to push crow-bar of the MWSS on the MOH and 
vice versa. None of us has used it in favour of implementing the reform... to 
introduce FM to the public, I have even asked the MOH to produce video clips such 
as the ones for improving the energy consumption or safe driving, but no 
reaction... " [N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Video clips to promote good driving which were broadcasted on the IRIB on the order of 
the police were seen as an efficient means of training. Lack of media engagement harmed 
the implementation because mostly negative views towards the policy were broadcasted: 
"... because we did not engage with them, the media has acted more as a barrier by broadcasting the opposite views more than the positive ones... " [N8, O, senior financial officer ]. 
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Some examples of such negative effects were mentioned: 
"... i watched an interview on TV in which a famous heart surgeon was incidentally 
asked to talk about FM. He illogically criticized the policy with no reason and in 
absence of anyone to debate with him. Even if unintentional, such events destroy 
FM in the society... " [N10, PU, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
Even on the few occasions that FM was covered on the IRIB, it was assessed as 
inappropriate and worried the public: 
"... talking to people has its own language. A brief talk about insurance on a TV 
episode has no benefit than making people worried about their uninsured children. 
People are attracted by talking about things which are their cup of tea, such as 
their health situation or how losing weight, etc,... " [N7, O, senior insurance official]. 
Print media were also consistently criticized of not contributing toward implementation. I 
could not find any particular article in magazines or newspapers about FM, except a few 
critiques in the IMA seasonal journal which addressed the lack of implementers' 
knowledge and the rushed implementation. The journal was exclusively distributed among 
doctors. Calling FDs as "doctor of the village", it made doctors angry as they felt that the 
IMA looked down at family doctors. 
Many officials felt that implementers had failed to approach the media to promote the 
reform: 
"... We are guilty of not establishing a proper relationship with the media, thus they 
are unconsciously endangering implementation... we are certain if we correctly 
address them, they would defend the policy because they would presumably 
understand that if their children want to live in this country, there is no other way 
[than rationing services]... "[N4, PR, senior member of national team for reform]. 
The mass media approached the reform in a negative way, so it could not prepare people 
for implementation: 
"... because the media was not aware of the policy, it could not play a positive role. 
I think the media reflected more on critiques. Traditionally, we Iranians highlight 
defects rather than successes... (he made an example of how a movie promoted 
position of a relief organization in the society)... I think if FM had been explained 
[by the media] to the public, we had a less stressful job... they have seen mainly 
the empty half of the glass, either the IRIB or newspapers... " [NI5, PU, senior 
insurance manager]. 
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In addition, policy makers and implementers got frustrated by witnessing that only failures 
were reflected on the media: 
"... although the media has not been a barrier, it forced us to respond many 
criticisms that made us exhausted. Sometimes it led to our unwise decisions, 
inappropriate reaction, or resignation due to increasing pressure... " [N11, PR, senior 
health official]. 
Worse still, policymakers were cautious in interacting with the media, for fear of losing their 
position to political rivals: 
"... our presence on the media has not been appropriate. The huge managerial 
replacements made us conservative to do so... "[N16, PU, former insurance 
maanger]. 
Some interviewees pointed out that even a slight presence of FM on media was mostly 
commercial, not for educating the public: 
"... even the rare occasions of FM appearance on the IRIB have been the 
advertisement impulse and show off to promote some policymakers, rather than 
attempts to increase public's awareness... if it is going to be training, it should be 
continuous, starting from and ending in a certain point... I suppose if FM is going to 
be established throughout the society, the public must be continuously trained by 
the media, similar to what we did for the PHC ... "[NI7, PR, senior health expert]. 
Furthermore, the media was accused of being dominated by specialists, who endangered 
rationing and FM: 
"... I am a higher specialist myself. Instead of promoting FM, the IRIB has been 
promoting the specialties and higher specialities. The IRIB's approach to health is 
precisely against ours... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
In a society with no private TV or radio, the IRIS was accused of looking at health through 
monetary lenses: 
"... the /RIB is an organization which asks for money prior to any discussion. It does 
not recognize health as a national task and for all organizations. Why does the IRIB 
invite a doctor to talk about acne? Is our problem informing people about acne, or 
should the public be aware of the challenges of public health and how those 
challenges are going to be tackled? ... "[N14, PR, senior former health official]. 
Health officials accused the IRIB of prioritizing commercial interests over training the 
public, but they allocated a very small proportion of the FM budget for the media. 
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Nonetheless, the provincial IRIB in Golestan was employed more effectively to promote 
the policy: 
"... We have created a good interaction with the IRIB. There is a weekly TV 
programme, which is commonly produced by the DOH. There is another one called 
Garden alley, which is hosted by one of our managers. The IRIB has provided us 
many opportunities free of charge. It even heats us up here [in Golestan]. We have 
regular panels being attended by the DOH, the MIO representatives, the chancellor 
of the university, etc, ... 
I think we overcame many primary challenges because of 
the strong provincial media... " [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Surprisingly, such a structured approach to the reform by the provincial IRIB was not 
acknowledged in villages, while the IRIB's failure was addressed by few practitioners and 
members of the public: 
"... training on TV could be so helpful, but I have seen nothing about it... 
[L1.4, midwife]. 
Mentioning the effectiveness of TV programmes to address people about the reform, the 
public trustees complained about a lack of a TV series about FM: 
.. the 
first prerequisite to enjoy this chance (FM) was getting trained by the IRIB... 
people like movies, short interludes or cartoons like X more than anything... " 
[L2.9, imam]. 
Apparently, despite the provincial health officials' expectations, the impact of TV series 
[assuming such programmes existed] was negative, at least on practitioners' motivation, 
which indicated the need for change or revision: 
.. A programme called 
`window' flies on the antenna across the province every 
Friday that covers FM sometimes. Not only is the programme not informative, but it 
actually attempts to confront the implementers ... They never encourage patients to 
ask for less prescription drugs or listen to their doctor, rather they attempt to 
diminish FM. They have been mostly destructive towards the reform... " 
[L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
However, despite provincial managers' emphasis, there was a consensus at local level 
about the half-hearted engagement of the media in the implementation. 
5 Explanation of the reform to staff & the public 
Some key individuals were trained to design and implement the reform: 
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"... most policy-makers were unaware of modern health notions and managerial 
concepts. Within the last 5 years, to build up our people's capacity, we asked the 
WHO, the University of Harvard and other scientific bodies to hold courses such as 
Flagship and workshops in health economics. Attending such trainings, they 
realized the need for the reform and attempted to make evidence-based policies to 
undertake it... " [N14, PR, former senior policy maker]. 
However, the lack of training for both practitioners and the public was cited by every single 
interviewee. Managers across the MOH and the MIO were also not trained in the 
necessities of the reform: 
`... our main mid and long-term challenge is lack of explanation (of the policy), 
whether to the public, or practitioners and managers. There are thousands of 
personnel and senior managers across the MOH, universities, and the MIO, to 
whom preliminary concepts of referral system and necessities of FM has not even 
been explained ... "[N10, 
PR, PU, senior member of national team for reform]. 
As this senior policy maker declared, managers did not even have a basic introduction to 
FM and its advantages. Those who were supposed to promote the policy suffered a lack of 
awareness. The opportunity for training prior to implementation was missed, or such a 
chance did not occur at all because of the rush to implementation: 
"... our crucial problem was that the custodians of the implementation had not been 
explained... if only I could train the involved people prior to the implementation 
even by postponing the implementation for 2-3 months. Training people before 
starting was more important than settling blind practitioners in villages ... " [N12, PR, senior health official]. 
This key policy-maker was regretful of irreversibly missing opportunities to explain the 
reform in advance. Lack of awareness about the policy adversely affected its 
implementation. Because the public was not appropriately prepared for the reform through 
poor advocacy and training, their reaction to the policy was affected. In addition, even 
information focus courses which were held for policy makers and national managers, were 
not documented and disseminated to staff. 
5.1 Explanation of FM to practitioners 
Practitioners, particularly doctors, were not only unaware of FM, but were not trained to be 
a family doctor. Adverse impacts of both mostly effected doctors, probably because of their 
distinct position as the head of the health team with the gate-keeping role. 
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5.1.1 Awareness of the policy 
Implementers were accused of inadequate interaction with practitioners to bring them in 
line with the policy, its expectations and necessities: 
"Although it is late, but explaining the policy to the practitioners is the first task that 
the MOH must carry out, particularly for doctors, without which we will get lost. / 
never think that sending some legislation drafts and letters establishes the policy in 
their mind as it is in ours... " [N8, O, senioir finance policy maker]. 
Managers were irritated because doctors were not aware of the policy expectations: 
"... a big problem is that our practitioners do not match the requirements of the 
reform. A number of doctors were practicing in their own clinics prior to joining the 
implementation, having no idea of what the policy expects... "[P 1, PR, provincial 
health official]. 
Lack of practitioners' awareness lowered their satisfaction, because of the lack of insight 
about the aims and necessities of the reform. It was significant enough to be the chief 
complaint of one purchaser: 
"... if only we had made practitioners more aware of the policy or if at least we had 
done so after implementation, we would be able to show them (brilliant) future 
horizons of FM, which could certainly affect their attitude... " [P2, PU, provincial 
official]. 
Practitioners themselves asked for clear information and being kept informed of FM: 
"... we were not informed of this (FM). The district health manager who is not even 
familiar with the alphabet of health made us aware of the general issues in the 
health system (not FM), very briefly and vaguely... actually we trained ourselves. 
No educational material was provided than a folder containing what we were 
expected to do... "[L6.2, FD, family doctor]. 
The lack of the policy explanation made practitioners suspicious of the implementers' 
capability to undertake the reform: 
"... they could not even tell me what they expected me to do. I think they do not 
know themselves what they want... some irregular workshops were held, but were irrelevant to FM. We were not even given a handout. .. "[L4.4, nurse]. 
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There was not a planned curriculum for training them, at least to transfer basic 
requirements for practice and expectations. They were promised training sessions, but 
nothing materialized. Practitioners doubted the effectiveness of such classes which were 
not designed to improve the participants' knowledge about FM, because of the lecturers' 
ignorance. Thus, they concluded those ceremonial sessions were held just to be held: 
"... as teachers, we were blank ourselves. We were told that the participants are 
private doctors, who have been practicing in their own clinics and are now in 
charge of FM. We were instructed to explain our duties to them. We taught them 
nothing of FM, but whatever we had been doing as managers... " [L5.1, DA, district 
health official]. 
Even if flawed and inappropriate, such sessions were held only once at the beginning of 
the implementation. Given the high turnover of doctors, many of whom did not participate 
in such sessions and the majority of them denied the existence of such sessions. 
5.1.2 Training to be family doctor 
Recruited family doctors were GPs whose medical training did not appropriately match 
with FM. For instance, health promotion was not taught to doctors: 
"... implementing FM requires radical changes in our education system. FM might 
not be properly established, unless the training system shifts from patient dominant 
to health dominant. Doctors, who most think of running their private clinics, might 
not keep the population healthy over a night... " [N2, PR, senior health official]. 
Doctors were not only unfamiliar with the health promotion aspects of their responsibilities, 
but also looked down on it as not their top priority. As a result, graduating GPs from the 
Iranian universities did not posses essential expertise to function as family doctors: 
"... the most important change in medical education is to change the medical 
mentors' approach to health. To understand that beyond working in hospitals, 
doctors are responsible for societal health... this is why, we are seriously following 
to teach our medical students 'outpatient case management which emphasizes on 
prevention and health promotion ... "[N12, PR, senior health official]. 
Lack of public relations skills to communicate with the public adversely affected the 
public's trust: 
"... our health teams, particularly the doctors, do not have enough expertise to interact with the public. Many are young, recently graduated and inexperienced 
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doctors... whereas we believe that a family doctor must be 5 stars... " 
[P3, GMU, senior provincial health official]. 
In addition, primary care has not been effectively embedded into the curriculum of medical 
schools in Iran: 
"... recently graduated GPs have not been efficiently trained on health dimensions 
of the society and public health specifications including primary care... " 
[N9, O, senior national policy maker]. 
Worse still, doctors had little insight into the rural health fields: 
"The gap between what we were taught and what is really seen in the field is 
horrible. i do not exactly know which one must be revised, academy or the field. 
Even our environmental health experts are not capable enough for fieldwork.. . to 
succeed we must adjust our educational system to bring FM in line with field 
requirements... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
This was why proper training about FM was the first item on many interviewees' agenda to 
revitalize the cascade of implementation: 
"If only I was able to gather a bunch of GPs to train them at least six months about 
FM... There are some doctors who look at FM as just an opportunity to make 
money... I am even prepared to give scholarship to some GPs to be trained in the 
British NHS, where FM has been successfully implemented... " [P3, GMU, senior 
provincial health official]. 
5.2 Training the public 
Interviewees also explained the effects of the lack of cultural preparation of the public, 
prior to and during the implementation. Such a lack of awareness annoyed practitioners, 
because of the public's resistance to the reform: 
"... a number of measures must have been simultaneously taken prior to 
implementation, most importantly the public preparation... we asked, even begged 
people to register in Behbar. It should not have been like this. We must have 
created a need in the public to ask us about insurance and better services 
instead... " [N3, MP, member of parliament]. 
Behbar introduced almost free use of services, but practitioners were unhappy because of 
the lack of the public preparation: 
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... sad 
to say, we are witnessing how implementing a reform without a-priori 
cultural preparation ends up in failure... " [N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Villagers compared themselves with their urban counterparts who were entitled to use their 
insurance log-books for whatever services, and therefore felt inferior: 
"... lack of the villagers' awareness of the extent to which FM is in their interest was 
our big ignorance... villagers feel contempt, assuming urban households enjoy 
better and more appropriate service which they are deprived of. They must be 
informed about this... " [N1 5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
Moreover, the public's lack of awareness about their rights broke the referral cycle and 
damaged the quality of services: 
"... if patients knew that it is their right to get my feedback (specialist doctor) written 
down in their log-books, they would be pushing me to do so, to stop themselves 
from being passed between doctors. They would also know that the next time, they 
must be visited by their own doctor, who knows them well... the probability of 
mistakes would have dramatically come down... "[P5, O, provincial union official]. 
Public cooperation was also damaged because of the lack of explanation of the benefits 
they were entitled to in FM: 
"... the first important recipe for success in any change is assuring the public that 
their interest is met by the reform. People must feel they will be benefited by 
implementing a reform, financially or whatever... " [P8, O, senior provincial officer]. 
Perhaps, this was why implementation was easier in more literate areas, where people 
better understood the reform: 
"Public literacy has been a meaningful determinant in this implementation. The 
more literate the area, the better their compliance ... " [N 11, PR, senior health 
manager]. 
Implementation was not publicly supported because of failing to educate the public, which 
lowered their cooperation. Instead, the public became a barrier to implementation in many 
villages. Changing public behaviour was difficult because they did not accept the terms 
and conditions of the reform: 
"... people are still confused about their rights in this reform. They think because of 
the (insurance) log-books, they are entitled to visit whoever they wish. They do not 
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know that a referral system is in place, within which the doctor, as the health 
custodian, has the final say... " [P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
In addition, doctors were irritated because of public behaviour due to unawareness: 
"... to be honest, if / do not stamp their log-book they will hit me. We have to stamp 
sometimes just to get rid off some patients. Sometimes they bring the log-book (not 
the patient), asking for referral to the specialist. They insulted me couple of times 
... "[L6.7, 
FD, family doctor]. 
The main aim of FM, promoting health by building a close relationship with the public, was 
threatened and personal relationships between doctors and the public were destroyed. 
Fights and arguments not only inhibited a mutual relationship, but prevented some people 
from visiting health centres. Doctors acknowledged the patients' innocence in this regard, 
addressing the lack of public preparation: 
"... sometimes / have to horribly wake up at 2.00 am, because someone knocks the 
door asking for his log-book to be stamped for visiting a specialist for the day 
after... sometimes they wake me up around dawn time for a common cold ... 1 do not think the public must be blamed, rather the government is guilty of providing them a 
dateless ticket with no a-priori explanation. Given the situation, what other 
behaviour do you expect? " L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Managers also addressed the fact that the public have not been informed to avoid such 
misconceptions: 
"... if only we had brought people in line with the reform. They only understood rural 
insurance, not the referral. They assume this log-book is like others... " 
[L3.1, DA, district health expert]. 
Worse still, given the tribal culture of some villages, some of the non-local doctors who 
rejected patients' unreasonable requests were grilled by officials. This was why the public 
representatives asked for improved explanation: 
"... 1 suggest endorsing a training plan in FM through which health volunteers could 
teach the public the requirements of the reform... " [L5.9, imam]. 
5 Auditing performance 
Auditing practitioners' performance gave rise to three concerns which affected 
implementation: the appropriateness of the tools and methods; poor quality of audit staff; 
and how audit results were applied to improve implementation. 
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6.1 The appropriateness of tools & methods 
The auditing system was criticized for several reasons including its inappropriateness as 
the basis for pay for performance; lack of defined criteria; and lack of audited individuals' 
awareness about the content of such criteria: 
"... to create a competitive environment for implementing FM, the output of health 
centres must be evaluated on the basis of some generous and available criteria... 
ask Dr. X or Dr. Y [the head and vice president of the MIO] about the criteria they 
use in audits? They do not have any criteria to assess individuals' satisfaction. We 
have only included some quantitative criteria such as the number of issued log- 
books or registered population, not the qualitative indices which enhance the 
quality of services... " [N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Lack of evidence-based, clear, and relevant criteria for audit, caused auditors to mix up 
level of audits and left the output vulnerable to individuals' interpretation: 
"... a clear format for audit with the distinct and defined items is needed for accurate 
grading. For instance, the MOH audits the health houses, meanwhile the health 
houses are separately audited by the MIO, the district health authority, as well as 
the health centres. It shows that there is no logical grading in place for auditing. In 
addition, our audit is unsystematic, with no score or ranking. Everything depends 
on the auditors. I mark a centre as perfect, whereas it is marked intermediate by 
another auditor... it resembles the Rumi's story about touching an elephant in dark, 
everyone describes it as the touched part... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
The ambiguous hierarchy of auditing ended up in a waste of resources. Indeed, there was 
no checklist or checklists were not useful in changing practitioners' behaviour: 
"... audits must be on the basis of measurable criteria, not whatever the individuals 
fancy. An appropriate checklist is a useful tool to change behaviour... people would 
like to get good marks. If our aim is changing behaviour, then the checklists must 
be logical and proportionately weighted for the different items... " [P3, GMU, senior 
provincial health official]. 
Because there was not a defined checklist, doctors did not take the audit seriously: 
"... in the last nine months, I have been audited once. The way they mark us is 
funny. They ask us about the list of our patients, and whether we tick the referral 
forms. They tick some things quickly... we do not actually know what we are going 
to be audited on (laughing)... "[L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Practitioners were not aware of the content of checklists and what they were expected to 
do: 
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"... when doctors settled [in health centres], we must have kept them informed 
about our expectations and what they would be audited about... an audit is 
different from an exam... " [N10, PU, PR, member of national team for reform]. 
Apart from the lack of piloting the audit criteria, the lack of explanation about the audit 
process caused serious fears of ignorance: 
"We have fallen into the habit of moving against rules. The society is not prepared 
to accept auditing. Making laws in absence of compliance worsens the situation, 
because it breaches the immorality of breaking rules. Audit is good in principle, if 
the public had been culturally prepared in advance... " [N9, O, senior policy maker]. 
Concerns regarding the cultural inappropriateness of auditing were mainly because of 
embedded ceremonial behaviour in Iranians, which prohibits both the audited and the 
auditor to apply the results of audits: 
"... auditing is an amazing concept, however, it does not work in our country 
because most of the time the ceremonial relationship discourages people to act 
properly... " [N8, O, senior finance official]. 
Nevertheless, the DOH in Golestan tried to bridge the gap by designing a checklist during 
workshops attended by representatives of the district health authorities and provincial 
managers: 
"We have designed an audit pyramid that might be also used at the national level 
to mobilize the system... " [P1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
6.2 Poor quality of audit staff 
After two and a half years of implementation, nothing had been done to train professional 
auditors. The lack of qualification and poor monitoring behaviour of auditors led to 
dissatisfaction on the part of practitioners, particularly doctors whose income was more 
linked to the audits than others. The audits did not only fail to improve practitioners' 
behaviour, but also led to scepticism about the reform: 
"... i agree that audit is necessary and good, but unfortunately a person with a 
diploma or BSc audits me. His main concern is why I am paid more than him. He 
tries to deduct my score as much as possible to level his salary with me... to put 
my money in his pocket perhaps... " [L1.2, FD, family doctor]. 
Doctors requested to be audited by a doctor, accusing the non-medical auditors of not 
understanding them and being jealous of them: 
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"Do you know who decides how much we get paid? No doctor is among them. The 
auditors do not understand even two simple medical terms. Once we talk, they just 
shake their heads! I have no doubt they are depressed because they are not 
doctors. They knock our door at 1.00 am to check whether we are present or not... 
my sixth sense tells me what they have in their mind... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Appointing non-medics to audit doctors was interpreted as an intentional act to diminish 
doctors, a sign of mismanagement: 
"... Why should doctors not do this job [audit]? Once the DOH assumes that 
doctors are capable enough to improve the public's toilet behaviour and hygiene 
actions, why must not a doctor do this? Many doctors are unemployed and could 
do the job. / know they [auditors of the DOH] are not paid little, so payment should 
not be a problem to recruit doctors for auditing... if a high school student sees this 
behaviour with doctors, s/he doubts becoming a doctor, whose reputation is being 
endangered by people with far less education... " [L5.5, FD, family doctor]. 
Surprisingly, the senior provincial managers were well aware of the auditors' poor 
behaviour, but did not attempt to improve the situation: 
"We have appointed some people with little expertise to audit the implementation. 
Auditing such a national and big reform needs well- educated people with good 
knowledge of technical and morality aspects of audit... because the results affect 
doctors' payment, that ends up in conflict... "[P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Moreover, the audits were labelled as a charade, which would not result in improving 
quality of services: 
"... many times in audits i notice that [health] centres have been made up, many 
secret letters have been distributed to change things, all leaves have been 
suspended and equipments have been installed quickly... " [N5, PU, senior 
insurance official]. 
In addition, practitioners complained about the conflict of interest of auditors, suspecting 
that the more they reduced a practitioners' score, the more money they could put in their 
own pocket (even though it was not true): 
"... This is such a corrupted system that deducts (doctors' income) to expand 
auditors' pocket. It indicates that the DOH would like me to be a bad doctor.. . what sort of system is this with a direct link between deducting the doctors' money and 
crediting auditors' account. It resembles that a police takes money from guilty drivers for himself... " [L3.3, FD, family doctor]. 
Doctors did not trust the audit process or the level of their earnings which was based on it. 
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Given the low level of trust between the auditors and practitioners, some called for audits 
to be undertaken by others to avoid such accusations and to obtain an accurate base for 
payment: 
"I think we must hand over the audits to private third parties. We could contract 
them to undertake audits and provide us with reports... " [N1 7, PR, national health 
expert]. 
Despite the agreement for common audits by the DOH and the MIO, they undertook 
parallel audits, using different criteria and checklists: 
.. we had agreed to establish common audit teams along with the MOH, but the 
massive managerial changes deteriorated things... " [NI5, PU, senior insurance 
manager]. 
Common teams for audit were more ceremonial for the MIO: 
"We audit the health centres every three months. It was being independently done 
in the beginning. We established common teams to audit in parallel with the DOH. 
However, we have our own checklists and undertake our own audit... " 
[P2, PU, provincial policy maker]. 
No common audit was carried out in practice, probably because of different approaches to 
the implementation by the MOH and the MIO. The MOH was concerned about the quality 
of services, whereas the MIO's preference was quantitative aspects of implementation for 
payment. Nevertheless, the DOH and the MIO in Golestan held a few meetings to share 
results of their own audits. 
6.3 Applying audit results 
Interviewees had several concerns about the way that audit results were employed to 
improve implementation of FM. Many complained of not applying the audit results to train 
the practitioners for better performance: 
"... audit results must be applied for training practitioners rather than a tool for 
punishment. Ones with low marks could be forced to sit a course, instead of deducting their income... " [P5, PU, provincial union]. 
Practitioners' felt that audits were similar to sitting an exam or being in an interrogation 
session, rather than an interactive process for improvement: 
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.. trying to show a serious gesture, auditors 
tick something quickly, ask foolish 
questions assuming we are in pupils in elementary schools. Worse still, they do not 
know themselves neither the question nor the answer... it looks like grilling or being 
in custody rather than a constructive audit session... " [L6.6, Midwife]. 
Using audit results to calculate the salary of practitioners was identified as harmful: 
.. 
Applying audit results in doctors' earnings is conceptually good, but it must not 
harm doctors. They are not allowed to freeze doctors' money until the audit results 
get prepared... they could apply it for scientific promotions instead... " 
[N6, O, national union, physician]. 
In addition, many practitioners believed that the results were applied discriminatively: 
"I have received many complaints from family doctors about discriminations in 
audits. Comparing their income with each other, they think individuals' opinions 
determine their payment instead of their real marks. Across the districts, doctors 
believe that despite their similar scores, their income was significantly different, 
accusing managers of manipulating the results discriminatively. They lost their 
motivation for better and harder work ... 
" [P4, provincial health manager]. 
All in all, because of the manner of undertaking audits, expertise and morality of auditors, 
and the wrong way of applying the results in the payment, a number of interviewees were 
very critical of the audit system: 
"The current audit system is not reliable... it must be extensively revised. 
Unfortunately, it does not enhance the quality [of services] at all. We often audit to 
grill people, not to train them. The effects of such behaviours have been adverse at 
many places... "[P7, PR, provincial health expert]. 
7 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the interaction between the policy and the environment in 
which implementation took place. Therefore, factors that were discussed in this chapter 
were consequences of issues in chapters 6&7. Five major issues arose that affected 
implementation: 
" Lack of local understanding resulted in wrong decisions; 
Unrealistic policy making in an autocratic background ended in merger of two 
diverse policies; 
Unrealistic and ambiguous policy resulted in inter-organizational hostility; 
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" Lack of clear governance of health and health not being priority led to meritocracy 
undermined; and 
" Caused lack of attention to human resources. 
First, as mentioned in Chapter six, the policy was formulated with no consultation with 
local informants, so the imposed policy was not tailored to respond to various peripheral 
requirements and was mistakenly executed. That was why even incentives for 
encouraging public resulted in their anger and dissatisfaction. For instance, the public 
registration for Behbar that might have been an enjoyable experience turned in a bitter 
conflict between the public and volunteers who carried out the job. The decision was 
reducing the registration fee on frequent occasions, apparently a good attempt to 
encourage as many people to register and get the Behbar log-book. However, the decision 
was not developed based on an organic and mutual communication with the local level. 
This led to the public and practitioners' lack of faith in the policy and implementers and 
ended in failure. 
Another consequence of autocratic decisions that attributed to implementation failure was 
payment to practitioners, which was hugely welcomed in concept, but it was practically a 
painful and dissatisfactory experiment because of what was called ineffective bureaucracy. 
In fact, even positive aspects of the policy wrestled the autocratic nature of the society and 
were faced preventable barriers. Payment to practitioners was too delayed to overcome 
practitioners' dilemma to stay in deprived places, so their turnover was high, in contrary to 
the necessity of implementation and long-term needed relationship between patients and 
practitioners. 
Second, the study revealed that implementation was a failed attempt to merge two diverse 
policies (FM & Behbar) by two organizations with diverse and sometimes contradictory 
goals. It was a mission which was failed to accomplish because of a chronic barrier before 
the development of Iran: not making goals clear before starting to implement policies. This 
was not the case only for FM. This chapter presented a few examples of people who 
boarded the policy ship with different or even conflicting agenda, hoping to achieve their 
personal or organizational benefits. The public benefits and efficient engineering of 
resources were not considered. The two main implementers: the MOH and the MIO 
pursued contradictory goals. The former's aim was to promote health, whereas the latter 
aimed at bridging the gap in service provision and accessibility for the poor in rural areas 
through Behbar. They agreed in the beginning to do this as a common task, accepted 
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parliamentary bill and started to implementation. However, individuals at a local level were 
able to change or override the constitutional rules and divert the direction of 
implementation to obtain their organizational diverse aims, which resulted in several 
failures. What was implemented was neither FM nor fulfilled the MIO's goal. Therefore, the 
resources were wasted and FM lost its reputation for the public. 
Third, the study revealed the severe hostility between the MOH and the MIO as the main 
barrier to their satisfactory cooperation in the common task of implementing FM. The 
hostility was not only due to their diverse goals. For two reasons, whatever policy was 
putting into practice by these two bodies might have experienced more or less a similar 
destination. First, their organizational perspectives were fundamentally different that was 
even recognizable for several staff at the local level. The MOH was branded a preventive 
focused organization whose attempt was promoting health and improving primary care. 
Whereas, many described the MIO as a curative focused body who by default was 
reluctant to pay for primary care. Such an accusation was ruled out by the MIO after they 
started implementing FM with the MOH, although it was proved with several evidence in 
practice. Second, their organizational past bubbled up their tension because of their effort 
to prove their supremacy. The MOH was unhappy at losing control over the MIO. On the 
other hand, the MIO's focus was proving its independency to the MOH. They looked to 
each other as rivals not partners. The MOH accused the MIO of not releasing money so 
paralyzing the MOH to fulfil its goals. Whereas, the MIO restricted payments to the MOH, 
accusing it to not meet the relevant criteria of implementation. This was why their 
cooperation in the purchaser-provider split failed. The concept of purchaser-provider 
separation and the benefits it might bring into the health system was attractive to many 
interviewees. However, the separation resembled a political game for organizational 
benefits, which reduced their cooperation considerably, diminished their trust in each other 
and collapsed their volatile partnership. Time and resources of the two were wasted 
fighting and accusing each other, rather than attempting to improve implementation. 
As a harmful consequence of little willingness for cooperation, interviewees at all levels 
pointed to communication failures that avoided a proper command centre for 
implementation of FM, which in turn obscured it in several ways. For example, because of 
the inevitably rushed implementation, no systematic mechanism was established to get 
feedback either from practitioners or the public. This resulted in a lack of interaction and 
little trust between them, which inhibited the flow of information for improving 
implementation. It also led to a flawed process of auditing practitioners' performance either 
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in conducting audits or applying the results, which not only resulted in not improving 
practitioners' performance and behaviour, but reduced their trust in the health system. 
Fourth, scientific tasks were approached ideologically, so meritocracy was undermined. 
Political support was beneficial for Behbar to get parliamentary approval, because of being 
consistent with the pillars of the revolution. However, healthcare was not a national 
commitment so the majority of policy makers and managers were replaced when the 
government changed, due to political preferences. Given the limited availability of 
technocrats trained for the reform, replacing them in the early stages of implementation 
with cadres who lacked knowledge, insight and expertise, harmed the implementation and 
faded the FM policy for the public. 
And lastly, human resources were not considered as pillars for development and core to 
the policy cycle. Due to autocratic nature of policy making, some important stakeholders 
were ignored in defining the policy, the consequences of which were discussed in Chapter 
6. In addition, there was too much attention to hardware, whereas little attention to human 
resources as the software for running activities. For instance, the preparation phase was 
limited to physical spaces and equipping health centres, albeit it was not satisfactory at the 
end. However, little attempt was conducted to prepare people at the three levels for the 
reform. Explanation of the reform is a good example. At national level, policy makers other 
than a few were not explained about the reform, its necessities, prerequisites and changes 
it might cause. At the local level, doctors were not provided with a basic training regarding 
their duties and expectations. Given the general lack of training social medicine, public 
relations and primary care for medical students, managers and practitioners became 
frustrated and lost their trust in the reform due to lack of preparedness. This also 
decreased their motivation, which in turn reduced the quality of services for the public. 
Finally, the policy was not explained to the public either a-priori or after starting 
implementation. They annoyed and irritated practitioners by their inappropriate demands 
therefore. Worse still, the public were not aware of their rights such as keeping medical 
records, which decreased the efficiency of implementation. An important indicator of 
undermining human resources was not employing the mass media to promote the policy 
and make people aware of the reform, which consistently was emphasized by interviewees 
as a strong barrier to implementation. 
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Chapter 9: Impact of the policy on local stakeholders 
Introduction 
The experience of implementation and the content of the policy had impacts on local 
practitioners and public representatives. How FM was implemented affected their attitudes 
and behaviour towards the policy. In this chapter, the impact of the policy on three local 
groups: public sector practitioners (including members of health team in rural health 
centres: family doctor, nurse, midwife, and various technicians and experts who work 
under family doctor's supervision in FM), local private doctors, and public representatives 
is considered. 
1 Impact on public sector practitioners (members of health team) 
The FM policy had an impact on local practitioners in rural health centres including: family 
doctors, nurses, midwives, and other members of the health team. Most practitioners 
reported that implementation was different from their expectation: 
"My preliminary interpretation from FM was something good for the public, which 
might also change doctors' situation... I expected delivering more services to the 
public through a real referral cycle. Such a dream was not only fulfilled, but also the 
implementation put doctors' reputation in danger. People ask us to prescribe some 
particular drugs for them. Others only ask to be referred, assuming we are a 
signature machine... " [L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
Implementation created various tensions between the professions: 
"... my expectation from FM was enjoying a personal and close family doctor. A 
doctor who serves families and responds to theirA-Z needs... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
Non-medical practitioners were unhappy about the income gap with doctors: 
"... GPs earn at least 1 millionTM every month. What makes them entitled for this 
[high] earning? It is said that the government might not afford this huge money 
anymore. I think it will end up in budget deficit. Sooner or later they will terminate it 
because it does not fulfil public's expectations and is very costly ... " [L4.5, E, Iocal health technician]. 
Substantial rise in doctors' earning was criticised by a few non-medical practitioners: 
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"... who says that doctors are the most important people to provide care? Could 
you even imagine a doctor functioning without a nurse in this village? What could 
s/he do if a pregnant women pops in the [health] centre with an emergency 
complain? Nothing... if managing the [health] centres is his responsibility, 1 could 
do the job much better... to be honest, they [doctors] are scared themselves of 
managing the centre... " [L6.3, N, nurse]. 
Members of health team both doctors and others were concerned about eight aspects: 
" Lack of motivation; 
" Lack of job security; 
" Lack of respect; 
" Delay in payment; 
" Poor working condition; 
" Poor contracts; 
" Ethnic tensions; 
" Rationing. 
1.1 Lack of motivation 
Provincial managers pointed out that the lack of proper incentives for better performance 
lowered practitioners' sense of ownership: 
"... our service providers do not feel this programme as their own. I guess because 
there is no distinguished award for better performance... " [P4, provincial health 
manager]. 
Doctors complained about lots of responsibilities but lack of incentives, which decreased 
their willingness to remain in FM: 
"In a very short period of starting implementation, I got happy because of the increased income. However, it does not fulfil my expectations anymore. I neither 
want this income nor huge work load, while I am being insulted. You remember 
how we used to be reputable. Even Bangladeshi doctors (some South Asian 
doctors worked in rural areas between 1982- 1990) were respectful. As the children 
of this country, we are deprived of minimum facilities as well as reputation. We are 
always asked for more work and work... I think it [FM] is good for passing the 
mandatory scheme, but not for the stable life... going this way, I do not think it 
would have a future... " [L5.3, FD, family doctor]. 
Doctors joined FM in the hope of delivering good services to the public, as well as better 
and more secure earnings. They criticized the implementation and doubted its 
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sustainability. Given the key role of the doctor as head of the health teams, such an 
attitude harmed implementation. Many doctors did not consider their role a sustainable 
position to establish a long-term relationship with the public. Instead, they viewed FM 
simply as an opportunity for a higher income and a route to a brighter future: becoming a 
specialist registrar. They described FM as good for doctors in their mandatory scheme. 
Non medic practitioners also shared same feeling: 
"... Why should 1 dedicate myself to promote this programme [FM]? Does this 
system acknowledge my efforts? You dedicate your profession to serve the public, 
but nobody cares, even the public themselves... " [L4.6, nurse]. 
In addition, incentives for doctors' managerial duties were not explicitly endorsed in the 
policy, which left it vulnerable to district managers' personal interpretation. Some had 
considered extra payment as a managerial fee, whereas many districts had dismissed 
such a right for doctors. A new version of the policy (7.2) revised this shortage, and 
considered 5-7 % of the budget as for managerial purposes. However, it had still not been 
enacted five months later. Also midwives complaint about lack of incentives when they 
were forced to carry out irrelevant jobs, which dissatisfied them: 
"... well, / understand that / should try my best to serve people, but why they force 
me to act as a pharmacy assistant and grill me if 1 make a mistake? I cannot carry 
out my main duties because of these kinds of jobs... " [L6.6, midwife]. 
Lack of incentives other than monetary ones was also emphasized as the reason for 
doctors doubting the future of FM: 
"... you will see this in the coming 2-3 years with no doubt. None of doctors are 
satisfied here or even in Tehran. Money does not matter at all... this system will not 
be stretched to cities because it fails in villages. Similar to the destiny of Tehran- 
Caspian Sea highway, FM will be handicapped in rural places and would be still 
nowhere after 20 years ... 
doctors will gradually lead this programme to failure, 
because of pressures on them to tolerate insults which make them cruel and 
convinced to destroy either the public or the system... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Some influential policy makers were aware of this, but did not attempt to change it: 
"... Implementation is not going well at all. We might have settled doctors and 
midwives, but the main challenge is to keep them moving along the goals... doctors 
pass the time looking forward to starting speciality and get rid of this mess. FM 
needs a doctor to stay with public for many years to manage their A to Z" 
[N2, PR, senior health official], 
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This indicates the lack of top policy makers' insight towards motivation of staff. 
1.2 Lack of job security 
Practitioners had little hope about the future of FM. Because of their short-term contracts, 
they looked at FM as a temporary programme that did not secure their position: 
"... due to (short-term) contracts, doctors and midwives have the least trust in the 
future (of FM). They keep asking us: will the implementation be continuing until the 
next year? This is the worst possible scenario for implementing change" 
[P3, GMU, senior provincial health official]. 
Unfortunately, lack of hope in the future of FM was not just among doctors in their 
mandatory scheme. Civil servants in the DOH had the same feeling, mainly due to their 
insecure and unsustainable position: 
'... if 1 had time to become a specialist registrar, / would have done so. / do not see 
a future in this programme. We are despising it here. The sooner one can separate 
himself from this system, the better rescue he would find for himself... " 
[L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
Some doctors felt as prisoners who were counting seconds to breathe fresh air: 
"... do you think I am here for what? It has a high deprivation index so I can end it 
sooner. I need no money; /just want to finish it as soon as possible. .. l will surely leave this and am counting seconds towards its end... "[L4.4, FD, family doctor]. 
In addition, although practitioners other than doctors, midwives and nurses were officially 
considered as members of the health team, they were completely separate. Even their 
working hours were different, because of which they felt insecure: 
"... 1 am not in FM (member of health team). We were told that all staff are 
members of the [health] team, however, nothing has changed. I do not think they 
will renew my contract after this... " [L3.7, E, Iocal health technician). 
Worse still, in centres with more than one midwife, there was a clear distinction between 
those working in FM and those not. Such an environment discouraged unity to build up an 
encouraging working environment. 
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1.3 Lack of respect 
Despite policy makers' presumptions about the impact of higher pay on practitioners' 
motivation, lack of respect damaged their morale: 
"If the MOH thinks doctors are happy because of 500,000TM monthly payment, this 
system will collapse. This huge work load, while I have to tolerate lots of insults, is 
not worth this [little] money. I wish / could hit people who insulted me... " 
[L5.2, FD, family doctor]. 
Such an environment made doctors so pessimistic that they rejected the proposal of 
becoming specialists in FM after working as an FD for a while: 
"... even if i get paid as much as a FM specialist, I am not going to continue in this 
system. They [DOH] are not even committed to the agreement that they forced us 
to sign. How could / stick to such a dream with these unreliable people" 
[LI. 2, FD, family doctor]. 
Worse still, despite the policy emphasis and the crucial demand, nurses had an unstable 
position in the health team, because of which they criticized FM: 
"... they treat us as their slaves. We do not know whether they [DOH] would 
recognize nursing as a profession which is essential in any health services 
including this? I am sure they want to torture us with this insecurity to do whatever 
they want... " [L6.3, nurse]. 
Some implementers called FM as the project, which induced it is temporary and would be 
finished soon like any other project: 
"... there is no job security and pension in FM... the project of FM is likely to be 
finished and bye!.... many educated people keep telling me that after five years, 
they (MOH) might give you (provider) some money and terminate the project. The 
majority believe that (FM) would not succeed... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
Feeling it temporary raised the practitioners' apathy and reduced their commitment: 
"... money is a powerful external tool to change behaviour, but it cannot make 
change on its own. We have done nothing to strengthen practitioners' internal 
motivation. We are depreciated this time. Every single one of us gets into the 
system to make a difference, however, he becomes cynical after a while... " 
[P4, provincial health manager]. 
In addition, reduced user fees were addressed as one of the main reasons for decreased 
respect of doctors and threatened their dignity. Doctors accused the public of not 
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appreciating cheap products, only respecting whatever is obtained with difficultly and is 
expensive: 
"Look! The clearest aspect of FM for public is cheap services. Our people do not 
appreciate cheap and easily accessible products. If we do not pay for something 
and obtain it for free, it becomes worthless for us. This precisely happened in this 
reform, by providing doctor, drug, and medical services at the cheapest ever 
possible price. I used to do the same job at a city clinic, where I had great respect. 
Here, patients insult and hit me ... " [L1.2, FD, family doctor]. 
A number of practitioners linked the reduced fees to increased unnecessary work, 
unrealistic expectations and increased drug consumption due to public over-utilization: 
"... the DOH and the MIO are guilty for all these unfortunate things. They put GPs 
on sale. People accuse GPs of everything. 24 hours a day, 7 days a week a doctor 
with just 170 TM (8 Pence) has been provided for them, and they still insult us. 
They used to come 5.00am to make appointments for 3.00pm. They had to wait all 
that time with no right for objection and were happy to pay more. What about now? 
While they are prepared to stand even one hour in a bakery queue, they object to 
10 minutes waiting to see the doctor... the DOH put us on sale and we became 
cheap (for the public)... " [L5.3, FD, family doctor]. 
They were not only doctors who complained about the consequences of cheap services. 
Other practitioners also addressed the negative side effects: 
"Guess what proportion of people who come to the [health] centre really need 
help? Some people come around only to spend their time and take some drugs for 
fun... we have to fight with people because of these cheap fees ... " [L4.10, E, health 
centre personnel]. 
Some branded the reduced fees as the central policy-makers' intentional attempt to reduce 
GPs' status. They felt that even the poorest people could afford three fold more fees: 
"I think the visit fee must be at least 500-700TM. I am sure there is an intention to 
make doctors valueless (with emphasis). It does not look like an accident. 170TM 
for each (doctor) visit has intention, as well as ignorance its behind. There was no 
doctor here beforehand so people had to commute 100KM to see a doctor. Now, 
because of very cheap tariffs, they visit us for funny reasons... I promise even the 
poorest people afford 700TM. FM was implemented to diminish doctors' reputation. 
If the government is honest in making services affordable, why has it not 
subsidized water and electricity bills for the poor?... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
The rate of public visits to health centres and use of services went up dramatically, not 
necessarily for better quality of services or users' understanding about the benefits of FM, 
but because of the significant reduction in fees: 
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"... do not mistakenly assume that people will go to health centres because of better 
services, or are happier because of the great environment here. They visit us 
because they pay only 170TM, compared to 3000TM outside. That is it... " 
[L6.5, midwife]. 
Although the reduced fees improved equity and affordability of services, it harmed the 
prevention and health promotion aspects of FM: 
"... how can I expect a student wash his hands and care about his personal 
hygiene, while his poor parents do not care enough to pay a little to visit doctor and 
take medications to treat his parasitic disease?... " [L3.7, E, Iocal health technician]. 
The harmful effects of an increasing unnecessary workload were another complaint: 
"... 1 can show you lots of examples of unnecessary injections which were done 
because of patients' insist. If the drug was reasonably expensive and the injection 
fee was real, I am certain its rate would come down... people treat us like their 
slaves once we inject them. I am prepared to pay from my pocket, but do not get 
17TM (less than one pence) as the injection fee. It is an insult... " [L6.6, nurse]. 
This was why the more knowledgeable villagers called for an increase in fees to 
encourage the preventive aspects of FM: 
"... increasing fees is necessary to screen the real patients. Low fees have faded 
the position of FDs by unnecessary visits. We cannot achieve true goals of FM with 
this... fees must be increased at least same as that of other insurances (SSO, 
MIO.... ) up to 30% contribution by patients (now 10%)... " [L2.2, councillor]. 
Alternatively, as the government insisted on subsidizing services, some called for free 
services rather than low charges: 
"It is better not charging patients, rather than taking this ridiculously little money. 
Keep my words: doctor's position will be undoubtedly diminished within the next 
two years. FM was introduced to destroy GPs... " [L4.5, FD, family doctor). 
1.4 Delay in payment 
Wage arrears were another reason which lowered practitioners' morale: 
"... my salary is l mi hionTM in name, but unfortunately it is not paid in full. Every 
month I get paid a partial payment of 500,000TM, while the rest depends on their 
(DOH) generosity for 5 or 6 months later or even more... how can I take this 
programme seriously?... " [L5.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Because of the arrears, practitioners lost their patience and faith in the implementers: 
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"... we do not get our money by the end of each month... after lots of lamentation 
and groaning (laugher), we get paid something which has no flavour... you have to 
steer your eyes on the road waiting the money comes or not (laugher)... " 
[L2.6, midwife]. 
Worse still, the partial payment was not a defined fraction of practitioners' income. It was 
the same for all practitioners, which was described as unfair and discriminative: 
"... we face discrimination even in partial payment. A midwife in X, whose total 
salary is 280,000TM, is paid exactly the same partial payment as her counterparts 
in deprived area of Y, whose full salary is almost double. The case is also true for 
doctors. Equal partial payment of 500, OOOTM for a doctor with monthly earning of 
1.4MTM and his colleague with total salary of 700,000TM is unfair... " 
[P7, PR, provincial health expert]. 
There was another practical problem in relation to capitation payment, particularly in health 
centres with borderline registered population like 3000, or 5500. Practitioners were less 
willing to work in centres with less than 4000 population. In centres with transitional 
number of inhabitants, like 5500, doctors resisted recruiting a second doctor, as to secure 
a higher income. One single-handed centre had as many as 6600 population. District 
authorities, particularly in inaccessible villages, overlooked such breaches to retain 
doctors. There was an attempt by doctors to work in population-dense villages to get paid 
more. Many did not care how the responsibilities for such a big population could be met by 
only one doctor. 
1.5 Poor working condition 
Practitioners doubted the sustainability of FM because of poor working condition. Doctors, 
who worked in health centres without living-in facilities, were instructed to spend night 
shifts in A&E at hospitals: 
"... in centre X without living-in amenities, because our doctor gets fully paid without 
any night shifts, he has to spend night shifts in the city hospital... " [L1.1, DA, district 
health manager]. 
Night shifts in hospitals, which were irrelevant to FM and against the policy dissatisfied 
practitioners and led to their objection: 
"... 1 am here (rural health centre) 8.00am- 4.00pm. Sometimes they (district health 
authority) force me for night shifts in hospitals with no incentive. I have to come back here again the morning after. This is an obvious injustice... " [L1.4, midwife]. 
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1.6 Poor contracts 
Despite the existence of sufficient practitioners, the format and content of their contracts 
did not encourage many to join the reform. They were asked to sign a contract that was 
branded unfair and against their dignity and interests. They were treated as contractors by 
the MOH with no sick leave, holiday entitlement, pension and insurance. Implementing in a 
rush left the legal framework undeveloped, which ended up with practitioners' anger: 
"What reform? It is just a reform in name. As a citizen who delivers service to 
villagers, I am not even entitled for health and treatment service that my target 
people are, because I am not insured ... even a street-sweeper has his off hours, 
why should not we have that?... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
Worse still, doctors (though not other practitioners) were asked to provide financial 
collaterals in the interest of the MOH to be granted a contract, which offended them: 
"... practicing medicine is not a business. Why doctors called contractors and are 
asked to provide promissory notes? OK, if it mandatory by law, why just for 
doctors? Are not midwives and nurses members of health teams?! They are 
doctors not burglars. Asking them to settle in deprived areas, inhibiting them from 
many amenities, while they have to go to the bank and buy promissory notes which 
makes them financially obliged, is an obvious exploitation that interferes peaceful 
and efficient practice. .. "[N6, 
O, national union, physician]. 
Because of the lack of other employment opportunities, most doctors had no choice but to 
accept such conditions, however, dissatisfied and angry: 
"... sometimes I feel my throat is getting pressed. I wish I had become whatever but 
not a doctor. / live in a society in which doctors are valueless. My dignity has been 
smashed here. I do not care about money, please do not destroy my personality ... if the implementation is going to continue this way, I prefer to work as a waiter in 
rural Australia, but not get the MOH money... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor). 
Practitioners felt insecure because of the lack of a pension: 
"... I have been working here for one year and a half, but even five years like this 
means nothing. It is like I have not been here even one day... " [LI. 3, nurse]. 
They were forced to sign contracts with no detail about their time commitment, earning, 
etc. Contracts were often delayed and sections about time, money, and employer 
responsibilities were missing. Practitioners were pushed to sign and return the contract to 
the officials quickly; otherwise, they would be likely to lose their job: 
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".. They [the DOH] sent a contract that was blank. There was only my name and 
the basic salary there. They can easily manipulate my salary. Even if I notice they 
have done so, I can say nothing ... 
"[L4.5, midwife]. 
As a result of feedback and practitioners' objections, the welfare aspects of contracts such 
as pension, time off and leave were later revised. Doctors were not considered as 
contractors anymore, so they were not supposed to provide financial collaterals. However, 
the basis of payment in contracts was still vague for many practitioners. 
1.7 Ethnic tensions 
In the diverse provinces of Golestan, tribal issues were a source of conflict for many 
reasons. Some doctors were irritated by ethnic tensions in their audit: 
"... 1 know these people do not like me because I am Fars (Persian ethnicity) and 
Shiite (religion), whereas they are Turkmen and Sunni. 1 know they calculate my 
salary in a way that I get less than my Turkmen counterparts. In case of absence, I 
am certain they deduct my salary four times more compared to my Turkmen 
colleague. Outstanding doctors are always chosen among the Turkmen here... 
whoever Mr. E (head of district health authority) likes, is paid more... " 
[L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Although issues like the language barrier was emphasized as a reason for prioritizing local 
doctors to practice in rural Golestan, the tribal preferences was probably the real one: 
... most people prefer 
to visit Turkmen doctors. Women visit doctors more than 
men. They are more illiterate than men so it is more difficult to explain their 
complaint (to non Turkmen speakers)... " [LI. 8, village teacher). 
In addition, the district health authorities who worked in ethnic minority areas, preferred to 
recruit local doctors: 
"... being knowledgeable and speaking the local language are both essential. I 
admit that non-local doctors have been successful, however, the ability to speak 
the local language is really an asset to engage with people... " [L2.2, DA, district 
health expert]. 
It was not only managers who preferred local doctors but also some local practitioners did 
so because of its facilitating role to teach the public: 
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"... a doctor who speaks the same language (as the public) is better, because 
patients are mostly elderly who do not speak and understand other languages. 
People could be also trained better with a local doctor... " [L2.5, midwife]. 
Local doctors from the private sector also pointed out the greater likelihood that local 
doctors would stay in the village for longer, in addition to the possibility of efficient 
communication between the doctor and patient: 
A doctor is a reliable person for the public. Some people cannot express for 
instance their psychiatric complaints in other languages than their mother tongue. 
Actually, they prefer to do so... people want their doctor to stay and live along with 
them. Locals are better in this regard ... " [L6. I O, private doctor]. 
1.8 Rationing 
Irrespective of significant variations between health centres, the policy tended to rationing 
doctor's behaviour in prescription without considering differences and customizing 
patterns. Doctors complained about their limited choice in prescription, as well as effects of 
such limitation on their efficiency. Even though 270 drug items, a long list of laboratory 
tests, x-rays, and ultrasounds could be prescribed by family doctors, however, doctors 
were demanding expanded prescription power. Some doctors complained that they were 
not allowed to order even simple tests like FBC (Full Blood Count) in FM scheme (but GPs 
are allowed to prescribe such a test and in general): 
"FBC is the most important lab test which is the mother of all other tests to 
distinguish many diseases. I do not know why we are not entitled to order it (in 
FM)... "[L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
This was echoed by managers: 
"... our doctors ask to be entitled to order HBS-Ag, taking into account its relatively 
high prevalence in our region... " [L2.1, DA, district health manager]. 
Such factors prohibited doctors from providing a basic level of service for their assigned 
population, as well as wasted resources by causing unnecessary referrals to higher levels. 
Nonetheless, the purchaser insisted on doctors' freedom to choose whatever benefited the 
patients: 
"... we reduced drug numbers from 390 to 270, based upon doctors' freedom of 
choice to prescribe whatever they want for their patients... "[NI5, PU, senior insurance manager]. 
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In very remote parts of the country, doctors complained that due to rationing drugs, some 
necessary items were out of access: 
"... some drugs like third generations (sephalosporins), and serum injections have 
not been included (in the list)... " [L2.3, FD, family doctor]. 
In the meantime, some items were being expired because of their rare rate of prescription: 
".. 
.1 
have 273 items in the warehouse, most of which are not prescribed, like 
Idoquinole, Plazil, and Teophilin, which i cannot even return those. 100 items are 
mostly prescribed ... " [L1.3, nurse]. 
2 Impact on private practitioners 
Despite the opportunities that FM provided for practitioners, the private sector was 
opposed to FM. Because of rationing, working conditions, and a lack of dialogue with 
private practitioners when the policy was being formulated, many experienced GPs who 
had been practicing in villages for many years did not join FM. Even at the price of losing 
their jobs or a significant reduction in the number of their patients and inevitably their 
earning, they kept themselves away from the implementation: 
.. 
We should have considered the private practitioners who had invested in the 
rural areas prior to implementation. Because of FM, many established doctors were 
forced to close down their clinics, where they had been working for long... (looking 
at me): Doctor! You used to run a clinic yourself. You know how long we attempt to 
gather some patients. We directed many patients towards the health centres. Over 
a night, we demolished the business as well as the reputation of many private and 
established doctors ... 
"[N5, PU, senior insurance policy maker]. 
Unfair and unilateral contracts discouraged some experienced private doctors from 
practicing in FM: 
"... our contracts were just for three months. Every other night we were asked for 
night shifts. To be honest, the way they treated me I felt I am less than X (a group 
of immigrants in Iran)... what is labour's law? Even labourers have their own 
rights... " [L2.8, private doctor]. 
Despite the policymakers' awareness, FM created job opportunities for many practitioners 
at the price of making many others jobless: 
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"... our main strategy was helping the private sector, not leading it to bankruptcy. 
We did not intend to destroy the practitioners who had been working there for long. 
We should have prioritized and showed them that we were not their enemies... " 
[N17, PR, national health expert]. 
This was why FM was originally planned to be implemented in cities, where there was no 
choice but to contract the private sector. Its concurrence with Behbar, which was not the 
choice of the MOH, destroyed the fragile presence of private practitioners in villages. 
Private doctors were afraid of joining despite being verbally prioritized for recruitment. 
However, they complained that FM had ruined their business: 
"Private doctors complain a lot. Implementing a big change has some losers... 
most of them did not use their priority to be employed [in FM]... I think they must be 
considered within a comprehensive plan. We ruined 100s of established private 
doctors to recruit the 132 family doctors in health centres... They [private 
practitioners] are our colleagues. 24 pharmacies in villages also underwent 
bankruptcy. We are not allowed to bury alive a pharmacist who has invested a lot 
in a village.. . "[P 1, PR, provincial health manager]. 
Most private doctors in villages were forced to close down their clinics and move to other 
places. A few still continued to practice, even though their patients were halved in number. 
Lack of consideration about employing experienced private doctors made some doctors 
call the reformists criminals: 
"... from my point of view, FM has had no positive effect (with emphasis)! Believe 
me! It has only expanded the specialists' income. People at the ministry [of health] 
did something for their own benefits and disappeared then. I suppose the MOH is 
the most criminal ministry in Iran. " [L6.9, private doctor]. 
A small percentage of private doctors joined FM not because of desire, but because of the 
lack of other choices to work: 
"... Doctors hugely lost in this implementation... the MIO contracted some doctors 
who had no choice to survive but to join the programme ... "[P5, O, provincial union]. 
The policy did not allow private doctors who were employed as FDs to practice in their own 
clinics, except in the three cities, where the task was handed over to private doctors. To be 
awarded the contract of a family doctor, they had to close down their clinics. Echoing the 
public, private doctors requested to leave people free to choose their doctor, rather than 
forcing them to visit doctors in health centres: 
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"... this is the public fund, not the minister of health's aunt money! Let people 
choose whoever they like. Why a doctor who had practiced here for 14 years, was 
forced to close down his clinic and leave the village? They caused him to feel that 
his biggest enemy is the MOH. That doctor will become a psychotic... 
[L2.8, private doctor]. 
Employing some practitioners at the price of demolishing others' businesses was also 
condemned and branded against the law: 
"... despite the 4`h plan (for development) and article 44 of the constitution, the 
current implementation is expanding the public stewardship and is demolishing 
many GPs' practices in villages and small cities ..... [N6, O, national union for doctors]. 
Establishing FM practice only in health centres was seen as wasting human resources by 
putting all eggs in one basket: 
"... this minister [of health] has allocated all public funds towards health centres. 
Doctors, who had studied many years using the MOH's scholarship, were fired 
overnight... the minister diminished all of us to improve a village health centre.... 
should the private sector be murdered?... I used to visit 100 patients a day (before 
FM), now hardly reaches 30... my capital was the public's trust, / could not share it 
with others... " [L6.1 0, private doctor]. 
This doctor did not want to share his long-term achievements and position with other 
doctors in health centres, as the majority of them were inexperienced newcomers. Despite 
a huge loss in his income, he was not willing to cooperate. The policy was not flexible 
enough to accommodate the established private doctors and respond to their requests. 
Therefore, some private doctors preferred to be jobless, rather than joining the 
implementation: 
"... 1 prefer to close down my clinic and become a taxi driver, rather than working in 
the health centre [FM]... " [L5.9, private doctor]. 
The history of the MOH was mentioned as the main reason for this mistrust,: 
"I cannot trust them [MOH] because of its black history. People like Mr. X [the 
former minister of health] or Mr. Y [the more previous minister of health] were 
treacherous towards me... these people's past is black from the beginning. They 
are dreaming that they are doing something good, but FM has only filled the 
specialists' pockets... "[L2.8, private doctor]. 
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Nevertheless, the policy was rightly revised to permit the provincial DOHs make fee for 
service contracts with private providers other than doctors, including pharmacists, 
laboratories and radiology clinics. 
3 Impact on the public 
Impact of the implementation of FM on the public is investigated here under four 
categories: 
1. Resistance to rationing 
2. Preference for specialists 
3. Desire for unnecessary prescriptions 
4. Reduced user fees 
This study did not investigate direct accounts of the public, but was restricted to public 
representatives as explained in Chapter 5. 
3.1 Resistance to rationing 
Restricting the public's access to health care was unwelcome. The common result of 
rationing was public resistance. As policy-makers knew that there would be resistance to 
gate-keeping, they called the reform FM to overcome the public reaction: 
"People are generally resistant to limitation. This was why we advised 
implementers to call the reform FM that indicates positive aspects such as active 
care, instead of calling it 'referral' which might have a negative annotation" 
[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
"... people do not like rationing and being controlled by Behbar ... " [Li . 7, councillor]. 
"... similar to their urban counterparts, people prefer to be visited by specialists 
(without being referred by FD) ... " [L1.8, Imam]. 
Lack of choice to visit their desirable doctor, jeopardised the public's cooperation. Even 
though the public complained about rationing, the significantly reduced fees meant they 
did not respect FM entirely. However, serious concerns existed for expanding 
implementation to cities, where people would be asked to pay for health insurance. There 
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is serious doubt therefore to what extent the implementation will be successful, once it 
requires a public contribution to the premium: 
"... taking a number of deprived people with least expectations, whom do not know 
their rights and restricting them to a doctor, is not a masterpiece. You do this to the 
labour community; they will hit you... " [N13, PU, insurance official]. 
Despite trying to convince the public about the benefits of referral and FM, it was difficult 
for them to accept such limitations. Perhaps the pattern of implementation in Golestan, in 
which people were free to choose their doctor (in seven small cities which had contracted 
private doctors), while health centres were in charge of preventive care, caused this 
complication. Because the 95,000 people in the seven cities could register with private 
doctors, who used to be their own doctors, their freedom was intact. On the other hand, 
the remaining 725,000 people, who were registered with FDs in health centres, could not 
select their doctor: 
"... since Behbar came in, we are restricted to the health centre. Despite our 
desire, we are not allowed to see more experienced doctors, which upset people. I 
have noticed that in Z (a small city 25 KM away), people can register with the 
doctor, whom they fancy... I prefer to have the Z model here. If FM is to satisfy 
people, we prefer to be free for choosing our doctor... "[L2.9, imam]. 
This reflects the impact of implementing FM in two different ways in areas close to each 
other. It also indicates how important it was to contract experienced doctors who were 
trusted by the public. Enjoying their support during implementation improved the public 
view of FM. 
3.2 Preference for specialists over generalists 
Bringing the public in line with the referral requirements was difficult because they 
preferred to seek care from specialists rather than GPs: 
"... we live in a society with the taboo of special dominancy and technology 
prioritization... " [P2, PU, provincial policy maker]. 
The public did not consider GPs as suitable for managing even simple issues: 
"... 1 am not happy (with FM) because we are only visited by GPs. They are not as 
capable as specialists in the cities. Their knowledge and experience is limited to 
general medicine... " [L1.8, imam]. 
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Worse still, people did not consider the doctors who were in their mandatory scheme as 
the experienced ones: 
"Most doctors in health centres are inexperienced general physicians who are 
passing their mandatory scheme. For me, experience is more important than 
knowledge... because they are young, they are not as good to manage some cases 
... " [L5.9, villager]. 
There was a consensus that recruiting recently graduated GPs in their mandatory scheme 
was against the purpose of FM: 
"... Behbar is destroying FM because the doctor who practices in the health centres 
does not possess the specifications of a FD. S/he is a temporary and mandatory 
doctor, whose attempt is collecting the money and leaving the village... " 
[N13, PU, insurance policy maker]. 
Even illiterate people in small villages expected to visit specialists for simple issues such 
as a common cold. There were several reasons for this. First, specialists were promoted in 
the mass media and promoted themselves given their power, money and influence. 
Second, although there was a two-fold difference in (private) visit fee for specialist and 
GPs (7000 vs 3000TM), the visit fee itself was low enough to be affordable even by the 
poor. Third, the general cost of health services, particularly for visiting doctors was low 
compared to other services, e. g. hairdressing. People therefore looked at FM simply as a 
gate to specialists: 
"... 1 go to the (health) centre because the doctor there knows to whom refer me. It 
facilitates my referral" [L2.5, Villager]. 
Many people emphasized that they visited family doctors just for the commonplace 
complaints: 
"... 1 just see the family doctor for colds or this sort of things... " [L2.9, imam]. 
Specialists pleaded guilty to creating such a picture of GPs. Some would not accept GPs 
as the gatekeepers: 
"... no specialist will be working under GPs gate-keeping. Relationships are not 
healthy and monitoring tools are inefficient in this country. Who guarantees that 
privileged information is prevented?... "[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker]. 
251 
Specialists also responded to the public's irrational demands more easily, which in time 
became common. Doctors, who took scientifically-based actions, were bypassed by the 
public: 
"People act on the basis of the desirability principle. Once my right decision ends 
up in my infamy, whereas my colleague's wrong decision brings him more glory 
and income, wrong procedure is being inevitably promoted. Monetary motivations 
are the strongest ones. Specialists who undertake any measure to retain their 
clients, not only do not come in line with the referral, but actually oppose it" 
[N7, O, senior insurance policy maker). 
3.3 Demand for unnecessary treatment 
People had illogical demand for some services, mostly drugs. As drugs were cheap and 
accessible, people liked to be prescribed many unnecessary items. A number of patients 
insisted that doctors should prescribe drugs for them. They got offended if a doctor 
resisted doing so: 
"... one of my troubles is convincing people who need no drug.. Unless they pay 
3000TM for drugs, they think that the doctor is not knowledgeable ... " [P4, provincial health manager]. 
Sometimes, people visited and paid another doctor who was not afraid of responding to 
their demands: 
"... People worship doctors who bombard them with injections, antibiotics, pills, etc, 
" [P3, GMU, senior provincial health official]. 
In the current competitive medical market in Iran, most patients' requests were granted so 
as to retain clients. Ironically, most prescribed drugs were not used until they expired. The 
fact that family doctors have been instructed not to prescribe more than 2.5 items in every 
prescription, limited their influence on the public and lowered their respect, because the 
people's unrighteous demands were easily answered upon their visit to the specialists: 
"Some drugs that family doctors are not permitted to prescribe are being easily 
ordered in some clinics. Changing this culture is difficult... " [P4, provincial health 
manager]. 
Such a situation made the public presumptuous to challenge the doctors' prescription: 
.. 1 took my two years old severely diarrhoeic son to the [family] doctor. He only 
prescribed ORS and assured us that he will get better. I told him that the problem 
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was infectious and that ORS could only compensate his salt deficiency. He replied: 
/ am a doctor, / know what to do... / took him to the specialist who prescribed an 
injection and tablet. The first doctor did not act properly" [Li. 8, councilor]. 
This villager was a grocer who evaluated the doctor's prescription as incorrect. He paid a 
specialist several times more to give him what he wanted. The specialist was also not 
afraid to reject his request. These actions bypassed the family doctor and decreased his 
authenticity before the public. 
In addition, rejecting a request could even end up in a argument or fight, whereas a 
positive response led to escalating the prescription items, both of which challenged the 
doctor's position. Worse still, the patient was able to fulfil his request from other sources 
than a FD, which worsened the GP's reputation: 
"... we have a very bad job. Half of the patients complain of cold and leg pain. 
When you cover those problems, they remember their digestive difficulties. When 
they are leaving the room, they also remember their palpitation. Sometimes they 
demand to be prescribed for drugs they are running short of them, irrelevant to 
their current complaints... " [L2.4, FD, family doctor]. 
Furthermore, preventive behaviour was not strong in the society, which made it difficult for 
family doctors to increase the public's compliance to care more about health. People did 
not seek care prior to becoming extremely ill: 
"... We do not normally visit a doctor before we become disabled, or unable to 
move... " [LI. 8, villager]. 
3.4 Reduced user fees 
People were happy with the lower fees, because they could enjoy almost free doctor, drug 
and inpatient services. The public's interpretation of FM was not referral, health, family 
doctor, etc. Most thought the reform was the insurance log-book, rather than FM or even 
Behbar: 
"I am so happy because of the log-books [in response to how he felt about FM]... 
we visit doctors and take drugs at a cheaper price. There was a card beforehand, 
which many doctors did not accept. Drugs were also not subsidized. Using the log- 
books we could ask the doctor to refer us to the specialists... " [L 1.7, villager]. 
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Because of chronic deprivation in rural areas, people did not care about what entitled them 
to services. They only minded two issues: no difference with the urban population and the 
freedom of choice: 
"... at the beginning of the registration process, people were not that hopeful. 
Theydid not believe we were going to give them the log-books... " [L6.9, councillor]. 
They expected to use the log-books even for dentistry services, like holders of other log- 
books (not differentiating FM with other schemes): 
"... some come along showing their [Behbar] log-books, while asking for dentistry 
services. They probably think that because the log-book was issued by the MIO, 
they are entitled to dentistry services like other MIO insured people" [L2.7, village 
dentist]. 
Possessing such an insurance log-book was interpreted as a sense of dignity by the 
public. It acted as a filler to their long-term gaps with their urban counterparts. Being 
mostly unaware of the alternatives to the Behbar log-book, the public was happy because 
of being recognized in the society. 
Nonetheless, villagers still felt inferior because of the extent of their entitlement and 
freedom of choice, compared to other types of the log-books such as the SSO: 
"... many villagers feel inferior because they are unable to use their fBehbarJ log- 
book for the same services as the city inhabitants do ... " [N15, PU, senior insurance 
manager]. 
4 Summary 
The perceptions and behaviour of local staff and the public were shaped by three factors: 
Public resistance to rationing and preventive focus; 
" Private practitioners role ignored; and 
" Public practitioners' rights and needs overlooked. 
The public and practitioners -private or public- were critical of implementation and were 
highly doubtful regarding its sustainability, so did not take the implementation seriously 
and as a permanent task. Practitioners and public's expectation of FM was different from 
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what was being implemented, so they lost their trust in implementation and had little 
positive view towards it. 
First, due to autocratic approach and lack of local understanding, the public long-term 
habit to visit specialists even for common place reasons and sometimes as a fashion, was 
ignored. As a result, people resisted rationing. The majority of the public viewed FM simply 
as a gateway to visit specialists, albeit their main criticism was their restricted freedom of 
choosing doctors. They did not care about health promotion and rationing behaviour. 
Rather they perceived the policy as being Behbar log-books, which facilitated cheaper 
access to specialists and to some extent reduced their difference with city inhabitants. 
Some specialists encouraged this behaviour by inducing "reverse referral" and damaging 
public services reputation for their patients. FM policy being made by a small group of 
specialists with potential interests in the private sector, and given their influence on the 
society and mass media, they had influenced the public towards valuing specialty and 
undermining primary care and general practice. Failing to include these powerful people or 
their representatives in the policy cycle deteriorated their confidence in the policy and 
determined them to stand against it. Excluding established and experienced doctors who 
were trusted and might encourage people towards FM and primary care, resulted that 
implementation failed to tackle these powerful opponents. 
Second, as a consequence of lack of attention to and investment in human resources 
which was discussed in Chapter 8, no situation analysis was carried out to identify losers 
and winners of implementation in advance. For instance, private practitioner's role and 
their requirements were ignored. As a result, it was not only not attractive to them to join 
FM, but they were forced to close down their clinics and leave areas where they had lived 
for a long time. Their business and reputation were destroyed overnight and those 
influential actors who might potentially act as advocates of FM, became its serious 
enemies. Ironically, this also damaged the privatization of services in FM, an aspect that 
the policy had encouraged. The policy did not consider incentives and benefits for 
experienced and established local doctors. For example, there was no difference in the 
income of an experienced doctor and a recently graduated GP who was in the mandatory 
scheme. Private doctors were afraid to risk their reputation in FM, which reduced their 
income and made their duties more difficult. Therefore, they opposed the implementation 
and discouraged the public to utilize FM services. 
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Third, public practitioners were not considered the real clients of the reform. Their rights 
and benefits were not fairly recognized. Practitioners' welfare and basic rights were 
overlooked. Almost all public practitioners felt humiliated and dissatisfied by the way they 
were recruited and treated. Unfortunately, policy makers' mechanical view towards 
practitioners resulted in taking hostility guards against the MOH, instead of organizational 
dependence and ownership. This was because of policy shortcomings and managers' 
behaviour. Policy makers assumed that because of a several fold increase in practitioners' 
payment, they would be happy and obey whatever was requested of them. For instance, 
contracts were unfair and unilateral and practitioners' working condition was hard with little 
incentives. Particularly, doctors were called contractors and were asked to provide 
financial collaterals to be contracted, which led to their negative feeling and lack of trust. 
Reduced user fees were another gesture that adversely affected practitioners' morale. 
Although it was introduced to facilitate the public's affordability, the fee was too low and 
made people suspicious about the good quality of services, so they paid little respect to 
family doctors. In the context that public were not prepared for rationing, it caused serious 
conflicts in practitioner-public relationships and reduced both groups' trust in the policy and 
in the implementers. 
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Chapter 10 Discussion and conclusion 
Introduction 
This thesis had six objectives. The first, to explore and select theories of implementation of 
change, was covered in Chapter 2 and the second, to identify and categorize facilitators of 
and barriers to the implementation of change, was covered in Chapter 3. In Chapters 6-9, 
the third objective of describing the facilitators of and barriers to the implementation of FM 
in Iran was covered. In this Chapter I turn to the final three objectives. The Chapter 
consists of six sections: 
First, the main findings of the empirical research are summarized. Second, before 
addressing objectives 4-6, the findings are explained in the light of the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 2 (completing objective 3). The third section addresses 
objective 4, given the fact that most selected theories have been developed in high-income 
countries, their applicability in Iran is reflected upon. Fourth, I discuss ways in which this 
thesis might contribute to the theoretical literature (objective 5). Finally, the strengths and 
limitations of the study are addressed before identifying policy implications (objective 6) 
and future research needs. 
I Summary of findings 
Three interrelated categories of factors affected the implementation of FM in Iran: 
y aspects of the policy (content), (described in Chapter 6); 
Z the existing environment (context), (Chapter 7); 
the interaction between the two (process), (Chapters 8& 9). 
1.1 The content 
Despite FM being welcomed because of its potential benefits to improve the health 
system, it failed to address several issues and was not based on a correct understanding 
of the situation. This arose because the policy making was autocratic, in which FM was 
formulated by a small group of people and imposed on others. Implementation of FM in 
Iran was obstructed because of trying to impose the policy without taking into account 
various stakeholders' views. In addition, the policy was ambiguous and not realistically 
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tailored. It was a merger of two contradictory policies (FM & Behbar) with divergent goals. 
Such a situation led to a lack of ownership, trust, common language and cooperation 
between actors. The policy lacked a secure and distinct financial basis such that many 
perceived it as unsustainable and did not submit themselves seriously to its 
implementation. 
1.2 The context 
The health system was not prepared to accommodate the prerequisites of the policy. 
Despite some advantages, such as the pre-existing PHC network that facilitated 
implementation, the health system impeded implementation for several reasons. First, it 
lacked a defined macro-level philosophy of governance, which made it difficult to steer FM 
towards a clear destination. As a consequence, the policy was vulnerable to individual 
discretion. Second, FM was not integrated with the financing system. Third, the insight, 
knowledge and resources of implementers, particularly at national level were doubted by 
many. And fourth, politicians used health care to gain political advantage, rather than 
recognizing it as a citizen's right, although some individuals, such as a former minister of 
health and a few MPs, strongly advocated FM. 
1.3 The process 
1.3.1 Ineffective policy execution 
One consequence of the autocratically determined policy was a wide gap between the 
policy as formulated and as executed, because of a lack of local understanding, such as 
aspects of payment and recruitment. Ineffective bureaucracy jeopardized the situation. 
The merger of two contradictory policies (FM & Behbar) by two organizations (the MOH & 
the MIO) who had a history of inter-sectoral hostility contributed to the problem. Moreover, 
political considerations took precedence over a scientific approach and undermined 
meritocracy. Aspects of human resources were not considered sufficiently, so investment 
in them and tailoring their expertise for the task of implementation were undermined. As a 
result, an effective centre for leading the implementation did not form, which resulted in 
lack of cooperation and collaboration. Instead, because of such hostilities, the purchaser- 
provider separation that was put into practice hoping to increase the quality of care, ended 
in mistrust, fighting and accusations. 
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1.3.2 Local antagonism 
The content of the policy and process of implementation shaped the perceptions and 
behaviour of local practitioners and public representatives who were critical of what they 
experienced. Their expectation of FM was different from what was being implemented, so 
they did not trust in the policy for several reasons. First, the policy overlooked the public's 
opposition to rationing and a focus on primary care. Second, the role of private 
practitioners was not considered, so their potential contribution was ignored and lost. Most 
established private practitioners suffered, so they became enemies of FM. Third, public 
practitioners as the main service providers in FM were not considered key clients of the 
reform. Their rights and benefits were overlooked and as a result, they discouraged the 
public to use FM services, which in turn hindered its implementation even further. 
1.4 Overall 
Imposing a policy (FM) the concept of which was supported, together with implementation 
of another policy (Behbar), in a health system which lacked clear governance, as well as 
organizational shortages such as inappropriate finance and an inadequate insurance 
system, ended in dissatisfaction, frustration, a waste of resources and loss of trust. 
Implementation might have increased provision of some services in rural areas, but 
fulfilling its main goals was doubted. It settled doctors and midwives in villages, but despite 
better payments, not only did it not improve practitioners' satisfaction and motivation, it 
actually reduced their trust in the health system, harmed many private clinics, and 
decreased their cooperation. Worse still, villagers, whose satisfaction and equitable 
service provision were highlighted, were unhappy about rationing, lack of freedom of 
choice, and their difference with urban counterparts. They demanded an insurance log- 
book, such as the SSO, to entitle them to free and unlimited services. They opposed 
Behbar therefore and challenged the policy. The implementation ignored the main features 
of FM, such as prevention and health promotion, and threatened the concept of FM. 
2 Theoretical explanations of findings 
As explained in Chapter 2, the findings of this study will be discussed on the basis of a 
four-fold theoretical framework (Harrison, 2004): 
¢ The interpretive frame is used to address the applicability of the 'garbage can' 
notion (Cohen et al, 1972) of health governance in Iran, which is deemed to be the 
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core obstacle to implementation. The 'Multiple Streams' model is employed to 
explain the conjunction of opportunities that resulted in the formation of 
implementation. That also points to the effects of policy actors' perceptions, 
behaviour and beliefs on the implementation process. 
The influence of the administrative frame is clear when discussing the hierarchy of 
decision making and the effects of a top-down approach to the policy. It is used in 
conjunction with other frames to explain the formation of policy and address effects 
of autocratic policy making in Iran. 
The bargaining frame uses a few elements of advocacy coalition framework in 
conjunction with network theories to explain formation of the policy, and impact of 
actors' beliefs and interaction on its implementation. 
The institutional frame employs institutional rational choice theory to illuminate the 
ways that social and political institutions constrained possibilities for action, by the 
government and other players. This frame is complemented by incorporating 
communication models including principal-agent perspective. 
Although I used the four-fold framework to organize my approach and thinking, my 
understanding of what took place with FM in Iran was guided by the application of several 
theories, which were used solely or in different combinations with each other based on the 
structure of the dynamic model of health policy analysis (introduced in Chapter 5). 
2.1 The content 
Formation of FM 
The way that the policy was formed was the main reason for its problematic content. The 
formative stage of policy making and the consequences that are affected by institutional 
and situational factors include coincidence (with Behbar) and external events. The process 
can be portrayed as a series of interrelated games in which bounded rational actors 
pursue their interests as well as those of their institutions. In particular, merger of FM with 
Behbar and the consequence of that affected the implementation of FM a lot. Thus, 
theories of policy implementation are not sufficient to explain the formation of FM. This is 
why, acknowledging that they are not theories of policy implementation, I used 'multiple 
streams' of Kingdon (2003) in conjunction with network theory (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) in 
an interpretive frame to explain how the policy was formed. 
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Kingdon (2003) views policy implementation as being determined by three streams: 
problems, policies, and politics. 
Three problems pushed FM onto the agenda. First, health indices revealed that the 
existing PHC could not respond to the public's requirements anymore. Second, anarchy in 
the insurance system, disintegration of the national health account, and the increasing 
expense of health services drew attention to the need to reengineer the system to a more 
efficient one. Third, the increasing prevalence of chronic conditions such as diabetes, 
obesity and high blood pressure despite several years of preventive attempts brought the 
issue to the fore. Although all these problems were taken on board, other, mostly social 
conditions such as increasing inequity and patchy insurance coverage received more 
attention. The values and beliefs of the former minister of health, his deputy, and some 
other stakeholders as regards equity, quality of care, and the Islamic revolutionary ideals, 
contributed to magnifying problems. This matches the first stream of Kingdon (problems), 
which he categorizes as 'perceptual, interpretive elements' that constitute the need for a 
change of policy. 
Coincidental opportunities also contributed to implementation of FM. Almost at the same 
time that Behbar was approved in parliament, the World Bank agreed a loan of $125million 
to the government of Iran to equip the infrastructure, including health centres. Despite 
many concerns regarding how the money was spent, the overall impact of the loan was 
significant in making health centres better. The coincidence was so intertwined that the 
majority of managers in health authorities did not recognize that the funding source for 
much equipment such as vehicles, laboratory facilities and examination sets was not 
Behbar. Given the MIO's refusal to pay for infrastructure and equipment out of Behbar 
resources, such an opportunity was vital to formation of FM. 
Policies constitute the second stream. Although a wide variety of ideas were considered, 
the idea of FM as the basis for rationing services was welcomed. Its technical feasibility 
(the PHC, human resources, etc) and acceptability (assigning a family doctor to everyone 
and removing financial barriers by Behbar) contributed to the rise of the policy. The idea of 
FM was then adopted by a small group of medical specialists who created a policy 
community network (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Bressers and O'Toole (1998) indicate such a 
network concept: 
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"... has been fuelled in part by recognition of the complex array of actors involved in policy 
choices as well as the inability of contemporary government to move unilaterally without 
incorporating the constraints, preferences, and resources of other social actors". 
The network led by the former minister of health (2001-5) and included the CEO and some 
selected managers from the MIO, the MPO, the SSO, the deputy of health in the MOH, a 
few MPs, and a small number of civil servants with specific interests from the MOH and 
the MWSS. All together the network did not exceed 15 people. Many influential 
stakeholders including the chancellors of universities, the GPA, the IMA, journalists and 
MPs were not included. Despite agreements on micro aspects of the policy, the network 
faced complexities and constraints in achieving common goals. The existence of a small 
group to define policy is not rare (Smith, 1993). For instance, studying partnerships in 
health in Australia and New Zealand, Lewis (2005) points to the strategic information ties 
which were concentrated around a few people. 
In addition to common values and interests among network members, resource 
mobilization and knowledge exchange occasions (such as the flagship and other courses) 
enhanced the performance and achievement of their partnership (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003). The personal experience of the former minister of health and his deputy 
(2001-5) facilitated such mobilization. Even though they were both surgeons, so by default 
should have had little inclination towards primary care, their appointment transformed 
policy subsystems and gave greater prominence to the national unit for health sector 
reform within the DOH. Whatever the reason for their passion, the policy group's top-down 
approach to the policy might have been legitimate in taking the political climate and strong 
opponents' conflict of interests into account. Their effort to develop FM was distinct from 
their role as surgeons, which illustrates two issues. First, institutions do not fully determine 
actions, rather, they provide a set of sanctioned options. Second, actors may choose to 
break the rules, irrespective of the consequences, for many reasons such as their personal 
beliefs, their party benefits, and their religious faith. Scharpf (1997) considers the role of 
idiosyncratic factors in the policy process, particularly the people in leadership positions 
who are less bound by organizational rules than subordinates. 
When the government changed in 1997, elites who possessed novel beliefs, norms, and 
preferences had joined the policy network. The network redefined the problems, made 
themselves knowledgeable and rode on the wave of policy change to push FM onto the 
agenda (Nelson, 1978). The notion of FM and referral existed before. But it was the insight 
and preference of the health minister, who had been the deputy for health previously that 
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obtained a parliamentary vote of confidence for establishing FM. He appointed a task 
group for devising the policy within the DOH in the MOH. The centrality of the ministry of 
health accelerated the process and drew attention to FM as the single significant strategy 
to enable reengineering of the health system. 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) also consider issue networks. This is a less integrated 
perspective, comprising a large number of members with broad values and backgrounds, 
whose resources and power is unbalanced. While policy communities lead most policy 
decisions, issue networks have limited access to the policy process and therefore may 
have less influence. Both are best perceived as the two ends of a policy subsystem 
continuum. However, there was no issue network during the formation and implementation 
of FM. Although the policy was formulated by a few well-known policy makers, it was 
perceived as an imposition from above and biased towards the views of the former 
minister of health and his deputy. Such perceptions had serious consequences such as 
lack of ownership, lack of cooperation and mistrust. It also left the policy vulnerable to 
personal interpretation by local clinicians. Discretionary practice that aimed to counter the 
constraints and other unwelcome consequences of FM, eventually became a routine 
coping mechanisms that adversely affected implementation (Lipsky, 1980). 
Politics (the third of Kingdon's streams) also played a fundamental role in formation of FM. 
He considers three elements here: the national mood, pressure group campaigns, and 
administrative and legislative turnover. Because of the weak structure of NGOs and 
pressure groups in Iran, there was no clear indicator of national mood for or against the 
policy. If there is public support for an initiative, it is more likely to survive, and vice versa. 
Due to the absence of distinguished interest groups, politicians did not have an indication 
of the level of support or opposition. Further, no public poll was conducted to determine 
public opinion. Although public representatives declared their overall support for the policy, 
particularly for Behbar which enhanced access to services, no evidence was found 
indicating a national mood about FM. Rather, public rejection of rationing indicated their 
mood against the need for referral to access specialist care. 
The public were not told about the benefits of FM and their priorities were not considered 
in policy design. There was a lack of local understanding in designing the policy. Long- 
established views of the public, such as resistance to rationing and preference for 
specialist care, were overlooked by policy makers, intentionally or because of lack of 
insight. Mechanistic approaches to the policy meant policy makers failed to understand 
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people's preferences. Therefore, not only were the public in rural areas not satisfied, but 
they perceived the policy as restricting them and putting them in a worse position than 
people in cities. The public did not therefore support FM and did not welcome practitioners, 
which in turn jeopardized the public-practitioners' relationship. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1999) argue that although public opinion is seldom knowledgeable enough to affect policy 
specifics, it can certainly alter general spending priorities and the perceived seriousness of 
problems. 
The three streams of Kingdon's model occasionally flow together, whereby a 'policy 
window' opens (Kingdon, 1985). This presents a temporal opportunity for a 'policy 
entrepreneur' to promote a case and for choices to be made (Zaharadias, 1 999). The 
parliament opened the policy window by approving Behbar and coupling the streams 
together at a critical moment. The window opened in the last days of the Persian year (12th 
March 2005), when the majority voted for the budget with little challenge regarding 
diversion of funds. However, such diversion of funds adversely affected its sustainability. 
The fleeting opportunity of Behbar encouraged the advocates of FM in the MOH to push 
their policy of FM onto the agenda, which had previously been abandoned for many 
reasons including insufficient funds. The policy entrepreneurs were highly skilled at 
coupling. They deliberately defined FM in terms of referral as the only solution to fulfil the 
aims of Behbar. They seized the opportunity to initiate action by convincing the MWSS to 
purchase services in the form of FM. As Kingdon (2003) notes, the success of policy 
entrepreneurs to promote spill-over in adjacent areas is enhanced by underlining a similar 
analogy in legitimising their arguments. In politics, loyalty is a luxury that few can afford 
(John, 2003). At that time, there was a high likelihood that the policy would rise or fall on 
various government agendas, or the opportunity would be lost. Another opportunity to 
implement FM would have been unlikely in near future. 
Incorporation of two policies resembles what Walker (1971) calls a 'momentum 
phenomenon'. Explaining policy formation at high levels in the U. S., he argues that when 
there is a breakthrough in a policy domain which was previously neglected by the 
government, it is often followed by a surge of administrative or legislative policies in that 
domain which have persisted for a long time. The new policy of Behbar revitalized FM, 
which had been neglected for a while. This initial policy shift and deliberate association of 
Behbar with FM had spill-over effects. Such effects secured the position of FM by 
ideologically matching it with the purpose of the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, it became 
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difficult for the MIO to reject FM and referral as the operating strategy for Behbar, despite 
the fact that pay for preventive services were fundamentally in conflict with its mission. 
However, such a fundamental paradox, incorporating two contradictory policies, harmed 
implementation and proved to be causi-reversible. Nonetheless, given the governmental 
change that took place immediately after starting implementation, it became impossible for 
the new government to abandon the reform. 
This quick series of activities to operationalize FM also resembled the notion of "minimum 
winning coalition" (Ricker, 1980), in which the goal is to maximize net benefits at the 
margin, that is, in the short-term. The MOH compromised by accepting the merger of the 
two policies. It was a deliberate attempt to maximize average benefits over the long-term 
advantages of a planned FM policy. The MIO compromised, too, by accepting to pay for 
preventive care, even if it had no choice by law than to do so. 
Using Kingdon's multiple streams to explain the formation of FM at the national level is 
particularly helpful because it integrates policy community networks with broader events 
and addresses the idea-versus-interests dilemma (Hayward, 1991). It connects the broad 
political event (the ideological stream and the revolutionary concept of access for the poor 
and enhancing equity) to a narrow sectoral development of health services (rationing on 
the basis of FM) in specific ways. Although one did not determine the other, political 
events outside the health sector influenced the solution (Behbar) when the window opened 
(the seventh parliament). The model also indicated the importance of self-interest (the 
former minister of health, his deputy, and a few national policy makers) in addressing the 
significance of ideas in two ways. First, solutions to respond to the problems were 
developed not simply on the basis of efficiency or power, but also equity. Second, political 
ideology was a good heuristic in the ambiguous environment of the health system in Iran. 
Politicians, particularly MPs who voted for Behbar, used the idea not only to address the 
public but also to define themselves. The policy entrepreneurs whose purpose was to 
couple Kingdon's three streams, bent the ideological proclivities on some occasions to 
take advantage of fleeting opportunities (Zahariadis, 1996). 
Nonetheless, the model can be criticized for not providing tools for a meso- or micro-level 
analysis or closer examination of the coupling process. In summary, these factors 
influenced the direction of the policy but did not determine or facilitate its implementation 
on their own. Further, the role of policy entrepreneurs is vaguely defined, but it does 
introduce the notion of rational actors attempting to navigate the turbulent and 
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disconnected streams. Exactly how these agents operate and the impact of their values 
and norms on their function are not specified. These will be discussed later using 
Institutional Rational Choice Theory. 
2.2 The context 
2.2.1 Health care governance: `Garbage can' model of choice 
The study revealed the lack of a clear and recognized philosophy for the health system in 
Iran as a big challenge. Instead there was a combination of models, the role of each being 
questioned even by high-ranking national policy makers. Feldman (1989) defines 
ambiguity as 'a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or 
phenomena'. Ambiguity led to confusion, vagueness, and stress. It made the background 
of policy making uncertain, both for macro aspects such as the future of the reform and for 
micro issues such as the required budget. The incremental unveiling of policy over time did 
not reduce the degree of ambiguity (Wilson, 1989). 
The heart of the barriers to implementation was that the policy was made by 'organized 
anarchies' (Cohen et al, 1972), where ambiguity was rampant. In addition, the public were 
excluded from the debate, as were the majority of decision-makers inside the MOH and 
the MWSS. The 'garbage can' analogy is a useful theoretical viewpoint for understanding 
what occurred. The government (both the current and the former which started the 
implementation) were characterized by two general features. First, fluid participation. Staff 
turnover in the MOH and the MIO was high. In particular, subordinates drifted from one 
decision to the next so that prioritization of policies lacked any systematic manner. 
Second, because of ambiguity, the main aims of the reform were unclear for key actors. 
Although the majority praised the policy, every one boarded the policy ship to follow 
his/her own or organizational priority, which were contradictory on many occasions. As 
Weick (1979) suggests, choice becomes less an exercise in solving emerging problems 
and more an attempt to make sense of a partially comprehensible background. Therefore, 
contradiction and paradoxes appear. For instance, although the provincial DOH was 
supposed to strengthen its function to serve FM, capitation payment was cut and the 
number of administrative personnel not increased. In such situation, there was no room to 
use the available information either via provincial feedback or studies conducted by unions 
such as the GPA (Feldman & March, 1981). 
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It is hardly novel that policy makers sometimes do not make their objectives clear. The 
existence of a rationale for a policy avoids decisions being made without precise 
preferences, particularly when there are time constraints. Nonetheless, the strategic 
decision to implement FM concurrently with Behbar was to some extent facilitated by such 
opaqueness. Cohen et al (1972) describe such a situation as "a collection of ideas rather 
than a coherent structure". 
Ambiguity of goals increased the degree of hostility between the two frontline 
implementers: the MOH and the MIO. The primary aim of the former was to bridge the gap 
with primary care in cities, whereas the latter attempted to improve access to services in 
rural areas for the poor. Such a mismatch in the main goal had difficult consequences. For 
instance, the MIO did not accept the capitation payment proposed by the MOH, refused to 
sign a common agreement for five months, and did not cooperate to expand the 
programme to cities, despite the clear emphasis in the policy. This arose because the 
policy for the MIO was insurance for villagers and contracts with the MOH to provide 
necessary services, mostly treatment. The MIO was not interested in health promotion. 
Despite such differences, both implementers agreed upon the name of FM for the policy. 
Divergent and to some extent contradictory approaches to the policy resulted in actors' 
confusion at all levels. 
2.2.2 Effective policy brokering 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) emphasizes policy brokers as drivers of policy in 
bottlenecks. The role of parliament was important, though was sometimes inconsistent. On 
the one hand, the surprising budget approval opened the window and completed an 
important stream to materialize the policy. Some influential MPs in the Commission on 
Health, who were simultaneously engaged in the policy network, played an extraordinary 
role in brokering the policy. They created empathy in legislatures and brought some 
degree of organizational common sense. They persuaded the two implementers to 
cooperate. Being aware of a long history of poor inter-sectoral cooperation in Iran, 
parliament sagaciously planned the programme in a way that the two ministries were 
obliged to cooperate. They deliberately appointed the MOH as the policy maker and the 
MIO as the purchaser. Such a legal distinction ensured FM was not buried by the MIO, 
which was opposed to paying for preventive services. In line with the ACF, the MOH 
reciprocally revised its strategic position based on a new situation (budget approval in 
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parliament) and the need to react to an external event (the recent split of the MIO from the 
MOH). 
Parliament also performed as a strong policy broker to keep the implementers committed 
to the common task. The head of the Commission on Health and a few other MPs 
engaged in several activities to mediate the MIO and the MOH's interpretative tensions 
and practical battles. Policy brokerage was more important to the success of the dominant 
coalition than its own strategies. Parliament also played a role in establishment of the 
National Office for FM (NOFM) within the Ministry of Health. The office played not only a 
role in bringing the two implementers closer, but listened to neglected stakeholders 
including the GPA and the IMA, as well as some key individuals. The former president 
(1997-2005) also acted as a strong policy broker. As the head of the Supreme Council for 
Health and Food Security, he intervened at a delicate time when the two implementers' 
fragile coalition was about to collapse. 
The strong role of parliament because of legislative turnover, which affected the policy in a 
dramatic way, was in contrast to the poor role of interest groups. Parliament initiated the 
concurrence of FM with Behbar which altered the former. Policy networks can be a major 
source of inertia (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992), unless policy equilibrium is punctuated 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991) resulting in a policy innovation. A sudden influx of 
conservatives, who were ideologically against inequity, into the seventh parliament (2003- 
7) of the Islamic Republic, revitalized the revolutionary motto of enhancing the quality of 
life of the poor and those in rural areas. Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) argue that radical 
policy change takes place only when there is a positive feedback in the policy subsystem. 
Because of the strong link that Behbar presented to the ideological purpose of the Islamic 
Republic, it attracted parliamentary support, even at the price of a sudden diversion of 
funds. Both timing and chance were important factors. The Commission on integration in 
parliament altered the annual budget bill for the year 1384 (2005), proposed by the 
government, in order to divert funds into Behbar. The proposed budget for Behbar was not 
based on any rationale and calculation. It was allocated by reducing funds for a few civil 
projects such as dams and road construction. The majority of MPs voted for Behbar 
because of the insurance log-books, which were expected to bridge the access gap 
between rural and urban residents. They overlooked the rationing nature of the referral 
strategy or probably did not realize it. 
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The Commission on Social Affairs in the parliament proposed the Behbar bill. It 
emphasized the role of the MOH as the policy maker but had little idea about FM. The very 
emotional process of gaining approval for the bill surprised both the MOH and the MWSS, 
which had been lobbying the parliament respectively for FM and Behbar on a smaller 
scale. Progress in parliament resulted from concern to support the poor rather than 
improving health. Many MPs might have voted for the bill to promote themselves to the 
public and to attract votes for the next election. They were in the dark either about the 
consequences of referral or the impact of FM on Behbar. Probably their interpretation of 
Behbar was significantly different from the proposed implementers, even the MIO's. Thus, 
despite its overall support, parliament's controversial interpretations of the policy triggered 
a few MPs to oppose implementation. Some MPs opposed referral and suggested that 
people be left free to seek services from wherever they preferred. This was followed by the 
Commission on Health in parliament (interview with the Vice President of COH on 
06.10.2008: http: //www. farsnews. com/newsh. php? hoz=46) that accused the MOH of 
failing to implement FM in villages. Extinguishing the harm of such powerful voices at a 
time that implementation needed support was a difficult task that failed. 
2.2.3 Knowledge and insight of policy makers 
Within the general process of policy change, ACF has a particular interest in 
understanding policy-oriented learning (Sabatier, 1999). Such learning refers to relatively 
enduring alterations of thought or behaviour that result from experience and/or new 
information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives. 
Policy-oriented learning involves increased knowledge of problem parameters and the 
factors affecting them, feedback concerning policy effectiveness, and changing 
perceptions of the probable impact of alternative policies. The framework assumes that 
such learning is instrumental, that is, that various members of different coalitions seek to 
better understand the world in order to further their policy objectives (Eberg, 1997). They 
resist information, suggesting that their core beliefs may be invalid or unattainable, and 
use formal analyses to buttress and elaborate those beliefs or attack their opponents. 
Because there was not a real pro- and anti- FM coalition per se, there was no 'partisan 
mutual adjustment' in either policy. This facilitated an adjustment (learning) of the two 
policies by the provider side (the MOH) and revision of the policy because of the 
'enlightenment function' (Sabatier, 2007) of some external stimuli, such as the irregular 
feedbacks from the periphery as well as sporadic reports such as the one produced by the 
G PA. 
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ACF argues that learning is unlikely to transform into policy change unless the actor who 
learns possesses sufficient power (incumbency) to affect the course of governmental 
programmes (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith , 1999; Hansen & King, 2001). This perspective 
provides a rather self-evident claim that major policy change in the wake of external 
shocks is more likely if an incumbent coalition member revises core aspects of his/her 
belief system (Nohrstedt, 2005). Policy transfer models argue that the motivating factor of 
policy learning or voluntary policy transfer is the policy makers' demand for effective 
solutions to particular problems (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Rose, 1991). To obtain such 
remedies, the only organized attempt was a small policy network within the MOH, whose 
members had minimal knowledge but some relevant expertise and experience to carry the 
task out. They did not research to identify the most appropriate strategy and instruments to 
practice FM. Rather, they devised the policy features by drawing lessons from different 
sources, including their own experience. The incompatible composition of the network and 
the lack of expertise in the policy group resulted in designing a flawed policy, which made 
a significant contribution to implementation failure. The main reason was that the solutions 
were neither tailored to the public nor deliberately pertinent to problems faced in the 
Iranian context (Considine, 2005). 
2.3 The process 
2.3.1 Ineffective policy execution 
2.3.1.1 Lack of balance between policy subsystems 
The advocacy coalition framework focuses on sectoral subsystems made up of individual 
actors rather than communities: not only interest group leaders, but also agency officials, 
legislators from multiple levels of government, applied researchers, and perhaps even a 
few journalists (Sabatier, 1999), who are actively concerned with a policy problem or issue, 
and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain (Sabatier, 1997). Within the 
subsystem, ACF assumes that actors can be aggregated into a number (usually one to 
four) 'advocacy coalitions'. Sabatier suggests that actors are glued within competing 
coalitions by 'belief systems' which range from core beliefs such as the relative priorities of 
health, 'policy core' (the proper scope of government), and secondary aspects (the best 
way to deliver policy). Core values are the least susceptible to change (Sabatier, 2007), 
while policy beliefs may only change following external shocks to the subsystem (such as 
the socio-economic environment). He considers secondary aspects are subject to change 
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following policy learning and refining in accordance with new information and the 
`enlightenment function' of policy analysts. 
A top-down approach to the formulation of FM prevented any subsystem from being 
formed. For instance, the media and journalists were excluded. Such an approach to the 
media was surprising, taking into account many previous occasions when the MOH had 
effectively employed it for its programmes such as breast-feeding, vaccination, family 
planning and traffic accidents. Some authors suggest that there is a direct causal link 
between media attention and rapid policy change (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). They 
mention a few examples of how high media attention to smoking, alongside other reasons, 
in the early 20th century caused a dramatic rise in tobacco consumption, whereas negative 
media coverage since the 1960s has reduced it. However, it is not clear whether it is the 
media or the public attention that determines the nature or intensity of the policy 
improvement. 
Regarding the composition of members in the sub-systems and coalitions, no applied 
researcher was a member of any coalition. However, because actors had multiple jobs, 
some politicians, legislators, policy makers, and managers in the team were also 
researchers themselves or applied others' research that they had commissioned. Because 
the two ministries (MOH & MWSS) lobbied for two separate policies (FM & Behbar), each 
had its own subsystem. The FM subsystem was more organized and slightly better led in 
formulating policy. The glue that temporarily linked the two approaches in one coalition 
was the common core belief in combating inequity. Consistent with the ACF hierarchy of 
belief systems, such a belief was strong enough in both groups to adopt FM with Behbar, 
despite the diverse direction and strategy of the two. Using the guidance instruments 
(change in rules and budgets in parliament) to realize their own policy objectives, the two 
groups reached agreement to concurrently implement FM and Behbar. Under 
parliamentary pressure, both implementers compromised on their own secondary beliefs. 
2.3.1.2 Lack of collaboration and coordination 
The ACF highlights the possibility that many conflicts in policy implementation cut across 
the divide between policy makers and those formally charged with putting policy into 
practice. Formation of a fragile coalition to match the two policies of FM and Behbar failed. 
Not only were the main missions of the MOH and the MIO contradictory but their diverse 
interests were viable to overcome the difficulties of the referral system. Although 
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parliament put some efforts to combine different resources to enrich the quality of health 
services for the rural public, institutional heterogeneity led to coordination problems. 
Zafonte & Sabatier (1998) address such lack of coordination by distinguishing 'strong 
(formal)' from 'weak (informal)' coordination. The implementation of FM suffered from a 
lack of both kinds. Assuming that actors share core beliefs and trust each other, the 
authors argue that actors might alter their behaviour to at least create weak coordination in 
the coalition. Neither prerequisites existed in this implementation. Because of mistrust, 
they lacked the opportunity for informal coordination, which is particularly important among 
members coming from different organizations with legal or structural impediments. 
The relationship between beliefs and organizational inter-dependencies also highlights the 
lack of coordination. Fenger & Klok (1998) categorize beliefs as congruent, divergent, and 
unrelated. They argue that competitive interdependency occurs when the functional tasks 
and resources of actor A interfere with actor B's ability to take action consistent with B's 
goals (and often vice versa). In contrast, symbiotic interdependency occurs when the 
functional tasks and resources of actor A contribute to Actor B's goal (and often vice 
versa). On such an occasion, actors have an incentive to exchange their respective 
resources in order for each to attain its goals. The relationship between the MOH and the 
MIO could be categorized as symbiotic interdependence. Assuming they had congruent 
beliefs, coordination in the same coalition should have been relatively easy. In contrast, 
divergent beliefs plus competitive interdependency will lead actors to be in different 
coalitions. Implementing FM in Iran was a cross-diagonal case. The two actors (MOH & 
MIO) had congruent beliefs (equitable services) but were competitively interdependent 
(one provided healthcare and promoted health while another purchased healthcare 
services). However, the ACF recognizes their policy core belief of enhancing equity as the 
principal glue for being categorized in the same coalition (Sabatier & Zafonte, 1999). 
2.3.1.3 Lack of training 
Individual and organizational experience have a substantial role in assuring desirable 
professional practice and clinical outcomes (Dudley et al, 2000). The surprising window of 
opportunity opened by parliament caused a rushed start to implementation. As a result, 
practitioners were not trained both technically and socially on necessities of FM. A small 
community of health professionals could have played a key role in compensating 
practitioners' lack of expertise by organizing training courses for newly-graduated doctors, 
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nurses, etc, in rural areas (Tantivess & Walt, 2008). Nevertheless, given the transitional 
period of presidential change, if the rushed implementation had not been started and 
practitioners had not been settled in villages, there was a high probability that 
implementation would not begin at all. 
On the basis of Schofield's (2004) model of learned implementation, in order to fulfil the 
aims of a new policy, local staff seek to obtain necessary information to guide policy 
execution and draw lessons from several sources. Two categories of knowledge: technical 
and procedural are required to do so. The model suggests that procedural knowledge has 
an important role in adapting and utilizing technical information, by increasing skills and 
capabilities of practitioners to deal with impediments. This thesis revealed a lack of 
knowledge for both types in implementing FM, let alone its usefulness. 
Schofield's model can also link the lack of training to the lack of issue networks and NGOs 
in Iran. It also links to the substantial lack of collaboration in the country to explain learning 
for policy implementation. She mentions that when practitioners discover the strategies to 
operationalize new policies, they do not hesitate to share such knowledge with others in 
their formal and informal networks, the so-called 'communities of policy learning and 
practice'. She suggests that collective learning among service providers as members of 
policy learning networks can encourage and steer a policy through to implementation. 
However, lack of collaboration and absence of any effective issue network, including all 
stakeholders, inhibit the environment in which knowledge and information are shared and 
exchanged among agents. 
2.3.1.4 Following institutional interests rather than common goals 
Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) broadly conceives institutions as systems of rules 
structuring the options available to actors. Rules can be formal regulations as well as 
informal social norms and shared expectations. By sanctioning some courses of actions 
and encouraging others, this system of rules establishes a frame within which actors act. 
In conjunction with Kingdon's definition of the 'policy entrepreneur', actors in the IRC can 
also be a group functioning as a 'composite actor', which covers many of the actors 
involved in the policy process such as: ministries, interest organizations, political parties, 
and NGOs. Scharpf (1997) mentions the advantage of the framework as treating 
organizations as a single actor rather than analysing the internal actions of an 
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organization. It approaches the policy process as a strategic interaction between actors, a 
dynamic game. 
March and Olsen (1989) argue that institutions are the main independent variables in 
structuring political decisions and policy outcomes. Institutions simplify decision-making by 
providing alternatives that are more or less readily available and plausible. They provide 
familiarity, reduce psychological uncertainty and eventually lead to a belief structure which 
constitutes the routinization of meaning as well as the establishment of coalitions. 
Moreover, institutions rationalize idiosyncrasy, heterogeneity and diversity by shaping 
decision makers' preferences, thereby introducing a measure of uniformity. Altering 
incentives or disincentives, changing the balance of power among policy makers, 
introducing new technology, or shifts in organizational secondary beliefs open windows for 
non-incremental policy change. 
IRC recognizes actors' ideas and interests in relation to their institution. The concept of 
'ideas' covers both cognitive dimensions (descriptions and theoretical analysis of the social 
reality) and normative dimensions (values, beliefs, and identities) (Campbell, 2004). 
Institutional rational choice (IRC) can also contribute to the analysis of the preferences of 
the key actors that revitalized the abandoned policy of FM. The MIO had the least 
institutional interest in providing or even paying for primary care. Rather, its priority was to 
insure people and pay for their treatment when they got sick. On the one hand, Behbar 
was not so much an insurance policy as a government subsidy to support the villagers 
because no premium was paid by the insured. On the other hand, the MIO had been 
recently separated from the MOH and needed to prove its independence. Therefore, on 
the top of the MOH advocates' success in selling FM to the MIO, the Behbar funds were 
an attractive incentive to enhance the MIO officials' agreement to accept FM which ran 
counter to their institutional strategy. 
In addition, following the long-standing principle that whoever possesses the money 
controls the game, the MIO's gesture to accept FM accelerated the flow of funds towards 
the organization. This opportunity was the best tool to end the long-term dominnace of the 
MOH over the MIO. The MIO agreed to implement Behbar in the framework of FM by 
signing bilateral contracts. However, given the chronic embedded partialism in Iran, the 
MIO paid reluctantly for primary care. The lack of cooperation of the two in this common 
task has been so great that the former deputy for health in the MOH (the current advisor to 
the minister in FM in 2008) asked the president in a recent interview (10`h August 2008, 
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http: //www. farsnews. com/newsH. php? hoz=46) to return the FM fund from the MIO towards 
the MOH. He threatened that unless the request was fulfilled, FM could not succeed. On 
this basis, the game played out between the two players over the common implementation 
of FM and Behbar left FM as a loser to Behbar. 
For all these reasons, no effective partnership was established between implementers, 
which harmed implementation. However, at the local level, the public's cooperation to 
mobilize resources and their contribution to improving the infrastructure was far ahead of 
official networks. While government and its hierarchical institutions remain important, 
policy analysis must also take into account a range of open-ended, more ad hoc 
arrangements which increasingly affect decision-making. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) talk 
about 'new spaces of politics' where there are 'concrete challenges to the practices of 
policymaking and politics coming from below'. In their view, policy analysis has to become 
more deliberative: less top-down, involving expanded networks, and more interpretative, 
taking into account people's stories, their understandings, values and beliefs as expressed 
through language and behaviour. 
Partnerships range from the bottom-up, locally self-generated and voluntary, to top-down, 
centrally steered and government mandated programmes. The former appeared to be 
impossible because of the uncooperative background, while the latter so-called 'managed 
networks' (Lewis, 2004) were created by local government officials (DOH and district health 
authorities). Despite some benefits, these types of partnerships faced substantial 
difficulties in Iran. Partnership in the public sector often reflects efforts to institutionalize the 
positive effects of networking (such as increasing diversity by involving a greater range of 
actors) by requiring organizations and programmes to have more formal connections with 
each other (O'Toole, 1997). 
Establishing the National Office for FM (NOFM) was an attempt at appeasing personal 
interpretations and integrating control of implementation. The Office started to include 
more stakeholders and encourage partnerships. However, the way of steering the 
implementation and the speed of the process limited the scope for progress. Again, public 
and practitioners were not effectively engaged and their views were not considered. The 
attitude of the policy network group appears to have undermined the level of trust required 
to influence such a programme. Thus, because of fundamental institutional and to some 
extent ideological differences, the establishment of the NOFM remained only a symbolic 
measure that made no real difference. 
275 
Worse still, there was managerial change, during which a large number of experienced 
policy makers were replaced with inexperienced staff soon after starting the 
implementation. This restricted policy making even more. People with a lack of expertise 
and minimal knowledge took over the task of revising the policy and planning for its 
execution, which harmed implementation. This may stand as the main reason for 
reluctance towards the policy, lack of trust between different actors and minimal 
cooperation. 
2.3.1.5 Ineffective relationship in execution 
The relationship between service providers as contractors and the MOH as the policy 
maker and employer was flawed. On the basis of principal-agent perspective, sub-optimal 
implementation of a policy is an inevitable result of the structure of modern institutions in 
which decision makers ('principals') delegate responsibility for implementation to their 
officials ('agents') such as civil servants in the MOH, doctors, nurses, managers, or private 
contractors (Buse et al, 2005). It explains many failures of top policy makers (principals) 
because of personal discretions by agents and considers the impact of local actors and 
their boundaries in executing implementation. However, it does not explain the institutional 
interests and values of principals, nor the impact of principals' approaches to the policy as 
well as the way that the policy is introduced. 
According to the perspective, principals can only indirectly and incompletely control agents 
(Pollitt, 1993). Agents have discretion in how they operate on behalf of principals and may 
not even see themselves as primarily engaged in making a reality of the wishes of 
principals. The perspective opens avenues to link doctors' and other practitioners' 
behaviour to their own discretion. The majority of practitioners were contracted by district 
health authorities and, therefore, became civil servants, similar to provincial and local 
managers. However, the principal-agent approach makes a distinction and leaves room to 
consider these agents as members of professional unions, such as the GPA. Their 
discretion opens up the potential for ineffective or inefficient translation of the 
government's plan, since agents have their own views, ambitions, loyalties, interpretation, 
and resources which can hinder policy implementation. 
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2.3.1.5.1 Contracting and auditing performance 
The principal-agent insight emphasizes the design of institutions and the choice of policy 
instruments in the knowledge that the 'top' needs to monitor and control local staff at a 
reasonable cost. This has led to an increasing focus on the contracts to define the 
relationship between principals and agents as a mechanism to ensure the principal that its 
objectives are followed by agents, aiming to improve the efficiency of service provision 
through market mechanisms (Mills et al, 1997). Adopting such a concept for FM, contracts 
were designed to be signed between the district health authorities and the provincial 
department of health as the official representatives of the government, and the 
practitioners. 
Sheaf and Lloyd-Kendall (2000) argue that contracts must institute mechanisms to ensure 
that providers realise a principal's objectives, and embody a strong principal-agent 
relationship between authorities and providers. In addition, in the setting of primary care, 
they ask for consideration of two aspects in contracts. First, focusing more on evidence- 
based processes of primary care, health outputs and patient satisfaction and less upon 
service inputs. Second, the need for longer-term contracts in order to promote the 
'institutional embedding' of the agent in the wider management system. Neither of these 
was considered while making contracts in FM. Instead, a number of issues diverted the 
contracting from its intended function and made it an unwelcome experience for many 
practitioners, which reduced their motivation. 
First, the vague macro governance for the health system created a paradoxical 
environment of contracting private agents, albeit they were public employees. Second, 
contracts were prepared and drafted with minimal consultation with legal and human 
resources advisors, even inside the MOH. Most practitioners interpreted their contract as 
humiliating. Calling providers 'contractors' and asking doctors to provide bank security 
damaged their dignity. Doctors did not expect such terms being used. 
Third, contracts were too vague, unilateral (many commitments for the provider side 
against minimal responsibility for the principal), and no-specific in many important aspects 
such as time and payment. Fourth, contracting was complex and bureaucratic. 
Practitioners were given only a couple of hours to sign a contract after months of delays 
and the contract had to be signed by officials at three levels. This caused delayed payment 
and wasted time, money, and energy. Practitioners did not receive a copy of their signed 
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contract which made them suspicious that the principal was going to exploit them and 
damaged mutual trust. 
In contrast, Tuohy (2003) points out how vital a trust-based principal-agent relationship is, 
as well as a contractual relationship in which actors are relatively well-informed. This might 
then lead to performance monitoring and information sharing within complex and loosely 
coupled networks. Thus, the flawed process of contracting, in turn, adversely affected 
auditing performance. 
For all these reasons, contracts discouraged practitioners and adversely affected their 
attitude towards the reform. Despite the emphasis to expand privatization, the principal 
was gradually converted to a substantial controller of the reform rather than steering its 
principles. The MOH highlighted the low incentive the private sector had to invest in 
primary care in deprived and rural areas as the reason for public expansion of services. 
However, despite their willingness, the majority of established private practitioners in some 
areas were not contracted. Instead, government was unable to design and negotiate 
contracts in a way that ensured the government was able to derive significant efficiency 
gains from contractual arrangements. As an example, in order to promote privatization and 
retain private doctors loyal to the reform, rather than making them enemies, the MOH 
could have subsidized a major proportion of patients' fees to visit private doctors, at least 
in the early months (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). Experienced and trustworthy private doctors 
were not allowed to promote the policy and explain the role of referral to the public. 
In addition, in order to increase the quality of services, the principal-agent perspective 
considers performance indicators as essential to ensure the delivery of services is 
satisfactory and to assess whether they are meeting government objectives or not. Smith 
(2002) points to four key factors-from a principal-agent viewpoint- that the effectiveness of 
performance measurement depends on: the extent to which the chosen performance 
measures reflect faithfully the objectives of the system, the nature and quality of the data, 
the incentives for practitioners to scrutinize and act upon the data, and the culture of the 
organization within which the data are deployed. The optimal design of performance 
measurement systems relies heavily on local factors. If correctly considered, they are likely 
to offer a highly cost-effective instrument for securing major improvements in system 
performance as well as motivating practitioners. Unfortunately, the auditing system in FM 
was flawed in all aspects. There were no defined criteria to conduct audits, auditors were 
not qualified, the checklists were unknown and kept from practitioners, and the result of 
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such audits were wrongly and to some extent discriminately applied. As a result, the audit 
was used as a tool by the principal to judge an agent's performance. Not only did auditing 
not improve providers' behaviour, but it was abused by practitioners to legitimize their poor 
performance. 
2.3.1.5.2 Purchaser-provider split 
Principal-agent perspectives recommend contracting out of services to the private sector if 
this is regarded as superior to in-house, public provision, or the establishment of more 
independent public providers, so-called 'public firms' or'public enterprises'. Purchaser- 
provider separation that was applied for the first time at this big scale in Iran did not 
succeed in changing the status quo of primary healthcare. Similar experiences have been 
reported in decentralisation of secondary care services in Iran (Jafarisirizi et al, 2008). 
Instead, the separation became a reason for fighting, misunderstanding, lack of 
cooperation and failure of the fragile partnership. Despite this, the majority of interviewees 
praised the concept of separation for three reasons: they were unaware of either the 
consequences of separation or the historical barriers before its implementation, they 
supported the idea to attain their own benefits, or they simply adhered to the common rule 
of ceremonial talk in Iran. 
The separation that aimed to improve the relationship between the principal and agents, 
damaged the relationship between the two implementers, mainly because of their 
institutional past. Devil shift (Sabatier et al, 1987) encompassed their relationship, 
particularly on the MIO side. Most actors from each group assumed that they are correct, 
virtuous, and fair in their judgments. Thus anyone who disagreed with them must be 
mistaken about the facts, operating from the wrong value premises, or acting from evil 
motives (Harrison, 1976). Such a relationship became a strong barrier to effective 
cooperation. On the one hand the MIO, that used to be under the MOH, looked at 
implementation as an opportunity to prove its independence and superiority to its rival 
(MOH). On the other hand, it was hard for the previously superior institution (MOH) to 
recognize the MIO, which it viewed as a child, to control the funds. Although both 
organizations occasionally showed some degree of common language and agreed upon 
certain objectives, they never became close enough to cooperate. The separation harmed 
implementation and wasted resources in fighting, when unity and cooperation were 
essential. This was why the MOH explicitly admitted that due to mismatches between the 
MOH and the MWSS, people have not experienced the benefits of the reform after three 
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years of implementation (interview on 20.10.2008: 
http: //www. farsnews. net/newstext. phi)? nn=8707280657). People were pronounced as the 
main victims of the disagreement between the implementers, despite lots of meetings to 
resolve problems. 
2.3.2 The process: Local antagonism 
Promoting health and increasing the quality of services, particularly through strategies 
such as FM and referral requires engaging people and building stronger partnerships. 
Such a cooperative environment may ultimately lead to better outcomes through a 
coordinated service, where actors and institutions understand each other's roles and have 
ongoing relationships. Such trust and cooperation leads to opportunities to do more things 
together (Lewis, 2005). However, experience of FM in Iran could not enjoy effective 
partnerships, reasons for which are discussed below. 
2.3.2.1 Actors' discretion 
The principal-agent perspective can partly explain the amount of agents' discretion and the 
complexity of the principal-agent relationship that was observed during implementation. 
Implementation of FM started universally for almost 24 million people, accounting for about 
one third of the population of Iran. FM was implemented on the basis of rationing services 
through referral, which was a big change and against the public's habits. Coast (2001) 
argues that whether citizens want agents to make rationing decisions on their behalf is 
ambiguous. She concludes that citizens also vary considerably in the extent to which they 
want to be directly involved in making rationing decisions. Agents, in contrast, view citizens 
as needing them to make decisions. The citizen-agent relationship in this implementation 
was both imperfect and complex. The vague policy left space for agents' discretion which 
was difficult to deal with. The degree of discretion and the idiosyncratic behaviour of 
managers and practitioners occurred for several reasons including: the public's lack of 
awareness and preparation, historical deprivation in rural areas, and the villagers' 
longstanding gap with city inhabitants, which had been promised would be bridged through 
this reform. 
In addition, the nature of the policy was distributive (allocating public funds to insure 
villagers and providing health services for them at a very cheap price). As Ripley and 
Franklin (1982) suggest, it is easier to implement distributive changes than regulatory or 
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redistributive ones. Redistributive policies have obvious losers, whereas the cost of the 
regulatory ones is spread across the population less visibly. Contrary to the benefits of 
investors, the rationing strategy had a regulatory nature with a potential to restrict 
specialists and threaten the utilization of sophisticated medical technology. Grindle & 
Thomas (1991) recommend that likely opponents be identified prior to making policy. Lack 
of such an analysis caused them to oppose the change in Iran. 
Two other factors affected the relationship. First, apart from the pre-existing PHC that 
facilitated implementation, most contextual factors obscured it by increasing the possibility 
of individuals' discretions. Lack of preparation in villages encouraged interference of 
providers by the public, which jeopardized the situation by discouraging practitioners to 
stay. Second, lack of capability in the MOH and the MIO was worsened by replacing 
managers and policy makers with officers who had a lack of knowledge and expertise. 
2.3.2.2 Failed expectations 
Ideas played an important part in the policy perception. John (2003) defines ideas as 
discourses that are closely connected to political interests, neither determined by them nor 
determining of them. Both FM and Behbar, as well as the final policy draft for concurrent 
implementation had a clear ideological component that was illustrated in the 
implementation slogan: 'improving equity through the enhanced accessibility and 
increased quality of services'. Wrapping the package of services in the auspicious of FM 
created a positive picture for people. Many villagers even in remote areas perceived FM as 
an opportunity to have a personal doctor who visited them at home and actively looked 
after them. Lots of practitioners, including doctors, expected something similar to what 
they had seen in some foreign movies. Given the chronic deprivation in many rural areas 
and the long-term gap in scale and quality of available medical services, the policy was 
initially perceived as a remedy, and so it was welcome. However, because of rationing 
care, which was not explained to the public in priori, and given people's preference to visit 
specialists, it turned into a bitter cultural crash and failed to fulfil expectations. 
2.3.2.3 Lack of mutual trust 
The degree of trust between different groups of actors was poor. Practitioners did not trust 
the MOH and its intentions. In a society in which being a specialist was fashionable, the 
majority of FDs did not trust the government plan to award them the degree of 'specialist 
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in family medicine' after a couple of years of services. The public also did not trust the 
government and were dubious about its real intentions. Worse still, the two implementers 
themselves did not trust each other. Lack of trust led to a lack of common language, low 
degree of cooperation and partnership, minimal coordination, disintegration, and inevitably 
led to implementation in ways not intended. 
The basis for mistrust varied. For instance, service providers were not considered 
important clients. Not only did they not engage directly or indirectly in making and diffusing 
the policy, but their dignity and status were diminished. Some doctors lost their long- 
established businesses overnight. The way of contracting practitioners and the process of 
their recruitment negated the positive impact of some innovations such as financial 
incentives. It also raised practitioners' anger and suspicion. An example was the lack of 
involvement of doctors in determining tariffs for health services. Reducing user fees to 
almost zero was on one hand in line with the equity objectives of the policy. But on the 
other hand, it led to either destroying providers' trust and decreasing their reputation, or 
over-utilization of the service, both of which were in conflict with the aim of FM. Such a 
strategy might have been avoided through communication with doctors or consulting their 
representatives. Over-utilization of services ended in practitioners' high workload leading 
to anxiety, stress and frustration. 
Another example was employing staff at some health centres to carry out duties 
inappropriate to their qualifications. For example, nurses as pharmacy assistants or 
midwives as nurses. It was a mistaken coping strategy to address the personnel shortage. 
It increased mistrust, reduced the quality of care and left practitioners angry, all of which 
eventually harmed implementation. As Lipsky (1980) points out, when front-line staff face 
implementation constraints, ambiguous policy content, uncertainty in the work 
environment, or work-related hazard, they invent mechanisms to counter such problems. 
These coping mechanisms may partly explain deviations from the expectations of national 
policy makers. The main hazard for implementation was routinizing such discretions, some 
of which diverged from the principle of FM. For example, lack of health record keeping in 
health centres and reducing the emphasis on prevention became routine in the health 
centres. This confirms Lipsky's view that lack of commitment among senior actors to 
provide adequate resources, made the work environment unpleasant and affected frontline 
actors negatively, so they lost their faith in the policy. 
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Further to the implementers' failure to build trust and partnership, the quality of 
relationships was also based on political preferences, rather than capability and merit. 
Even the low proportion of practitioners' pay based on performance was subject to 
individual opinion. As a result, pay for performance did not enhance practitioners' courage. 
Instead, practitioners felt abused and punished. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The implementation of FM is a case study that illustrates the importance of coincidence 
and opportunism by rational and institutionally embedded actors in pushing a complex 
reform. In addition, the lack of competing coalitions led to abandoning the idea of reform 
during unstable conditions. 
The complementary theories which were incorporated into the analytical model show the 
level of competition to define the nature of policy change. Their value is inextricably linked 
to the narrative of policy change that is selected. Using complementary frames to explain 
findings revealed that what appears to be a new reform is in fact a continuation of long- 
term trends towards stronger state control in planning and providing health services, 
despite the legal emphasis on privatization in Iran. The current actors and policy 
processes reflect broader policy trends, more apparently the lack of clear health 
governance in Iran. 
Studying the lack of partnership between actors revealed that it is not only theory that is 
needed to drive implementation, but also more appropriate methods for exploring pluses 
and minuses. Pure description explains nothing, yet reflects the complexity of reality, while 
abstract theorizing and modelling explains much but only by ignoring the complexity of 
reality (Hay, 2002). The thesis also revealed that organizational structures and beliefs are 
in relation to actors' performance and vice versa. 
A theoretically-based policy approach enhanced the understanding of the underlying 
programmatic ideas and values in policy formulation and its implementation. Centralization 
of political control, maximizing institutional benefits and 'benefits of scale' to fulfil the 
revolutionary slogan were the underlying values. The increasing mistrust between actors 
which inhibited them from cooperation was combined with a strategic miscalculation: 
relying only on financial incentives as the steering mechanism to encourage practitioners, 
while the majority of practitioners (public and private) were overlooked and their interests 
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were ignored. Moreover, the pace and tight steering of the process left relatively little room 
for a broader public and political debate. The policy process that led to what has become 
the second revolution in health sector reform in Iran, was in actuality determined by 
relatively few actors involved in decisive moments, who were pursuing diverse goals with 
contradictory interpretations. Understanding such a policy network proved to be helpful in 
appreciating coupling of streams to make real-life policy making and implementation, 
which contributed in the analysis for the policy. 
The policy that was welcomed because of its innovation and incentive for cooperation was 
badly implemented. Contrary to its purpose, it not only dissatisfied the public but also left 
the majority of practitioners frustrated. Core to all this disarray was a simple but crucial 
societal character: the main stakeholders did not make their main goal clear. They adopted 
the policy with contradictory and clashing interpretations, while prioritizing their individual 
and institutional interests over the public's benefit. The window of opportunity opened and 
the policy was adopted on the basis of beautiful and ideal words rather than real solutions 
to common problems. The policy itself was a contradictory attempt to connect two different 
problems by two hostile organizations with divergent missions. Despite some deliberate 
efforts for reducing practical problems, the big divergence between Behbar and FM was 
too fundamental to overcome the challenge. 
The policy was ideal, but too visionary. The two implementers agreed verbally and in 
written agreements to cooperate. Yet, their efforts to bridge the huge gap in their approach 
ended in increasing misunderstanding, less compromise, and more fights. Parliament's 
attempt to split the purchaser from provider ended in mistrust between the two and to 
some extent depreciation of the essence of FM. The goal seemed to be neither integrating 
insurance nor improving health, rather it was a political gesture to show that parliament 
cares about the poor. That is why the cost-effectiveness of distributing log-books to 24 
million people, while almost 10% of villagers had insurance overlap, was not evaluated. 
However, the extent to which FM was really implemented after four years of running the 
programme remains unclear. To date, almost 2500billionTM (El. 5billion) has been spent 
on implementation. In return, a big turnover of practitioners has occurred, bilateral 
agreements have been delayed, per capita expenditure for healthcare decreased while 
inflation is sharply increased, and the plan for expanding implementation to cities has been 
postponed for the fifth time. Nonetheless, the implementation could be seen as successful 
if its main goal was settling GPs and midwives in rural areas, irrespective of their attitude, 
public satisfaction, and quality. 
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A significant mistake at all stages was that different actors were not acknowledged and 
their roles not taken seriously. Therefore, they mistrusted the policy and the implementers, 
and their cooperation was reduced. It would have been very difficult to universally 
implement FM without the public-civic partnership. Such a partnership was not 
meaningfully established at different levels. Although some independent networks 
coexisted along with the policy network, they did not work together for similar purposes. 
Rather, they pursued contradictory, personal, tribal, or institutional aims that ended in 
minimal cooperation and partnership. Given the inadequate preparation of the health 
system and uncertainties of long-term finance, the sustainability of the policy was the main 
concern for many, considering the tough period that the country has recently been 
experiencing. 
3 Applicability of selected theories in a middle-income country 
Many experts point out the importance of contextualization in both place and time in health 
policy analysis (Walt et al, 2008). Health policy environments in high-income countries 
differ from those in middle and low income countries, where, for example, there are 
weaker regulations, regulatory capacity and monitoring systems; lack of purchasing power 
as a leverage to influence types and quality of services delivered; and more patronage in 
political systems, among many other differences. In spite of differences between high and 
low income countries, however, it is increasingly recognized that policy processes are 
changing everywhere. Over the past 10 years, a significant shift is acknowledged in the 
nature of policy and policy-making, which points to the involvement of a much larger array 
of actors in the policy process (Buse et al, 2005). 
All theories/approaches that were used to analyse the findings of this thesis, have been 
initiated and developed in the context of high-income countries of Europe and North 
America. Although some theories have been applied in the context of middle and low 
income countries, the conjunction of theories in the four-fold framework has not been 
tested in a middle-income country. As this thesis revealed, the experience of FM in Iran 
faced a number of facilitators and barriers because of the macro-political structure of 
Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as socio-economic and cultural specifications of the 
country, many of which differ from characteristics of Western societies. Furthermore, policy 
is increasingly shaped and influenced by forces (such as global civil society) outside state 
boundaries (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The growing literature around issues of globalization 
reflects the extent to which the world is perceived to have changed. For instance, 
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exchanges have become faster; and ideas and perceptions spread rapidly through global 
communications and culture. This section investigates the applicability of the theories used 
in understanding the story of implementation of FM in Iran. 
3.1 Multiple Streams and network theories 
This thesis showed the applicability of multiple streams theory in explaining the conditions 
in which FM was brought to the fore, however, the nature of problems were different from 
the context in the West. For instance, ideological beliefs rooted in revolutionary ideas of 
the Islamic republic, such as the importance of equity, pushed decision makers towards 
reform. Besides, expediency and coincidence accelerated the process of policy ratification 
in such background. One of main contextual differences between middle and high income 
countries is the extent to which evidence-base policy making is practiced. Historically, 
middle-income countries have been behind the latter, so that individuals' power as well as 
coincidental events, have steered policy more. 
Politics was a crucial factor in formation of FM in Iran, but in different ways than Kingdon's 
background. For instance, the role of individuals and their supremacy over others to push 
the policy was highlighted. Whereas, organized political frameworks such as advocating 
bodies or elected parties run the agenda in Western democracies, even though powerful 
individuals might be behind the scenes in those contexts as well. For example, Dye (2001) 
argues that even in a democracy like the United States, public policy is made from the top 
down, not from the bottom up. In his view, public policy reflects the values, interests and 
preferences of the governing elite. Dye separates policy development from 
implementation, admitting that bureaucrats may affect policy in implementation, but 
suggesting that all decisions are monitored to ensure they are not altered significantly. 
Therefore, the macro picture of the two settings might appear not significantly different. In 
addition, the thesis revealed the negative effects of imposing policies on lower-level actors 
as well as high rank stakeholders, who were overlooked in making the policy. It also 
uncovered the adverse effects of ignoring issue networks and front-level staff on quality of 
services, as Lipsky (1980) points out, as well as a lack of academics- so called 'epistemic 
community' networks engaged to justify the policy, as Stone (2001) argues. 
However, the experience of FM in Iran revealed additional components to Kingdon's 
streams such as opportunism and coincidence, without which the policy was unlikely to 
materialize. Kingdon considers contextual-based flexibility in strategies to fulfil goals. 
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There are other Western-based models, including Walker (1971), which points out 
"momentum phenomenon" to fulfil policy by appreciating golden times. However, 
diversions such as the merger of two contradictory policies (FM with Behbar), have not 
previously been addressed in the model. 
Lack of pressure groups, NGOs, and CSOs because of the nature of the political structure 
in Iran, is among main differences between Western democracies and the Iranian model of 
governance. Instead, intra-governmental advocates within the MOH pushed FM onto the 
agenda. Moreover, legislative influx changes were not attributed to shifting power from one 
party with political majority with another in Iran. Rather, revolutionary mottos and 
ideological motivations was a main incentive. Despite fundamental diversities between the 
two political regimes at macro-level, the third stream of Kingdon applied to the context of 
Iran based on its unique structure of Islamic republic. All in all, Kingdon's model appears to 
be applicable in the context of middle-income countries including Iran, with a few 
contextual modifications. 
The multiple streams showed their sensitivity to the different dynamics in problem 
definition, solution development and the political processes that brought the three together 
at a particularly opportune moment in Iran. It showed how the impact of ideas could be 
explored without necessarily denying the importance of self-interest. It also reshaped the 
ability of the 'garbage can' concept to explain forming a policy in a middle-income country. 
3.2 "Garbage can" model 
The 'garbage can' perspective was a useful notion for investigating the role of health 
system governance on experience of FM in Iran. Two characteristics: high turnover of 
actors and ambiguous aim applied here. In addition to these characteristics of the model, 
embedded individualism in engaged organizations was important. Unlike in Western 
democracies in which civil servants' turnover is not subject to political change, in Iran the 
unstable position of actors because of political shift led to greater ambiguity. Thus, the 
"garbage can" model applied in this context, but not due to its traditional character in high- 
income countries. Rather, a unique political regime and governance of health, consisting of 
an amorphous pattern of different philosophies of health governance made it applicable. 
Its appropriateness in this context might indicate a lack of transparency and defined 
governance in Iran. Even some high-ranked policy makers were unclear about the main 
goal of the reform in Iran. Ironically, ambiguity contributed to formation of FM policy, 
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regardless of implementation outcomes, which would have been hard to achieve 
otherwise. Political ideology was a good heuristic in the ambiguous environment of the 
health system in Iran and pushed some influential individuals' pet policies to the fore. 
3.3 Advocacy coalition framework 
Sabatier (1999) argues that the ACF was originally developed with a largely American 
context of federalism in mind and most of the initial applications were on energy and 
environmental policy in the USA. However, since the late 1980s, it has been applied to a 
fairly wide variety of policy areas in European and Commonwealth countries. The 
minimum condition for the AFC applicability is that some degree of coordinated dissent 
from the policies of the dominant coalition must be possible, which was applicable in the 
context of health sector reform in Iran. 
However, there was no distinct and defined coalition per se in implementation of FM in 
Iran. Rather, groups of unstructured and influential individuals advocated FM. In other 
words, despite fundamental differences between the USA, where the ACF developed and 
Iran, elements of the theory were helpful in understanding aspects of implementing FM 
including: role of policy brokers; values and beliefs and their impact on actors' behaviour; 
policy changes as a result of learning; importance of explaining reform to the public; and 
coordination of executing change. The ACF was a useful tool to anatomize the potential 
impact of diverse members of coalitions affecting FM. For instance, the media community, 
applied researchers, and other important stakeholders were among anticipated coalition 
members, effects of their absence were realized from the ACF platform. Instead of 
coalitions, there were a number of policy subsystems across frontline organizations 
including the MOH and the MIO. Therefore, policy subsystem is a more accurate substitute 
for coalition in this context. As a result, a temporary alliance of the two was formed based 
on interests (organizational or individual) rather than core beliefs. This was consistent with 
the ACF which argues that achieving policy change usually requires that an advocacy 
coalition augments its resources by developing short-term coalitions of convenience with a 
variety of other groups (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
The ACF also proved to be an important framework to address some essential aspects 
which hindered the implementation of FM. Composition of coalitions, coordination among 
actors and role of training are among examples. The framework overlooks the role of 
public in coalitions and undermines their preparedness and briefing in core policy change. 
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It is rooted in the federalism in the USA, in which the composition of representatives of 
citizens including pressure groups, CSOs and interest groups who negotiate to define and 
implement the policy on behalf of the public. Whereas, the experience of FM in Iran 
showed how core policy beliefs are changed as a result of political interests. Embedded 
autocracy in a theocratic democracy resulted in a top-down approach to policy and a lack 
of public engagement. These led to resistance to the imposed policy of FM. 
The value of the ACF in explaining the implementation of FM also lies in its ability to show 
the delayed process of policy learning in formulating the reform. Despite leading policy 
makers' awareness of its necessity, it took almost a decade for the policy to be adopted. 
Sabatier (1998) argues that in decentralized political systems, such as the United States, 
coalitions that do not agree with a policy have numerous points of appeal (a court, 
legislatures, etc) that have different biases. Thus, dissatisfied coalitions can almost always 
find at least one route of appeal that will substantially block or delay implementation of the 
new policy. In contrast, in a more centralized system like Iran where routes of appeal are 
restricted, and civil society organizations and pressure groups are lacking, the dominant 
coalition might have been able to adopt the policy much more easily. For instance, by 
convincing the policy broker (the COH in parliament) of the merits of the policy without 
having to change the views of the other subsystems. However, long delays in 
implementation challenges the capability of the entire system to respond to societal needs 
and accommodate change in Iran. As bottom-up studies have shown, there is seldom a 
single dominant programme being pursued at different levels of the government (Hjern & 
Porter, 1981). 
The ACF showed the virtue of highlighting the possibility of addressing the conflict in 
implementation by dividing it between the policy makers and those formally charged with 
putting policy into practice. However, it could not explain why a small group of members of 
the dominant sub-system (MOH) who were powerful and influential enough to impose the 
policy earlier and attract funds to conduct pilot studies, waited until they were forced to co- 
implement it with Behbar. Further, the framework implicitly assumes that actors who hold 
similar policy core beliefs will act in concert and coordinate their behaviour (Zafonte & 
Sabatier, 2004; Weible, 2005; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). This was dubious in this 
implementation. Weible (2005) argues that organizations are unable on their own to 
produce the necessary resources to achieve their goals, so they must acquire additional 
resources from others. In contrast to this, even the small team of FM implementers had 
different approaches to auditing performance, allocating resources, and defining 
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appropriate services for the package. In line with Schlager (1995) and Schlager & 
Blomquist's (1996), even some strongly shared beliefs by the two implementers, such as 
making services more equitable and pooling resources, did not overcome the essential 
diverse common goal. Such beliefs decreased the probability of successful 
implementation, either for FM or Behbar. 
By focusing on shared policy beliefs within a coalition, the ACF ignores the interest that all 
individuals and organizations have in maintaining and increasing their viability and welfare. 
As a result, the interactions within and between implementers substantially diminished and 
hidden conflict between them flared up. Despite talk about the common core policy beliefs 
among the coalition, this study revealed the reverse. The main barrier against 
implementation was divergent macro goals between the implementers as well as their 
contradictory interpretations of the policy. Given this, the premise of shared belief remains 
doubtful and the challenge to the theory must be approached more cautiously. A good 
example is policy-oriented learning which took on a particular pattern in Iran. Due to 
diverse goals even for the two main policy sub-systems across the MOH and the MIO, 
each of them resisted information, saw the other as a rival not a collaborator, accused one 
another's policy core beliefs as invalid or unattainable, and attacked each other as 
opponents. This is what I call anti-coalition behaviour within semi-established coalitions or 
policy sub-systems in Iran. Given the different structure of the implementers, the changes 
and revisions in responding to feedback would also seem to contradict the widespread 
assumption that institutional differences are primordial. The study revealed that learning 
was not equally prominent but was still useful in explaining how political interests affect 
policy choices. Nevertheless, Sabatier (1999) rules out to include such concerns about 
coordination in the ACF because they are based on an alternative model of the individual. 
3.4 Institutional Rational Choice (IRC) 
The IRC approaches the policy process as a strategic interaction between actors, like a 
dynamic game. Such a perspective provided an understanding of the role of institutions, 
such as the MOH and the MIO in implementing FM. Applying the IRC in this study 
revealed that it might be accurate to consider members of the policy system, either civil 
servants or managers, as representing the interests of the organization for which they 
work. In other word, pursuing organizational interest by members of the key coalition 
impeded implementers' constructive cooperation. More accurately and, in contrast to the 
IRC assumption, this study revealed that individuals did not cause this problem. Rather, 
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engaging two organizations with divergent approaches to carrying out a common task 
which needed compromise and bilateral understanding reduced their cooperation. The 
experience of FM also showed the impact of institutional interests to overrule temporary 
settlements, based on the IRC. It represented empirical validation of IRC's theoretical 
emphasis on perceptions and trust in policy games (Scharpf, 1997). The extent to which 
the society was politically contaminated, contributed to such application of the IRC in Iran. 
In line with the IRC, the concept of actors' partnership was applicable in explaining the 
nature of common work in implementation of FM. Such partnerships were centrally steered 
with specific deliverables and targets defined by the centre rather than the individuals' 
relationships, which hampered implementation substantially. Undermining meritocracy as 
a result of political preferences was the main reason behind civil servant personnel 
changes after governmental change in Iran. This might be one of major contextual 
differences with Western democracies. Expectedly and similar to high income countries, 
the notion of path dependency applied in Iran. Because of embedded partialism and 
individualism in the society, returning to the past was pursued with even greater 
enthusiasm in this reform. Implementation was jeopardized not only because of resistance 
to change, but also because of the main players following divergent goals. 
3.5 Principal-agent perspective 
Principal-agent perspective was an appropriate approach, because practitioners (agents) 
were contracted by the principal (the MOH) to deliver some service (health services 
package) for the purpose of greater quality. In line with achievements of contracting 
services in high-income settings, particularly evidence from UK, the experience of FM in 
Iran endorsed the importance of evidence-based primary care as well as long-term mutual 
contracting on actors' motivation and quality of care that they deliver. However, contrary to 
the principles of the principal-agent perspective, the nature of contracts and the 
relationship between the MOH (principal) and practitioners (agent) was practically 
employer-employee in this implementation. In other words, as a result of principal's control 
of implementation, contracts which were designed to motivate staff acted as a powerful 
disincentive. In addition, principal-agent perspective proved useful to explain actors' lack of 
courage in implementing FM, because of big diversions from recommended and standard 
specifications of contracting. The same also applies to the auditing system. Diversions 
from the original perspective that were identified in implementing FM might indicate the 
importance of preparing society to adopt and tailor imported policies. Lack of 
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decentralization and the unique macro political system of Iran, hindered the relationship 
between principal and agent during implementation. 
In addition, using principles of the purchaser-provider split uncovered how important it is to 
remove cultural barriers prior to division of labour in an autocratic regime, as well as 
considering the organizational past. The model which was defined to provide a platform for 
improving practice and delivering better services in high-income countries, became a 
platform to explain failures of implementing FM in Iran because of cultural and 
organizational barriers, plus individualism as a result of which inter-organizational 
cooperation was hard to achieve. 
4 Contributions to the theoretical literature 
Theoretical frameworks including the one in this thesis are useful to identify elements and 
relationships among elements that need to be considered for theory generation 
(Ostrom, 2007). They do not, of themselves, explain or predict behaviour and outcomes 
(Schlager, 2007). Some minor contributions to the theoretical literature emerge from this 
thesis. 
First, the thesis has suggested a new perspective of inter-relationships that exist in 
implementation of policy, what I have called a dynamic model of health policy analysis 
(Chapter 5). The model emphasizes the complex reality of implementation. It points to the 
dynamic interrelation and interdependence of policies and their environments. 
Second, taking actors' hierarchy into consideration when analysing policy implementation, 
tends to challenge Walt and Gilson health policy triangle (1994). They developed a policy 
analysis framework specifically for health, although its relevance extends beyond this 
sector. Their framework has influenced health policy research in a diverse array of 
countries, and has been used to analyse a large number of health issues (Gilson & 
Raphaely, 2007). They noted that health policy research focused largely on the content of 
policy, neglecting actors, context and processes. Their policy triangle framework is 
grounded in a political economy perspective, and considers how all four of these elements 
interact to shape policy-making. In contrast to the dynamic model, proposed in this thesis, 
Walt & Gilson model adopts a linear and more sequential and mechanical order. In 
addition, no clear distinction is mentioned between two sets of actors in their model, the 
crucial notion which was identified as a major barrier to implementing FM in Iran. 
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Third, the thesis developed categories of facilitators of and obstacles to implementation of 
reform in the health sector (Chapter 3). The list not only contributed to the data analysis in 
this study but also might be used in other studies which seek similar objectives. Besides, 
the thesis added six factors to the list of obstacles: unrealistic policy; concurrent 
implementation with a contrasting policy; lack of local understanding; unclear health 
governance; inter-sectoral hostility; and undermining meritocracy. 
Fourth, the thesis successfully used the modified four-fold framework (originally introduced 
by Harrison, 2004) for the first time in the context of a middle income country. It expanded 
the framework by incorporating more theoretical approaches including network theories as 
well as principal-agent perspectives. The expansion of the original framework contributed 
to portraying a more comprehensive picture of implementation, without which some crucial 
aspects such as political structure and decentralization might have been overlooked. A few 
minor theoretical contributions to some components of the framework emerged: 
First, employing some aspects of the ACF was a heuristic approach in an 
opposite setting to the context where the ACF was derived (USA). It 
expanded applicability of the theory to the health sector and its capability to 
explain the implementation of change in the centralized setting of Iran. The 
Iranian experience indicates the applicability of the ACF to explain stability 
better than change. Contrary to what the ACF predicts, the findings suggest 
that short-term and mainly political interests of actors can be important in 
explaining major policy change. Politicians may sell out core beliefs in order 
to escape temporary strategic problems and to safeguard short-term 
political interests. 
Second, there is a debate among policy experts as to whether the concept 
of networks is merely descriptive, or whether it has explanatory value, 
whether it is largely a Western concept, developed by looking at policy- 
making in the US and UK, and whether it has legitimacy for developing 
countries (Thatcher, 1998). For some the network approach is not really a 
new analytical perspective, but signals rather a change in the policy 
environment and the political system. There are only a few empirical studies 
in health in developing countries which use network analysis as a lens 
(Tantivess & Walt, 2008; Schneider, 2006). Despite partial existence of its 
components, network notions were applicable in the context of Iran. It 
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revealed harms to implementation of FM as a result of imbalance between 
the two groups of networks, which is novel in such a context. 
Third, looking for coalitions to explain groups of effective individuals to 
advocate the dominant policy, the context of Iran proved to accommodate 
policy subsystems, or more accurately prominent policy subsystem within 
the boundary of a more pushing frontline organization. This might reflect 
lack of established structures such as NGOs as well as weak cooperation 
and teamwork, plus opaque policies and governance because of which 
coalitions fail to form. Therefore, the thesis suggests limited policy 
subsystems in this context, which seemed to be fitted to requirements of the 
ACF in explaining change. 
Fifth, only a few health policy analyses on low and middle income countries have explicitly 
discussed research design (Walt et al, 2008). The thesis would have benefited the field 
because of more reflection on the range of approaches that could be used, plus their 
relative benefits. More clearly, it was for the first time in Iran that stakeholders from all 
engaged levels were included in investigating implementation of change. Almost all 
studies, not only in Iran but also in most developing countries draw attention to national 
level stakeholders and mainly address their accounts. Moreover, there are not many 
studies in such settings and none in Iran, in which a fair collection of qualitative methods 
have been used. This thesis might have contributed to promoting qualitative research in 
addressing complex health initiatives in Iran and beyond. 
5 Rigour of the study 
Remaining receptive to different theoretical approaches enabled me to map out the social 
and historical context of how policy unfolded over time in order to understand its 
implementation. However, longer-term analysis is necessary to reconstruct the 
implementation trajectory. There are several criteria to judge the quality of qualitative 
research, either from a constructivist perspective or within a positivist paradigm (Spencer 
et al, 2003). Although Lincoln and Guba (1985) reject scientific criteria that appraise 
validity, generalisability, reliability, and objectivity for qualitative studies, proposing instead 
a set of naturalistic criteria defined as credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
conformability for interpretive research, I use some scientific criteria to address the rigour 
of this study. All approaches share basic principles: reducing the biases and accounting for 
the predispositions of researchers as well as data sources (Morse et al, 2002; Patton, 2002). 
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5.1 Limitations 
Policy evaluation requires a longer timeframe than political exigencies often allow. 
Sabatier (2007) suggests that 'a decade or more' is the minimum duration of most policy 
cycles, from emergence of the problem through sufficient experience with implementation 
to render a 'reasonably fair evaluation' of impact. A long span of study of the policy 
process may well be needed to identify unintended and unexpected consequences of 
policy. Longer-term analysis or'backward working' from a trigger statistic or social 
phenomenon may be necessary to reconstruct a policy implementation pathway. Given the 
timescale of this thesis, embedding such an aspect is contested. 
Most data in this thesis were obtained using semi-structured interviews, which despite 
several advantages have some limitations. All I had access to was what people said. 
Although I employed several methods to enhance validity and credibility of the data, there 
is no definite way to understand why people say something. I tried to contextually analyze 
the data, however I cannot be certain of respondents' underlying rationalizations, whether 
it was to impress me, show off, and promote a particular view or undermine their rivals. 
This was why I used other sources of data to enhance the validity of findings. Although I 
adopted multiple methods to enhance rigour, I could not simply combine data in order to 
arrive at an overall truth (Silverman, 1998; Armstrong et al, 1997). I adopted an interpretive 
approach in data analysis based on selected theories, rather than a positivist approach. 
Further, the fact that different analysts relying on different models produce different 
explanations suggests the need for introspection (Allison, 1969). I acknowledge that the 
data might be differently interpreted by using other frameworks for analysis. In addition, 
the research on the public's view on implementation was limited for practical reasons (see 
Chapter 5 for more details). Views were limited to those of public representatives. 
I chose simplicity, rather than an illusory search for the full picture. Although the four-fold 
framework was useful for unfolding implementation, the choice of particular theories 
implies an inherent bias. The thesis points to areas with potential for further exploration to 
identify more precisely the causal mechanisms driving policy change in Iran (John, 2003). 
Finally, although I revised, abandoned or addressed the limitations of my selected 
theories, I cannot claim I have been completely objective in this study. 
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5.2 Validity & reliability 
I adopted Mays and Pope's (1999) suggestion of triangulation to enhance the validity and 
reliability of findings. Triangulation is the most frequently cited technique for counteracting 
threats to the plausibility of natural field research (Burgess, 1984; Delamont, 1992; 
Denzin, 1970). However, it is controversial as a genuine test of validity. Rather it is a 
means of ensuring the comprehensiveness of a set of findings. Denzin (1970) identifies 
triangulation of data, methodology, theory, and researcher. The first three were applied in 
this study. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) explain that data triangulation 'involves the 
comparison of data relating to the same phenomenon but deriving from different phases of 
the fieldwork, accounts of different participants, and different points in the temporal cycles 
occurring in the setting (p. 197). Silverman (1993) argues that this use of triangulation is 
contested because data from different sources can only be used to identify the context 
specific nature of differing accounts and behaviour. He points out that discrepancies 
between different data sources (such as from doctors and their patients) present a 
problem of adjudication between rival accounts. These methods of triangulation will 
enhance in-depth understanding of findings but the extent to which the validity increases 
remains doubtful (Denzin, 1989). Thus, triangulation is seen as a way of making a study 
more comprehensive or of encouraging a more reflexive analysis of the data than as a 
pure test of validity (Pope et al, 2000). 
The thesis involved data collection over time, in different places, and from people at 
different levels including high and middle-ranking national policy makers, provincial 
officials, local practitioners and public representatives. I also divided the field study into 
two phases that opened avenues for comparison and focus in the second phase. By 
triangulating data, I was able to compare and contrast between phenomena from diverse 
sources. I also employed different methods for collecting the data, which increased its 
credibility. It is recommended that multiple methods are followed to test a situation or 
phenomena, to balance the flaws of one method with the strengths of another. Indeed, 
combining methods brought the best of each, which helped to overcome their unique 
deficiencies (Denzin, 1970). 
Another suggestion to enhance rigour is to have a priori hypotheses. However, well- 
defined hypotheses might suggest that other methods could have been more appropriate. 
A few research questions were shaped and refined during the research, while the design 
was adapted as the study proceeded. A second remedy is designing explicit analytical 
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constructs (equal to codes) prior to analysis (Milles & Huberman, 1994). Again these 
restrictive approaches might cause the researcher to overlook important emerging themes 
from the data. Therefore, in addition to the framework approach, an inductive approach 
was also developed for the analysis. 
I embedded some verification mechanisms to systematically and constantly monitor the fit 
of data to the analytical framework by reading, rereading, and constant consultation with 
main data extracts (Morse et al, 2002). Frequent changes to the theme table and 
categories of themes and sub-themes were made to modify analysis and improve 
credibility of the findings. 
Some suggest using more than one analyst to improve consistency or reliability and 
minimize the researcher's bias (Perry, 1994; Daly et al, 1992; Waitzkin, 1991). This was not 
possible in this study. To enhance the reliability, I took the samples purposefully, recorded 
the interviews, had them accurately transcribed, wrote up field notes as soon as possible, 
systematically coded the data, asked some more experienced qualitative researchers to 
verify my coding in some data sections, and was transparent in data analysis (Kirk & 
Miller, 1985). 
A long-established method for reducing error in qualitative studies is to search for and 
discuss elements in the data that contradict, or appear to contradict the emerging 
explanation of the phenomena under study. In order to increase sophistication and 
credibility, I considered deviant cases and attempted to explain the majority of the cases 
under scrutiny. 
I also held two sessions with a few national level respondents and a session with 
provincial respondents, in which I asked them to validate their accounts and clarify some 
complicated points (Silverman, 1998). This helped me to check my interpretation of the 
data and compare my account with theirs. It improved the level of agreement between us 
and reduced investigator's errors. In addition, the meetings generated further original data 
which resulted in changes in the thematic analysis. 
5.3 Generalisability 
The issue of generalising from qualitative research has been much discussed (Mitchel, 
1983; Schofield, 1993; Hammersley, 2000; Seale, 1 999; Williams, 2000). One of my main 
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objectives was understanding the processes of policy. Given the lack of understanding in 
this area in general, findings might not be generalizable per se, but still are helpful for 
other settings and scenarios. Besides, this research was concerned with depth and 
contextual understanding of a specific policy in Iran. Therefore, generalisabilty was not an 
appropriate aim. Instead of statistical, it tends to address conceptual generalisability. In 
research such as this where the 'total population' was impossible to ascertain, it is 
acceptable that samples do not statistically represent a population (Schofield, 1993). 
Generalisation beyond the sample can be made based on "the essential linkage between 
two or more characteristics in terms of some systematic explanatory schema" (Murphy et 
al, 1998). I took into account the wider social, historical and contextual factors in 
interpreting the findings. Nevertheless, generalizing the findings beyond its setting relies 
upon future empirical justification (Seale, 1999). 
6 Policy implications and future research 
This thesis provides an opportunity to consider the challenges that lie ahead and identify 
ways in Iran to narrow the identified gaps between aspiration and implementation. 
Concurrent implementation of FM with Behbar was an attempt to provide a universal 
coverage and people-centred services. However, a lot must be done in Iran as regards 
public policy and leadership, without which sustained improvement is hard to obtain. 
This thesis has provided some evidence of how to improve policy implementation. 
Recommendations are based on the reality of the Iranian context and the findings of the 
thesis. They follow the notion of the dynamic model of health policy analysis (Figure 5.1) 
and will be addressed in conjunction with areas in need of further investigation. 
6.1 Aspects of the policy (content) 
(A). Autocratic policy making impeded implementation of FM. It is too late to reverse this 
process, however the continuation of such an approach still causes harm by making 
influential stakeholders reluctant or even opponents of the policy. Disproportionate reliance 
on command and control could be replaced by the inclusive, participatory, negotiation- 
based leadership indicated by the complexity of the contemporary health system. Listening 
to the public is at the core of this task. Achieving it requires trade-offs that might start by 
taking into account citizens' "expectations about health and healthcare" and ensuring 'that 
[their] voice and choice decisively influence the way in which health services are designed 
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and operate" (WHO, 2008). A careful and comprehensive stakeholder analysis that 
identifies losers and winners of the policy will help. Such an analysis needs to be carried 
out by independent academics. 
(B). Population health can be improved through policies that are controlled by sectors 
other than health (WHO, 2008). As was overwhelmingly requested, representatives of 
different stakeholders must be involved in revising FM. In order to bring about such 
reforms in the complex environment of the health sector, it will be necessary to reinvest in 
public leadership in a way that pursues collaborative models of policy dialogue with 
multiple stakeholders - because this is what people expect, and because this is what 
works best. This requires trade-offs and negotiation with multiple stakeholders that implies 
a departure from the linear, top-down models of the past towards becoming learning 
organizations. Policies like FM today are not primarily defined by the component elements 
they address but by the social dynamics that define the role of health systems in society. 
The GPA, the IMA, the MPO, mayoral and city delegates, media and journalists, 
representatives of different practitioners at various levels, ministries other than the MOH 
and MWSS such as internal affairs, labour, cooperation, and transport, must be engaged. 
This might not happen unless health is declared at the highest political levels, as a task 
beyond the boundaries of the MOH. Parliament must see it as a national challenge which 
needs collaboration among social, economic, cultural, political, and health sectors. 
In addition, it must be investigated whether privatization and decentralization would reduce 
or increase bureaucratic barriers to implementation of FM. Given the diversity of Iranian 
society and big intra and inter-provincial differences; prominent partialism; ethnic 
preference; the fragile NGOs and CSOs; and the prolonged shadow of autocracy in the 
country, further research is required to address decentralization, the sequence of activities 
to do so, the categories of services to be privatized and the appropriate methods to 
evaluate such a process. More importantly, the country needs to improve health 
information systems to acquire critical data for decentralized decision-making 
(Tavassoli, 2008). 
6.2 Policy environment (context) 
(A). Lack of clear governance of health is a major challenge for the MOH and the other 
institutions, governmental and non-governmental, that provide health leadership. The 
system needs to adapt and tailor a selected form governance for health system in Iran. 
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Given poor collaboration in the country, as well as the degree to which the revolutionary 
and ideological approach undermines meritocracy, conducting such a task might be 
difficult. 
(B). Existing PHC networks are the only available host in rural areas to accommodate the 
current pattern of implementation of FM. The MOH could pay more to the private doctors 
in those areas to provide services, instead of expanding the governmental provision. 
Because most private doctors have several years of experience, this is also consistent 
with the abandoned article of the policy to pay incentive for every single year of 
experience. This promotes the policy and makes the private practitioners loyal to the 
principles of FM, which is good in the long-run for the entire health system. In addition, a 
comparison between the few private doctors who practice as FD in Golestan and the 
majority of public doctors might provide more sufficient evidence for this. 
The MOH's direction is towards expansion rather than contracting services with the private 
sector. Experienced and established local doctors who are highly trusted by the public, 
must be employed even if at a higher cost. Further research is needed to investigate how 
the system could maintain private practitioners in deprived areas, and how the private 
sector could be approached to invest in preventive primary care. 
(C). Financial aspects of the health system must be defined and formulated in general, and 
particularly for FM. Unsustainable funding has already created serious doubts regarding 
the stability and future of implementation. The insurance system must be substantially 
revised. The MWSS should be granted the full authority to integrate numerous insurance 
schemes and create a national insurance database. To do so, the political barriers and 
efforts for maintaining parallel insurance schemes must be removed. This is not likely 
unless all citizens are assured that minimal basic services at certain cost is provided for 
them in all parts of the country, enjoying the integrated national insurance system. 
Given the diverse financial sources and the nature of insurance organizations, a possible 
way that fulfils practical integration in a short time period would be to grant the MWSS the 
authority to unify the insurance policy making, and virtually integrate the financial pooling 
for health. Otherwise, the current nature of Behbar, which is insurance in name but support 
in reality, becomes the Achilles' heel of implementation. There are several ways to 
integrate the pooling and secure the finance such as pay rolls and social insurance. Given 
the different payment mechanisms involved, high degree of politics to allocate the budget, 
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and lack of trust that is embedded across different actors and organizations, fulfilling such 
methods in the short-term looks like a luxury that can hardly be afforded. More research is 
needed to evaluate the possibility of such insurance reform, which remains a major policy 
issue in Iran. 
(D). FM is not yet a priority in Iran. It is not considered a cornerstone for development, 
despite the overwhelming verbal support. Yet, treatment and highly specialized care is 
supported a lot. For long, a small group of influential people with substantial interest and 
benefit in the private sector, most of them medical specialists, has been simultaneously 
making decisions for the public sector. They also control the media which is run by the 
government. Further, professional trade unions including the IMA have a low-profile in 
decision making. Advocates of FM must be established to promote it as a grass root 
requirement not a vague goal to decorate the shop window. 
6.3 Management of implementation (process) 
(A). Despite some serious criticisms, this thesis does not provide sufficient evidence to 
advise whether the purchaser-provider split is helpful or not for implementation of FM. 
Besides, unless a clear and integrated funding mechanism is defined, there is no 
alternative way of financing implementation. The fundamental question is that should FM 
continue to be sacrificed for Behbar at the price of enjoying the financial opportunity? Or 
alternatively, and for the sake of FM, Behbar could be limited to covering deprived areas 
and improve access to health services for the poor. This could allow FM to remain as a 
prosperous and tested way to remedy the muddled health system in Iran. This would 
maintain the public hope of implementing FM. Further research is needed to determine the 
necessary requirements to do this. However, given the adverse effects of the current 
implementation on both public and practitioners, as well as the high faith in the concept of 
FM as the only prescription for reengineering the whole health system in Iran, making such 
a distinction seems to be essential. 
(B). It is essential that people who designed the policy and started to put it into practice, be 
officially invited to re-join the reform. The MOH in particular and other organizations must 
put their political differences aside and enjoy all potentials. A think tank needs to be 
established within the MOH consisting of policy makers; practitioners including doctors, 
nurses, midwives, etc as well as their professional associations like IMA and GMC; 
journalists and academics. The MOH needs more scientists to evaluate the system and 
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contribute to the reform. Lack of expertise is an apparent deficiency. To enjoy a less 
biased approach to the reform and in order to obtain a clear picture of implementation, it is 
worth that an independent evaluator investigates the implementation for the implementers, 
legislators, and the entire government. Such reports might open the eyes of insiders and 
persuade them to correct the wrong activities with more courage and less suspicion in the 
authenticity of reports. 
(C). Lack of sufficient explanation for the public and for practitioners has harmed 
implementation of FM. A short-term solution would be that parliament allocates a certain 
percentage of the annual budget for education. Further, parliament must ask third party 
researchers to audit the implementers' performance in training, and apply its results in the 
next year's budget allocation. A committee for education and training could be established 
by both MOH & MIO, consisting of professionals whose task is to decide on information for 
the public and practitioners. This committee should act as a steering group in a full-time 
capacity. Materials, methods of training and the approach need further investigation. The 
mid-term remedy is to reform medical education in Iran to joint it more with community 
practice. This can bring some evidence about the necessities of training medical students, 
who are capable to practice in the community and are armed with essential managerial 
and social skills. 
(D). Training administrative staff, practitioners and the public will improve implementation 
of FM. Although such an opportunity was missed, the mass media, particularly the national 
TV (IRIB) could be used to inform the public. Instead of broadcasting specialist-oriented 
programmes on TV, the direction must focus on public health challenges. This will be 
extremely difficult, given powerful opponents and their influence. If the public understand 
how important FM is in taking care of their long-term health, they may demand the policy 
themselves. This stage would be the real momentum of converting FM from a supply 
notion to a demand, which would secure its future. 
(E). The tariff system and auditing mechanisms should be revised and improved. Unless a 
method which relies on people contributing towards their health costs is introduced, the 
current low level of fees will neither improve equity nor enhance quality. Instead it 
encourages practitioners to quit the programme. Effective auditing needs contracting out to 
professional third parties to conduct, while they train the MOH's personnel to gradually 
take over the job. This approach tackles the conflict of interest in the current auditing 
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process. Because a third party auditor would avoid a ceremonial approach, it might also 
encourage practitioners to improve record keeping. 
7 Epilogue 
Successful implementation of FM requires inclusive leadership that engages with a variety 
of stakeholders beyond the boundaries of the public sector, from clinicians to lay people, 
and from politicians to academics. The former minister of health who initiated FM along 
with another former influential minister of health, both of whom are currently members of 
parliament, can create a strong coalition of pro-FM MPs to advocate the policy and lead 
reform. They can invite the media to run a widespread campaign for radical change in the 
health system including: financial integration, increasing the proportion of GDP per capita 
spent on health, promote decentralization, and encourage prevention. The coalition can 
integrate the evidence and unify stakeholders to change the status quo for the public good. 
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APPENDIX/. List of interviewees and focus group participants at 
three levels (Including the feasibility study) 
National Provincial 
Golestan (G) 
Local 
1- A former senior post 1- A senior manager at the 1- Head of A health district 
holder in the MoH Golestan university (Northeast of Capital of the 
province), A GP and two of 
his GP colleagues 
2- A current senior official in 2- An official in the GMIO 2- 1 FDs, 2 behvarzes, 1 
the MOH nurse, 1 midwife, 1 dentist, 
and 1 family planning 
expert. in G rural health 
centre (60 KM from Capital 
of the province). 
3- A member of 7 3- A senior manager at 3- Focus group with 2 
parliament GMU imams, one teacher, 2 
councilor, 1 manager of 
local village bank, and 2 
behvarzes as public 
representatives in the 
village of G. Teacher was 
invited for individual 
interview. 
4- A former senior official in 4- A senior manager at 4- Head of B health district 
the MWSS GMU (Northwest of Capital of the 
province), a GP. His deputy 
was an environmental 
health expert who was also 
a member of Village Islamic 
Council. All were 
interviewed. 
5- A senior policy maker in 5- A representative from 5- 3 FDs, 1 behvarze, 1 
the MWSS GMA nurse, 2 midwives, 1 
dentist, 1 expert in family 
planning, and 1 expert in 
communicable diseases, 
and one doctor from private 
sector in H health centre 
(70 KM from Capital of the 
province). 
6- A post holder in GPA 6- A very top official in 6-, 1 imam and I councilor 
Golestan province in the city of H were 
individually interviewed. 
7- A senior policy maker in 7- A technical officer in 7- Head of C health district 
NUHSR GMU (East of Capital of the 
province), a GP 8- A senior official in the 8- A senior official in 8- 2 FDs, 1 nurse, 1 nurse MPO Golestan Province assistant, 1 midwife, 1 
behvarz, an occupational 
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health expert, and a 
pharmacy assistant in C 
health centre. 
9- A former senior health 9- An MP from Golestan 9- An imam and a member 
official province of parliament were 
individually interviewed. 
10- A former senior official 10- Head of D health district 
in the MIO (East of Capital of the 
province), GP 
11- A current senior 11- 2 FDs, 1 nurse, 1 
manager in the MOH midwife, I expert in family 
planning, 1 expert in non 
communicable diseases, 
and 1 behvarz from I rural 
health centre (65 KM from 
Capital of the province) . 
12- A current top official in 12- A focus group was held 
the MOH participating by 1 imam, 2 
behvarzes, head of police, 
1 councilor, I teacher, 
governor of the city, and 2 
trustworthy elderly, in the 
village of I. Teacher and 
governor were also 
individually interviewed. 
13- A senior policy maker in 13- Head of E health district the MWSS (Southeast of Capital of the 
province), GP. His deputy 
in communicable disease 
was a GP. 
Head of informatics in the 
district was an experienced 
environmental health 
expert. 
14- A former senior post 14- 3 FDs, 1 midwife, 1 holder in the MOH nurse, 1 expert in 
environmental health, 1 
expert in family planning, 
and one doctor from private 
sector in J health centre 
(120 KM from Capital of the 
province) . 15- A senior manager in the 15- A focus group with: the MIO imam, 3 councilors, head 
teacher, 3 elderly trust 
worthies, 1 behvarz, 1 
health centre receptionist, 
head of police in the village, 
and I police man was held 
in the village of J. Imam 
and one councilor were 
individually interviewed. 
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16- A former senior official 16- Head of F health district 
in the MIO (Northeast of Capital of the 
province) a GP. His deputy 
was a GP. 
17- A former senior 17- 3 FDs, 1 nurse, 1 
member of the NUHSR midwife, 1 expert in 
radiography, 1 assistant 
pharmacist, 1 
environmental health 
expert, and two doctors 
from private sector in K 
health centre (160 KM from 
Capital of the province). 
18- An international health 18- 1 councillor and 
official in Iran governor general of the city 
of K were individually 
interviewed. 
19- An international health 
official in Iran 
20- A former senior official 
in the MOH (During 
feasibility study) 
21- A current manager in the MOH (During feasibility study), advocate of FM 
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APPENDIX II. Interview guides for three levels 
1- National level 
"Implementing Family medicine in Iran: Identification of Facilitators & 
Obstacles" 
Amirhossein Takian 
Interview guide to be used at national level 
Date & venue: 
Name & position of interviewee: 
General questions and materials that must be covered during interviews with officials at 
national level, which are subject to change; delete; expansion and refine according to the 
position and compliance of individuals (will be employed reflexively). Selected theories of 
implementation, results of reviewing empirical articles on facilitators of and obstacles to the 
implementation in health care and insights from exploratory visits to Iran have been largely 
considered to define these guide questions. 
1- First of all, please explain your broad perception of family medicine (FM) in Iran. 
2- To what extent do you think the current PHC (primary health care) organization in 
which FM is being implemented, has the capacity for proper implementation of FM? 
What aspects need change/improvement, etc? 
3- What is your opinion concerning the policy of FM itself? Please discuss and explain 
your understanding with evidence. 
4- Regarding the policy, to what extent do you think it is easily interpreted and clear in 
content? 
5- To what extent do you think that FM has been accepted/rejected by providers and 
stakeholders (not public)? Please discuss with evidence. 
6- How well has the policy been explained to you? 
7- So far, have you received any feedback from other policy makers and stakeholders 
either from centre or periphery regarding the implementation of FM? Please 
discuss. 
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8- What is your perception from the role of insurance bodies in this implementation? 
9- If you had an absolute power to make the policy and conduct the change, what did 
you do to maximize the insurance companies' efficiency in implementing FM? 
10-As far as you are aware, how FM is interpreted by different layers at centre and 
periphery? 
11- How do you interpret the political context and its role in the implementation? Please 
give reasons and evidence and discuss. 
12-As a national official and well-informant person, do you think that the 
implementation of FM has been properly and adequately armed with adequate 
logistics preparation (financial, human resources, and equipments)? 
13- Do you have any evidence that shows how far the policy of FM and its current 
process of implementation have been accepted by people? Please address the 
aspects that needs change (either in the policy or implementation) and give your 
reasons and substitutes. 
14- What is your opinion about merging FM into Behbar (rural insurance for all)? 
Please discuss in details. 
15- At the end of interview, is there any specific issue you would like to discuss further, 
add to your saying, or any particular factor which you think influence the 
implementation (facilitates or obstructs) and we did not discuss in our interview? 
Please fell free to talk about it while summarizing. 
With special thanks for your time and invaluable contribution 
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2- Provincial officials and service providers at local level 
"Implementing Family medicine in Iran: Identification of Facilitators & 
Obstacles" 
Amirhossein Takian 
Interview guide to be used at provincial and local levels 
Date & venue: 
Name & position of interviewee: 
General questions and materials that must be covered during interviews with officials and 
providers at local level. They are subject to change; delete; expansion and refine 
according to the position and compliance of individuals (will be employed reflexively). 
Selected theories of implementation, results of reviewing empirical articles on facilitators of 
and obstacles to the implementation in health care and insights from exploratory visits to 
Iran have been largely considered to define these guide questions. 
1- First of all, please explain your broad perception of family medicine (FM) in Iran with 
focus on your province (for providers with more focus on their relevant health centres 
and target population). 
2- To what extent do you think the current PHC (primary health care) organization in 
which FM is being implemented, has the capacity for proper implementation of FM? If 
it is flawed, what aspects need change/improvement, etc? 
3- What is your opinion concerning the policy of FM itself? Please discuss and explain 
your understanding with evidence. 
4- Regarding the policy, to what extent do you think it is easily interpreted and clear in 
content? Please discuss according to evidence and your actual experience of the 
implementation so far. 
5- How well has the policy been explained to you? 
6- Please discuss how communication has affected the process of implementation (in 
your province or your centre according to position of the respondent) of FM from your 
point of view. Please particularly stress the role of mass media and local media in 
your discussion. 
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7- So far, have you received any feedback from other policy makers and stakeholders 
either from centre or within Golestan regarding the implementation of FM? 
8- How do you deal with those feedbacks? 
9- How do you conceive the implementation of FM as a policy? Please stress your 
understanding of the reality of the process of policy making regarding FM. 
10- What is your perception from the role of insurance bodies in this implementation? 
11- If you had an absolute power to make the policy and conduct the change, what did 
you do to maximize the insurance companies' efficiency in implementing FM, in 
Golestan and universally? 
12- For local officials: As far as you are aware, how FM is interpreted by different layers 
at centre and periphery? To what extent it has been accepted/rejected by relevant 
people (policy maker, providers, public) in Golestan? Please discuss. 
13- How do you interpret the political context and its role in the implementation? Please 
give reasons and evidence and discuss. 
14- To what extent do you think that your province or your health centre has been 
properly and adequately armed with adequate logistics preparation (financial, human 
resources, and equipments) for implementing FM so far? 
15- Do you have any evidence that shows how far the policy of FM and its current 
process of implementation have been accepted by the public? Please address the 
aspects must change (either in policy or implementation) and give your reasons and 
substitutes. 
16- What is your opinion about FM into Behbar (rural insurance for all)? Please discuss 
in details. 
17- At the end of interview, is there any specific issue you would like to discuss further, 
add to your saying, or any particular factor which you think influence the 
implementation (facilitates or obstructs) and we did not discuss in our interview? 
Please fell free to talk about it while summarizing your talk. 
With special thanks for your time and Invaluable contribution 
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3- Public Representatives 
"Implementing Family medicine in Iran: Identification of Facilitators & 
Obstacles" 
Amirhossein Takian 
Interview guide to be used at local level for public's representatives 
Date & venue: 
Name & position of interviewee: 
General questions and materials that must be covered during interviews with 
representatives of public at local level. They are subject to change; delete; expansion and 
refine according to the position and compliance of individuals as well as results of 
interviews at national level and other findings from local level (will be employed 
reflexively). Selected theories of implementation, results of reviewing empirical articles on 
facilitators of and obstacles to the implementation in health care and insights from 
exploratory visits to Iran have been largely considered to define these guide questions. 
1- First of all, please explain your broad perception of family medicine (FM) in Iran 
with more focus on what you have observed in your area. Simply, what does FM 
mean to you? 
2- As user of services, to what extent do you think the current PHC (primary health 
care) organization in which FM is being implemented, has the capacity for proper 
implementation of FM? What aspects need change/improvement, etc? Please give 
reasons, evidence and discuss. 
3- How well has the policy been explained to you? 
N. B. Ask more questions to understand the role of that informing procedure on 
his/her perception of implementation. 
4- What is your general opinion concerning FM itself? 
5- Do you use services under auspicious of FM (Behbar) in your village? Are there 
differences between those and the ones were delivering through the PHC? 
6- In each case, please give reasons and discuss. Are you aware of other centres? 
Can you compare those with your centre? 
7- How is the behaviour of staff that are in charge of delivering care with them? 
Please indicate your evidence and discuss impacts of those factors in details. 
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8- In case of need to health care, where is the first point you refer to seek care in your 
area? If says health centre, go deeper and ask why? If says somewhere else, ask 
precisely why he/she does not go to the health centre, trying to understand his/her 
objections for finding facilitators and obstacles. 
9- What services do you preferably use from health centre and why? 
10- Have you ever given any feedbacks regarding implementation of FM to providers 
and officials? If yes, how did you do that? 
11-Was it responded or employed? What was the result? 
12- Since it was started, have you seen any changes in FM and the way that is being 
implemented in your area? 
13- What is your perception from the role of insurance bodies in this implementation? 
14- If you had an absolute power to make the policy and conduct the change, what did 
you do to maximize the insurance companies' efficiency in implementing FM? 
15- Have you or your relatives been referred to a higher level for seeking care by a 
family doctor? How did you find that referral and your acceptance? 
16- As far as you are aware, how FM is interpreted by other people in your area? To 
what extent it has been accepted/rejected by them? 
17- How do you interpret the political context and its role in the implementation? Please 
give reasons and evidence and discuss. 
18-To what extent do you think that your health centre has been properly and 
adequately armed (financial, human resources, and equipments) for implementing 
FM so far? 
19-At the end of interview, is there any specific issue you would like to discuss further, 
add to your saying, or any particular factor which you think influence the 
implementation (facilitates or obstructs) and we did not discuss in our interview? 
Please fell free to talk about it while summarizing your talk. 
With special thanks for your time and invaluable contribution 
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APPENDIX Ill. Summary of emerged themes & sub-themes 
FMFO study: List of final themes & sub-themes 
I. Aspect of the policy (content) 
1.1 Aspects that promoted its acceptance: 
" Focus on health; 
" Improved efficiency; 
" Improved quality of care; 
" Increased confidence in doctors; 
" Purchaser-provider split; 
" Expanded provision of services; 
" Expanded entitlement; 
" Better employment opportunities; 
" Increased pay for practitioners; 
" New payment framework; 
" International root of the policy. 
1.2 Aspects that criticized the policy: 
" Top-down approach; 
" Lack of sustainability in funds; 
" Ambiguity; 
" Too much flexibility; 
" Lack of local customization; 
" Impracticalities; 
" Unreliable expectation. 
II. The existing environment (context) 
11.1 The existing PHC (Primary Health Care) network 
" Position of the PHC for the public 
Accessibility 
" Efficient hierarchy 
" The only possible host 
11.2 The insurance system 
11.3 Organizational capacity of the health system 
" Capability of the implementers 
" Conflict of interests of policy-makers 
" Financial governance of health 
" Poor collaboration 
11.4 Individuals' knowledge & insight 
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FMFO study: List of final themes & sub-themes 
11.5 Legal ground for implementation 
11.6 Political environment 
" General pattern of health governance 
" Ambiguous policy-making process 
" Support for the policy 
11.7 Rural setting specifications 
11.8 Availability of resources 
" Physical facilities 
" Equipping health centres 
" Funding 
" Personnel 
" Clinical guidelines 
III. Experience of implementation (process & management) 
111.1 Administration 
" Public registration 
Provision of services 
" Bureaucratic payment system 
" High turnover of doctors 
" Medical recording system 
" Diversion of funds 
111.2 Cooperation 
" Lack of a common language 
" Inconsistent interpretation of goals 
" Lack of coordination 
" Lack of trust 
" Lack of advocacy 
" Lack of coalitions 
111.3 Political management of implementation 
" Politicisation of the reform 
" Governmental support 
Lack of decentralization 
" Rushed implementation 
111.4 Communication 
" Lack of feed back from the periphery 
" Communication among individuals 
The mass media 
111.5 Explanation of the reform to staff & public 
" Explanation of FM to practitioners 
" Training the public 
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FMFO study: List of final themes & sub-themes 
111.5 Auditing performance 
" The appropriateness of tools & methods 
" Poor quality of audit staff 
" Applying audit results 
IV. Impact of the policy on local practitioners and the public (impact on actors) 
IV. 1 Impact on public practitioners 
" Lack of incentives 
" Lack of job security 
" Lack of respect 
" Lack of pay 
" Poor working condition 
" Poor contracts 
" Ethnic tensions 
" Rationing 
IV. 2 Impact on the private practitioners 
IV. 3 Impact on public 
" Resistance to rationing 
" Preference for specialists 
" Demand for unnecessary prescriptions 
" Reduced user fees 
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APPENDIX IV. The information sheet 
Implementing Family Medicine in Iran: Identification of 
Facilitators & Obstacles 
Amirhossein Takian, MD, MHR 
Health Services Research Unit 
Department of Public Health and Policy 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
105 Bedford Sq, London, WC1 B 3DP 
Tel: 0044 (0) 2079272389 
Fax: 0044 (0) 2072994632 
amirhossein. takian(aýlshtm. ac. uk 
Implementing family medicine (referral system together with rural insurance programme in 
this study) is at the heart of the health reforms in our country. The easy part is to develop 
policies and plans but it is a lot harder to implement change. While progress in 
implementing change has progressed well in some places, in other places progress has 
not been as fast. This study aims to find out why this is so: what factors help promote 
change and what factors tend to hold-up or prevent the plans being implemented. 
To identify facilitators of and obstacles to implementation of family medicine in Iran, I am 
seeking the views of all those with an interest or involvement in family medicine: GPs, 
midwives, managers, policy makers, and other local people. Results of this study will help 
to improve future implementation. 
Six health centres in which family medicine is implemented (practiced) have been 
selected. Taking part in the study is entirely voluntary. The interview will last for about one 
hour. You will be asked general questions as well as your personal experience about the 
process of implementation. You will be free to withdraw at any time without giving any 
reason. 
Data collection will be carried out over a period of several months. Meetings will be held 
for staff of each health centre at the start of the study to provide further information and 
setting interviews. The data collected will be recorded mainly by the keeping of detailed 
field-notes and where possible interviews will be recorded with the consent of participants. 
All of the data collected will remain strictly confidential, listened to only by me, and written 
up so that it will not be possible to identify individuals. At the end of study all tapes will be 
destroyed. 
All the expenses for this study including travelling, accommodation, equipments such as 
laptop and voice recorder, will be paid by the researcher himself. There is no financial 
incentive or inducement to take part in the study. 
This work has been approved by Ethics Committee of University of Medical Science and 
health Services, Golestan Province, Iran and Ethics Committee of the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. It is hoped that the findings of the study will make a 
positive contribution to implementation of family medicine as well as series of reforms in 
the health system of our country. 
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Thank you for taking the time to read this. I look forward to meeting you soon and to 
hearing your comments. If in the mean time you have any questions about this project 
please do not hesitate to email me on: amirhossein. takian(a)lshtm. ac. uk 
With best wishes 
Yours sincerely 
Amirhossein Takian, MD 
PhD Student 
Appendix V. Final list of included literature in Chapter 2 
Books Articles 
Bardach, 1977 Bossert, 1998 
Barrett & Fudge, 1981 Buse, 2008 
Buse et al, 2005 Elmore, 1978; 1981 
Curry, 2000 Hill, 1997 
Dye, 2001 Hjern & Hull, 1982 
Fulop et al, 2001 John, 2003 
Go in et al, 1990 Lane, 1987 
Grindle & Thomas, 1991 Linder & Peters, 1989 
Harrison, 2004 Nohrstedt, 2005 
Hill & Hupe, 2002 O'Toole, 1986: 1995-, 2000; 2004 
Ho wood & Gunn, 1984 Pollitt, 1993 
Hood, 1976 Sabatier, 1986 
John, 2002 Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979 
Lipsky, 1980 Saetren, 2005 
March & Olsen, 1989 Schlager, 1995 
Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983 Schofield, 2004 
Mullins, 2002 Smith, 2002 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992 Tranfield & Starke , 1998 Rothstein, 1998 Tuohy, 2003 
Sabatier, 1999; 2007 Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993 Walker & Gilson, 2004 
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